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Judgment
Prafulla C. Pant, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 03-02-2003, passed in miscellaneous case No. 25 of 2002 by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)/Fast Track Court, Udham Singh Nagar, whereby application u/s 05 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was rejected by the trial court in entertaining the objections filed u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, against the award of the Arbitrator.
It appears that an award was given by the Arbitrator on 06-03-2002 and the revisionist filed his objections only on 24-10-2002 with application to condone the delay in filing the objections. Sub-section 3 to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides three months period for filing objections against the award. Proviso to said Sub-section permits further 30 days time to the objectors provided they show sufficient cause that they were prevented from making the objections against the award. The language of Sub-section 3 of Section 34 of aforesaid Act provides self-contained period of limitation for which Limitation Act is not required to be seen. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides as under:
Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
The aforesaid proviso has been interpreted by the Apex Court relating to the period allowed for filing the objections u/s 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company reported in 2001 AIR S.C.W. 3994. In para-7 of said judgment, the Apex Court has held that there is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a special law and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from that prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. After discussing the issue in para 12 and 13 in the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court held in para 14 that the time of limitation prescribed u/s 34 to challenge an award is absolute and un-extendable by court u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
In view of the aforesaid principle of law given by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that learned trial court has not erred in law in rejecting the application moved u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, by the revisionist, to get his objections entertained against the award. As such, since there is no illegality in the impugned order nor is there any jurisdictional error, the revision is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed.