Durga Dass vs Surinder Nath

V.K. Mehrotra, J.—Two submissions have been made before me by Shri B.B. Vaid in support of this second appeal which has been filed by one of the Defendants The first is that the trial court was bound to have afforded an opportunity to the Defendants to examine themselves as witnesses even though the two Defendants, who were, admittedly, present before the Court, had not asked for it.

A perusal of the judgment of the courts below shows that repeated opportunities were afforded to the Defendants to produce evidence. They did not avail of that opportunity. The trial court closed their evidence on March 16, 1967. The Defendants were present before the court. They did not make any prayer that they be examined as their own witnesses. The trial court was, in the circumstances, justified in proceeding on the basis that there was no evidence in support of the plea put forward on behalf of the Defendants in the written statement.

It was urged by Shri Vaid that inasmuch as the defenders were illiterate people the court was bound, if not in law-then, in equity, to have itself asked them to appear as witnesses in. the case. Suffice it to say that no material has been pointed out to me from which it can be inferred that they were illiterate. No legal provision or precedent has been shown which casts such a burden on the court in a situation of the nature present in this case.

The second submission made by Shri Vaid is that inasmuch as Kanta Devi was permitted to occupy the quarters while she was in the service of the Plaintiff, she would be treated to have become the tenant of the Plaintiff in law entitling her to the protection of the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987. The attention of the court was drawn by Shri Vaid to the provision contained in Section 14(3)(a)(ii) which provides that a landlord can apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession if the residential building was let out to the tenant for use as residence by reasons of his being in service or employment or the landlord, and the tenant has ceased to be in such service or employment.

The submission, founded upon this provision is that the fact that Smt. Kanta Devi was permitted to occupy the out-houses while she was working as a maid servant, would imply that the rendering of service was in the nature of rent which she was paying to the Plaintiff and had thus become a tenant of the out-houses. The argument cannot be accepted. The intendment of the provision aforesaid is that the premises is let out to an employee, for reason of his employment as a tenant as understood in law. It would not cover the case of a mere licensee who may be permitted to occupy some premises belonging to the landlord during the period of the employment of the licensee with the landlord.

The finding of both the courts below is that Smt. Kama Devi was granted license to occupy the out-houses while she was in employment with the Plaintiff. As such, the occupation of the Defendants there after became that of a trespasser.

There is no error in the view taken by the courts below. The appeal does not raise any substantial question of law and is dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure.