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Judgment
Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.
The present CRLMC No. 2002 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 BNSS, corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, for quashing the order dated 6th May, 2026 passed by the learned Nyayadhikari, Gram Nyayalaya, Semiliguda in G.R. Case No.102 of 2023. The accompanying interlocutory application seeks a stay of further proceedings in G.R. Case No. 102 of 2023.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
Semiliguda P.S. Case No. 99 of 2023 was registered on 20 July 2023 on a complaint made by the petitioner’s brother. The prosecution alleges that Durgadatta Sasani alias Jani, though belonging to the Brahmin community, assumed a Scheduled Tribe identity and used allegedly forged caste and related documents to obtain reservation benefits in education, including medical education, and subsequently secure appointment as an Assistant Doctor. The FIR also alleges use of different names and parentage particulars in educational records and a threat to kill the complainant through a poisonous injection.
The petitioner was taken into custody on 27 December 2023 and was subsequently released on bail. Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet dated 12 September 2024 was submitted for offences under Sections 468, 471, 420, 506 and 419 IPC. The prosecution case is substantially document-based and involves caste certificates, school and college records, voter lists, certificates and other official or collateral records. The criminal proceeding is registered as G.R. Case No. 102 of 2023 before the Nyayadhikari, Gram Nyayalaya, Semiliguda.
During trial, the complainant/prosecution filed an application dated 20 April 2026 seeking permission to produce and mark additional documents, including certified copies of order sheets, documents connected with a death certificate, an affidavit, a death report, correspondence from Gram Panchayat authorities, statements and reports, and voter lists for different years. The prosecution claimed that these documents were material for adjudication and that copies of relevant documents had been seized by the Investigating Officer, while some originals were allegedly in the possession of the accused.
The accused filed a written objection on 24 April 2026, denying that any original documents were in his possession and opposing the proposed marking of copies.
By order dated 6 May 2026, the Gram Nyayalaya allowed the prosecution to proceed with marking the intended copies as exhibits, while leaving their ultimate admissibility and evidentiary value to be considered during or at the conclusion of trial.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions:
The petitioner contends that the prosecution deliberately failed to produce the documents during investigation and sought to introduce them only after submission of the charge-sheet and commencement of trial. According to him, this belated attempt casts serious doubt on the genuineness, authenticity and credibility of the documents. He further denies that any of the alleged originals are in his possession and asserts that the prosecution is advancing a factually false explanation merely to overcome its earlier failure to collect or preserve the original material.
ii) It is argued that the foundational requirements of Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act were not satisfied. The prosecution allegedly produced no proof of the existence and execution of the originals, no satisfactory account of efforts made to obtain them, no proof explaining whether they were lost, destroyed or withheld, no notice requiring the petitioner to produce them, and no authentication establishing that the tendered copies were true and faithful reproductions. The petitioner relies upon Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. V. Shakrishnan1 for what he describes as a mandatory two-stage test governing secondary evidence.
iii) The petitioner submits that the lower court granted blanket permission without examining each document separately. Although voter lists and some official records may qualify as public documents, applications, affidavits, statements and collateral documents do not automatically become public documents merely because they are kept by a public authority. He emphasizes that a certified copy of a public record containing a private document may establish that the document was filed or recorded, but does not by itself prove its execution or the truth of its contents.
iv) Since the principal charges concern forgery and use of forged documents, the petitioner argues that production and forensic examination of the originals are particularly important. According to him, alterations, handwriting characteristics and other forensic markers cannot reliably be examined from photocopies, which may themselves be manipulated. In the absence of the original copies, the allegedly forged documents and evidence connecting the petitioner with their creation, secondary copies cannot establish the foundational ingredient of making or using a false document under Sections 468 and 471 IPC.
The petitioner characterises the impugned order as mechanical because the Gram Nyayalaya permitted the documents to be marked while postponing questions of admissibility and evidentiary value until final adjudication. He argues that this amounts to abdication of the court’s evidentiary gatekeeping function and forces him to defend himself throughout trial against potentially inadmissible material. On that basis, he invokes the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to prevent abuse of process and seeks quashing of the order dated 6 May 2026.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LOWER COURT FINDINGS:
Learned Gram Nyayalaya made the following observations:
The Gram Nyayalaya accepted two factual premises: that the copies sought to be marked had been seized by the Investigating Officer and already formed part of the case record, and that the complainant’s affidavit indicated that some originals were in the possession of the accused. The court treated the affidavit as sufficiently explaining why the originals had not been produced during investigation, observing that it disclosed a “strong possibility” of certain originals being with the accused. Its conclusion was therefore based primarily on the prosecution’s affidavit and the presence of the copies in the police record.
The court classified the copies as secondary evidence and reproduced the principal situations contemplated by Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. It reasoned that secondary evidence may be considered where the original is or appears to be in the possession of the opposite party, where the original is unavailable for a reason not arising from the producing party’s default, or where the document is public or its certified copy is legally permitted. The order, however, did not expressly record compliance with a notice under Section 66 or identify the precise statutory clause applicable to each individual document.
Considerable weight was placed on the truth-seeking function of criminal adjudication. Since the allegations under Sections 468, 471, 420, 506 and 419 IPC largely revolve around documentary material, the court held that the possibility of the copies assisting in discovering the truth could not be ruled out at an “inchoate” stage of trial. It considered outright exclusion more likely to prejudice the complainant than provisional marking was likely to prejudice the accused.
The central distinction drawn by the lower court was between marking a document as an exhibit and finally accepting it as admissible or reliable evidence. It held that permitting a copy to be marked did not conclusively determine its admissibility, proof, authenticity or evidentiary weight; those matters could be evaluated during the trial and while appreciating the evidence at its conclusion. The court also regarded cross-examination as an adequate safeguard against prejudice to the accused.
Analytically, the order adopts a permissive, trial-stage approach but does not undertake a document-by-document examination of whether each item is a public document, a certified copy legally receivable in evidence, or a copy requiring a separate foundation under Sections 65 and 66, nor does it make a definitive finding that the originals actually exist and are in the petitioner’s possession, relying instead on the complainant’s assertion and a “strong possibility.” These omissions constitute the principal grounds on which the petitioner has challenged the order; their ultimate legal effect remains for the High Court to determine.
Relying on the affidavit, the documentary nature of the prosecution case, and the opportunity for cross-examination, the Gram Nyayalaya concluded that allowing the documents to be marked would serve the interests of justice, truth and fair trial. It accordingly allowed the prosecution’s application and fixed the matter for the complainant’s evidence, without finally ruling on the admissibility or probative value of any particular document.
IV. THIS COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
Heard Learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the documents placed before this Court.
It is trite in law that primary evidence constitutes the best evidence of the contents of a document, whereas secondary evidence is an exception permitted only in circumstances recognised by law. Before a party can successfully rely upon a copy under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, it must establish the existence of the original and the foundational circumstances bringing its non-production within one of the statutory clauses.
In Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan2, the Supreme Court clarified that the introduction of secondary evidence involves a two-step process. The party must first establish its legal entitlement to lead secondary evidence by laying the requisite foundation under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, it must establish the existence of the original and the foundational circumstances bringing its non-production within one of the statutory clauses:
“Therefore, the introduction of secondary evidence is a two-step process, wherein, first, the party must establish the legal right to lead secondary evidence, and second, they must prove the contents of the documents through that evidence. The twin requirements are conjunctive.”
Equally, mere marking of a copy as an exhibit does not establish its contents, truth or probative value. An exhibit mark is not a judicial certificate of authenticity. The Court must still determine whether the document has been proved in the manner known to law.
However, the present proceeding arises from an order of a Gram Nyayalaya. Section 30 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008 confers a wider evidentiary discretion upon such court and reads as follows:
“A Gram Nyayalaya may receive as evidence any report, statement, document, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).”
The statutory language makes it evident that a Gram Nyayalaya is not invariably prohibited from receiving material merely because the same may not, at the stage of its production, strictly satisfy every requirement governing admissibility under the Evidence Act. The object is to enable an accessible and effectual adjudicatory process without being unduly constrained by technical rules of reception.
Nevertheless, Section 30 does not create a legal fiction that every document received by a Gram Nyayalaya stands proved or that its contents must necessarily be accepted as true. The power to “receive” material is distinct from the judicial exercise of determining its authenticity, reliability and probative worth. The discretion under Section 30 must be exercised judicially and cannot become a substitute for proof where the Court proposes to rely upon the contents of a document for recording a finding, particularly one carrying penal consequences.
Therefore, the principles underlying Sections 65 and 66 of the Evidence Act continue to furnish important safeguards while assessing whether and to what extent a copy may be acted upon. Where the prosecution alleges that the original is in the possession of the accused, the Court must examine the factual basis of that assertion and consider compliance with Section 66, unless the case falls within a recognised exception. Likewise, where a document is claimed to be a certified copy of a public document, its character and legal mode of proof must be determined independently.
A private application, affidavit, statement or collateral record does not acquire the character of a public document merely because it is preserved in a public office. The distinction between a public document and a public record of a private document must be maintained. A certified copy may prove the fact that a private document was filed or retained, but it does not necessarily prove its execution or the truth of every statement contained therein.
This Court also finds substance in the submission that a greater degree of caution is necessary where the very allegation concerns fabrication or forgery of documents. Photocopies may not disclose alterations, erasures, ink variations, handwriting features or other forensic indicators capable of examination from the original. Therefore, if the prosecution ultimately seeks to establish the act of forgery or connect the Petitioner with the making of a false document, the mere production of a photocopy cannot relieve it of the burden of proving the ingredients of the alleged offences.
The impugned order is not happily worded insofar as it suggests that the question of admissibility may invariably be deferred until conclusion of the trial. An objection which goes to the inherent admissibility of a document is required to be addressed when the document is tendered or before the Court proceeds to rely upon it. The Court cannot postpone every foundational objection and subsequently base its conclusion upon material which was never legally proved.
Yet, that infirmity must be considered in the correct procedural perspective. The Court below has not returned any finding regarding the truth of the documents, nor has it relied upon them to determine the guilt of the Petitioner. The order merely permits the copies to be brought on record, expressly leaving their admissibility and evidentiary value open for scrutiny. The copies were stated to have been seized during investigation and the complainant has filed an affidavit asserting that some originals are in the possession of the Petitioner. Whether that assertion is ultimately established is a matter for evidence.
The inherent power preserved under Section 528 of the BNSS is extraordinary in character. It is intended to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is not a substitute for an appeal against every interlocutory order, nor can it be employed to convert the High Court into a parallel trial forum for adjudicating disputed questions of fact and evidence.
In State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni3, the Supreme Court cautioned that at an early stage the Court is not required to appreciate the evidence to determine whether the materials would ultimately be sufficient to convict the accused. Though the said decision arose in the context of consideration of charge, the underlying principle of judicial restraint against premature appreciation of evidence remains relevant. The relevant excerpts are produced below:
“The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”
The present dispute pertains to the mode of reception and proof of documentary material at a nascent stage of trial. The Petitioner shall have the opportunity to cross-examine the relevant witnesses, dispute the existence and custody of the originals, challenge the genuineness of each copy and invite a specific ruling concerning its admissibility and probative value. The Court below also possesses sufficient authority to direct production of originals or summon the concerned public records wherever necessary.
If this Court were to exercise its inherent jurisdiction against every debatable evidentiary order passed during trial, the same would result in fragmentation of criminal proceedings and repeated interlocutory scrutiny by the High Court. Such exercise is neither contemplated by Section 528 of the BNSS nor warranted on the facts of the present case.
This Court, therefore, finds that although the objections raised by the Petitioner require careful consideration by the Court below, the impugned order does not presently disclose such manifest abuse of process or irreversible prejudice as would justify its quashing in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
In order to preserve the rights of the Petitioner and ensure a fair trial, the learned Nyayadhikari shall proceed in accordance with the following observations:
mere marking of any copy as an exhibit shall not be treated as proof of its execution, contents, authenticity or truth;
the admissibility and mode of proof of each document shall be considered separately, having regard to its nature as a public, private or collateral document;
where the prosecution seeks to rely upon secondary evidence, the foundational facts relating to the existence and non-production of the original shall be duly established, and the requirements of Sections 65 and 66 shall be kept in view;
the allegation that any original is in the possession of the Petitioner shall not be accepted merely on assertion, without giving him an adequate opportunity to controvert the same;
the Petitioner shall be afforded full opportunity to cross-examine the concerned witnesses and challenge the genuineness, admissibility and evidentiary value of the documents;
no adverse finding shall be founded upon any such copy unless the Court records a reasoned conclusion that the document is capable of being relied upon under Section 30 of the Gram Nyayalayas Act and has otherwise been sufficiently authenticated.
V. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is not persuaded to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to quash the order dated 6th May, 2026 passed by the learned Nyayadhikari, Gram Nyayalaya, Semiliguda in G.R. Case No.102 of 2023.
Accordingly, the CRLMC stands dismissed, subject to the observations and directions made hereinabove. It is clarified that this Court has expressed no opinion on the genuineness, admissibility or evidentiary value of any particular document or on the merits of the prosecution case.
The connected interlocutory application for stay also stands disposed of. The learned Court below shall proceed with the trial in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation touching upon the factual merits of the case.
Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.