AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Y.V. Narayana, J.—In this batch of writ petitions, the vires of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural-Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (for short, ''Markets Act''), is questioned.
Petitioners in all these writ petitions are the sugar factories located at various places in the Slate of Andhra Pradesh. Sugar-cane is the raw material for these factories. The case of the petitioners is that for the purpose of regulating the supply and purchase of sugar-cane required for use in sugar factories and khandasary units and for matters connected therewith, the State Legislature has enacted A.P, Sugar-cane (Regulation, Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961 (for short, ''Sugar Regulation Act''), The Sugar Regulation Act takes care of the general and overall development of the sugar-cane growers. In furtherance of the object of the Sugar Regulation Act, Section 3 provides for setting up of a Committee called, the A.P. Sugar-cane Advisory Committee. Section 4 enumerates the functions of the Committee. They are mainly to advise the Government on the regulation of supply and purchase of cane for factories and khandasari units; varieties of cane which are suitable or unsuitable for use in factories and khandasari unils; maintenance of good relations between the occupiers of factories and cane growers etc. u/s 5, the Cane Commissioner, who is appointed in exercise of the powers conferred u/s 9, shall constitute a Cane Development Council for each factory zone. Its functions as enumerated in Section 6 are: to consider and approve the programme of development for the factory zone with the funds at the disposal of the council; to devise ways and means for the execution of development plans such as cane varieties, rotation, cane-seed, sowing programme, fertilizers and manures; to recommend to the local authorities the undertaking of the construction or improvement of roads in the factory zone; to take steps for the prevention and control of cane diseases and pests; to impart technical training to cultivators in matters relating to the production of cane; to administer funds at its disposal for the execution of the development schemes; to lay down general principles in regard to the issue of orders regulating the cutting of cane and to decide disputes relating thereto on receipt of complaints from the cane growers and to perform other functions for the general improvement of the factory zone. Section 8 enables the Council to maintain Funds so as to meet the charges in connection with the performance of its functions. Apart from the Government, factories, cane growers and cane growers co-operative societies are the main contributors to the said Fund. u/s 15, the Cane Commissioner shall declare villages around the factory as factory zone for the purpose of cane supply to the factory. Section 16 regulates the supply and purchase of cane in factory zone. Under sub-section (1), where an area has been declared as the factory zone for a factory, the occupier of such a factory shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area and offered for sale to the factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. Subsection (2) specifically prohibits selling of cane that is grown in one factory zone to the factory or other persons situated in any other factory zones. u/s 19, the occupier of the factory is bound to pay the price of the cane supplied to him within 14 days from the date of supply. Fixation of price for the supply of sugar-cane will be done under the provisions of Sugar-Cane Act, 1934, which was enacted with the object to secure fair price to cane growers. There is one more mechanism under which the price is regulated, viz., Sugar Cane (Control) Order, 1966, which was issued in exercise of the powers vested under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, by the Central Government. Under Clause 3 of this Order, the Central Government, will fix minimum price of the sugar-cane, to be paid by the factories for the supply of the cane to them. This minimum price will be fixed at the beginning of each crushing season. It will be paid immediately after delivery of the cane at the factory. After the crushing season is over, the Central Government again fixes final price on the basis of a formula, which is evolved by taking into account various factors. Since the final price could be determined only at the end of the crushing season, the State Government meanwhile announces the price, known as ''State Advisory Price''. This price holds good for the period between the declaration of minimum price and fixation of final price. Even the State Advisory Price fixed by State Government is also an amalgam of various factors. Thus, ihere is a fool-proof formula for the fixation of price, which is with a view to see that no sugar-cane grower should suffer undue loss. Coming back to the Sugar Regulation Act, Section 21 empowers the Government to levy tax on the purchase of cane. This tax is essentially used for carrying out the functions stated earlier.
Further, it is the case of the petitioners that there is a separate mechanism which will take care of the growth of the sugar-cane in the fields. As the recovery of sugar from sugar-cane depends upon the time taken for transporting the cane to the factory, qualified persons deputed by the sugar factories periodically monitor the growth of sugar-cane in the fields. They use to take samples of the juice contents periodically for the purpose of verifying the percentage of juice in the cane. When the juice contents reach the required stage, harvest permits will be issued by factories for cutting the sugar-cane. Thus, in view of the above mechanisms, there is no necessity for any outside mechanism to meddle with either the growth of sugar-cane or production of sugar and that, in fact, all these services cannot be provided by the local markets established under the Markets Act. Since the sale and purchase of sugar-cane in the State is fully regulated under special enactment called, the Sugar Regulation Act, there is no necessity for the Government to again regulate the said produce under the Markets Act and levy fee under that Act. The contention of the petitioners is that there must be some ''quid pro quo'' i.e., correlation between the services rendered by the Government and the fee which is sought to be collected from them under the Markets Act. Since, it is contended that, the sugar-cane growers are not deriving any benefit whatsoever under the Markets Act, the Market Committees are not entitled to levy fee upon them. Hence, the writ petitions.
Since the legality of certain provisions of Markets Act is questioned, it is convenient to have a cursory look at the relevant provisions of the said Act before dealing with the contentions raised by the petitioners. The Markets Act was a result of long exploratory investigation by experts in the field with a view to provide suitable and regulated market by eliminating middlemen and bring face to face the producer as well as the buyer. Broadly speaking, the Markets Act was brought onto the Statute Book with the very same object. The object and purpose of the A.P. (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966, as seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, is to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and the establishment of markets in connection therewith. The intention of the Legislature is clearly deducible from a reading of the Act. Section 2 of the Act gives definitions of certain expressions which occur in the Act. Clause (i) defines the expression ''agricultural produce'', which means - anything produced from land in the course of agriculture or horticulture and includes forest produce or any produce of like nature either processed or unprocessed and declared by the Government by notification to be agricultural produce for the purposes of the Act. The term ''market'' is defined in Clause (vi). It means - a market established under subsection (3) of Section 4 and includes market yard and any building therein. Clause (xi) defines the expression ''notified area'', which means - any area notified u/s 3. Clause (xii) defines the term ''notified market area'', which means - any area declared to be a market area by notification u/s 4. u/s 3, the State Government is given power to declare its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock in such area as may be specified in such notifications. After considering the objections and suggestions, if any, the State Government is authorised to publish a final notification under subsection (3) thereof declaring such area to be a notified area. Sub-section (1) of Section'' 4 empowers the State Government to constitute a ''market committee'' for every notified area which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal. Sub-section (2) entrusts the duty of enforcing the provisions of the Markets Act upon the Market Committees. Sub-section (3) empowers the market committees, as the State Government may from time to time direct, for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock. It also provides for the establishment of such facilities in the market as may be specified by the Government from time to lime by a general or special order. Under sub-section (4), the State Government is authorised to declare by notification the market area to be the notified market area of a particular market for the purposes of the Act. Section 7 deals with trading of notified agricultural produce in the notified area. It stipulates that no person shall, within a notified area, set up,-establish or use, or continue or allow to be continued, any place for the purchase, sale, storage, weighment, curing, dressing or processing of any notified agricultural produce or products of livestock or for the purchase or sale of livestock except under a licence granted to him by the market committee. Section 12 is the charging Section. It is extracted hereunder:
"12. Levy of fees by the market committee:
(1) The market committee shall levy fees on any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock purchased or sold in the notified market area at such rate, not exceeding two rupees as may be specified in the bye-laws for every hundred rupees of the aggregate amount for which the notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock is purchased or sold, whether for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration.
Explanation I:--For the purpose of this Section, all notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock taken out of a notified market area shall, unless the contrary is provided, be presumed to have been purchased or sold within such area.
Explanation II:
.....
.....
(2) The fee referred to in sub-section (1) shall be paid by the purchaser of the notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock;
Provided that where the purchaser cannot be identified the fees shall be paid by the seller."
Under sub-section (1) of Section 14, the Market Committee is enjoined with a duly to pay into a Fund, which will be formed under the Markets Act, called the Market Committee Fund, all monies received from the traders in the form of market fee on transactions of sale and purchase of agricultural produce taking place within the notified market area and the said monies are to be credited to the nearest Government treasury or in a Bank with the previous sanction of the State Government. Section 15 enumerates the purposes for which the Market Committee Fund can be utilised. They will be extracted at appropriate time. Under sub-section (1) of Section 16, a common fund, called the Central Market Fund shall be formed and every market committee shall contribute 10% of its annual income to the said Fund. The amounts that are pooled up in this Fund shall be spent out for certain purposes which are set out in sub-section (2) thereof. The above are the salient features of the Markets Act.
The meaning of the terms ''tax'' and ''fees'' can be seen from the report of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt., . In that report, the Supreme Court explained the two concepts by quoting the definitions given by Latham C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Mathews v. Chicory Marketing Board, 60 CLR 263. In the contextual position that is obtaining in this case, it is pertinent to extract hereunder those two definitions:
"A tax is compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered. This definition brings out the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. The essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the tax-payer''s consent and the payment is enforced by law. The second characteristic of lax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is no element of ''quid pro quo'' between the tax payer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the tax-payer depends generally upon his capacity to pay."
The Supreme Court proceeded further and explained the meaning of the word ''fee'', which reads thus:
"A fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, Hie fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay."
In the succeeding paragraphs, after examining the two concepts, the Supreme Court draw a distinction between ''tax'' and ''fee'', which reads thus:
"A careful examination reveals that the element of compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though in different degrees and it is not totally absent in fees. This, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing a tax from fee."
"The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a capacity, although the special advantage, as for example in the case of registration fees for documents or marriage licencps, is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax, the particular advantage if it exists at all is an incidental result of Slate action."
"As fee is a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services....."
In a later decision - Kewal Krishan Puri and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another, , the Supreme Court evolved the following principles for satisfying the tests for a valid levy of market fee on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in a notified market area:
"(1) That the amount of fee realised must be earmarked for rendering services to the licensees in the notified market area and a good and substantial portion of ft must be shown to be expended for this purpose.
(2) That the services rendered to the licensees must be in relation to the transaction of purchase or sale of the agricultural produce.
(3) That while rendering services in the market area for the purpose of facilitating the transactions of purchase and sale with a view to achieve the objects of the marketing legislation it is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees but some special benefits must be conferred on them which have a direct, close and reasonable correlation between the licensees and the transactions.
(4) That while conferring some special benefits on the licensees it is permissible to render such service in the market which may be in the general interest of all concerned with the transactions taking place in the market.
(5) That spending the amount of market fees for the purpose of augmenting the agricultural produce, its facility of transport in villages and to provide other facilities meant mainly or exclusively for the benefit of the agriculturists is not permissible on the ground that such services in the long run go to increase the volume of transactions in the market ultimately benefiting the traders also. Such an indirect and remote benefit to the traders is in no sense a special benefit to them.
(6) That the element of quiff pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee.
(7) At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the neighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths, must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above."
But in later decisions, the Supreme Court made it clear that the law as pronounced in Kewal Kishan''s case (supra) is applicable to the facts of that particular case only and that it does not have bearing upon any other case. The fact that there is considerable change in the view point of the Supreme Court is discernible from the decisions rendered subsequent to Kewal Kishan''s case, in Sreenivasa General Traders and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , the Supreme Court had an occasion to again examine the concept of ''quid pro quo'' and upon review of the earlier decisions, it held as follows:
"The traditional view that there must be actual quid pro quo for a fee has undergone a sea of change subsequent to decision in Kewal Krishan Puri and Others Vs. State of Punjab and Another, . Correlationship between the levy and the services rendered/expected is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a ''reasonable relationship'' between the levy of the fee and the services rendered. Moreover, there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee. Both are compulsory exactions of money by public authorities. Compulsion lies in thb fact that payment is enforceable by law against a person in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent. A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual service rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. It is now increasingly realised that merely because the collections for there services rendered or grant of a privilege of licence are taken to the Consolidated Fund of the State and not separately appropriated towards the expenditure for rendering the service is not by itself decisive. It is also increasingly realised that the element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not a sine qua mm for a fee."
The law on the point became diluted still further with the passage of time. In the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti and Others Vs. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd., , the concept of ''fee'' again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has summarised the entire case law on the point and ultimately laid down certain principles at paragraph 21. The relevant portion of the said principles is extracted hereunder:
"It is not a postulate of a fee that it must have relation to the actual service rendered. However, the rendering of service has to be established. The service, further, cannot be remote. The test of quid pro quo is not be satisfied with close or proximate relationship in all kinds of fees. A good and substantial portion of the fee must, however, be shown to be expended for the purpose for which the fee is levied. It is not necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the payers of the fee but some special benefit must be conferred on them which has a direct and reasonable correlation to the fee. While conferring some special benefits on the payers of the fees, it is permissible to render service in the general interest of all concerned. The element of quid pro quo is not possible or even necessary to be established with arithmetical exactitude. But it must be established broadly and reasonably that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom the burden of the fee falls. There is no postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authorities to each individual to obtain the benefit of the service. The element of quid pro quo in the strict sense is not necessarily absent in every tax. It is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general correlation ship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied though no single payer of the fee receives direct or personal benefit from those services. It is immaterial that the general public may also be benefitted from some of the services if the primary service intended is for the payers of the fees."
On a careful perusal of all the decisions of the Supreme Court cited above, one can see radical change in its view point on tin''s aspect. In fact, the law on the principle of ''quid pro quo" has been very much diluted by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Whereas in the earliest decision reported in the Commissioner, H.R.E. v. L.T. Swamiar (supra), it stressed the need to confer some special benefit upon the payer of the fee and made it very clear that levy of fee must be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering services. But in the subsequent cases, i.e., in Kewal Kishan ''s case (supra) and Srinivasa General Traders'' case (supra), with the change in the circumstances, the Supreme Court further diluted the concept of fee. In those two reports, while accepting that the fee shall be collected for the services rendered, the Supreme Court, however, held that it is not totally necessary to confer the whole of the benefit on the licensees. It is also opined that the element of quid pro quo may not be established with arithmetical exactitude and that it is enough if a good and substantial portion of the amount collected towards fee is spent for rendering services. When it came to the latest decision i.e., Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti case (supra), the Supreme Court construed the word ''fee'' and the concept of the principle ''quidpro quo'' in a more liberal way. The Supreme Court in this report opined that while conferring some special benefits on the payers of the fees, it is permissible to render service in the general interest of all concerned and that there is no postulate of a fee that it must have a direct relation to the actual services rendered. It finally declared that it is enough if there is a broad, reasonable and general correlationship between the levy and the resultant benefit to the class of people on which the fee is levied (hough no single payer of the fee receives direct or personal benefit from those services. The above is the law on the point.
Let us now come to the merits of the contention raised in this case by duly keeping in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court. The contention of the petilioners is that Government is not entitled to levy fees upon them when it is not rendering any services whatsoever to them. It is contended that there must at least be some correlation between the services rendered and the fee collected. But, since the levy of fee that is sought to be collected from the petitioners is without rendering any services to them, such levy amounts to unreasonable restriction on their trade practice and is, therefore, violative of their fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Similar contention has been raised in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti case (supra) before the Supreme Court by the petitioner therein which is a paper mill in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It challenged the provisions of M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1973, the object of which is analogous to the Markets Act which is impugned in these cases. Under the M.P. Act, the paper mills which purchased bamboos from the State Government under a contract used to take delivery of the same from the forest depots of the Government and transport them directly to factory and, therefore, question of the bamboos entering into the Market yards established under the said M.P. Act docs not arise. But, the market committee levied fee on the sale and purchase of bamboos. The paper mill challenged the said levy contending that there is no direct or even indirect benefit conferred by the market committee either on the purchaser or trader of the bamboos and, therefore, the levy of fee under the said Act is unconstitutional. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noticed that in that case also, as in the present case, the fee levied will go to a common Fund, called the Marketing Development Fund, which will be spent (as provided u/s 44 thereof) for various developmental purposes through out the State for the betterment of the services rendered to the agriculturists in the State. After noticing the purpose for which the market fee is to be utilised, the Supreme Court held that the said purposes are in furtherance of the object of the Act, viz., to regulate the buying and selling of agricultural produce and the establishment and proper administration of markets for agricultural produce for the benefit of the agriculturists who are the primary producers of the said produce. The Supreme Court in this context held:
"The machinery and the facilities for which the market fees are being expended are all necessary to provide the necessary infrastructure to further the object of the Act. But for such infrastructure, the objects of the Act cannot be properly and adequately implemented. The fact that the respondent-Milts may not be the direct beneficiary of any one or some of the said facilities are not made use of by them does not absolve it from payment of the market fees. The said machinery and the facilities are meant for the benefit of all the buyers and sellers of all the agricultural produce within the market area and it cannot be denied that they are so. It is further difficult to appreciate the contention that in the circumstances, the respondent-Mills is not either directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the said machinery and the facilities as a buyer of the bamboos when the purchase is admittedly made in the market area as pointed out above....."
The above observations of the Supreme Court applies in all force to the case on hand and are complete answer to the contentions raised in this case. As already seen, u/s 12 of the Markets Act, the market committee is empowered to levy fee on the sale or purchase of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock. Under sub-section (1) of Section 14, the Market Committee shall, upon receipt of the market fee which is levied u/s 12 of the Act, pay into the fund called ''Market Committee Fund''. The expenditure incurred by the market committees under and for the purpose of carrying out the object of the Markets Act shall be defrayed from out of the said Fund. The purposes for which such Fund may be utilised are enumerated in Section 15. They are extracted hereunder:
"(i) acquisition of site for the market;
(ii) establishment, maintenance and improvement of the market;
(iii) construction and maintenance of buildings necessary for the market and for the health, convenience and safety of the persons, using the market and maintenance of buildings under the control of the market committee;
(iv) provision and maintenance of standard weights and measures;
(v) pay, pensions, leave allowance, gratuities, compassionate allowances and contribution towards leave allowances, pensions or provident fund of officers and servants employed by the market committee;
(vi) payment of interest on loans that may be raised for purposes of the market and the provisions of a sinking fund in respect of such loans;
(vii) collection and dissemination of information regarding alt matters relating to crop statistics and marketing in respect of notified agricultural produce, livestock and produce of livestock;
(viii) schemes for the extension of cultural improvement of notified agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock within the notified area, including the grant, subject to the approval of the Government, of financial aid to the schemes for such extension or improvement within such area undertaken by other bodies or individuals;
(ix) propaganda for the improvement of agriculture, livestock and products of livestock and thrift;
(x)..... omitted.
(xi) promotion of grading services;
(xii) measures for the preservation of food grains;
(xii-a) for the purposes of the Andhra Pradesh Rashtra Karshaka Parishad and Allied Bodies Act, 1987;
(xiii) such other purposes as may be specified by the Government by general or special order."
Thus, on reading of the provisions of Section 15, it is quite obvious that the Market Committee established under the Markets Act are enjoined with a statutory duty of providing marketing facilities to the farmers for (he purpose of selling the various types of agricultural products which are grown by them without there being scope for the intervention of middlemen. Thus, the main object of the Act is the elimination of middlemen in the bargaining of agricultural products in the State and securing of reasonable prices to the farmers. The preamble of the statute, in fact, reflects this very object of the Act. Clauses (i) to (vi) embedded in Section 15 are enacted for achieving this sole object. In addition to the above object of the Act, the Legislature further intended that the Market Committees established under the Markets Act should also strive for the overall improvement in the standards of agriculture in the State. This object, though not reflected in the preamble of the Statute, which, of course, according to the cannons of interpretation of statutes, is not mandatory, is discernible by a careful reading of Clauses (vii) to (xiii) extracted supra. It is no doubt true that sufficient funds must be placed at the disposal of the machinery created under the Statute for the purpose of carrying out the above objects of the Act. It is in this background, Section 12 is enacted, under which the Market Committees are empowered to levy fees on the sale or purchase of the notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock. Since Government is the proper authority to assess the prevailing conditions of agriculture or various types of crops grown in the State and its standards as it will be having readymade statistical data about the crop-situation in the State, discretion is given to the Government u/s 3 to include or exclude any particular agricultural product as notified agricultural produce so that the funds collected u/s 12 of the Act can be made use of by the Governmental machinery for the upliftment of that product. The Government, for the purpose of Section 3, will, of course, have to take into account various factors which will have bearing upon the improvement of the particular agricultural product which is sought to be notified under the Act. This discretion vested in the State Government u/s 3 is absolute. The Government in its wisdom is free to include or exclude any agricultural product as notified agricultural produce under the Markets Act, basing upon the overall assessment made with regard to the condition of the particular crop and take suitable measures for the improvement of the same. The contention of the petitioners is that when there exists special enactment which is fully taking care of the interests of cane growers by extending them all the services which are necessary for the growth of cane and progress of the crop, Ihe action of the Government in bringing the cane growers within the purview of Ihe Markets Act and seeking to levy fee under that Act is wholly unconstitutional. In M/s. Subbhash Chander Kamlesh Kumar Vs. State of Punjab and others, , similar contention was raised and a Full Bench of that Court repelled those contentions holding as follows:
"It was next contended that the Act made a provision for services which had already been envisaged under Sections 26 and 28 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961. To that extent there was duplicity and overlapping. It cannot be denied that there is a certain amount of overlapping in the objects sought to be achieved under the two Acts except that under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act the area of operation of services is the notified market area, urtderthe impugned Act it is additionally and more particularly the rural area. Such an overlapping is unavoidable as both the Acts have for their object better regulations of sale, purchase etc., of agricultural produce. Merely because there is overlapping, in our view, is no reason to hold the latter Act to be ultra vires."
The above observations of the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which were upheld later by the Supreme Court, is a complete answer to the contention raised by the petitioners herein. Further, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in Krishi Upaj case (supra), the services rendered under a particular enactment need not be direct. It is enough if the community as a whole derives ''some'' benefit. The Apex Court held that it is not necessary that the fee must have direct relation to the actual service rendered to each individual. It is enough if the machinery and the facilities for which the market fee are levied are meant for the benefit of all the buyers and sellers of all the agricultural products within the notified area. This view is further fortified by the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Ashok Kumar Dinesh Chandra and Another, .
The bone of contention of the cane growers herein is that the activity of sale and purchase of sugar-cane and the transportation of the same is undertaken in accordance with the provisions of the special enactment and there was absolutely no need for the cane grower at any stage to approach the market yards established under the Markets Act either for the sale or purchase of the sugar cane and the market yards do not render any service whatsoever to the cane growers in the State and that when the market yards are not providing any benefit or rendering any service worth mentioning to the cane growers, the cane growers in the State are not at all liable to pay market fee under the Markets Act. But, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the above cited cases, collection of fee under the Markets Act need not have direct relation to the service or benefits rendered to the payer of the fee. What is to be seen is whether the machinery created under the Markets Act is providing any service, which need not be a direct service but may well be an indirect service, to the community of the cane growers in general. If it is shown that the cane growers in the State are deriving some benefit under the Act, the collection of fee from the cane growers can be sustainable. In this case, unlike the cases which are cited supra, the Government is able to demonstrate before us that it did take necessary steps for the overall improvement of the sugar-cane crop, by producing some governmental orders. Upon perusal of those orders, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that the State Government has taken positive steps from time to time for the benefit of sugar-cane crop by spending considerable amounts, defraying the same from the fund which is created under the Markets Act. Those Governmental orders are placed on record. Therefore, we arc not ready to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that demand of fees under the Markets Act without rendering any direct service to the cane growers amounts to unreasonable restriction upon their trade. For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the collection of fee under the Markets Act from the cane growers in the State.
Mr. C. Kodandaram, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the petitioners, raised another contention on the issue of publication of notification u/s 3 of the Act. According to him, the impugned G.O. issued under sub-section (4) of Section 4 of the Markets Act, is liable to be struck down as Ihe same was issued without following the procedure laid down in Section 3 of the said Act. He contended that before issuing notification u/s 4(4) of the Act, the Government is bound to publish draft notification u/s 3(!) of the-Act and then final notification u/s 3(3) of the Act and that since the impugned notification was issued without issuing draft notification and final notifications as required u/s 3, the same is liable to be struck down. He cited a decision of the Supreme Court in this connection reported in Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Others, . It is true that under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Markets Act, the Government is required to publish a draft notification declaring its intention of regulating the purchase and sale of such agricultural produce in such area which shall be specified by it and as per subsection (2) of Section 3, such notification shall also invite objections from all the persons who are interested stipulating some time therefor. After the expiration of the period specified in the draft notification and after considering such objections and suggestions, the Government may. under subsection (3) of Section 3, publish a final notification declaring the area specified in the draft notification to be a notified area in respect of any agricultural produce which is specified in the draft notification. Section 4 empowers the Government to constitute, by issuing a notification, market committee for every notified area. Under sub-section (3) of Section 4, every market committee shall establish in the notified area such number of markets as the Government direct, for the purchase and sale of any notified agricultural produce, livestock or products of livestock. On the establishment of such markets, subsection (4) of Section 4 empowers the Government to declare by notification the market area and such other area adjoining thereto as may be specified in the notification, to be a notified market area in respect of the notified agricultural produce. The contention advanced before us is that the Government straight away issued the impugned notification u/s 4(4) without complying the requirements u/s 3. But, this contention, in our view, is only assumptive in nature in view of the issuance of G.O. Ms. No.4t6, Food and Agricultural (Mktg.II) Department, dated 29-11-1982, as required under sub-section (1) of Section 3 and G.O. Ms. No.412, Food and Agriculture (Mktg.ll) Department dated 25-6-1990 as required under sub-section (3) of Section 3, by the Government declaring their intention to regulate the purchase and sale of sugar-cane'' in the areas notified in Schedule-I to the notification issued in G.O. Ms. No.2095, Food & Agriculture (Agrl.IV) Department dated 29-11-1968. On a reading of G.O. Ms. No.412 dated 25-6-1990, two things are clear. Firstly, by issuing G.O. Ms. No.416 dated 29-11-1982, the requirement of issuing draft notification under sub-section (1) of Section 3 was duly fulfilled by the Government stipulating a period of 30 days for the receipt of objections, if any. Then, after the expiry of the period stipulated in the said draft notification, G.O. Ms. No.412 dated 25-6-1990 was issued as required under subsection (3) of Section 3 and both of them were duly published in official gazettes. In view of the issuance of G.O. Ms. No.412 dated 25-6-1990, the contention of the petitioners must be held to be incorrect. The learned Counsel at this juncture further contends that the so called G.Os. never saw the light of the day and they were never published in the official gazette for the benefit of the general public, it is contended that even the petitioners, whose interests would be vitally affected by virtue of the so-called G.Os., were not able to come to know about the existence of the G.Os. It is therefore, sought to be contended that these G.Os. were manipulated and brought into existence later in order to suit their, claim. But, the petitioners are forgetting one crucial factum i.e., that the G.Os. were not only issued by the Government by following the procedure in vogue but also duly published in the official gazette which is deemed to be a public document. When once the G.O. is published in a public document, the presumption under law is that such G.O. is put to the notice of the general public and the public does have knowledge about the said G.O. Merely because the petitioners missed to notice the publication in the official gazettes, it cannot-be said that G.O. Ms. No.416 or G.O. Ms. No.412 were never issued nor published by the Government at any time.
Learned Counsel further contended that even assuming for argument sake that G.O. Ms. No.416 and 412 were published as required under law, still it cannot be said that they have any statutory force inasmuch as there is abnormal delay in between these two G.Os. It is true that G.O. Ms. No.416 was issued on 29-11-1982 while G.O. Ms. No.412 was issued on 25-6-1990 i.e., 8 years thereafter. The learned Additional Advocate-General, however, explains the delay staling that the delay was only due to the change in the Government. While the Government which was in power thought it fit to notify the ''sugar-cane'' as notified agricultural produce under the Markets Act and issued draft notification u/s 3(1), the subsequent Government which was run by a different political party, kept the matter in cold storage. Thereafter, there was again change in the Government. Ultimately, the notification u/s 3(3) could be published. In that process, there was delay. The Government which was in power as a matter of policy and after duly taking into account the prevailing conditions in the State, decided to include ''sugar-cane'' as a notified agricultural produce under the Markets Act. The petitioners cannot attribute any mala fides to such a decision taken by the Government as a matter of policy. Moreover, there is no stipulation anywhere in the statute which prescribes maximum or minimum period within which notification u/s 3(3) shall be issued. There is no merit in the contention raised by the petitioners.
In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.