AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
J.N. Sarma, J.—This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 7.4.1998 passed by the learned Single judge in Civil Rule No. 161 of 1996.
A Civil Rule was filed by the Eastern Bus Owners Association, Dibrugarh represented by its Vice-President praying the relief as follows:
Declare the act of Respondents illegal and unconstitutional and as to why the clause in the order dated 6.6.95 (Annexure-IV) requiring the countersingnature of Sibsagar and Jorhat Regional Transport Authority etc. should not be quashed and for a direction to the Respondents to frame suitable rules in compliance with Section 96(2) (xi) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Annexure- IV to the Civil Rule is quoted below:
GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY : REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY. ORDER
In the interest of travelling public periodic stage carriage permit No. 26/D/92 granted in favour of Shri Dilu Borgohain of Khalihamari, Dibrugarh in respect of Bus No. AS-06/9415 on A.M.C.-Dibrugarh-Athebari Khowangghat-Salighat-Lakowa is temporily extended up to Jorhat via Nazira-Amguri-Mariani as an experimental basis.
This permission is valid from 6.6.95 to 5.9.95 or until further orders whichever is earlier.
Subject to countersignature of Sibsagar and Jorhat.
Sd/-Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Dibrugarh Region,
There is a clause that this permit is valid subject to countersignature of Sibsagar and Jorhat.
Section 88(1) of the Act as follows:
88 Validation of permits for use gut-side region in which granted.-(1) Except as may be otherwise prescribed, a permit granted by the regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region, unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region, and a permit granted in any one state shall not be valid in any other State unless countersigned by the State Transport Authority of that other state or by the Regional Transport Authority concerned.
Provided that a goods carriage permit, granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region, for any area in any other region or regions within the same state, shall be valid in that area without the countersignature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or of each of the other regions concerned:
provided further that where both the starting point and the terminal point of a route are situate within the same State, but part of such route lies in any other state and the length of such part does not exceed sixteen Kilometres, the permit shall be vaild in the other State in respect of that part of the route which is in that other state notwithstanding that such permit has not been countersigned by the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority of that other state:
Provided also that:
(a) where a motor vehicle covered by a permit granted in one state is to be used for the purposes of defence in any other state, such vehicle shall display a certificate, in such from, and issued by such authority, as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, to the effect that the vehicle shall be used for the period specified therein exclusively for the purposes of defence and
(b) any such permit shall be valid in that other state notwithstanding that such permit has not been countersigned by the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority of that other State,
So, the section itself provides that a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in other region unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other regon, so the clause inserted in Annexure-IV is valid.
Section 88(1) came up for consideration before the Apex Court in AIR 7966 SC 455 (Bundelkhand Motor Transport Co. v. Behari Lal Chaurasia and Anr.) where in paragraph 4 it has been laid down as follows:
Except as may be otherwise prescribed, an inter, regional permit by a Rigional Transport Authority in any region, is not vaild unless the permit is counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region,
It has further pointed out in paragraph 10 as follows:
The permit being a regional permit and not an inter-regional permit, there was no part of the route for which the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa, could by countersigning the permit extend it so as to make it operative within the Rewa region. In any event as one Regional Transport Authority is not competent to sit in judgment over the discretion exercised by any other Regional Transport Authority upon whom the power is conferred in regard to a particular matter under the statute, the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Rewa, granting countersignature in the teeth of the earlier order of the Jabalpur authority was invalid.
Section 96 of the Act gives the power to the State Government to make rules for the purposes of this Chapter under the Act. Section 96 is in Chapter V of the Act and it relates to control of transport vehicles Section 96(xi) provides as follows:
(xi) The conditions subject to which, and the extent to which, a permit granted in one region shall be valid in Anr. region within the state without countersignature.
The grievance of the Petitioner-Association is that no rules having been framed by the State Government and the Petitioner is subjected to harassment and as such, this Court should give appropriate direction to the authority to frame the rules.
The rule making power is within the domain of Anr. authority and this Court normally is not expected to issue a direction to the authority to frame such a rule, if otherwise also the authority can conduct its business or affairs. But at the same time if it is alleged that absence of rules leads to arbitrariness and/or to fanciful state of affairs or leads to despotic dealing the rule of law is to be enforced to avoid arbitrariness of executive action. It should be borne in mind that absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which the whole constitutional system is based on. The rule of law means that decision should be made by application of known principle and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and otherwise a citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or any rule , it is unpredicatble and such decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with rules and law. The rule of law has freed a man from any unlimited discretion of a despotic ruler. Where discretion is absolute men has always suffered. A decision of an authority must be governed by rules, not by humour. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. In order to avoid this short of topsyturvy situation, though we refrain outselves from issuing a direction to the authority, yet, we hope and trust that the authority shall bear in mind the above observations and shall frame a rule as required u/s 96(xi) of the Act within a reasonable time.
With the above observations, we dispose of the writ appeal. It is made clear that we are not interferring with the decision of the learned single Judge, save and except as indicated above. We have heard Sri D.C. Mahanta, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant and Sri B.P. Bora, learned Sr. Govt. Advocate, Assam for the Respondents. We make no order as to costs.
