Dr. V. Balasundaram vs Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and Others

K. A. Swami, C.J.—Learned Government Pleader is present and be is directed to lake notice. Accordingly, we have heard him.

This writ appeal is preferred against the order dated 23rd July, 1993 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petitions 12798 and 12883 of

1993. The petitioner in Writ Petition 12833 of 1993 is the appellant in this writ appeal.

In the writ petitions, the petitioners sought for quashing the order bearing G.O.Ms. No. 366 dated 11th May, 1993, naming one of the Districts

in the State as ''Villupuram Ramasamy Padayatchiar District''. Alternatively, it was also prated that the appellation ''Padayatchiar'' to the name of

Ramasamy be directed to be dropped as according to the petitioner, it is a caste appellation. Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition.

During the course of the order, learned single Judge has also observed that the petitioners have looked at the whole issue with the jaundiced eye.

Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that as ''Padayatchiar'' denotes the caste and the w hole object of the

constitution is to establish a casteless society, the very act of the State Government leads to encouraging a particular caste and it also creates an

apprehension in the mind of the residents of the District, which consists of several communities that Padayatchiars would have an upper hand over

the others. Learned senior counsel has also placed reliance on the preamble to the Constitution, Articles 14, 17 and 38 and also certain

observations made in Indra Sawhney etc. etc Vs. Union of India and others, etc. etc., . Learned senior counsel has specifically referred to

paragraphs 22, 23, 24. 25. 26, 27 and 399 (of SCC) : (Paragraphs 143, 144. 145, 146, 147, 148 and 371 of AIR). Of course, during the course

of the arguments, learned senior counsel also referred to S. 189 of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, S. 228 of the City Corporation Act,

S. 266 of the Madurai Corporation Act and also to S. 266 of the Coimbatore Corporation Act. The provisions contained therein relate to naming

the street with the approval of the State Government, So, at the outset, we may say that those provisions have no relevancy.

It may be relevant to notice that power of the State Government to form a District or to bifurcate a District into two or more is referable to the

Tamil Nadu District Limits Act, 1865, which contains only one section and it reads as follows :--

Power to alter limits of Districts or Zilas :--

It shall be lawful for the State Government from time to time, to alter the limits of existing Districts or Zilas.

Therefore, it follows that it is open to the State Government to create a new District out of an existing Districts. As far as the naming of the District

is concerned, it is not in dispute that the person after whom the District is named, was known as Ramasamy Padayatchi. The letters ''iar'' appended

to Padayatchi only represent the respect shown to the person. Therefore, the last letters ''far'' have no other meaning and do not tend to create any

apprehension in the mind of the people with regard to any caste. When the person after whom the District is named, was known as Ramasamy

Padayatchi and there is no legal bar in naming a district after a personage, we do not see anything wrong in naming the District with the full name of

the person, and by doing so, we also do not sec that the Stale will be encouraging one caste or the other. If, in fact, the District had not been

named with the full name of the person after whom it is named, probably, it would have become difficult to identify as to after whom it is named

because there are several person by name ""Ramaswamy"". Further the persons related to him would have raised an objection that full name had not

been taken as the person was known as ""Ramasamy Padayatchi"" and not as ""Ramasamy"" only. The contention that the act of the State

Government is opposed to the preamble of the Constitution and also other provisions contained in Articles 14, 17 and 38 of the Constitution, is

difficult to appreciate. When once it is not disputed that the person was known as ""Ramasamy Padayatchi"" only and the District is named after him,

by doing so there is no question of encouraging one community or the other. Merely because ""Padayatchi"" is one of the communities in the State

and the district in question it cannot be held that the District is named after one of the communities or the castes of the State, It is named after the

well known person of the area and he was known as ""Ramasamy Padayatchi"" only. Therefore, we do not see any contravention of the provisions

contained in Arts. 14, 17 and 38 of the Constitution, and it is not at all possible to hold that it is opposed to the very spirit of the Constitution

contained in its preamble. The observations relied upon by the learned senior counsel in Indra Sawhney etc. etc Vs. Union of India and others, etc.

etc., as contained in the paragraphs referred to above, also do not come to the aid of the appellant to hold that the naming of the District after

Ramasamy Padayatchi"" is an illegal or an unauthorised, act of the State Government. Therefore, we do not see any ground to interfere with the

order of the State Government naming the District as ""Ramasamy Padayatchiar"" after the person who was known as ""Ramasamy Padayatchi"".

The last submission made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant deserves to be accepted. It relates to an observation made in

paragraph No. 21 of the order of the learned single Judge, which reads thus:--

Hence I am of the view that the petitioners have looked at the whole issue with the jaundiced eye"".

In this regard, it is relevant to notice that every citizen is entitled to approach this court seeking the relief, which he bona fide believes that he is

entitled to seek. He may, ultimately be found to be wrong in his belief. That does not, unless the facts and circumstances of the lease warrant,

entitled the court to make an observation, which affects the image of the person, who approaches the Court. Of course, if the facts and

circumstances established in the case warrant an observation, the Court should not hesitate to make an observation even though it affects the very

image of the person who approaches the Court, but, if the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such observation, the Court will not

be justified in making such observation. In the instant case, we are of the view that the aforesaid observation is not necessary. Even if the aforesaid

observation is deleted from the order, the integrity of the order is not affected. The continuity of line of thought and the reasoning are not affected.

Further the petitioners cannot be held to have committed any-wrong in approaching this Court, seeking the relief as they have sought in the writ

petitions so as to warrant such an observation to be made against them. Accordingly, we delete the sentence, ""hence, I am of the view that the

petitioners have looked at the whole issue with the jaundiced eye"", occurring in paragraph 21 of the order of the learned single Judge.

Subject to the deletion of aforesaid observation, the writ appeal is rejected. No order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.