Dwita Datta vs S.B.I. C.A.P. Securities Ltd

The appeal arises out of a rather terse order of rejection of September 2, 2013 by which the appellant-writ petitioner's challenge to her termination from service was dismissed with the following observation:

"The petitioner's service has been terminated by the respondent no.1. Terms and conditions of the petitioner's service are not governed by statutory rules. The appointment is contractual. An Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 2003(4) CHN 446 has held that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced in view of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act. Remedy of the petitioner, therefore, lies in proceedings other than writ proceeding."

Since no affidavit had been called for by the writ court, affidavits were required to be filed in the appeal. Indeed, an initial affidavit was filed on behalf of the employer SBI Cap Securities Limited in which it was indicated that the writ petitioner-appellant had preferred an appeal from the order of termination but the appeal had not been disposed of. However, a more recent affidavit affirmed on behalf of the employer indicates that the appellate authority had dealt with the appeal on merits and the appellant herein had been contemporaneously made aware of the order.

On behalf of the appellant, the Personnel Policy Handbook of SBI Cap Securities is placed and page 19 of such handbook is cited in respect of disciplinary action that may be commenced against employees. The relevant section in the handbook contemplates that in case of misconduct the employee will be served an explanation letter or charge-sheet and if no response is received within 15 days, the matter will be put up to the Managing Director by the inquiry officer together with the recommendations. The managing director is said to be the disciplinary authority in all cases. The provision also provides for suspension and subsistence allowance. The provision does not detail any protracted proceedings to be conducted by way of inquiry or the like but it indicates that the Chairman would be the appellate authority. Unlike in cases governed by Article 311 of the Constitution, service rules pertaining to employees in any government company or any company controlled by a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, need not provide for a protracted procedure for inquiry or receiving evidence or the like and it is possible that disciplinary proceedings are conducted in a summary manner as long as the principles of natural justice are complied with and the procedure is not unfair to the perceived delinquent. It is not for the court to prescribe what procedure ought to be followed, as long as the rules are complied with and the court finds that a reasonable opportunity was afforded to the perceived delinquent to defend himself.

In the present case, there is no dispute that a show-cause notice was issued and the writ petitioner responded thereto, whereupon the matter was considered by the managing director and an order was passed. The appellant duly exercised her right to prefer an appeal. However, the order passed by the appellate authority may not have been formally communicated to the writ petitioner prior to the writ petitioner challenging the termination in this court.

In accordance with the rules of the employer, the appellate authority was the Chairperson of the company. It so happens that the Chairperson of all the subsidiary companies of State Bank of India is the Chairperson of State Bank itself. Thus, the then Chairperson of State Bank of India considered the petitioner's appeal and was of the opinion that no wrong had been done to the petitioner. However, the Chairperson also provided for the writ petitioner to execute an affidavit-of-undertaking wherein she would undertake not to repeat the mistake that had been found in her working, whereupon the writ petitioner would be afforded a chance to continue in employment.

The more recent affidavit filed by the employer speaks of the appellate authority's order being shown to the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner being requested to execute the appropriate affidavit-of-undertaking, which the writ petitioner refused to do. This apparently happened even before the writ petitioner came to court.

At an early stage in the present appeal, between the writ petitioner changing advocates, the writ petitioner was requested to execute the relevant affidavit for the employer to be persuaded to take the writ petitioner back into service. However, it is the grievance of the appellant that she has been wronged, that there is a stigma against her and there is no requirement to execute any affidavit that would tantamount to an admission of her apparent misconduct.

The termination took place in the year 2013. On the basis of the applicable rules, it does not appear that the writ petitioner has been prejudiced by any faulty procedure or has otherwise been unfairly treated. As to the opinion of the disciplinary authority, the power of judicial review will not permit the court to tinker with the same. Indeed, the Chairperson of the organisation also found that the decision against the writ petitioner could not be faulted. It is true that the Chairperson may not have given much or any reasons in support of the appellate decision; but it is now accepted that when a decision is affirmed in an appeal by an authority which is not trained in legal matters, as long as the application of mind to the matters in issue is discovered, the court in exercise of its limited authority of judicial review will not insist on elaborate reasons to be indicated by the appellate authority.

That there was an application of mind on the part of the appellate authority is evident from the fact that an alternative was suggested by the appellate authority as the Chairperson of the organisation, which the writ petitioner openly spurned.

Since the assessment in this jurisdiction is of the decision-making process rather than the decision itself, the decision-making process in this case is not found to be at fault. The appellant-writ petitioner exercised her choice of not abiding by the request of the Chairperson to execute an affidavit-of-undertaking. There is little scope for any relief to be granted to the appellant in this jurisdiction.

For reasons other than as indicated in the order impugned, the decision of the respondents to terminate the services of the appellant-writ petitioner is upheld. FMA 1138 of 2014 and CAN 1403 of 2014 are disposed of by affirming the dismissal of W.P. 24601 (W) of 2013.

There will be no order as to costs.