Dr. Shyam Raj Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh

Order (Full) uploaded on: 20/08/2026

Dr. Shyam Raj Singh, S/o Late Jagdesh Singh, Aged about 68 years, (i). R/o H.No.96, Arihant Nagar, Sarona, Tatibandh, Raipur, Raipur Dist., Chhattisgarh State, PIN 492013. (ii) Saraswati Shishu Mandir Road, Gali No.2, Krishna Nagar, Sangram Colony, Satna, Satna Dist., MP State, PIN 485001.

... Petitioner versus

State of Chhattisgarh, through Principal Secretary, Home Department, Govt. of CG, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, Raipur, Raipur Dist., Chhattisgarh State.

Director General (Jail & Reformation Services), Office of Director General (Jails), Headquarters, Raipur Dist., Chhattisgarh State

Superintendent, Central Jails, Raipur, Raipur Dist., Chhattisgarh State ... Respondents For Petitioner : Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate.

For Respondents : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Panel Lawyer.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal C.A.V. Order

For the sake of exposition, this Order is divided in following parts:-

Question of Law Involved

The short but important question of law that is involved in the writ petition is, whether the State Government is justified in instituting departmental proceeding against the petitioner of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such proceeding in violation of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1976’) allegedly relaxing the aforesaid Rule in exercise of power conferred under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976?

The petitioner herein takes exception to the order dated 18-10-2019 (Annexure P-1) passed by the State Government imposing a penalty under Rule 9(5) of the Rules of 1976 directing recovery of ₹ 1,09,975/- finding that the petitioner is guilty of misconduct under Rule 3-A of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965.

The petitioner was working on the post of Superintendent, Central Jail, Raipur and eventually, he was superannuated on the said post with effect from 31-8-2010 and thereafter, it is the case of the petitioner that he has been granted and paid all retiral dues including pension and gratuity. On 29-5-2013, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner alleging that he did not accept the lowest tender and caused loss of revenue to the Government to the extent of ₹ 1,09,975/- and thereafter, by order dated 3-11-2014, instituted departmental enquiry and further, in exercise of power under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, relaxed the period of four years as prescribed under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 18-10-2019, in exercise of power under Rule 9(5) of the Rules of 1976, the State Government directed recovery of ₹ 1,09,975/- against the petitioner leading to filing of this writ petition.

It is the case of the petitioner that the period prescribed in Rule 9(2) (b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976, which prescribes the time limit that departmental enquiry shall not be instituted in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution, is imperative and in exercise of power under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, such rule could not have been relaxed, as the prescription of time limit of four years in respect of an event which took place more than four years, is mandatory and the time barred action cannot be revived by relaxing the rule, more particularly, the Administrative Department has not passed any order relaxing the rule by recording reasons in writing, only the Finance Department has given its concurrence, which is not the compliance of Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, therefore, the order impugned dated 18-10-2019 suffers from jurisdictional error and it is liable to be quashed.

The State/respondents have filed return justifying its action stating inter alia that the period of four years as prescribed under Rule 9(2) (b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 has been relaxed in exercise of power under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 by order Annexure R-8 dated 3-11-2014, which is in accordance with law and the competent authority had also granted permission under Rule 9(2)(b) to institute and hold departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Thus, the rule has been relaxed by virtue of Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

A short rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner stating that exercise of power under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 is totally unwarranted, it is not a valid exercise of power and it cannot be exercised to take exemption from the rigors of the Pension Rules which requires to make the payment of retiral dues like pension and gratuity to a Government servant in the next month. Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 cannot be interpreted in favour of the respondents for shielding them from their neglect or delay in discharge of their statutory duties towards the retired employee. As such, the writ petition deserves to be allowed.

Dr. Veena Nair, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would make submissions as under: -

Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 is mandatory and the departmental proceeding is barred by limitation, as action has not been in accordance with the time prescribed in Rule 9(2)(b) (ii). By relaxing Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, such a period cannot be extended and the alleged relaxation in exercise of power under Rule 79 will be totally arbitrary and unbridled exercise of power by the State Government.

Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 has not been complied with, even otherwise, no reasons have been recorded in exercise of Rule 79 except the concurrence of the Finance Department and the period of limitation which the rule-making authority has prescribed for initiating departmental proceeding conferring power to the State Government in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution, cannot be extended in alleged exercise of the power of relaxation. Such a relaxation in rule is totally unwarranted, unsustainable and bad in law and liable to be set aside.

Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel appearing on behalf of the State/respondents, would submit that the State Government has rightly relaxed Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 in exercise of power under Rule 79 of the said Rules and as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival contentions made herein-above and also gone through the record with utmost circumspection.

In order to deal with the issue, it would be appropriate to notice the proceeding that has taken place against the petitioner.

The petitioner stood superannuated from the post of Superintendent, Central Jail, Raipur on 31-8-2010. Thereafter, on 22-1-2013, the Council of Ministers in exercise of power conferred Rule 9(2)(b) of the Rules of 1976, granted permission to institute departmental proceeding against the petitioner, which states as under: -

eaf=ifj"kn~ vkns’k

¼dk;Zlwph esa lfEefyr fo"k;½ ¼vk;Ve dzekad&71-3½ fnukad 22 tuojh] 2013 fo"k;% izdj.k dzekad&31@06 esa NRrhlx<+ yksd vk;ksx dh vuq’kalk vuqlkj MkW-';kejkt flag] rRdkyhu v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; dkjkxkj x`g] jk;iqj ds fo:)

dk;Zokgh ckcr~A fu.kZ;% fu.kZ; fy;k x;k fd MkW- ';kejkt flag] ¼lsokfuo`Rr½] rRdkyhu vf/k{kd] dsUnzh; dkjkxkj x`g] jk;iqj ds fo:) NRrhslx<+ flfoy lsok ¼isa’ku½ fu;e& 1976 ds fu;e&9 ds varxZr vkjksi i=kfn tkjh djus ,oa foHkkxh; tkap lafLFkr djus dh dk;Zokgh dh tk,” d`i;k le;kof/k esa vuqlkafxd dkjZokbZ djsaA lgh@& ¼lqfuy dqekj½ eq[; lfpo

Since the alleged misconduct as apparent from the impugned order Annexure P-1 is of the years 2004-05 & 2005-06 and from the order dated 22-1-2013, those were the events which took place more than four years before such institution and institution of disciplinary proceedings was apparently barred under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976, the State Government placed the case before the Finance/Administrative Department to relax Rule 9(2)(b) of the Rules of 1976 in exercise of Rule 79 for instituting disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and accordingly, the concurrence of the Finance Department, as provided under the proviso to Rule 79 was obtained, which states as under: -

But, however, there is nothing on record that as per Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, reasons have been recorded by the Administrative Department granting consent and relaxing the rule under Rule 79, except the concurrence by the Finance Department as noted herein-above. Thereafter, on 29-5-2013, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on the following charges: -

vkjksi %&

vkids }kjk o"kZ 2004&05 ,oa 2005&06 esa dsUnzh; tsy] jk;iqj esa cafn;ksa ,oa m|ksxksa gsrq yxus okyh lkefxz;ksa ds dz; esa xaHkhj vfu;ferrk,a cjrh xbZ gSA U;wure fufonk dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k x;k vkSj jktdh; jktLo dh gkfu igqpkbZ xbZA dsoy lQsn dkxt ds dz; esa gh :i;s 1]09]975@& dh gkfu 'kkldh; jkf’k dh igqpkbZ xbZ gS] tksfd N0x0 flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k fu;e½ 1965 ds fu;e 3 dk mYy?ku gSA vkius ,slk dj Lo;a dks vuq’kklukRed dk;Zokgh djus ds fy, nks"kh Bgjk;k gSA

Thereafter, finally, by order dated 18-10-2019 (Annexure P-1), the State of Chhattisgarh had passed the impugned order of punishment upon the petitioner, which states as under: -

NRRkhlx<+ 'kklu x`g ¼tsy½ foHkkx %% ea=ky; %% egkunh Hkou] uok jk;iqj] vVy uxj

&%% vkns’k %%& uok jk;iqj] vVy uxj] fnukad 18@10@2019 dzekad ,Q 3& 13@rhu & tsy@2009 %% izeq[k yksdk;qDr] NRrhlx<+ yksd vk;ksx] jk;iqj }kjk ikfjr vkns’k fnukad 13-09-2011] esa MkW- ';kejkt flag rRdkyhu v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; tsy jk;iqj ds fo:) lQsn dkxt dz; esa :i;s 1]09]975@& dh 'kkldh; jkf’k dk {kfr igaqpkuk ik;k x;k gS ,o a Jh ';kejkt flag ds fo:) vuq’kklukRed foHkkxh; dk;Zokgh lafLFkr dh tkdj vkjksi LFkkfir gksus ij ;Fkksfpr ’kkfLr vf/kjksfir dh tkus dh vuq’kalk dh xbZ gSA 2@ NRRkhlx<+ yksd vk;ksx dk mDr vkns’k ftl dnkpj.k ds laca/k esa gS] og dnkpj.k fnukad 11-07-2006 dks fd;k x;k FkkA MkW0 ';kejkt flag] tsy v/kh{kd ds in ls fnukad 31-08-2010 dks lsokfuo`Rr gks pqds FksA 3@ mDr fLFkfr esa ekuuh; yksdk;qDr dh vuq’kalk ds izpyu gsrq laHko vuq’kklukRed dk;Zokgh ds laca/k esa vkns’kkuqlkj lkekU; iz’kklu foHkkx] fof/k foHkkx dk vfHker izkIr djrs gq, vfHker vuqlkj foRr foHkkx dh lgefr izkIr dj eaf=ifj"kn esa vuqeksnu izkIr fd;k x;kA eaf=ifj"kn~ vkns’k fnukad 22 tuojh] 2013 esa fy;s x;s fu.kZ; vuqlkj MkW- ';kejkt flag ¼lsokfuo`Rr½] rRdkyhu v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; dkjkxkj x`g] jk;iqj ds fo:) NRrhlx<+ flfoy lsok ¼isa’ku½ fu;e&1976 ds fu;e&9 ds varxZr vkjksi i=kfn tkjh djus ,oa foHkkxh; tkap lafLFkr djus dh dk;Zokgh dh xbZA 4@ vipkjh vf/kdkjh MkW0 ';kejkt flag] lsokfuo`Rr] tsy vf/k{kd dks foHkkx ds Kkiu fnukad 29-05-2013 }kjk vkjksi i=kfn tkjh fd;k x;kA MkW0 flag }kjk vkjksi &i=kfn dk izfrokn mRrj izLrqr u djrs gq, vkjksiksa ls lacaf/kr lqlaxr vfHkys[kksa dh ekax dh xbZA tsy eq[;ky; }kjk muds pkgs vuqlkj mUgsa nks ckj vfHkys[k Hkh miyC/k djk;s x;s fdarq muds }kjk izdj.k esa foyac fd;k x;kA MkW0 flag }kjk vkjksi&i= dk izfrokn mRrj izLrqr u djus ds dkj.k foRr foHkkx dh lgefr vuqlkj NRrhlx<+ flfoy ¼ias’ku½ fu;e] 1976 ds fu;e&9¼2½ ¼ch½ ¼ii½ esa mYysf[kr 04 o"kZ dh le;& lhek ds ca/ku dks f’kfFky djrs gq, mDr isa’ku fu;e rFkk N-x- flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k rFkk vihy½ fu;e] 1966 ds fu;e 14 ds varxZr MkW- ';kejkt flag] tsy v/kh{kd ¼lsokfuo`Rr½ ds fo:) foHkkx ds vkns’k fnukad 05-11-2014 }kjk foHkkxh; tkap laLFkfir djrs gq, Jh ,l-,l- frXxk] v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; tsy] fcykliqj dks tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh ,oa Jh ,u-ds- 'kekZ] lgk;d tsy v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; tsy] fcykliqj dks izLrqrdrkZ vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k x;kA 5@ MkW0 ';kejkt flag ¼lsokfuo`Rr½ ds fo:) dsUnzh; tsy jk;iqj esa tsy v/kh{kd ds :i es a inLFkh vof/k ds nkSjku dz; dh xbZ lkefxz;ksa esa vfu;ferrk cjrus ds izdj.k esa fuEufyf[kr vkjksi ij foHkkxh; tkap lafLFkr dh xbZ%& 1- vkids }kjk o"kZ 2004&2005 ,oa 2005 &06 esa dsUnzh; tsy jk;iqj esa cafn;ksa ,oa m|ksxksa gsrq yxus okyh lkefxz;ksa ds dz; esa xaHkhj vfu;ferrk cjrh xbZ U;wure fufonk dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k x;k vkSj jktdh; jktLo dh gkfu igqapkbZ xbZA dsoy lQsn dkxt ds dz; esa gh :i;s 1]09]975-00 gkfu 'kkldh; jkf’k dh igqapkbZ xbZ gSA tks NRRkhx<+ flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k fu;e½ 1965 ds fu;e 3 dk mYya?ku gS] vkius ,slk dj Lo;a dks vuq’kklukRed dk;Zokgh djus ds fy, nks"kh Bgjk;k gSA 6@ tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh] }kjk fu;ekuqlkj foHkkxh; tkap lEiUu dj tkap izfrosnu esa lsokfuo`Rr tsy v/kh{kd] MkW0 ';kejkt flag ij yxs vkjksi dzekad 01 izekf.kr ik;k x;kA 7@ tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr tkap izfrosnu ij vipkjh vf/kdkjh dk vH;kosnu izkIr fd;k x;kA muds }kjk izLrqr vH;kosnu ij egkfuns’kd] tsy dk fcUnqokj vfHker@Vhi izkIr dh xbZ gSA egkfuns’kd] tsy }kjk mipkjh vf/kdkjh MkW0 ';kejkt flag }kjk izLrqr vH;kosnu esa mYysf[kr fcUnq xzkg~; ;ksX; ugha gksus dk mYys[k djrs gq, vekU; fd;k tkuk ys[k fd;k x;kA 8@ izdj.k ds tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr tkap izfrosnu ,oa vipkjh vf/kdkjh ds vH;kosnu dk egkfuns’kd] tsy ls izkIr vfHker ij fopkjksijkar vekU; fd;k x;kA vipkjh vf/kdkjh }kjk gkfu igaqpk;s x;s 'kkldh; jkf’k 1]09]975-00@& dk lek;kstu lsokfuo`Rr vf/kdkjh] MkW] ';kejkt flag rRdkyhu tsy v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; tsy jk;iqj ls fd;s tkus dk vufUre iz’kkldh; fu.kZ; fy;k tkdj NRrhlx<+ yksd lsok vk;ksx dh lgefr izkIr dh xbZA 9@ vr% jkT; 'kklu] ,rn~}kjk] MkW0 ';kejkt flag] lsokfuo`Rr tsy v/kh{kd ¼rRdkyhu tsy v/kh{kd] dsUnzh; tsy] jk;iqj½ dk d`R; NRrhlx<+ flfoy lsok ¼vkpj.k½ fu;e 1965 ds fu;e&3 ¼d½ ds varxZr dnkpj.k dh Js.kh dk vkjksi izekf.kr gksus ls muds }kjk 'kklu dks igaqpkbZ xbZ gkfu :i;s 1]09]975@& ¼,d yk[k ukS gtkj ukS lkS ipgRrj :i;s ek=½ dh olwyh NRrhlx<+ flfoy ¼isa’ku½ fu;e] 1976 ds fu;e&9 ¼5½ ds izko/kkuksa ds rgr MkW0 ';kejkt flag] lsokfuo`Rr tsy v/kh{kd dk izkIr ifjyfC/k;ksa ls fd, tkus dh 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djrk gSA NRrhlx<+ ds jkT;iky ds uke ls rFkk vkns’kuqlkj lgh@& ¼tud dqekj½ voj lfpo NRrhlx<+ 'kklu] x`g ¼tsy½ foHkkx 15.The aforesaid order is sought to be challenged by way of the present writ petition.

In order to consider the challenge to the aforesaid order dated 18-10-2019, it would be appropriate to notice Rule 9(2)(b)(i) & (ii) which state as under: -

A careful perusal of the provision contained in Section 9(2)(b)(i) of the Rules of 1976 would show that if the departmental proceedings are not instituted against the Government servant by the disciplinary authority while he was in service, then it shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor, and sanction of the Governor or/ his delegate Council of Ministers/Chief Minister as may be prescribed by the Allocation of Business Rules, is required to be taken. Similarly, Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 provides that such sanction shall not be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such disciplinary proceedings.

The usage of the word “shall” in the above-stated Rules 9(2)(b)(i) & (ii) of the Rules of 1976 would show that requirement of sanction from the Government prior to institution of departmental enquiry and which shall not be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of such proceeding, is mandatory. Such mandatory safeguard is intended to prevent institution of unwarranted proceedings against the superannuated employees. {See Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan v.

(paragraph 29).}

The Supreme Court in Kadirkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan (supra), while dealing with Rule 27(2)(b)(ii) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1982, which is the pari materia provision to Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976, has held that this provision is benevolent in nature, as it regulates the State’s discretion to institute or continue departmental proceedings, and observed as under: -

Rules 9(2)(b)(i) & 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 are pari materia to Rules 9(2)(b)(i) & 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972. The provisions contained in Rules 9(2)(b)(i) & 9(2)(b)

Their Lordships considered the issue and held that the period of limitation is prescribed by Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) for initiating departmental enquiry after retirement and if the action is barred by limitation, departmental proceedings could not have been initiated in violation of that Rule, and observed as under: -

Similarly, in the matter of State of U.P. and another v. Shri Krishna Pandey^{44.(1996) 9 SCC 395}, the Supreme Court has held that time-limit has been prescribed for initiating departmental enquiry after retirement and when the departmental enquiry for embezzlement was initiated more than four years after the delinquent was allowed to retire on superannuation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that such departmental enquiry is incompetent, as the State had disabled itself by their deliberate omissions to take appropriate action against the respondent (therein) and allowed the officer to escape from the provisions of Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services Regulations. It has been observed by their Lordships in paragraph 6 of the report as under: -

As such, four years is the time-limit/period of limitation prescribed by the rule-making authority by way of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of departmental proceedings and such a provision is a mandatory provision well designed to protect the superannuated Government servants from unnecessary harassment after their superannuation.

Now, this would bring me to the next question of power of relaxation.

It is the case of State Government that four year’s period of limitation prescribed in Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 has been relaxed in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976. Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 which provides power to relax, states as under: -

A careful perusal of the above-stated Rule would show that though the power to relax rule is conferred to the State Government, on satisfaction of any Department of the Government, that operation of any rule is causing hardship to any particular case, it is necessarily required to be exercised in a just and equitable manner and to mitigate hardship, if any, caused in a particular case. However, such a power of relaxation cannot be exercised to revive the time barred action and mandatory provision cannot be relaxed. The power of relaxation must be construed strictly and cannot be used as blanket authority to disregard the binding Rule.

The pari materia provision of power to relax except the proviso contained in Rule 22 of the Haryana Service of Engineers Class I PWD (Public Health Branch) Rules, 1961 came to be considered by the Supreme Court in the matter of J.C. Yadav and others v. State of Haryana and others^{55.(1990) 2 SCC 189} and highlighting the object and purpose of conferring the power to relax, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the object and purpose of conferring this power on the government is to mitigate undue hardship in any particular case, and to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner. It has been observed by their Lordships in paragraph 6 of the report as under: -

Similarly, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in the matter of Shri Amrik Singh and others v. Union of India and others^{66.(1980) 3 SCC 393} has observed that there must be undue hardship and, further the relaxation must promote the dealing with the case “in a just and equitable manner”.

As such, the object of the power of relaxation is obviously to neutralise an injustice as a result of operation of any rule. It has been described to be the reserve power to deal with unforeseen situations or circumstances and it is to be exercised in the public interest with a view to maintain integrity and efficiency in service. (See R.R.

Power to relax rules must be made judiciously keeping in mind the object and purpose. The power is conferred upon the Government to meet any emergent situation where injustice might have been caused to any individual employee or class of employees or where the working of the rule might have become impossible (see Ashok K. Uppal v. State of J&K^{88.(1998) 4 SCC 179}). The power of relaxation must also be expressly conferred (see Sanjay Kumar Manjul v. Chairman, UPSC^{99.(2006) 8 SCC 42}).

In the matter of Sandeep Kumar Sharma v. State of Punjab^{1010.(1997) 10 SCC 298 at 304}, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have however cautioned that arbitrary exercise of such power must be guarded against and that the rule of relaxation must get a pragmatic construction so as to achieve effective implementation of good policy.

In the matter of State of Punjab v. Dr. Rajeev Sarwal^{1111.(1999) 9 SCC 240}, it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a power of relaxation cannot be read into a rule which is explicit as to a particular matter, e.g. where maximum period of study leave prescribed is 24 months, an employee cannot ask for relaxation to exceed that period.

Similarly, in the matter of Suraj Prakash Gupta v. State of J&K^{1212.(2000) 7 SCC 561}, the Supreme Court has held that the exercise of the power of relaxation would be considered to be bad when the reasons for such relaxation are found to be hopelessly insufficient.

It is a well-established principle of law that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for doing a particular act, that act must be performed in that designated manner or not at all {see Brajendra Singh Yambem (supra)}. While Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 vests the State Government with the power to relax rules in cases where its application causes "undue hardship", thereby enabling the matter to be dealt with “in a just and equitable manner", this general power cannot be interpreted so broadly as to override or negate specific substantive provisions, such as periods of limitation, explicitly embedded in the governing pension rules.

Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 provides a mechanism for the relaxation of rules, not for their rewriting, which remains exclusively within the domain of the legislature. In the present case, no legally tenable grounds demonstrating undue hardship have been placed on record, and the mere concurrence of the Finance Department does not suffice to meet this mandatory threshold, as the power to relax does not translate into an unfettered power to dispense with the rules altogether.

Consequently, the State Government could not lawfully invoke Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 to bypass the mandatory statutory protection afforded under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976, which explicitly bars the institution of departmental proceedings against a retired government servant in respect of any event that took place more than four years prior to such institution. Initiating disciplinary proceedings after a staggering delay of 7-8 years from the alleged date of misconduct, under the guise of rule relaxation, constitutes a direct violation of statutory safeguards, rendering such an administrative action fundamentally unsustainable in the eyes of the law. The State must administer the law equitably and without "an evil eye or an unequal hand", because permitting the unbridled exercise of discretionary powers of this magnitude would convert a tool intended for equity into an engine of oppression, paving the way for systemic abuse against public servants.

Accordingly, it is held that in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976, the power of relaxation could not have been exercised by the Government to rigor out from the mandate contained in Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 which mandatorily prescribes that such sanction shall not be in respect of an event which took place more than four years before the institution of departmental proceedings. In the instant case, the alleged event has taken place during the years 2004-05 & 2005-06 and charge-sheet has been issued to the petitioner on 29-5-2013, which is delayed by more than 7-8 years before the institution of such proceedings. As such, the action as held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brajendra Singh Yambem (supra) is barred by limitation and thus, departmental proceedings could not have been initiated by the State Government, particularly, when the Administrative Department has not recorded any reasons for grant of relaxation as required by Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 and only the Finance Department has made concurrence required by the proviso to Rule 79, leaving it for the Administrative Department to accord reasons, which were not recorded at all.

The general power to relax rules under Rule 79 of the Rules of 1976 cannot be invoked to bypass or dilute an explicit statutory provision. Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Rules of 1976 sets an absolute bar against initiating departmental proceedings against a retired Government servant in respect of an event occurring more than four years prior to such institution. While Rule 79 provides administrative flexibility to deal with a case in a just and equitable manner to alleviate undue hardship, this discretionary power cannot be extended to override an express, mandatory and statutory restriction. To permit relaxation in teeth of a mandatory and statutory prohibition would be to rewrite the statutory scheme under the garb of administrative discretion. Consequently, any relaxation of the limitation prescribed under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) by taking recourse to Rule 79 is legally impermissible and unsustainable.

Consequently, the impugned order dated 18-10-2019 (Annexure P-1) is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above with no order as to costs.

Sd/-