Eastern Coalfields Ltd. vs Malati Bhuiani And Ors

Aggrieved by the judgement and order dated September 11, 2013 passed in W.P. No.1017 of 2011, this intra-court Writ Appeal has been filed. The

judgment impugned to this appeal has been assailed on two grounds. The first is that this Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition

filed by the petitioner praying for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the appellants herein (respondent in the writ petition) to give her

appointment on compassionate grounds. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on paragraphs 24 and 25 of a judgement of a Division Bench of

this Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited vs. Sudama Das & Ors., reported in 2007 (1) CHN 851.

The case of the appellant is that the father-in-law of the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 was an employee of Eastern Coalfields Limited and was

serving in Dhanbad. After his death, his son Mahendra Bhuiani, the deceased husband of the writ petitioner, had made an application before the

General Manager, Mugma area, Eastern Coalfields Limited for providing him with an employment under the National Coal Wage Agreement - V and

the said prayer for appointment was duly approved by the authority and was communicated to the agent, Badjna Colliery on June 12, 2008 under

reference No.ECL/CGM/MA/P-II(Expl.)/2008/1283 by the Chief Personnel Manager.

According to the appellant, unfortunately the husband of the writ petitioner expired on June 19, 2008, that is, before the appointment letter could be

issued in favour of the deceased husband of the writ petitioner and he, thus, did not join his duty. According to him, the said Mahendra Bhuiani, since

deceased, did not become an employee of the Eastern Coalfields Limited as was not in service. Reliance has also been placed on a judgement in the

case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Banerjee, reported in [2008] 3 SCC 456. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, the

said judgment squarely convers his contention and relies on paragraph 13 thereof.

“13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State

of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the head office of the appellant Company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by

itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment

passed against the respondent.â€​

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/writ petitioner contends that as the approving authority had his office at Burdwan, this

Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as a part of the cause of action has arisen in Burdwa, the place where the prayer for

employment of the deceased husband of the writ petitioner had been approved by the said authority.

His next submission is that as soon as the prayer for appointment of the deceased husband of the writ petitioner/respondent no.1 was approved, it

should be taken that he was given employment under the appellant and he should be treated as a regular employee of the said company. On his death,

according to the learned adovcate for the respondent/writ petitioner, the wife of the deceased employee shall be entitled to be given appointment on

compassionate grounds. On the point of jurisdiction, we find that the appellant’s case is squarely

covered by the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Banejree [supra] wherein the apex Court had

held that the cause of action should be given the same meaning and purport as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure even for

the purpose of consideration of applications under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. According to the apex Court, cause of action should be

construed as a bundle of facts and in such cases where the entire cause of action occurred within a particular territorial jurisdiction of a High Court

only because the head office or the approving authority was stationed at another territory, the High Court under whose jurisdiction the head office was

situated would not have jurisdiction to entertain such writ application. In the instant case, the entire cause of action occurred in the district of Dhanbad

at Mugma. As such, we are contrained to hold that the writ petition ought not to have been entertained on the ground of lack of jurisdiction at the first

instance.

On the second submission made by the learned advocate for the appellant, we find that the Chief General Manager, Mugma by a letter June 12, 2008

had requested the agent Badjna Colliery to furnish certain information to the Chief General Manager so that the appointment letter of the husband of

the writ petitioner could be prepared. It appears from the records that within seven days from the date of issuance of this letter, the husband of the

writ petitioner expired on June 19, 2008. No appointment letter had been issued by the appellant before his death. As such, he could not be construed

to be in employment.

Rule 9.3.1 of the National Coal Wage Agreement â€" V clearly states that employment would be provided to a dependant of a worker who was

disabled permanently or who died while in service. In our considered view, the petitioner’s deceased husband died before any appointment letter

was issued to him by the appointing authority. Mere approval of his prayer for appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be treated as an

appointment letter and such approval did not make him an employee of the appellant as he was not in service. When the petitioner’s deceased

husband was not in service, the question of granting appointment to the petitioner on compassionate ground under the said agreement of the NCWA

did not arise.

We are of the view that the learned Judge was wrong in entertaining the writ petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and also erred in construing

the approval of appointment of the petitioner’s husband as an appointment under the appellant and in treating him as an employee. With the

reasons as aforesaid, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated September 11, 2013 passed in WP No.1017 of 2011 is set aside. There will

be no order as to costs.