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Judgment
In Second Appeal No. 314 of 1920: This second appeal arises out of a suit for the specific performance of a contract--for the sale of the suit
land--executed by the 2nd defendant on 10th October 1913 in favour of plaintiffs. The 1st defendant, to whom the land was sold by the 2nd
defendant on 14th March 1916, is the contesting defendant. The District Munsif decreed the suit; but, on appeal by the 1st defendant, the
Subordinate Judge held that there was no contract and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appeal.
The alleged contract is evidenced by Ex. A, the material portion of which, runs as follows :--""In respect of the lands which you and others had
sold to my mother Ammoyammal on the 2nd October 1902, you executed a cultivation Muchilika to me on the 10th October 1913 specifying the
lands with particulars of numbers. The amount mentioned in the said sale deed is Rs. 600. And the amount of small loans taken from time to time is
Rs. 200. On payment being made of the total amount of Rs. 800 (Eight hundred), within the 30th Vygasi of any year whatsoever, I shall execute a
sale-deed to you in respect of the lands consisting of acres (10-52) ten and fifty two cents specified in the aforesaid sale-deed. I shall not execute a
sale-deed to any other person. Should a sale be so effected to any other person such sale shall not be valid."" It is clear that, under this document,
the promisee has the option of paying the price agreed upon, within the 30th Vygasi of any year but that he was not bound to do so. Assuming that
there was consideration for Ex. A and that there is an agreement inding on the promissor, this agreement may, in popular language, be described as
an agreement to sell. But what the 2nd defendant really did was that she bound herself to sell to plaintiffs on certain terms, if they choose to avail
themselves of the binding offer and her agreement is in truth, merely an offer which cannot be withdrawn and certainly does not connote an
agreement to buy. It is only in this sense that there can be said to have been an agreement to sell in the present case. (Helby v. Mathews (1895)
A.C. 471 per Lord Herschell, L. C.). In Dickinson v. Dodds (1876) 2 Ch. D. 463 , James, L. J. said ""Unless both parties had agreed there was
no concluded agreement""; and Mellish, L. J. said ""I am clearly of opinion that it was only an offer, although it is in the first part of it, independently
of the postscript, worded as an agreement, I apprehend that, until acceptance, so that both parties are bound, even though an instrument is so
worded as to express that both parties agree, it is in point of law only an offer and until both parties are bound, neither party is bound.
The learned Vakil for the appellants, while conceding that the 2nd defendant could not sue the plaintiffs for specific performance before the
plaintiffs tendered the price, contended that the plaintiffs must be deemed to have agreed to buy but that only the payment of the price was
postponed at their option and that this is a case of successive (as opposed to simultaneous) performance of reciprocal promises (S. 54 of the
Contract Act). But we find it difficult to follow this argument. So long as the 2nd defendant cannot charge the plaintiffs with a breach or failure to
perform though they are to begin, there never was a contract at all. The case in Charamudi v. Raghavalu 28 M.L.J. 471 was referred to in the
course of the arguments. The point now before us was neither argued nor decided in that case. The only point raised in it was whether the contract
therein was void as opposed to the rule against perpetuities. It may be that in the case of a personal contract executed so far as one party is
concerned as in South Eastern Railway v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, Ltd. (1910) 1 Ch. l2 it is binding between the parties and
no question of the application of the rule against perpetuities arises. But where the agreement is executory on both sides, with an option to one of
the parties to do as he likes, there is nothing more than a standing offer, though it may be that, during the lifetime of the promisor, the distinction
between a binding offer and a complete agreement is not of much importance as between the parties. In Charatnudi v. Raghavelu ILR (1915)
Mad. 462 the case arose between the parties and the offer was not revoked by the death of the promisor or otherwise. Hut when the offer is at an
end, e.g., (1) by the death or insanity of the promisor (See Contract Act. Section 6(4)) or (2) by the destruction of the subject matter of the offer
(See Edwards v. West (1878) 7. Ch. D. 858 of Section 56 of the Contract Act or (3) by the promisor selling it to a third party, the sale being
known to the promisee before acceptance as in Dickinson v. Dodds (1875) 2 Ch. D. 463 , there is nothing to accept. In the last case if the
undertaking not to withdraw the offer was not a mere nudum pactum but a binding undertaking it may be that the promisee might mantain an action
for damages against the promisor. But in this case the plaintiffs made no such claim against the 2nd defendant either in the Court below or in
second appeal. So far as the 1st defendant is concerned, there is no agreement, the specific performance of which can be claimed by the plaintiffs
(See Dickinson v. Dodds 4 and Second Appeal No. 2594 of 1914).
The result is the Second Appeal fails and is dimissed with costs of the 1st defendant (1st respondent).
In S. A. No. 315 of 1920.
It is conceded that this second appeal follows the result of Second Appeal No. 314 of 1920 and is dismissed with costs of the plaintiff (1st
Respondent).