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Judgment
Venkataswami, J.—These two Revision Petitions under S. 115 of the CPC are preferred against the judgment of the learned District Judge,
Nilgiris at Uthagamandalam, in C.M.A. Nos. 124 and 123 of 1984, respectively. The matters arise out of a decision rendered by the learned
District Judge as Appellate Authority under S. 47-A(4) of the Stamp Act.
Brief facts relating to the cases are the following:
The petitioners herein who are common in both the cases have purchased extensive extents of lands in Mel-Kundah Village, under two sale deeds
dated 24.05.1981 and 16.06.1982, measuring extents of 276 acres and 43-76 acres, for Rs. 2,35,000/- and Rs. 37,521/- 20P., respectively. The
Joint Sub Registrar, Coimbatore in the first instance, and the Joint Sub- Registrar, Ooty, in the second instance, felt that the market value of the
properties conveyed under the respective sale deeds was not properly reflected in the documents. Therefore, they referred the matter under S. 47-
A(1) of the Stamp Act, to the Assistant Collector, Coonoor, for determination of market value of the properties covered under the said two sale
deeds and consequently for collection of correct stamp duty. On receipt of the References, the Assistant Collector, Coonoor, issued notices to all
concerned with the sale deeds and, after making an enquiry into the matter and also a personal inspection of the properties, initially passed an
Order, fixing the market value of the properties at Rs. 2,500/- per acre provisionally. Thereafter, the Assistant Collector called upon all the
persons concerned to file their objections. The petitioners herein filed their detailed objections for the proposed market value of the purpose of
Stamp Act and also produced documentary evidence to substantiate that the market value as shown in the documents in question is correct and
that it does not call for any increase. However, the Assistant Collector, Coonoor, not accepting the objections raised by the petitioners for fixing
the market value at Rs. 2,500/- per acre, confirmed the market value as suggested in the provisional notice.
Aggrieved by the fixation of market value as mentioned above by the Assistant Collector, Coonoor, the petitioners preferred appeals under S.
47-A(4) of the Stamp Act to the Appellate Authority (District Judge, Nilgiris at Uthagamandalam). The learned District Judge, by the judgments
dated 19.02.1985, for the reasons stated therein, has confirmed the market value as fixed by the Assistant Collector and consequently dismissed
the appeals. Hence the present Revision petitions.
Before going into the merits, a preliminary objection raised by the learned Additional Government pleader has to be considered. According to
the learned Additional Government Pleader, this Revision Petition under S. 115 C. P. C. is not maintainable as the Appellate Authority named
under S. 47-A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act being the District Judge, cannot be considered as a Court, but has to be considered as a persona
designate.
To appreciate the above contention, S. 47-A (4) and (5) has to be extracted, which reads as follows:
47-A. Instruments of Conveyance, etc., undervalued how to be dealt with.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector under sub-S. (2) or sub-S.(3) may appeal to any appellate authority specified in sub-S. (5).
All such appeals shall be preferred within such time, and shall be heard and disposed of in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under
this Act.
(5) The Appellate Authority shall be
(i) In the City of Madras, the Madras City Civil Court; and
(ii) Elsewhere:
(a) The subordinate Judge, or if there are more than one subordinate Judge, the Principal Subordinate Judge, having jurisdiction over the area in
which the property concerned is situated; or
(b) If there is no such Subordinate Judge, the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area aforesaid.
(Explanation omitted)
It is seen from the above that the Appellate Authority in the City of Madras is, ""The Madras City Civil Court and elsewhere, the Appellate
Authority is named by the office. I have no doubt that it would not have been the intention of the Legislature to prescribe two different categories of
Appellate Authorities, one as Court and another as persona designate. Even otherwise, there are rulings of this Court and the Supreme Court to
hold that the Appellate Authorities mentioned under sub-s. (5) of S. 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act are ''Courts''.
Balasubramanyan, J. in E.K. Venkaimarban v. Dakshinamurthy 1980 (1) MLJ 275=94 L.W. 243, after referring to a judgment of the Supreme
Court in The Central Talkies Ltd., Kanpur Vs. Dwarka Prasad, observed that a Persona Designate is a person who is pointed out or described as
an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of the class or as filling a particular character, and hence the appellate authority
constituted under the Rent Control Act is a Court.
In Jugal Kishore Inga v. Co-operative Bank 1967 SC 1494, the Supreme Court had considered whether the Assistant Registrar of Co-
operative Societies was a ''Court'' within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Supreme Court held that the Assistant Registrar was
functioning as a Court in deciding the dispute in question and his adjudication was not based upon a private reference nor was his decision arrived
at in a summary manner, but with all the paraphernalia of a court and the powers of an ordinary civil Court of the land. The Supreme Court further
observed:
It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a Court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the Court should have, apart
from having some of the trappings, of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definite judgment, which has finality and authoritativeness
which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
In Rathinasamy v. Komalavalii 1982 2 MLJ 486, Division Bench of this Court has considered the decision of Balasubramanyan, J. referred to
above and ultimately, agreeing with the learned single Judge and disapproving the contrary views expressed by two other learned Judges held that
for the purpose of Ss. 3, 5, and 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, the appellate authority is a Court and that S. 5 of the Limitation Act is
applicable to an appeal preferred by the petitioner under S. 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Bearing
these principles in mind, and having regard to the fact that in the City of Madras, the City Civil Court is named as appellate authority, I have no
hesitation to come, to the conclusion that the District Judge who has decided the matter as appellate authority has decided it as a Court and not as
a persona designate. Rules 9 to 14 frame under the Indian Stamp Act by the State Government also confirm the above position. Rule 9 prescribes
the manner of preferring appeal; 10 Rule prescribes the procedure for the disposal of appeals; Rule 11 refers hearing of appeal; 12 Rule relates to
order in appeal; Rule 13 refers to return of records i.e. Collector; and Rule 14 enables the Appellate Authority to follow the CPC in respect of
matters not provided for in the Rules. Therefore, the preliminary objection is overruled.
Now, on merits. It is seen that neither the Collector nor the Appellate Authority have discharged the duties entrusted to them as explained by
this Court in Collector of Nilgiris at Ootacamund Vs. Mahavir Plantations Pvt. Ltd., . and R. Rajalakshmi and Others Vs. The Revenue Divisional
Officer and Another, .
In Collector of Nilgiris, Ootacamund v. M/s. Mahavir Plantations (P) Ltd. (supra), Balasubramanyan, J., under identical circumstances, has
held as follows: (Head note is set out)
The valuation guidelines prepared by the Revenue Officials at the instance of the Board of Revenue were avowedly intended merely to assist the
sub-Registrars to find out, prima facie, whether the market value set out in the instruments had been set forth correctly. The guidelines were not
intended as a substitute for market value or to foreclose the inquiry by the Collector which he is under a duty to make under S. 47-A. The
valuation guidelines were not prepared on the basis of any open hearing of the parties concerned or of any documents. They were based on data
gathered broadly with reference to classification of lands, grouping of lands and the like. This being so, the Collector acting under S. 47-A cannot
regard the valuation guidelines as the last word on the subject of market value. To do so would be to surrender his statutory obligation to
determine market value on the basis of evidence, which is a judicial or a quasi judicial function which he has to perform. To adopt figures prepared
in the valuation guidelines would be dangerous, because they offer no guarantee of truth or correctness of the data, not being susceptible to check
or verification by a judicial or quasi judicial process of evaluation of evidence. W.P. 2526 of 1977 dt. 15.11.1979 (Mad) relied on.
The market value determination in the land acquisition proceedings cannot be adopted either as the basis or ever as one of the pieces of evidence,
for the purpose of determining the market value under S. 47-A of the Stamp Act. This is because what the award of compensation determines as
the market value cannot in itself be treated as evidence in the sense that it is proof of a fact. For, an award of a land acquisition Collector merely
represents the end product of a decision making by a quasi judicial authority. The data taken note of by him would constitute evidence of facts, but
what he awards as market value is only his decision and it can by no means be regarded as a piece of evidence in itself. Where the law does not
regard any previous decision as final and binding between the parties in subsequent proceedings and where no estoppel is laid down by the law,
any decision of a Court or tribunal cannot by itself be regarded as a piece of evidence in subsequent proceedings let alone as conclusive evidence.
At any rate, there is nothing in S. 47-A or in any other provisions of the Act which accord to an award in land acquisition proceedings the status of
evidence, conclusive or otherwise.
The conception of open market which the Explanation to S. 47-A projects cannot be understood in the same way as market value under the land
Acquisition Act is understood. For ex hypothesis, the discussion of market value in the Stamp Act is with reference to a transaction imbedded in an
instrument, to which the parties thereto have signified their acceptance voluntarily and willingly. There is no element of compulsion in a sale or a gift
or an exchange. In this context therefore, the conception of a willing buyer and a willing seller would be autologous and would only tend to
obfuscate the obvious elements in market valuation. This conception has been adopted in land acquisition cases only because the acquisition
thereunder is under legal coercion and the property owner to whom compensation is to be given on the basis of market value is almost always an
unwilling party. It is only in that context that Courts have adopted the principle that the market value must be determined on the basis of a willing
buyer and a willing seller.
Open market under the Stamp Act is an objective standard which lays down that the market value to be adopted by the Collector and the market
value which the parties are required to adopt in their instruments must be a fair market value in the sense that there are no economic shackles or
inhibitions of any kind which prevent the price level from finding its level. Thus, the conception of open market rules out, at one end, fancy price
and, at the other end, distress sales, Economic equilibrium is the hallmark of open market.
Srinivasan, J. also, under similar circumstances, held as follows:
Unfortunately, the attention of the learned Subordinate Judge was not drawn to the relevant rules. The learned Subordinate Judge has proceeded
on the footing that there are number of sale deeds of nearby lands and on the basis thereof, the value of the land in question has been fixed by the
Revenue Divisional Officer at Rs. 1,21,500/-. It is to be seen that the sale deeds relied on by the Revenue Divisional Officer relate to small extents
of 5 cents, 3 cents and even lesser extents. Much reliance could not be placed on those sale deeds as it is not known whether these sale deeds
relate to agricultural lands or douse sites. It is clear from Rule 5 that with reference to agricultural lands, the matters to be taken into account
include the average yield from the land, nearness to road and market, distance from village site, level of land, transport facilities, facilities available
for irrigation and the nature of crops raised on the land in addition to the valuation of the adjacent lands. If there is no sale deed available to show
the value of the adjacent lands in the vicinity, that cannot prevent the Court from fixing the value on the basis of the other matters referred to in the
rule. It is open to the petitioners to let in evidence with regard to the other matters mentioned in rule 5(a).
There is nothing to indicate that the objection statements filed by the petitioners have been seriously taken note of by the original authority or the
appellate authority. As I propose to remand the matter, I do not want to deal with it more elaborately except to observe that relevant rules have
not been borne in mind, both by the Collector and by the Appellate Authority. Placing reliance on the Guidelines of the Revenue authorities, and
resting the decision solely on that basis cannot be supported in view of the earlier decisions of this Court. In the circumstances, the orders of the
Collector as well as the Appellate Authority are set aside, and the matters are remanded to the Collector for reconsideration in the light of the
earlier decisions of this Court and the observations made in this order. The Civil Revision Petitions are allowed and remanded as indicated above.
However, there will be no order as to costs.