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Judgment
In this appeal challenge is to the Judgment and Order dated 29.05.2013 made by the Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s
Compensation, Sub-Division-II, Hubli, in WCA/F.No.32/2011, whereby A compensation of Rs.3,12,940/- with 12% interest is awarded.
It is the case of the claimants that, one Mohammed Jafar Peerkhanavar was the husband of Claimant; he was working as a permanent Lineman in
the employ of Respondent No.2/Company; on 2.02.1999 he was repairing the line in between Jallapur and Kelalkonda by mounting the Electric Pillar;
at that time due to sudden short circuit, he fell down and sustained injuries; he was taken to KIMS Hospital, Hubballi for treatment; but on 03.02.1999
he breathed his last. His L.Rs. have been awarded compensation, which is now in challenge.
The learned counsel for the Appellants/Employer submits that, the Judgment and Order of the Employees Compensation Commissioner are flowed
because:
(a) son of the deceased employee is given compassionate appointment on account of death of his father in harness, under the Service Regulations of
the Corporation;
(b) the claimant has been given various terminal benefits of service of the deceased; DCRG sum of Rs.63,500/- is paid and further a regular family
pension every month is being paid in a sum of Rs.14,190/-.
(c) the Commissioner ought not to have awarded any interest since claim petition was filed after brooking an inordinate delay of about 11 years or so.
The counsel for the Appellants cites the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Smt.Kanta Aggarwal and Others
case reported in AIR 2008 SC 3118; paragraph Nos.10, 11, 12 of the same read as under :
“10. It is pointed out that the award as made is extremely high and the concept of just compensation has been lost sight of.
Learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment and additionally submitted that appeal of respondent No.1 is pending. In normal
course, when two appeals are directed against the common judgment, both the appeals should be heard by the same Bench of the high Court.
But we find that the high Court lost sight of the fact that the benefits which the claimant receives on account of the death or injury have to be duly
considered while fixing the compensation. It is pointed out that respondent No.1 was getting Rs.4,700/- p.m. and a residence has been provided to her
and actually the compassionate appointment was given immediately after the accident.â€
The learned counsel for the Respondent/Claimant per contra contends that, the law relating to compensation payable to the employee is completely
codified in the Employees Compensation Act, 1993 and therefore in the absence of an enabling provision in the Act to put forth mitigating factors now
pleaded by the Appellants/Corporation, the Commissioner was justified in awarding the just and proper compensation ignoring the same, since
Parliament did not intend the grant of Service Benefits as and to be the factors which are to be considered whilst quantifying the compensation.
The learned counsel for the Claimant also points out that, the Judgment of the Apex Court relied upon by the Appellants is under a legislation whose
purpose is totally in variance with that of 1923 Act. In other words he states that, the Judgment referred under one legislation cannot be pressed into
service for the interpretation of another legislation, when such legislations are not in pari materia.
The counsel for the Claimant/Respondent also contends that, the 1923 Act imposes a statutory obligations on the employer to pay the compensation
at once when the employee dies or injured out of and in the course of employment. Because of this legal position whatever delay allegedly brooked in
filing the claim petition is to be ignored as being irrelevant to the award of interest, since there is no contra indication in the Scheme of 1923 Act.
I have considered the rival contentions advanced at the bar, though not with required amount of research. The contention of the learned counsel for
the Appellants that, the mitigating factors mentioned about ought to have been considered by the Commissioner for Employees compensation do not
find support in the scheme of 1923 Act. If the terminal benefits which an employee earns were to be taken as the set of factors relevant for
quantifying the amount of compensation, the Parliament would have made such a provision in the 1923 Act itself. I have turned pages of the statute
book and they do not yield any scope for such contention.
The contention of the learned counsel for the Appellants that, the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 relating to awarding of compensation to
the victim of accident are similar to the provisions of 1923 Act providing for compensation to the deceased or injured employee in as much as the
dominant object of both the Acts is re-compense does not impress me, since the plea of pari materia has to be founded on the cogent jurisprudential
material. In deciding whether the provisions of two legislations are pari materia, the objects of these legislations in question are relevant but not
decisive. M.V.Act is a socio welfare legislation whereas Employees’ Compensation Act is a labour welfare legislation. Although, it could be
argued that the difference is not in kind still the difference in degrees is enormous and therefore, the plea of pari materia cannot be pressed into
service.
The Supreme Court in the case of Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. V. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. reported in AIR 2013 Supreme
Court 2959 has observed:
 PARI MATERIA:
Viscount Simonds in A.G. v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) 1 All ER 49, conceived the above mentioned principle to be a right
and duty to construe every word of a statute in its context and used the word “contest†in its widest sense, including “other statutes in pari
materiaâ€. Earlier, same was the view taken in R. v. Loxdale (1758) 97 ER 394 stating that when there are different statues in pari materia, though
made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory
to each other. This Court in State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd., Okara, AIR 1964 SC 669 held that when two pieces of legislation
are of different scopes, it cannot be said that they are in pari materia. In Shah & Co., Bombay v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1877, this Court
held that the Rent Act, 1947 and the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 were not held to be the acts in pari materia, as they do not relate to the
same person or thing or to same class of persons of things.
Justice G.P.Singh in his magnum opus “Principles of Statutory Interpretation†10th addition, 2006 at page 275 states as under:
“The meaning of the phrase pari materia has been explained in an American case in the following words: “Statutes are in pari materia which
relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word simlis. It is used in
opposition to it â€" intimating not likeness merely but identity. It is a phrase applicable to public statutes or general laws made at different times and in
reference to the same subject.†When the two pieces of legislation are of differing scopes, it cannot be said that they are in pari materia.â€
The counsel for the Appellants is not in a position to point out how the plea is invocable in the present case.
The counsel for the Appellant-Insurance Company vehemently contends that the Claimant has brooked a delay of more than a decade in
presenting the claim petition and therefore, the interest which otherwise would have accrued during this period should be denied to the claimants. She
points out the Latin maxim ‘vigilan ibus non dormientibus jure subveniunt’
(law assists those who are vigilant and not those who are indolent) I have carefully considered this argument.
The scheme of 1923 Act imposes an obligation on the employer to pay compensation at once without waiting for a claim petition being presented
by the injured or the L.Rs. of the deceased. This provision is enacted keeping in view the labour welfare in as much as the working class generally is
in a disadvantageous position compared to an capital holder. The obligation to pay the compensation is not dependant upon the workman or the L.Rs.
of the deceased workman making a claim. Therefore, the question of delay raised by the counsel for the Appellant â€" Insurance company pales into
insignificance.
The other aspect of the matter is that if the delay were to be a ground for denial of interest, such a provision would have been enacted by the
Parliament in the Act itself. The absence of such a provision since 1923 supports the argument advanced on behalf of the claimant that the delay
cannot be a ground to deny the interest which statutorily accrues to the benefit of the estate of the deceased workman. Therefore, this argument also
fails. Accordingly, I pass the following :
ORDER
The Appeal is dismissed.
The amount in deposit if any shall be transmitted to the Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation at once who shall release the same to the
claimants immediately without making any delay.
Costs made easy.