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Judgment
The judgment dated 07.12.2015 in C.C. No.16/2009 on the files of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam, is under challenge in this appeal filed under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code [hereinafter referred as ‘Cr.P.C’, for short], at the instance of the first accused, who was found guilty by the special court.
Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/first accused and the learned Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the judgment impugned and the records of the Special Court.
The prosecution case in brief is that accused Nos. 1 and 2 while working as the Secretary and IIIrd Grade Overseer respectively of Ranni-Angadi Gramapanchayath and as such being public servants, abused their official position, had hatched conspiracy between them and in pursuance of that conspiracy, they demanded bribe of Rs.1,500/- from PW1 on 31-10-2007, at the panchayath office for issuing the building permit to PW1. Then it was accepted on 07.11.2007 on the date of trap.
Thus the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of P.C. Act, [hereinafter referred to as the 'P.C.Act' for short] by accused Nos. 1 and 2.
The learned Special Judge ventured the matter after completing the pre-trial formalities. During trial, PW1 to PW6 were examined, Exts.P1 to P13 and MO1 to MO7 were marked from the side of prosecution. Availing the opportunity provided for adducing defence evidence, DW1 to DW3 were examined and Exts. D1 to D7 were marked on the side of the defence. CW1, a court witness also was examined and Exts. C1, C1(a) and C2 were also marked. On considering the matter on merits, the learned Special Judge found that the 1st accused/appellant herein committed offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of P.C. Act and sentenced the first accused for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act, while acquitting the second accused for want of evidence. The sentence imposed by the Special Court is as under:-
“In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions of the 1st accused/convict, he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of ₹20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only), in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months u/S.7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He is also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of ₹30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only), in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months u/S.13(1)(d) r/w.S.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The substantive sentences will run concurrently. The period of detention as remand prisoner will be allowed to get as set off u/S.428 Cr.P.C.”
The learned counsel for the appellant/first accused zealously pointed out that in this case evidence of PW1 is not reliable, since he was declared hostile to the prosecution when he denied that any person other than the Secretary, who is the appellant/first accused herein, had demanded bribe from him.
It is submitted further that as per the evidence of PW1, who had lodged application for getting building permit on 31.10.2007, the first accused demanded bribe for himself and for the second accused for an amount of Rs. 1,500/- on 31.10.2007. But as per the evidence of PW2 and Ext.P6, the first accused was on 'other duty' on 31.10.2007, and the same would show that the allegation of demand made on 31.10.2007, by the first accused is falsehood and an impossibility. Thus the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore by enlarging the benefit of doubt the 1st accused/appellant may be acquitted.
Repelling this contention, it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that even though PW1 was declared hostile, when he did not mention the overt tact against the second accused, as regards the demand and acceptance of bribe by the second accused, as regards the appellant/first accused is concerned, his evidence is convincing and the same was in tune with the allegation of the prosecution. It is also pointed out that a witness is not expected to recollect and narrate the entire version with photographic memory notwithstanding the hiatus and passage of time as held by the Apex Court in the decision in Vinod Kumar Garg. v. State (Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi) reported in [2019 KHC 7175]. Therefore minor variations in the evidence of a witness, need not be considered as serious to disbelieve the same. It is further pointed out that since the demand and acceptance of bribe by the appellant/first accused are proved by the prosecution, by the evidence of PW1 supported by the evidence of PW2 decoy witness and PW5, the Trap Laying Officer, the conviction and sentence entered into by the Special Court impugned herein do not require any interference.
In response to the rival contentions, the points to be considered are as under;
Whether the Special Court is in right in holding that the appellant/first accused committed offence punishable under Section 7 of the P.C. Act. ?
Whether the Special Court is in right in holding that the appellant/first accused committed offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act.?
Whether the verdict of the Special Court would require interference?
The order to be passed?
Point Nos. 1 to 4: In this case the prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of PW1 to find demand and acceptance of MO1 series bribe money on 07.11.2007 by the appellant/first accused in continuation of the demand made on 31.10.2007. PW1, the de facto complainant, a man aged 70 years, testified that he had made complaint before the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pathanamthitta regarding the demand of bribe by the accused. Then after 3-4 days again he went to the Vigilance office and lodged a written complaint. PW1 identified the then Secretary of Ranni Angadi Panchayath, A1, and also the 2nd accused at the dock. According to him, he had put up an application for permission before the Panchayat to construct a house in three cents of land, owned by him. Then the 2nd accused visited his land and measured the same. The application so given to the 1st accused, was tendered and marked in evidence as Ext.P1. After the visit, the second accused had informed him that permission was to be obtained from the Secretary. On the very same day, he met the Secretary and then the Secretary demanded ₹1,500/- as bribe for giving permission and he was instructed to remit some other amount in the office. PW1 replied that he did not have the money and he waited there till 3.00 p.m. and returned. During further chief examination, PW1 testified that at the panchayath office he had met only the Secretary and he had not met any other person. According to PW1, apart from Secretary, no others had demanded bribe from him. At this juncture, PW1 was declared as hostile and the court allowed him to be cross examined on this aspect, by the legal advisor representing the prosecution. During cross-examination, he admitted that Ext. P2, FIS was given by him and the same would bear his signature. Further he testified that he had given Ext.P2 and convinced of its contents thereof and what had been stated therein were true.
During further examination, PW1 given categoric evidence regarding the entrustment of three five hundred rupee notes to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and noting numbers of the same by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and he identified the said notes as MO1 series. Thereafter, MO1 series was entrusted back to him by the Deputy Superintendent of Police and he was instructed to give the same to the appellant/first accused, if he would demand for the same and also show a signal on demand of the same. Accordingly, he reached the Panchayat office at 11.30 hours and entered into the room of the Secretary/first accused. He found the Secretary alone in the room. When he enquired the purpose of his visit, he told about the permit he applied for. Soon, the Secretary asked him whether the money demanded was brought. He replied in the affirmative and handed over MO1 series to the appellant/first accused and he had accepted the same by using his right hand and put the same on his pocket. Then he was directed to remit the fee in the office. During this transaction, he could not find the second accused therein. Thereafter, he had showed the signal as instructed and the vigilance team entered into the office of the appellant/first accused. Even though PW1 was cross examined as regards to the demand and acceptance of bribe by the first accused as well as the pre and post trap proceedings his evidence in this regard was not at all shaken, except the fact that he did not support the case of the prosecution that the second accused also demanded bribe.
PW2, the independent witness for trap, the Technical Officer of District Industrial Office, Kozhenchery testified that on 7-11-2007 as per the direction of the General Manager of District Industrial Office, he had gone to Pathanamthitta Vigilance office as a trap witness and he reached there at the vigilance office at 9.30 a.m. Apart from this witness, PWD Engineer, Jayarajan also was there. The de facto complainant (PW1) also was there and he gathered details of the complaint from PW1. The de facto complainant handed over three 500 rupee currency notes. The Deputy Superintendent of Police had taken note of its numbers and initialled on the same and after smearing phenolphthalein powder on it, the same was entrusted back to the de facto complainant directing that if the appellant/first accused would again demand the same, had to be given and also instructed him to give a signal if the bribe money would be accepted by the accused. PW2 identified Ext.P3, pre-trial mahazar in this regard. At 10.45 a.m., they had started to the panchayath office, Ranni Angadi and reached there at about 12. The complainant was sent to the office. Witnesses in the vigilance party had taken positions surrounding the office. After 10 minutes, the pre-arranged signal was received. Accordingly, the Dy.S.P. along with him and other witnesses entered into the room of the Secretary (A1). PW2 identified the 1st accused as Secretary at the dock. The Dy.S.P. and these witnesses were introduced them to the appellant/first accused. Then the Dy.S.P. called PW1 to the office room and enquired about what had been transpired. Then PW1 informed that he had paid the amount when the appellant/first accused demanded the same. When Dy.S.P. enquired this aspect with the appellant/first accused, initially the first accused denied the same, but later he admitted demand and acceptance of MO1 series by him. Then PW1 disclosed that the accused accepted the amount and counted the notes. Then he had put the same in his shirt's pocket.
C.P. Gopakumar, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of VACB, the Trap Laying Officer got examined as PW5. According to him, on 07.11.2007, PW1 reached his office and given statement. Acting on the same, he had registered Ext.P10 FIR. He identified the signature therein. Then witness Nos. 2 and 3 (gazetted officers) were brought to his office and in the presence of PW1, Phenolphthalein powder test was demonstrated and three five hundred rupee notes produced by PW1 were taken into custody by preparing mahazar. According to him, he had put initials on the notes and he identified the initials and also MO1 series notes as the currency notes, so entrusted by PW1. Thereafter, the money was entrusted back to PW1 with instruction to give the same to the accused, if the first accused would demand for the same. The Sodium Carbonate Solution used for demonstration were marked as MO4 through him and pre-trap mahazar was marked as Ext.P3. He deposed further that thereafter, the vigilance party along with gazetted officers and PW1 reached the office of the first accused and PW1 was sent to the office with a direction to give signal on demand and acceptance of the bribe by the first accused. He got the signal at 12.15 p.m., and he along with the witnesses entered into the room and introduced the identity of himself and other witnesses. When he enquired to PW1, he stated that the first accused demanded Rs. 1,500/- and thereafter, it was given to him and he kept the same in the left pocket of his shirt. Though the first accused initially denied the receipt of bribe, subsequently, he had admitted the same. Then he brought the other officers in the room of the first accused and prepared Sodium Carbonate solution in four separate glasses. He deposed about the dipping of the right hand of the first accused in Sodium Carbonate Solution and its pink colour change, MO3 identified as the said bottle, containing Sodium Carbonate Solution in this regard. Similarly, when the left hand of the first accused was dipped in the Sodium Carbonate Solution, the same also showed pink colour and the bottle of Sodium Carbonate Solution got identified as MO6. Then at the instance of the second witness, the pocket of the shirt of the first accused was searched and the first witness took MO1 currency notes therefrom and when the same notes were dipped in Sodium Carbonate Solution the same showed pink colour and the bottle containing Sodium Carbonate Solution so used was identified as MO5. He also deposed about the phenolphthalein test of the pocket of the shirt of the first accused and pink colour change therein also. Then he had seized the shirt worn by the first accused and the same got identified as MO7. He also deposed the arrest of the first accused and preparation of post trap mahazar, Ext.P4 and then Exts.P5 to P8.
PW6 the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pathanamthitta, who filed the final report in this case also supported the prosecution and recorded the statements of witnesses.
On the side of defence, three witnesses were examined and the deposition rendered by them as extracted in the judgment of the trial court reads as under:-
“24.DW1, the Head Clerk of Ranni-Angadi panchayath who brought the records had given evidence. That 30 entry in building application register in page No.6 was identified by this witness and its photocopy compared with the original and found correct was marked as Ext.D1. 33 entry in page No.7 was identified by the witness. It's compared true copy was marked as Ext.D1(a). The file which this witness brought and related to T.K.Gopi's building permit. Its photocopy was marked as Ext.D2 which was having 14 pages. The attested photocopy of the building permit file of Thomas was marked as Ext.D3(a) and page Nos. 1,9, and 11 were marked as Ext.D3.
25.DW2, T.K.Gopi, who was retired from State bank of Travancore, identified the file of his application given in Ranni-Angadi panchayath for construction compound wall which he had filed on 24/10/2007. On 31/10/2007, the overseer (A2) who was there in the court came to inspect the place and this witness brought him from the panchayath office at 11 a.m. At 10.30 a.m., he was taken in an autorikshaw after inspection they reached panchayath office by noon. This witness again reached panchayath office and by 4.30 p.m. he got permit which was given by first accused. This witness denied the prosecution suggestion that A2 had not accompanied him on 31/10/2007. A2 came there and measured the compound wall.
26.DW3, P.K.Jayan, who was the U.D. clerk of the Ranni-Angadi Panchayath, for one and half years from 2007. He had given evidence that while he was working there in Ranni-Angadi Gramapanchayath, the 1 accused was the secretary and the second accused was the overseer. This witness was looking after building permit monitoring C2 section. From that section, for site inspection mostly A2 overseer was going. In some cases secretary also used to go. This witness also added that, in the absence of overseer, for sending any other official the secretary was not having any objection. On going through Ext.D1 the witness submitted that on 31/10/2007 DW2 T.K.Gopi was given building permit. On 31/10/2007, C.V Thomas (PW1) seen applied for building permit and that had been issued on 14/11/2007 and this witness identified his handwriting. On going through Ext.C1, the file of the application of T. K. Gopi, this witness identified Ext.C1(a), the handwriting in column No.11.(1) as that of the overseer (A2) and he also identified his handwriting there in Column No. 11(2) as that of case. He identified the signatures therein both as that of A1. In column No.11(1) the report given by A2 is for site inspection. This witness submitted that apart from the entries therein, there is no other report in the file. It is categorically mentioned by this witness that he had affixed permit number and date as per the instruction of the Secretary (A1). As per the report in column No.11(1) that was for granting permit no objections have been raised. Fees were calculated on the basis of permit therein. On this witness writing there in column No.11(2) along the secretary had signed it. In C1 file there is no written letter for entrusting overseer to conduct site inspection. On confronting Ext.P7 file it is submitted that there was no writings of 2 accused. Further, there was no authorization from the part of the Secretary (A1) to inspect the site by anybody and there was no report also. On showing the D3 file, this witness had identified the brief report prepared on 09/11/2007. On that day itself the Secretary (PW3) recommended to issue the permit. Whether there was any detailed report or authorization letter was there during his period, all he could not remember. In the cross-examination the witness could not remember, whether as per Building Permit Rules, Secretary had to go for site inspection. In C1(a) site inspection column No.11 entry alone was there. There was no other entry. He could not say whether there was any separate report in C1 file. He could not mention on which day column No.11(1) return entries were made. As on today's practice, that file is incomplete. On that date, that report was complete.”
On perusal of the evidence given by PW1, it could be found that during the chief examination, PW1 deposed regarding the lodging of Ext.P1 application before the appellant/first accused seeking permission for construction in his three cents of property. He also stated that the Secretary demanded Rs.1,500/- as bribe. While deposing so, he stated that except the Secretary, none others demanded bribe to him and at this juncture, the learned Public Prosecutor sought permission to cross examine him on declaring him hostile.
Here, according to PW1, the first accused/appellant herein demanded and accepted MO1 series bribe money from him, on 07.11.2007, in continuation of previous demand on 31.10.2007. Although he was declared hostile as he did not support the prosecution regarding involvement of the second accused, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 as regards to the demand and acceptance of MO1 series bribe money by the appellant/first accused. It is the well settled law that mere hostility of a witness would not take away the entire evidence of the said witness inadmissible or not reliable. Even reliable portion of a hostile witness also can be relied on to prove a fact in issue. It is pertinent to note that here in tune with the version of PW1, PW5 and PW2 deposed in support of the prosecution. In such a case the Special Court is right in giving relevance on the evidence of PW1 to prove the ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the P.C. Act. Therefore, merely because PW1 did not support the prosecution case against the second accused his evidence found to be reliable as discussed cannot be discarded and the same can safely be acted upon.
Regarding absence of the appellant, in the office on 31.10.2007, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/ first accused, based on the evidence of PW5 that on 31.10.2007, the appellant/first accused was on other duty and Ext.P6, the Attendance Register would show that he was on 'other duty'. However, DW2 examined in this case, is the person who applied for permit to construct compound wall as per Ext.D2. His evidence would show that the appellant/first accused reached his property for inspecting the same and he brought him from the office at 11.00 a.m. and he reached the office at 10.30 am for bringing him. He also deposed that he had dropped him at the office and the Secretary reached back in the office in the afternoon. He also reached the office and his permit was issued at 4.30 p.m. on the same day, signed by the appellant/first accused, the Secretary. Thus the evidence of DW2 would show that the appellant/first accused, though on 'other duty', he was available in the office on 31.10.2007.
It is judicially noticeable that when officers working in offices when posted for 'field duty' or 'other duty', the same would be noted in the attendance register to justify his absence in the office. However, recording 'on duty' in the attendance register alone is quite insufficient to hold that the officer must be absent in the office on the date shown as 'other duty'. A person on 'other duty' on field or otherwise could very well reach the office, on the date of 'other duty', after completion of the duty to do his remaining works. Therefore, merely because in Ext.P6, the appellant/first accused was recorded as 'on duty', on 31.10.2007, the evidence given by PW1 as regards to lodging of Ext.P1 application before him on 31.10.2007, supported by the evidence given by DW2 cannot be disbelieved. Thus the evidence of PW1 to the effect that, the appellant/first accused received Ext.P1 application from PW1 on 31.10.2007 and demanded bribe is liable to be believed.
In this connection it is relevant to refer a 5 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [AIR 2023 SC 330], Neeraj Dutta Vs State, where the Apex Court considered when the demand and acceptance under Section 7 of the P.C. Act to be said to be proved along with ingredients for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the P.C. Act and in paragraph 68 it has been held as under :
"68.What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:
(a)Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(b)In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
(c)Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d)In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i)if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii)On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1) (d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
(e)The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f)In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.
(g)In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1) (d) and (ii) of the Act.
(h)We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”
Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the P.C. Act is extracted above. Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the P.C. Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant. The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant. Insofar as Section 7 of the P.C. Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law.
In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala reported in [2025 KHC OnLine 983], in Crl.Appeal No.323/2020, dated 12.9.2025, wherein in paragraph No. 12, it was held as under:
“12.Indubitably in Neeraj Dutta’s case (supra) the Apex Court held in paragraph No.69 that there is no conflict in the three judge Bench decisions of this Court in B.Jayaraj and P.Satyanarayana Murthy with the three judge Bench decision in M.Narasinga Rao, with regard to the nature and quality of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for offences under Section 7 or 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, when the direct evidence of the complainant or “primary evidence” of the complainant is unavailable owing to his death or any other reason. The position of law when a complainant or prosecution witness turns “hostile” is also discussed and the observations made above would accordingly apply in light of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. In view of the aforesaid discussion there is no conflict between the judgments in the aforesaid three cases. Further in Paragraph No.70 the Apex Court held that in the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary,oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution. In paragraph No.68 the Apex Court summarized the discussion. That apart, in State by Lokayuktha Police’s case (supra) placed by the learned counsel for the accused also the Apex Court considered the ingredients for the offences punishable under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act,1988 and held that demand and acceptance of bribe are necessary to constitute the said offences. Similarly as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Aman Bhatia’s case (supra) the Apex court reiterated the same principles. Thus the legal position as regards to the essentials to be established to fasten criminal culpability on an accused are demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. To put it otherwise, proof of demand is sine qua non for the offences to be established under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988 and dehors the proof of demand the offences under the two Sections could not be established. Therefore mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of bribe or as undue pecuniary advantage or illegal gratification or the recovery of the same would not be sufficient to prove the offences under the two Sections in the absence of evidence to prove the demand.”
In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in [2026 INSC 365] in The State of Kerala v. K.A.Abdul Rasheed, the Apex Court considered the decision [(2023) 4 SCC 731], Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) and in paragraph 13 the Apex Court held as under:
“13.We pause here to notice that the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta had specifically dealt with the efficacy of the deposition of hostile witnesses. It referred with approval to Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration wherein it was held:
“52.From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”
In the present case, the evidence of PW1, duly corroborated by PW2 and PW5 (the Dy.S.P.), clearly establishes the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. Accordingly, the learned Special Judge is justified in holding that the appellant/first accused had committed the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act and therefore the conviction recorded against him does not warrant any interference. Coming to the sentence, I am inclined to modify the sentence to the statutory minimum, in consideration of the plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/first accused.
In the result:
the appeal is allowed in part and the conviction imposed by the Special Court stands confirmed;
the appellant/1st accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 2 months for the offence punishable under Sections 7 r/w 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the P.C. Act;
substantive sentence shall run concurrently and default sentence shall run separately;
The order granting bail to the appellant/1 accused and his bail bond stand cancelled with direction to the appellant/1 accused to surrender before the Special Court forthwith to undergo the modified sentence.
Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court concerned for executing the modified sentence.
