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Judgment
Y.V. Narayana, J.—Challenging the decree and Judgment delivered in L.G.C. No.99 of 1989 by the 1st Respondent, this writ petition is filed.
The 2nd respondent filed the above said L.G.C. before the 1st Respondent i.e., Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, contending that in the year 1960, it acquired the land which is in the occupation of the petitioners herein an extent of Ac.7.22 cents in S.No.54/2, Peda Waltair, for the purpose of Night Soil Trenching Grounds and that, therefore, the petitioners have no right or title over the land in question. The petitioner''s case is that no doubt the land, which is in their occupation, is located in S.No.54/2 but the same does not belong to the 2nd respondent as they are the absolute owners of the said land. It is further contended that the 2nd respondent had actually acquired some other land situated in T.S. No.27/1, 27/2 and 27/3 and not the land situated in S.No.54/2. Subsequently, enquiry was conducted and the Special Court by judgment dated 29-6-1995 declared the 2nd respondent as owner of the property in an extent of Ac.6.75 cents in S.No.54/2 out of the petition schedule land and further directed the petitioners herein to deliver vacant possession of the said extent of land to the 2nd respondent. Questioning the said judgment, the present writ petition is filed.
It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that even though there is ample evidence on record which clearly shows that the land in occupation of the petitioners is not in Survey No.54/2 and it is in S.No.27/1, 27/2 and 27/3, the Special Court committed an illegality and material irregularity in not appreciating the same and thereby committed an error in allowing the L.G.C. The learned Counsel also tried to lay much emphasis on the other point, which is not connected with the merits of the case, with regard to the legality of the Judgment that was pronounced in this case by the Special Court. It is his contention that since the Judgment was not pronounced by the Members who prepared it, the same cannot be said to be a Judgment in the eye of law. According to him, the provisions of the CPC are not applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Act and if that is so, the Bench consisting of 3 Members cannot follow the provisions ofOrder XX Rule 2 of the CPC and pronounce the draft Judgment prepared by its predecessor-Bench. It is contended that a Judge is duty bound to hear the arguments of the parties before pronouncing a Judgment and that since the learned Members of the Bench who had actually pronounced the Judgment in this case did not hear the arguments such Judgment is not a Judgment in the eye of law.
As far as the contention with regard to the merits of the case is concerned, we have perused the entire Judgment and found no illegality nor irregularity in appreciating the evidence. There is reliable documentary evidence in the form of Exs.A17, C1, Ex.A21, A24 and A25, which categorically show that Survey No.54/2 is (he revised survey number, which corresponds to the old Survey Nos.27/1 to 27/3 of Peda Waltair village, which was acquired under Award No.4/60 dated 7-12-1960 for the purpose of Night Soil Trenching Grounds. The evidence further established that though by the time of passing of the award the new survey No.54/2 was very much available, the old survey Nos.27/l to 27/3 were allowed to continue in the award and therefore there is discrepancy in the survey number, because of which the petitioners now want to take advantage. The petitioners, it is in evidence that, were in the know of things about the change of survey numbers and they wantonly kept quiet at the time of passing of the award. Therefore, in view of the voluminous documentary evidence on record, the Special Court recorded a finding of fact that the Municipality is the owner of the land in question. There are no merits in the contention of the petitioners on this point.
We are also unable to accede to the other contention of the petitioners that provisions of CPC are not applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Act and, (herefore, the judgment pronounced by the existing Bench cannot be said to be a Judgment in the eye of law. Before dealing with this contention, few facts are necessary to be narrated here for better understanding of the issue. The then Members of the Bench consisting of Justice P. Kodanda Rammayya as Chairman, Sri M.J. Vijaya Vardhana Rao as Judicial Member and Sri V. Rajaiah as Revenue Member, heard arguments and reserved the L.G.C. for Judgment. Later on, Judgment was also prepared by it and the same was to be pronounced on 12-10-1992. As per the docket entry dated 12-10-1992, a representation was made before the Bench that this Court by Order dated 30-9-1992 made in some writ proceedings stayed all Further proceedings including pronouncement of Judgment in the L.G.C. Therefore, the Bench could not deliver the Judgment which was made ready as on that date. Meanwhile during the currency of the stay order passed by this Court, the Chairman of that Bench retired and subsequently Sri Justice lyyapu Panduranga Rao assumed office as new Chairman. On 3-4-1995, it was represented before the existing Bench consisting of Justice Iyyapu panduranga Rao and other Members that the stay order granted by the High Court was vacated. Thereafter, the said Bench heard further arguments. Objection was, however, taken before that Bench that the Judgment prepared by the erstwhile Bench could not be pronounced by the existing Bench as the provisions of CPC are not applicable. The Bench ruled out that objection and pronounced Judgment. As already pointed out, the same contention has been reiterated before us. But, in our opinion, the provisions of the CPC are very much applicable to the proceedings under the Act insofar as they are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. This is what is the purport of Section 9 of the Act. Section 9 reads thus:
" 9. Special Court to have the powers of the civil Court and the Court of Sessions :--Save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court and for the purposes of the provisions of the said enactments, Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court, or as the case may be, a Court of Session and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor."
A plain reading of Section 9 leaves no doubt about the power of the Special Court to follow the provisions of the CPC, provided they are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act. Of course, sub-section (5-D) of Section 7 of the act empowers the Special Court to follow its own procedure which shall not be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code. But, this provision shall be read along with Section 9. A combined reading of the provisions of Section 7 (5-D) and Section 9 makes it clear that even though the provisions of Section 7 excludes the applicability of CPC to the proceedings under the Act, Section 9 is an exception to the said provision. Thus, it cannot be said that the provisions of the CPC are wholly not applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Act. Having gone through the entire Act and the Rules, we find no provision which is similar to the provisions of Order XX Rule 2 CPC, following which the Judgment was pronounced in the L.G.C., and therefore it cannot be said that the provisions of Order XX Rule 2 CPC are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The Special Court, therefore, did no mistake in pronouncing the Judgment by following the provisions of the CPC.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners, however, cited some judgments viz. Surendra Singh and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , Pabbati Shankaraiah and Others Vs. Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Warangal, , The Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam Vs. Smt. B. Lalita Devi and Others, . Siirendra Singh''s case (supra) arose under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Criminal Appeal was heard by the Division Bench consisting of Justice Bhargava and Justice Kidwai and the matter was reserved for Judgment. Later, Justice Bhargava prepared the Judgment, signed no each page without date and sent the same to Justice Kidwai. Before the Judgment could be pronounced, Justice Bhargava died and on 5-1-1953, Justice Kidwai delivered the Judgment on his behalf and on behalf of Justice Bhargava. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court holding that:
"Upto the moment the judgment is delivered Judges have the right to change their mind. Therefore, however much a draft judgment may have been signed beforehand, it is nothing but a draft till formally delivered as the judgment of the Court. It follows that the Judge who ''delivers'' the judgment, or causes it to be delivered by a brother Judge, must be in existence as a member of the Court, at the moment of delivery so that he can, if necessary, stop delivery and say that he has changed his mind." (para 12)
In our opinion, the facts of the above cited case and the facts of the case on hand are different In this case, Sri Justice Kodanda Ramayya, who prepared the judgment, had just retired from service but he was still in ''existence'' unlike in the case cited supra. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. The case in P. Shankaraiah v. I.T.O., Warangal (supra) arose under Article 226 of the Constitution. The matter was heard by Justice Vaidya and reserved for judgment. Later, judgment was prepared but before it could be pronounced, Justice Vaidya passed away. Subsequently, the matter came up before Justice Alladi Kuppuswami (as he then was) for pronouncement of the judgment prepared by Justice Vaidya. Justice Kuppuswami, however, did not pronounce it but heard arguments afresh and delivered his own judgment. Learned Counsel for the petitioners sought to highlight the said judgment as a precedent in all cases. Since Justice Kuppuswami was of the opinion that the rule enunciated in Order XX Rule 2 CPC is inapplicable to the writ proceedings, he prepared another Judgment and pronounced the same. In this case, we have already held that the rule enunciated in Order XX Rule 2 CPC is very much applicable to the proceedings in the instant case, which are initiated under the provisions of A.P. Land Grabbing (P) Act. Therefore, the ratio in the above referred case cannot be applied to the case on hand. Even in the case 3rd cited above, there is no observation which lends support to the case of the petitioners. The purport of the Judgment rendered by the Division Bench in that case is that the Special Court constituted under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982, is not bound to follow the ''rigours'' of the provisions of the CPC as it is governed by a special enactment, but in our view, it is still empowered to follow those provisions of the CPC which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the special enactment (Section 9) and the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the above judgment is also of no use for the petitioners. There are no merits in the writ petition.
In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.