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Judgment
RENGASAMY, J. :
These writs of certiorari have been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings in CC Nos. 670/88. 152/89
and 133/89 on the file of the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences). WP 12715/88 has been filed by the company viz. English
Electric Company of India Ltd. whereas WP 12716 to 12718 of 1988 have been filed by the directors of the company in their individual capacity
all for the same purpose of quashing the CC No. 670/88 on the file of the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences). The other
two writ petitions have been filed by the company to quash the subsequent criminal proceedings CC 152/89 and CC 133/89 initiated by the
respondents.
In the affidavit of the petitioners, the allegations are that they have been wrongly prosecuted by the respondents before the Addl. Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate without any basis and without following the procedures established by law and the assessment levied by the respondents
has been quashed by the Tribunal and inspite of that they have been prosecuted. That the complaints have been filed not by the first respondent
CIT and therefore, the prosecution against them is illegal and have to be quashed.
The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Uttam Reddy, has placed two submissions before this Court for quashing the proceedings pending
before the Metropolitan Magistrate and they are, that the complaint is not according to law and the prosecution itself is not bona fide. The
company and the directors have been prosecuted under s. 276C of the IT Act for wilful attempt to evade the tax and therefore, now the
complaints have been lodged under s. 279 of the IT Act before the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. According to the learned
counsel, Mr. Uttam Reddy, for initiating the proceedings under s. 279 the complaint must be at the instance of the Chief CIT or CIT for the alleged
offence under s. 276C, but in this case the facts reveal that the Dy. CIT had addressed the CIT for sanction and on the basis of the sanction
granted by the CIT the complaints have been lodged against the petitioners that as the amended s. 279 of the IT Act is very specific that a person
shall not be prosecuted against for an offence under sections including of s. 276C except at the instance of the Chief CIT or CIT, whereas in these
cases, only the sanction has been obtained from the CIT and therefore, it will not amount that these complaints are at the instance of the CIT and
as the section has not been complied with for prosecution, the prosecution is illegal and not in accordance with law, that as the liberty of the
petitioners is threatened by the initiation of the prosecution not in accordance with law the petitioners are entitled to seek protection under Art. 21
of the Constitution of India and therefore the prosecution has to be quashed.
The allegation of the respondents is that the petitioners have another unit in Hosur and for the purpose of getting the Income Tax benefits they
have inflated the expenses of the other unit also and the records have been fabricated and therefore, they have committed the offence under s.
276C.
Whether the accounts submitted by the petitioners will amount to the offence under s. 276C is a matter to be considered by the magistrate. But
the contention raised before me is that as these complaints have been lodged not at the instance of the CIT but at the instance of the Dy. CIT the
complaints have not been lodged according to law but it is a matter to be considered by the criminal Court before which the matters are pending
now. On a perusal of the complaints, in one paragraph it is mentioned that the complaints are at the instance of the CIT himself. The learned
counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Uttam Reddy, would submit that this description in the complaint is totally incorrect as these complaints have been
filed only on the sanction accorded by the CIT and not at the instance of the CIT himself. Anyhow when the complaints read that the petitioners
have been prosecuted at the instance of the CIT the writ Court cannot go into the question whether the complaints have been lodged at the
instance of the CIT or at the instance of the Dy. CIT with the sanction of the CIT. Even if it is taken that the Dy. CIT had lodged the complaint on
the sanction accorded by the CIT, it is for the concerned Court to interpret whether the sanction given by the CIT will amount to the prosecution at
his instance. Anyhow that is a matter to be adjudicated by the competent Court but not by the writ Court.
The apex Court has held in series of cases that for any findings on the question of fact no writ will lie unless there are patent errors leading to
manifest injustice. [Vide Ameteep Machine Tools Vs. Labour Court, Haryana and Another, and Muni Lal and Others Vs. Prescribed Authority
and Others, . Therefore the question whether these complaints have been lodged at the instance of the CIT or at the instance of the Dy. CIT with
the sanction of the CIT are questions of fact to be considered by the trial magistrate and this Court cannot go into that question at this stage when
especially there is nothing to show that there is patent error leading to the manifest injustice. Further, when the petitioners have got opportunity to
raise these matters before the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate himself, they cannot come forward with these writ petitions alleging that
the prosecution itself is illegal and not according to law. The learned counsel would contend that as the liberty of the petitioners is at stake they
have invoked Art. 21 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings. As mentioned above, whether the respondents/complainant have followed the
procedure of law are matters to be considered by the learned magistrate before whom the proceedings is pending now. Certainly the petitioners
have got right to raise these questions even in the initial stage before the magistrate for the discharge. But it appears that these petitioners filed
criminal miscellaneous petitions before this Court in Crl MP 3621 and 3122/89 of 1989 for the very same relief viz., to quash the proceedings
which is sought for now also and this Court has held that the ingredients of those offences are matters of evidence and the petitioners have
opportunity to urge all their contentions at the appropriate stage and the inherent powers need not be invoked to evaluate the averments in the
complaint. On this ground this Court has dismissed the criminal miscellaneous petitions which were filed to quash the proceedings. When this Court
has already considered that the proceedings before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be quashed as the allegations raised by the
petitioners are matters of evidence and the petitioners have to seek the very remedy before the concerned magistrate, they are not expected to
repeat the very same contention once again in this Court even though the form of relief sought for is under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
Anyhow the relief is same, though the same is sought for under two different forums. As mentioned above, whether the complaints have been
lodged properly and in accordance with law is a matter for consideration by the magistrate. Therefore that aspect cannot be gone into in this writ
proceedings.
Then coming to the mala fide alleged in this proceedings, the learned counsel would submit that the assessment made by the IT authorities have
been quashed by the Tribunal, while the appeals were pending before the Tribunal, that the respondents have lodged these complaints only for the
purpose of getting the reward which was announced under the Government Scheme when the matter was pending before the appellate authority,
that they could have waited till the disposal of the appeal and the filing of these complaints when the appeals were pending before the appellate
authority itself would indicate that somehow or other they wanted to prosecute the petitioners which exhibit mala fide and therefore, the
proceedings are liable to be quashed. The apex Court has held in P. Jayappan Vs. S.K. Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticorin, that there is
no provision in law which provides that a prosecution for the offences under s. 276C or s. 277 of the IT Act cannot be launched until reassessment
proceedings initiated against the assessee are completed. The appeal before the appellate authority is a continuation of the proceedings and for the
reason that appeal was pending it cannot be stated that no prosecution should be launched till the disposal of the appeal. Further, the appellate
authority also though has allowed the appeal has observed that the assessee was in error in claiming enhanced relief so as to include the notional
interest on the balance outstanding with the head office and on such notional interest the assessee was not entitled to any relief under ss. 80HH and
80-I, of the IT Act. Therefore, the observation made by the Tribunal makes it clear that the petitioner-company has claimed certain relief to which
they were not entitled to and they included the notional interest for the purpose of same relief. Whether this conduct on the part of the company will
amount to offence or not is not a question of fact to be considered by the learned Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. When the competent
authority viz., the Income Tax appellate authority itself has made an observation that the assessee has claimed certain benefits though they are not
entitled to, it cannot be argued that in view of the order of the appellate authority the petitioners cannot be prosecuted. Anyhow as held by the
apex Court till the assessment proceedings are over, the authority need not wait for launching the prosecution against the assessee for the alleged
offence. Further whether the prosecution of the petitioners during the pendency of the appeal proceedings will amount to mala fide or not also is a
question of fact depending upon the conduct of the prosecuting agency. That aspect cannot be considered by the writ Court and therefore, both
the Grounds urged by the learned counsel are not sustainable in those proceedings when especially the relief is sought for to quash the proceedings
which are pending before the judicial authority.
One more fact is that the petitioners have now once again filed Cri OPs before this Court for quashing the proceedings which are pending
before the Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on the ground that the assessment has been set aside by the appellate authority. As rightly argued
by the learned counsel for the respondents, there cannot be two parallel proceedings for the very same relief of quashing the prosecution. When
the petitioners have chosen the forum under the CrPC to quash the proceedings that shows that they have remedy under the CrPC When such
remedy is available to them, they are not entitled to approach the writ Court for the very same relief of quashing the proceedings under Art. 226 of
the Constitution of India making out the allegation that as the provisions have not been complied with, the liberty of the individual is at stake.
The learned senior counsel Mr. S. V. Subramaniam appearing for the respondents would submit that Art. 226 of the Constitution of India
cannot be sued against the proceedings before the Court of law and he relies upon a decision of the Kerala High Court in Sheikriyammada Nalla
Koya Vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Laccadives, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands, Kozhikode and Others, wherein the Court has held that
Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to set aside the order passed by the Court. Even though in this case no order is passed,
but only the proceedings are pending before the competent Court. Article 226(1) reads that notwithstanding anything in Art. 32, every High Court
shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate
cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition,
quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It would
indicate that the writs can be issued only against any person or authority referred to in Art. 226 of the Constitution of India including the
Government, but this cannot be exercised against Court of law. As rightly argued by the learned counsel the wording of this Article is that ""to any
person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government"", excludes the judicial forum. Therefore I fully agree with the learned counsel
that these petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be directed against the proceedings before the judicial magistrate viz., Addl.
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (Economic Offences).
Therefore the writ petitions are not sustainable and are dismissed accordingly, with cost of Rs. 1,000 in each petition.