High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 BOM CK 3252

Edelweiss Financial Services Ltd. vs Multi Commodity Exchange Ltd. & Anr.

Bombay High Court · Decided on 18 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
N. J. Jamadar, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 12779 of 2026

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Judgment

67 paragraphs · 4,875 words
1.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and, with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2.

By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner takes exception to an order dated 13th May, 2026 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, Mumbai, in Chamber Summons No. 1311/2024, whereby the said chamber summons taken out by the defendant in S.C. Suit No. 1576/2015 to implead the petitioner – respondent therein, as a party defendant to the said suit, came to be allowed and the plaintiff – Respondent No. 1 herein was directed to implead the petitioner as a defendant to the said suit.

3.

The background facts leading to this petition can be stated, in brief, as under :-

3.1

Multi Commodity Exchange of India Ltd. (“MCX”), Respondent No. 1/plaintiff is a National Level Commodity Exchange recognized by the Forward Markets Commission (“FMC”) under the provisions of Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. Respondent No. 2 – defendant was the Managing Director and the Chief Executive Officer of the plaintiff from 01st July, 2012 to 22nd October, 2013. The petitioner is a company engaged in providing diverse financial services.

3.2

The plaintiff purportedly availed of the financial services of the petitioner. The plaintiff asserts that, during the tenure of the defendant as Managing Director and CEO of the plaintiff, the defendant had accorded approval on an internal note regarding two agreements with the petitioner dated 06th July, 2013 for availing two services namely :- (a) Treasury advisors to provide investment advisory services and (b) Investor and Financial Communication Advisors to provide investor and financial communication counsel and execution services.

3.3

Pursuant to the aforesaid agreements, the petitioner raised an invoice dated 01st July, 2013 for Rs.55,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Five Lakhs) purportedly towards advisory fees. The defendant granted approval for payment vide email dated 12nd July, 2013 and payment was accordingly made to the petitioner on 15th July, 2013.

3.4

Subsequently, the MCX and the petitioner, in pursuance of the meeting held on 25th August, 2013, agreed to terminate and cancel the aforesaid service agreements and a formal deed of cancellation came to be executed between the plaintiff and the petitioner. It was, inter alia, agreed that, the petitioner was not required to refund any portion of the fee of Rs.55,00,000/- paid to it by the plaintiff, the latter was not required to make any further payments, and neither party would raise any dispute or institute any proceeding against the other in any forum in the future.

3.5

It is the claim of the plaintiff that, during the special audit conducted by the Price Waterhouse Coopers Pvt. Ltd. (“PwC”) pursuant to the directions of the FMC, it transpired that, the payment of Rs.55,00,000/- to the petitioner on 15th July, 2013 was not supported by any record to indicate, whether the advise given by the petitioner was consumed by the plaintiff, that the transaction was very unusual as per the then prevailing industry practice; that the defendant had failed to obtain competitive quotes from other service providers and that there was no due diligence on the part of the defendant before sanctioning the payment. The plaintiff thus asserted that, the defendant had defrauded the plaintiff to the tune of Rs.55,00,000/-. The plaintiff thus instituted the suit for recovery of the sum of Rs. 74,04,054.79/- (Rupees Seventy Four Lakhs Four Thousand Fifty Four and Seventy Nine Paise) alongwith further interest at the rate of 18% p.a.

3.6

In the said suit, the defendant took out a chamber summons seeking impleadment of the petitioner as a party defendant to the suit. The defendant contended that, in the light of the facts of the case, the petitioner’s presence as a party to the suit was indispensable for proper adjudication of the issues that arose for determination. The agreements and transactions between the plaintiff and the petitioner were central to the plaintiff’s claim and in the absence of the petitioner, the Court would not be in a position to pass a complete and effective decree.

3.7

Both the plaintiff and the petitioner resisted the prayer for impleadment. It was contended that, the petitioner was neither a necessary party nor a proper party to the suit.

3.8

By the impugned order, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, was persuaded to allow the chamber summons opining that, to address the issues involved in the suit, the presence of the petitioner was necessary.

3.9

Being aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

4.

I have heard Mr. Akash Rebello, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Devya Shah, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1/plaintiff and Mr. Rahul Sarda, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2/defendant, at some length. With the assistance of learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on record.

5.

Mr. Akash Rebello, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would urge that, the impugned order suffers from a serious legal infirmity as the discretion to implead a party has been exercised by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, in violation of the settled principles of law. Amplifying the submission, Mr. Rebello would urge, in the plaint there is no whisper about the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged fraudulent acts attributed to the defendant, the then employee of the plaintiff. No relief has been sought against the petitioner. In fact, there is no lis between the plaintiff and the petitioner. On the contrary, the plaintiff and the petitioner have amicably terminated those service agreements by executing a deed of cancellation. Taking the Court through the terms of the deed of cancellation dated 06th September, 2013, executed by and between the plaintiff and the petitioner, Mr. Rebello would urge that, the parties have expressly agreed that, they shall not raise any issue before any forum at any point of time in future. In such a situation, the petitioner could not have been impleaded as a party defendant against the wishes of the plaintiff who is dominus litus.

6.

Mr. Rebello further submitted that, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, did not examine the issue in a correct perspective. Whether the petitioner is either a necessary or a proper party was not considered by the learned Judge, keeping in view the import of those concepts. Without properly analyzing the objections raised by the plaintiff and the petitioner, the learned Judge went on to implead the petitioner by making a general observation that to address the issues involved in the suit, the presence of the petitioner was necessary.

7.

Mr. Rebello would urge, undoubtedly the power to add or delete a party is discretionary in nature, yet, the trial Court could not have exercised the discretion without keeping in view the factors which inform the exercise of such discretion. To lend support to these submissions, Mr. Rebello placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tarun Keshrichand Shah & ors.1, and Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & ors2.

8.

Mr. Devya Shah, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 – plaintiff, consistent with the stand before the trial Court asserted that, the plaintiff does not intend to prosecute the petitioner.

9.

Mr. Rahul Sarda, the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 – defendant, however, supported the impugned order. Mr. Sarda would urge that, the very premise of the suit that a sum of Rs. 55,00,000/- was fraudulently transferred to the petitioner implies that the petitioner, who is the beneficiary of such transaction, is a necessary party when the plaintiff seeks recovery of the said amount. In such circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff is not seeking any relief against the petitioner pales in significance. Mr. Sarda would urge that, the trial Court was fully justified in observing that, to decide all the issues that cropped up for consideration in the suit, the presence of the petitioner was necessary. Such an exercise of discretion cannot be said to be perverse or legally unsustainable.

10.

Mr. Sarda would urge that, as the trial Court had exercised its discretion to implead a party who is directly involved in the transaction in respect of which the suit is instituted, this Court, in exercise of its limited supervisory jurisdiction, need not interfere with the impugned order. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Sarda placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of J. N. Real Estate Vs. Shailendra Pradhan & ors.3, and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & anr., Vs. B. Gurappa Naidu & ors4.

11.

I have given careful consideration to the aforesaid rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the parties.

12.

To start with, it may be apposite to note a few uncontroverted facts. The jural relationship between the parties, especially between the plaintiff and the defendant, is not much in dispute. The defendant was working as the MD and CEO of the plaintiff during the period 01st July 2012 to 22nd October, 2013. Secondly, the fact that service agreements were executed between the plaintiff and the petitioner, purportedly for providing financial advisory services and eventually those agreements were terminated pursuant to the cancellation agreement dated 25th August, 2013, are not much in contest. Thirdly, a sum of Rs. 55,00,000/- was paid by the plaintiff to the petitioner under the approval of the defendant. Under the cancellation agreement, the plaintiff and the petitioner have agreed, inter alia, that, the petitioner need not refund the sum of Rs.55,00,000/-, nor would the plaintiff be liable to pay any further amount to the petitioner, and that neither party would raise any dispute before any forum at any point of time in future.

13.

In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts, if the substance of the claim of the plaintiff, as is evincible from the averments in the plaint is noted, the plaintiff seeks to recover the aforesaid amount of Rs. 55,00,000/- alongwith interest thereon from the defendant on the premise that, the defendant had paid the said amount to the petitioner fraudulently, on the ground that, (a) there was no due diligence before sanctioning the invoice raised by the petitioner, (b) the payment made to the petitioner under the subject invoice was not contractually covered, (c) there was no material to show that, the advise rendered by the petitioner was consumed and (d) no competitive quotes were invited before entrusting the advisory services to the petitioner.

14.

It is imperative to note that, in the entire plaint, there is no whisper, even remotely, that, the petitioner was involved in the alleged fraudulent activities. No act of omission or commission has been attributed to the petitioner. Consequently, the plaintiff has not sought and does not profess to seek any relief against the petitioner.

15.

Keeping the aforesaid factual context in view, it is necessary to examine whether the petitioner was either a necessary or a proper party. The legal position as regards the impleadment of a person as a party to the suit is fairly well settled. Addition or deletion of a party is not an act of initial jurisdiction but that of judicious discretion. Such discretion is required to be exercised keeping in view all the circumstances. Under the provisions of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I, the Court is empowered, at any stage of the suit, to add or delete a party. From the phraseology of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I, it becomes evident that, the person who can be added as a party to the suit ought to be either (a) a person who ought to have been joined as Plaintiff or defendnat, but not impleaded or (b) any person whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to effectively and completely adjudicate upon, and settle the questions involved in the suit.

16.

In the case of Mumbai International Airport Private Limited Vs. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited and Ors.5, the Supreme Court, expounded the distinction between a necessary party and a proper party in the following term:

“15.

A `necessary party' is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the Court. If a `necessary party' is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A `proper party' is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in disputes in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.”

17.

The Supreme Court also expounded the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court in the matter of addition or deletion of the parties under Order 1 Rule 10(2) as under:

“22.

Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10(2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non-party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice.”

(emphasis supplied)

18.

Thus, the essential test to add a person as a party defendant to the suit, is whether in the absence of such person no effective decree can be passed in the suit, meaning thereby a necessary party, or though no relief is claimed against a person, the presence of such person, would assist the Court in completely and effectually adjudicating the suit, meaning thereby a proper party.

19.

On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the case at hand, it has to be seen whether the learned Judge, City Civil Court, has applied the correct test to determine whether the petitioner is either a necessary or a proper party. The nature of the claim in the suit, the averments in the plaint and the relief sought, if considered as a whole, justify a legitimate inference that, the trial Court would not find itself in such a situation where it cannot pass an effective decree in the suit. As noted above, in the entire plaint there is no averment to the effect that the petitioner, a financial service provider, was also involved in the alleged fraudulent payment of Rs.55,00,000/-towards the advisory fees.

20.

The endeavour of Mr. Sarda to salvage the position by canvassing a submission that, the assertions in the plaint that the actions and conduct of the defendant was fraudulent implies that the petitioner was also a party thereto, cannot be readily acceded to. What has been attributed to the defendant are the acts and omissions in the discharge of his duties as the MD and CEO of the plaintiff.

21.

It is imperative to note that, the execution of the two service agreements between the plaintiff and the petitioner on 06th July, 2013 as such has not been disputed. Nor the execution of the cancellation agreement dated 25th August, 2013 as such is put in contest. In the absence of pleadings, especially in the face of the mandate in Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("Code, 1908") to furnish particulars where a party relies on any misrepresentation, fraud or other vitiating element, the submissions premised on the inference of fraud by implication and that too against a party qua whom there is no pleading, cannot be countenanced. The petitioner is certainly not a necessary party to the suit.

22.

It is true, the principle of dominus litis does not give an unfettered right to the plaintiff as to whom to implead as parties to the suit. If it is demonstrated that, a person is a necessary party to the suit, then the principle of dominus litis becomes subservient to the exercise of discretion by the Court to implead such party with a view to pass an effective decree.

23.

In the case of J. N. Real Estate (supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Sarda, it was enunciated that, if a party is found to be either necessary or proper party, the Court would have the jurisdiction to implead him, even against the wishes of the plaintiff concerned.

24.

However, where the party seeking impleadment fails to satisfy that the party proposed to be impleaded is either a necessary or proper party, then the plaintiff cannot be forced to litigate against such third party. The reliance placed by Mr. Rebello, on the decision in the case of Nak Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. (supra), appears to be well founded. The observations in Paragraph Nos. 35, 37 and 38 are material and, hence, extracted below :-

"35.

In the case at hand, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not claiming any relief against the appellant. There is no iota of material to indicate that the relief, as claimed in the suit against respondent No.3, if granted, would be implemented against the appellant. Therefore, the appellant is not a necessary party to the suit. ....

37.

This apart, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit against their wishes. The decree, if any, passed in the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the appellant that is not a party to the suit.

38.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fundamental principle laid down in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das [(2018) 2 SCC 352] wherein this Court has observed:

“11.

…..

11.4.

…the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co- plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit.

11.5.

… a necessary party is one without whom, no order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding.”

25.

The thrust of the submission of Mr. Sarda was that, the fraudulent conduct is attributed to the defendant in relation to the transactions with the petitioner. The questions as to whether any advisory services were rendered by the petitioner, whether the appointment of the petitioner as financial consultant was unusual and whether the services rendered by the petitioner were utilized by the plaintiff are the matters which cannot be effectively adjudicated without the presence of the petitioner.

26.

I am afraid to accede to aforesaid submissions. As noted above, the allegation against the defendant is that the defendant had not carried out due diligence before appointing the petitioner as a financial consultant and before making the payment, and that there was no material to indicate that, the advisory services were in fact rendered and, if rendered, were utilized by the plaintiff. In the light of these assertions qua the defendant, the petitioner is not even a proper party. The aforesaid questions can very well be decided on the basis of material that may be produced by the plaintiff and the defendant. At best, the petitioner could be a witness in the event either party finds itself unable to substantiate its claim or defence, as the case may be. That, however, does not render the petitioner a necessary or proper party to the suit.

27.

The aforesaid position was expounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal (supra). The observations in Paragraph No. 14 of the aforesaid judgment are instructive and, hence, extracted below :-

"14.

It cannot be said that the main object of the rule is to prevent multiplicity of actions though it may incidentally have that effect. But that appears to be a desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objectives. The person to be joined must be one whose presence is necessary as a party. What makes a person a necessary party is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on some of the questions involved; that would only make him a necessary witness. It is not merely that he has an interest in the correct solution of some questions involved and has thought or relevant arguments to advance. The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled, therefore, must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party. The line has been drawn on wider construction of the rule between the direct interest or the legal interest and commercial interest. It is, therefore, necessary that the person must be directly or legally interested in the action in the answer, i.e., he can say that the litigation may lead to a result which will affect him legally that is by curtailing his legal rights. It is difficult to say that the rule contemplates joining as a defendant a person whose only object is to prosecute his own cause of action. Similar provision was considered in Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All ER 273, wherein after quoting the observations of Wynn-Parry, J. in Dollfus Mieg et Compagnie S.A v. Bank of England, (1950) 2 All E.R. 605, 611, that the true test lies not so much in an analysis of what are the constituents of the applicants' rights, but rather in what would be the result on the subject matter of the action if those rights could be established, Devlin, J. has stated:-"The test is `May the order for which the plaintiff is asking directly affect the intervener in the enjoyment of his legal rights." (emphasis supplied)

28.

It is true, this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction is not expected to re-appreciate, reweigh and reanalyze the evidence and the material on the basis of which the Court below has passed the order. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be resorted to as an appellate jurisdiction in disguise to correct factual errors or mere errors of law.

29.

In the case of Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd., (supra), on which reliance was placed by Mr. Sarda, the principles were culled out by the Supreme Court in the following terms :

"35.

In short, the principles laid down in the above matters is as follows:

a)

The power of superintendence under Article 227 is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a) unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals.

b)

It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record.

c)

The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal."

30.

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in the case of Rajendra Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and another6, exposited the contours of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as under :-

“85.

The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial Superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an appeal in disguise”.

86.

In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law.” (emphasis supplied)

31.

In the facts of the case at hand, the upshot of aforesaid consideration is that, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, did not adopt the correct test to decide whether the petitioner is a necessary or proper party to the suit. An order of impleadment of a person as a party defendant to the suit cannot be sustained on a general observation that, to address the issues involved in the suit, the presence of such party is necessary, especially when the plaintiff has neither made any assertions against that party in the plaint, much less, sought relief against such party, nor otherwise wishes to prosecute such party. As the learned Judge, City Civil Court, has exercised the discretion in derogation of the settled principles of law, this Court is enjoined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction and interfere with the impugned order.

32.

In the considered view of this Court, the impugned order suffers from errors of law and manifests a failure to exercise the discretion under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code, 1908 in a judicious manner. Therefore, this Court is inclined to interfere with the impugned order. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed.

33.

Hence, the following order :-

: : O R D E R : :

I) The Writ Petition stands allowed.

II) The impugned order dated 13th May, 2026, stands quashed and set aside.

III) The Chamber Summons No. 1311/2024 in SC Suit No.1576/2015 stands dismissed.

IV) The petitioner - Defendant No. 2 stands deleted from the array of the defendants.

V) It is clarified that, the observations hereinabove were confined to consider the justifiability of the impleadment of the petitioner as a party defendant to the suit only and the trial Court shall not be influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove while adjudicating the suit between the plaintiff and defendant on its own merits and in accordance with law.

VI) Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

No costs.

Footnotes

  1. 1.(2026) 3 SC 631
  2. 2.(1992) 2 SCC 524
  3. 3.2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015
  4. 4.2026 SCC OnLine SC 745
  5. 5.(2010) 7 SCC 417
  6. 6.(2019) 20 SCC 143