High CourtsDivision Bench(1957) 03 AP CK 0017

Eluru Venkata Subba Rao vs District Transportation Superintendent (Traffic) Vijayawada Southern Rly.

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 14 March 1957 · Citation: AIR 1958 AP 206

HON’BLE JUDGES
Subba Rao, C.J · Manohar Pershad, J
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 648 of 1954

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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 932 words

Subba Rao, C.J.—This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order dated 17-5-1950 of the District Transportation Superintendent (Traffic), Bezwada. The application was filed on 22-11-1954 i.e. more than four year after the date of the order sought to be quashed.

2.

It is a well settled rule of practice that an application by way of writ of certiorari other writ should be filed within a reasonable time from the date of the order which the applicant seeks to be quashed. In appropriate cases, the High Court certainly has power excuse the delay.

3.

A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nathamooni Chetti v. Viswanat Sastry, 1950 2 Mad L J 448: AIR 1951 M 250 (A), pointed out the procedure obtaining in that Court in the following terms:

Though there is no specific period limitation, it has generally been the accept practice of this Court not to exercise the extra ordinary power by way of the issue of pregative writs when there has been a long del since the passing of the order sought to quashed.

4.

Another Division Bench of the said Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner income tax, Madras. 1951-1 Mad LJ 417: (A 1951 Mad 204) (B), re-stated the rule of practice thus at page 420 (of Mad LJ): (at p. of AIR) :

We have held that though there is period of limitation as such prescribed application for the issue of prerogative was long delay can be one of the grounds for fusing to grant an application, for the issue such writs.

5.

Govinda Menon J. of the same High Court in Y. Venkateswarlu Vs. State of Madras, (after noticing the aforesaid rule and the decisions cited above, issued the writ in is of one year''s delay on the ground that, in circumstances of that case, there was justification for the petitioner waiting for nearly year as he "had been knocking at the doors his departmental superiors to find out whet from those quarters he could obtain relief."

6.

Umamaheswaram J. of this Court accepted the same rule of practice in Annam v. The State, 1955 Andh LT 831: (AIR 1 AP 739) (D). But, in that case, being regard to the transgression of a further mental principle of civilized jurisprudence, learned Judge thought it fit to issue the was though there was a delay of about 11 month. The learned Judge at p. 838 (of Andh LT): p.742 of AIR) observed :

....There is no rigid or inflexible holding that a writ should not be entertained after a period of 11 months.

(sic)terciting the aforesaid decisions, he proceed to observe:

But I am referring to those decisions only the purpose of showing that there is no id rule fettering my discretion to interfere in cross case of this description.

7.

The High Courts of Allahabad and avancore issued writs even though in one the four years elapsed from the date of the (sic)ler and, in the other, three years passed by them the date the order was made. Even in (sic)gland, the period fixed for filing a writ certiorari is six months, though under O. 64, R. 7, R. S. C. there is power vested in the support to extend the time and excuse the delay filing a writ of certiorari. There is no reason (sic) this High Court should follow a different (sic). In our view, applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution will be entertained only if they filed within a reasonable time from the date he making of the order. Ordinarily, a period of six months may be concerned reasonable but, in extraordinary circumstances, this. Court may, in its discretion, excuse delay. Otherwise, while periods of limitation fixed for every form of remedy available to (sic)rty, there will not be any time limit for the (sic)cise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court. The exercise of power under Art. 226 by Court, irrespective of any time lag will introduces complications and unsettle rights finally (sic)led by authorities empowered to do so.

8.

Learned Counsel then contends that there clear and adequate reasons for excusing the (sic) in this particular case. The order was made the District Transportation Superintendent (sic)flic) on 17-5-1950 and an appeal filed against same was dismissed by the Chief Operating superintendent on 16-8-1950. The present application was filed more than four years after that (sic). The only reason which the learned Counsel I advance is that his client was sending me�(sic)als to the General Manager and to the Government of India. The fact that he sent some trials to the Government and other superior (sic)rs cannot be a ground for. ignoring this long

9.

It is then said that he filed an application before the Conciliation Officer for (sic)ing the dispute between, the railway and client but the Conciliation Officer did not that dispute. In support of this contention certain correspondence that passed being : the Conciliation Officer and the General (sic)tary, M. S. M. Railway Association, (sic)ada, between 10-11-51. and 25-2-1952 is before us.

That correspondence only shows that the (sic)ner wrote a letter to the Conciliation and that the Secretary reminded him at and enquired what further action he taken therein. It does not appear from accord what happened to that application ether the petitioner had seriously pursued the circumstances, we cannot hold that any (sic)able explanation has been offered for executions his Inordinate delay of four years from (sic)te of the making of the order.

10.

The application fails and is dismissed costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 50/-.