Madan Singh vs State of Rajasthan

Farjand Ali, J

By way of filing this instant petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 05.07.2014 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bikaner in Criminal Revision No. 72/2013 (Krishan Kumar v. State & Anr.), whereby the order of taking cognizance dated 02.02.2013 passed by the learned A.C.J.M. No.4, Bikaner was set aside and respondent No.2 was discharged.

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that on 28.08.2012, the petitioner had gone near Man Mandir to meet a relative, when respondent No.2, allegedly in a drunken state and in police uniform, arrived with another person. The petitioner was asked to accompany them to the police station, and upon seeking reasons, was allegedly abused, assaulted, and forcibly taken to Jai Narayan Vyas Colony Police Station. There, he was allegedly beaten and wrongfully detained in the lock-up until released under pressure from the public and his relatives. Despite assurance from the SHO, no action was taken against respondent No.2. Consequently, the petitioner filed a private complaint on 27.09.2012, whereupon statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. were recorded. Based on the same, the learned A.C.J.M. No.4, Bikaner took cognizance against respondent No.2 for offences under Sections 341, 323, 342, 504, and 506 IPC. Respondent No.2 challenged the said order by filing a revision, which was allowed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bikaner on 05.07.2014, resulting in the setting aside of the cognizance order and discharge of respondent No.2. Aggrieved thereby, the present revision petition has been preferred.

Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record.

It is a settled position of law that the protection under Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is not a shield for arbitrary, mala fide, or patently illegal acts committed by public servants under the guise of official duty. The legislative intent behind Section 197 is to prevent vexatious litigation against public functionaries for bona fide actions performed in the course of official functions—not to grant them a license to commit criminal acts with impunity. For invocation of the statutory bar on cognizance under Section 197, it must be demonstrated that the act in question was so integrally connected with the discharge of official duty that it could be said to have been performed while acting or purporting to act in such capacity. The mere fact that the accused is a police official does not ipso facto bring his actions under the protective ambit of Section 197 unless there exists a reasonable nexus between the act and the official duty.

It is now well recognized that the section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission committed by a public servant while on duty, but is confined in scope to only such acts which are so closely interlinked with the discharge of official functions that they can reasonably be said to have been performed in the course of or by reason of such duty. If, on a prima facie evaluation of facts, it is found that the impugned act bears no proximate or reasonable connection with the discharge of official duties, the protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. would stand excluded.

In the instant case, the alleged act of forcibly picking up the petitioner from a public place without any registered criminal case, confining him unlawfully, subjecting him to custodial violence, and subsequently releasing him under public pressure, cannot be said to be an act done “while acting or purporting to act” in discharge of official duty. These acts appear to be wholly dehors the legal authority and beyond the scope of any lawful police procedure. The alleged misconduct, far from being connected with any investigation or legitimate exercise of power, prima facie reflects an abuse of position. It is well established that illegal acts—such as wrongful confinement, abuse, and physical assault—do not fall within the lawful sphere of duty, and thus do not attract the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C.

Even where a public servant exceeds the limits of authority, a degree of protection may be claimed if the act is broadly referable to the discharge of official duty. However, where the act is entirely alien to official duty—such as arbitrary detention without any criminal case, or custodial assault without lawful justification—the bar under Section 197 is inapplicable. The Courts have consistently held that no protection can be extended where the act is patently illegal and bereft of any official justification. The law does not contemplate that public office be used as a cloak for lawlessness.

The jurisprudence surrounding Section 197 Cr.P.C. further clarifies that the protection it affords is neither blanket nor automatic, and applies only when the alleged act is reasonably connected with the discharge of official duties. The expression “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty” contemplates acts that are either directly part of the public servant’s lawful functions or are ostensibly done in furtherance thereof. The provision, however, cannot be invoked to shield conduct which is plainly illegal or committed for personal reasons under the guise of authority. The protection is designed to advance public interest by enabling officers to discharge their lawful duties fearlessly, not to permit impunity for acts that are arbitrary, mala fide, or ultra vires the law.

The law is equally clear that even when a public servant exceeds the scope of lawful authority, the act may still fall within the protective umbrella of Section 197 if it retains a reasonable nexus with official duty. However, if the act is wholly unconnected—such as wrongful confinement of an individual without any pending case, infliction of physical violence in the absence of custodial necessity, or arrest without legal justification—such conduct is not a mere excess but a departure from duty itself. In such cases, the protection under Section 197 stands excluded. The nature and quality of the act must be examined; only if the act is so integrally linked to official function that it can be postulated as having been done in discharge of duty, will the statutory bar apply. Otherwise, any cognizance taken by the court without sanction remains valid and unimpeachable in law.

Hence, in the present matter, the alleged conduct of the respondent No.2 does not attract the embargo under Section 197 Cr.P.C., and the trial court was justified in taking cognizance without requiring prior sanction. The revisional court, in setting aside such cognizance on the ground of absence of sanction, appears to have misapplied the scope and object of Section 197 Cr.P.C.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no legal infirmity in the order dated 02.02.2013 passed by the learned A.C.J.M. No.4, Bikaner, whereby cognizance was rightly taken against respondent No.2 without awaiting sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C., as the alleged acts prima facie appear to be outside the ambit of official duty. The revisional order dated 05.07.2014 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bikaner, setting aside the cognizance and discharging the accused, is thus unsustainable in law and deserves to be quashed.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 05.07.2014 is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Revisional Court with a direction to specifically consider and return a finding on the core issue—whether the alleged act of forcibly picking up a person from a public place without any registered case, beating him, forcibly confining him in a police lock-up, and releasing him only upon public pressure, can be considered as an act done in the discharge of official duty. The Revisional Court shall, in light of settled judicial precedent, clarify whether such conduct can attract the statutory protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., bearing in mind that the protection is intended only for lawful acts done in furtherance of public duty—not for unlawful, arbitrary, or extraneous actions masked as official conduct.

Accordingly the instant revision petition is disposed of.