Dr Ravi Bhushan vs Nitin Kumar

Hon'Ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.

Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Vinod Kant, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri Hemendra Pratap Singh, for the respondent.

The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assails the order dated 03.08.2026 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-II, Hapur, in P.A. Case No. 02 of 2018 (Nitin Kumar v. Ravi Bhushan), whereby the petitioner's application, Paper No. 76-Ga, seeking permission to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the respondent-landlord has been rejected.

The dispute arises out of a release application instituted by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 1972”), seeking release of the disputed premises on the ground of personal bona fide need.

According to the release application, the respondent purchased the disputed shops through a registered sale deed dated 11.12.2014 and required the premises for his business. The disputed premises comprise Private Shop No. 2, bearing Municipal No. 18-8/447/12(7), situated at Ahata Dayanand, Railway Road, Hapur, which was let out at a monthly rent of Rs.105/-. The petitioner was also a tenant of the adjoining Private Shop No.1, bearing Municipal No. 18-8/447/13(6), at a monthly rent of Rs.100/-. It was asserted that, although separate rent receipts had been issued in respect of the two shops, the intervening wall had been removed and the shops were being used as a single unit.

The respondent claimed that he required the disputed premises for his business, as he was experiencing difficulty in personally supplying dry fruits to shops. He further asserted that the petitioner had been apprised of his requirement and that a notice dated 25.05.2015 had been served upon him.

The petitioner contested the release application, disputing the bona fide nature of the respondent's alleged need. He questioned the necessity of the disputed premises in view of the business activities already being carried on by the respondent and the alleged availability of other properties. According to the petitioner, the respondent was carrying on business under the name and style of Bangla Sweet, an adjoining property belonging to the respondent's mother was also being used for business purposes, and a property situated on the first floor behind the disputed shop. The petitioner also disputed the evidence concerning the alleged letting and questioned the adequacy of the disclosure of the relevant particulars and supporting documents.

In support of the release application, affidavits of six witnesses were filed on 02.08.2018. The petitioner questioned the credibility of the witnesses, asserting that two of them were the parents of the principal witness and that the remaining witnesses were also interested in the respondent's case. Particular reliance was placed on the statement of one witness concerning the alleged letting of the property situated on the first floor behind the disputed premises. The petitioner sought to examine the witnesses on matters relating to the respondent's bona fide need, the availability of other properties, the business activities of the respondent and his family members, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged letting.

The petitioner accordingly moved an application, Paper No. 76-Ga, seeking permission to cross-examine all six witnesses. The application alleged that their affidavits contained material discrepancies and that relevant particulars concerning the respondent's other properties and business activities had not been adequately disclosed. It was contended that cross-examination was necessary to test the veracity of the statements made by the witnesses and to establish the petitioner's defence to the claim of bona fide need. The respondent opposed the application by filing objections.

By the impugned order dated 03.08.2026, the Prescribed Authority rejected the application. It noted that the affidavits of the respondent's witnesses had been filed on 02.08.2018, whereas the petitioner had filed his evidence, comprising the affidavits of his own witnesses, on 18.12.2019. The proceedings had thereafter been fixed for arguments from 06.01.2020 onwards.

The order impugned records that, instead of concluding the arguments, the petitioner had filed another application, Paper No. 69-ka, which was disposed of by a detailed order dated 24.07.2024. When the matter was thereafter fixed for arguments on 06.02.2025, the petitioner failed to advance submissions on several dates, whereupon a final opportunity was granted by order dated 15.05.2025.

While rejecting the application for cross-examination, the Prescribed Authority observed that proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act of 1972 are intended to be decided expeditiously by following a summary procedure. It found that the petitioner had not furnished sufficient justification for seeking cross-examination of all six witnesses and had already addressed the relevant allegations through the affidavits of his own witnesses. The application was, accordingly, rejected as lacking merit, with the observation that it appeared to have been filed with a view to delaying the disposal of the release proceedings.

The Prescribed Authority also took note of this Court’s order dated 19.11.2025 passed in Matters Under Article 227 No. 13932 of 2025, whereby expeditious disposal of the pending release proceedings had been directed. In the light of that direction, the parties were required to conclude their arguments, and the matter was fixed for final arguments on 20.08.2026.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order rejects the application for cross-examination without adequately examining its necessity in the context of the controversy arising in the release proceedings. It is contended that the summary nature of proceedings under the Act of 1972 does not, by itself, justify denial of an opportunity to test the evidence adduced by the opposite party, where such examination is necessary for an effective adjudication of the dispute.

It is further submitted that the petitioner has specifically disputed the landlord’s bona fide need and raised issues concerning the availability of other properties, the business activities carried on by the landlord and his family, and the alleged letting of other premises. According to learned counsel, these matters are material to the determination of the release application, and the petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to examine the landlord’s witnesses to test the assertions made in their affidavits.

Learned counsel further contends that the relationship of certain witnesses with the landlord, coupled with the alleged discrepancies in their affidavits, furnished sufficient grounds for permitting cross-examination. It is argued that the application could not validly be rejected merely because the proceedings had remained pending for a considerable period or because this Court had directed their expeditious disposal, without first determining whether the proposed examination was necessary for a fair adjudication.

On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the impugned order suffers from material illegality and has denied the petitioner an effective opportunity to establish his defence. It is, accordingly, prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the petitioner be permitted to cross-examine P.W.-1 to P.W.-6.

Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the petition and supports the impugned order. It is submitted that the release application was instituted in 2018 and the affidavits of the landlord’s witnesses were filed on 02.08.2018. The petitioner thereafter filed his own evidence by affidavits on 18.12.2019, and the proceedings have remained at the stage of arguments for several years.

It is further contended that the petitioner did not seek cross-examination when the landlord’s evidence was filed and has offered no satisfactory explanation for seeking such permission after the proceedings had reached the stage of final arguments. The application, according to learned counsel, proceeds on general allegations concerning the landlord’s bona fide need, the availability of other properties, the business activities of the landlord and his family, and the alleged letting of other premises, without identifying any specific statement requiring clarification or challenge or demonstrating why cross-examination of each of the six witnesses is necessary.

Learned counsel submits that the petitioner has already placed his defence on record through the affidavits of his own witnesses, and the application discloses no sufficient ground for permitting further oral examination. It is urged that reopening the evidentiary stage at this juncture would prolong the proceedings and undermine the legislative objective of expeditious adjudication under the Act of 1972. The respondent, accordingly, seeks dismissal of the petition.

The issues that arise for consideration concern the legal principles governing the recall of a witness for further cross-examination in proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, having regard to the applicable statutory provisions, the principles governing cross-examination in civil proceedings, and the circumstances in which evidence may be reopened or a witness recalled at an advanced stage of the proceedings; and whether, in the light of the aforesaid legal framework and the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order declining such recall warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

Section 34(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 confers upon the Prescribed Authority and the other authorities specified therein the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and to examine such person on oath. Section 34(1)(b) further empowers the authority to receive evidence on affidavits. The statutory scheme thus contemplates adjudication on the basis of affidavit evidence, while preserving the authority’s power to summon a person for examination on oath where the circumstances of the case so warrant.

Rule 15(3) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 provides that an application under Section 21(1) of the Act of 1972 shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. The provision reflects the legislative intent that proceedings concerning the release of buildings should be disposed of expeditiously. The summary nature of such proceedings, however, does not dispense with the requirement of a fair opportunity to the parties to establish their respective cases, nor does it exclude oral examination where such examination is necessary for the proper adjudication of a material controversy.

A conjoint reading of Section 34(1)(a) and Section 34(1)(b) of the Act of 1972 makes it evident that the statutory scheme does not exclude the cross-examination of a deponent whose evidence has been tendered by way of affidavit. While clause (b) enables the authorities to receive evidence on affidavits, clause (a) confers the power to summon and enforce the attendance of any person and to examine such person on oath. The power to permit cross-examination is, therefore, available to the Prescribed Authority. The existence of such power, however, does not confer an absolute or unconditional right upon a party to demand the cross-examination of every deponent in every case, irrespective of the nature of the controversy or the necessity of such examination for its determination.

The exercise of this power must be guided by the necessity of cross-examination for the proper adjudication of the dispute and must be undertaken in appropriate cases for sufficient reasons. The principles underlying the proviso to Order XIX Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which contemplates the production of a deponent for cross-examination where such examination is considered necessary, reinforce the requirement that the necessity of oral examination must be established in the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The mere filing of an application seeking cross-examination does not, by itself, oblige the Prescribed Authority to allow it as a matter of course. The authority must exercise its discretion judicially, having regard to the nature of the proceedings, the issues requiring determination, and the purpose for which cross-examination is sought.

A party seeking permission to cross-examine a deponent must, therefore, identify the particular statement or factual assertion in the affidavit whose veracity is sought to be tested and explain the circumstances in which, and the reasons for which, such examination is necessary. A general assertion that cross-examination is required to test the truthfulness of the deponent, without identifying the specific factual controversy requiring examination, would not ordinarily furnish sufficient grounds for exercising the discretion in favour of the applicant. The Court or authority concerned must determine whether the proposed cross-examination is directed towards resolving a material controversy bearing upon the adjudication of the dispute or is merely intended to secure a further opportunity to elaborate upon a case already set up. The nature of the proposed questions and their relevance to the issues in controversy are, accordingly, material considerations in determining whether the request deserves to be allowed.

The nature and purpose of proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act of 1972 must also be borne in mind while considering an application for cross-examination. The legislative scheme contemplates expeditious adjudication of release applications, ordinarily on the basis of affidavit evidence, while preserving the power of the Prescribed Authority to permit cross-examination wherever necessary. Rule 15(3) of the Rules of 1972, by prescribing that an application under Section 21(1) shall, as far as possible, be decided within two months from the date of its presentation, underscores the importance attached to expeditious disposal. Consequently, unnecessary or routine cross-examination, particularly where the relevant facts can adequately be established through documentary evidence or verified by other means, ought not to be permitted in a manner that frustrates the legislative objective of expeditious disposal. At the same time, the requirement of expedition cannot be invoked as an inflexible ground to deny a request where the applicant establishes that cross-examination is necessary for the just determination of a material issue. The statutory objective of expeditious disposal and the requirement of a fair opportunity to address material factual controversies must be considered together, without allowing either consideration to operate to the exclusion of the other.

The question whether cross-examination is necessary must accordingly be determined with reference to the factual backdrop of the case, the nature of the controversy, the material sought to be elicited from the deponent, and the relevance of that material to the issues requiring adjudication. The Prescribed Authority must also consider whether the application has been made bona fide or whether the surrounding circumstances indicate an attempt to delay the proceedings. Where the dispute relates to a matter capable of determination on the basis of documentary evidence or otherwise capable of verification without oral examination, cross-examination may not be warranted merely because a party has sought it. Conversely, where a specific and material factual assertion requires testing through oral examination and its determination is necessary for the proper adjudication of the dispute, the authority must consider the request on its merits and cannot reject it solely on the ground that the proceedings are summary in nature or ought to be concluded expeditiously.

The controlling consideration is thus the demonstrated necessity of cross-examination, assessed in the context of the proceedings as a whole. The Prescribed Authority must determine whether the proposed examination is relevant to a material issue, whether the purpose sought to be achieved cannot adequately be served by the material already on record or by other means of verification, and whether the request is bona fide or is calculated to prolong the proceedings. Neither the assertion of a party that cross-examination ought to be afforded as a matter of right nor the general objective of expeditious disposal can, by itself, determine the outcome. The discretion must be exercised judicially, by balancing the necessity of oral examination for the just determination of the dispute against the need to prevent unnecessary or dilatory prolongation of the proceedings.

The principles governing the exercise of discretion in matters concerning the examination and recall of witnesses may be examined with reference to Order XVIII Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’^11.CPC). The provision empowers the Court to recall a witness who has been examined and to put such questions to the witness as it thinks fit. It is principally intended to enable the Court to clarify doubts, ambiguities or inconsistencies arising from the evidence already on record. It is not intended to confer upon a party an unrestricted right to reopen the examination of a witness, supplement evidence already adduced, or obtain a further opportunity to improve its case.

In Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) through LRs. v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate^{22.(2009) 4 SCC 410}, the Supreme Court held that the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases. The provision is intended to enable the Court to clarify any ambiguity in the evidence and not to fill omissions or lacunae in the evidence of a witness already examined. Recall of a witness cannot, therefore, be permitted as a matter of routine merely to provide a party an opportunity to improve its case.

The scope of the inherent power under Section 151 CPC was further explained in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy^{33.(2011) 11 SCC 275}. The Supreme Court clarified that, in an appropriate case, the Court may exercise its inherent powers to reopen evidence or recall a witness for further examination or cross-examination, even where the specific requirements of Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC are not attracted. The availability of such inherent power, however, does not justify its routine exercise. The Court must be satisfied that the request is bona fide, that the evidence sought to be elicited is material to the controversy, and that permitting the proposed examination is necessary in the interests of justice. The power cannot be used to provide a second opportunity to a negligent litigant or to permit a party to repair deficiencies in its evidence without sufficient justification. The decision, therefore, recognises that the power to reopen evidence or recall a witness at the instance of a party is distinct from the Court's power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC to seek clarification of evidence, while making clear that the former must be exercised in furtherance of the interests of justice and not to afford an unrestricted opportunity to improve a party's case.

In Bagai Construction v. Gupta Building Material Store^{44.(2013) 14 SCC 1}, the Supreme Court reiterated that the powers under Order XVIII Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to overcome omissions in pleadings or evidence when the relevant material was available to the party throughout the proceedings. The Court disapproved an attempt to reopen evidence at a belated stage, particularly after the conclusion of arguments, in the absence of an acceptable explanation for not taking the necessary steps earlier. The decision underscores that the expression “at any stage” in Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC does not confer an unrestricted power to reopen a concluded evidentiary stage or to permit a party to introduce material that could, with due diligence, have been brought on record earlier. The stage at which the application is made and the explanation for the omission or delay are, therefore, material considerations in determining whether the requested exercise of procedural power is justified.

The same approach was reiterated in Ram Rati v. Mange Ram (Dead) through LRs.^{55.(2016) 11 SCC 91}, wherein the Supreme Court held that Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC cannot be used by a party to seek further elaboration on aspects omitted from the evidence already closed. The power to recall a witness under that provision is intended primarily to enable the Court to clarify its doubts and cannot be exercised routinely at the instance of a party seeking to supplement its evidence. Read together with K.K. Velusamy (supra), the decision makes it clear that the Court's inherent powers under Section 151 CPC remain available in an appropriate case for reopening evidence or recalling a witness for further examination or cross-examination. Their exercise, however, requires a reasoned assessment of the necessity and bona fides of the request, the materiality of the evidence sought to be elicited, the stage of the proceedings, and the explanation for not seeking the proposed examination earlier.

The aforesaid decisions concern, in their immediate context, the exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the recall of witnesses and the reopening of evidence in civil proceedings. The present proceedings, however, arise under the Act of 1972, and the application in question seeks permission to cross-examine the landlord's witnesses. Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC, which principally enables the Court to recall a witness for clarification, cannot be treated as directly governing the petitioner's request merely because the application relates to the examination of witnesses. Nor can the power to reopen evidence or recall a witness for further cross-examination at the instance of a party be equated with the Court's power to recall a witness for clarification under that provision. Nevertheless, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court concerning the materiality of the evidence sought to be elicited, the bona fides of the applicant, the stage of the proceedings, the explanation for delay, and the impermissibility of using procedural powers to fill lacunae provide relevant guidance in examining the request made before the Prescribed Authority.

The principles governing the recall of a witness and the reopening of evidence have also been considered by this Court in Shri Gopi Kishan Khandelwal v. Archana Tripathi^{66.2026 SCC OnLine All 264}. In that case, the Court considered a request for re-examination where the witness's statement during cross-examination appeared inconsistent with his affidavit in evidence on a material aspect of the dispute, namely, the issuance of rent receipts. The Court noticed that the witness had neither been confronted with his earlier statement nor afforded an opportunity to explain the apparent discrepancy. In those circumstances, a limited opportunity for re-examination was permitted to clarify the inconsistency, without allowing the party to introduce fresh evidence or fill lacunae in its case.

The decision in Gopi Kishan Khandelwal (supra) must be understood in the context of the particular circumstances in which relief was granted, including the limited purpose of the proposed re-examination and the absence of objection from the respondent's counsel. It does not dispense with the requirement that the necessity and bona fides of a request for further examination be independently assessed in each case. The controlling consideration remains whether the proposed examination is genuinely necessary to clarify a material ambiguity or inconsistency, or whether it seeks to afford a party another opportunity to develop its case or overcome an omission that could have been addressed earlier.

The aforesaid decisions also bring out the distinction between an application seeking permission to cross-examine a deponent whose evidence has been tendered by affidavit and an application seeking to reopen evidence or recall a witness for further cross-examination after the evidentiary stage has substantially concluded. In the former situation, the principal inquiry is whether the applicant has demonstrated the necessity of oral examination for determining a material factual controversy. In the latter, the inquiry necessarily extends to the stage of the proceedings, the extent of the examination already undertaken, the nature and purpose of the further examination proposed, the reason why the relevant matter was not addressed earlier, and whether the request seeks clarification of a material ambiguity or inconsistency or an impermissible opportunity to fill a lacuna in the evidence. The fact that a party may have been entitled to seek cross-examination in the first instance does not, by itself, establish an entitlement to reopen a concluded evidentiary stage or to recall a witness for further cross-examination at a belated stage.

The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions accordingly require the Court or Authority concerned, while considering a request for further cross-examination or recall of a witness at an advanced stage of the proceedings, to examine the precise object of the proposed examination, the materiality of the matter sought to be elicited, the stage already reached in the proceedings, the extent to which the witness has previously been examined, and the explanation furnished for any delay or omission. The authority must further assess whether the request is bona fide and necessary for the just determination of a material controversy, or whether it is intended to supplement evidence already adduced, repair a deficiency that could have been addressed earlier, or delay the conclusion of the proceedings. Where a genuine ambiguity or inconsistency concerning a material issue requires clarification, a limited opportunity of further examination may be warranted, subject to safeguards appropriate to the circumstances. Conversely, where the application merely seeks to revisit matters already available for examination, without a satisfactory explanation for the omission or delay, the procedural power to recall a witness or reopen evidence cannot be employed to afford a party an additional opportunity to improve its case.

Neither the summary nature of proceedings under the Act of 1972 nor the mere fact that an application has been filed at a belated stage is, by itself, conclusive of the matter. Equally, the general assertion that cross-examination is necessary to test the veracity of a witness does not, without identification of the material factual issue and a sufficient explanation of the necessity for further examination, establish an entitlement to recall. The controlling consideration is whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, the proposed examination is genuinely required for the just adjudication of the dispute and whether its necessity outweighs the considerations arising from the stage of the proceedings, the explanation for the delay, and the need to prevent procedural powers from being used to prolong the litigation or repair deficiencies in a party's case. The discretion must be exercised on a reasoned consideration of these factors, so that the requirement of a fair opportunity to establish the truth is reconciled with the legitimate objective of bringing the proceedings to an expeditious conclusion.

The petitioner has contended that the application for cross-examination was rejected in the context of this Court’s direction in Matters Under Article 227 No. 13932 of 2025 for expeditious disposal of the pending release proceedings. A direction for expeditious disposal does not, by itself, warrant denial of a procedural opportunity necessary for the fair adjudication of the dispute. The Prescribed Authority remains bound to consider an application on its own merits and in accordance with law. Expedition and procedural fairness are not mutually exclusive; the need to avoid undue delay must be balanced against the necessity of affording the parties a fair opportunity to establish their respective cases.

The earlier direction of this Court could not, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground for rejecting the petitioner’s request for cross-examination. It was, however, a relevant consideration in assessing the consequences of reopening the evidentiary stage after the proceedings had reached the stage of final arguments. The validity of the impugned order must ultimately depend upon whether, in the light of the grounds advanced in the application, the purpose for which cross-examination was sought, and the material already on record, the petitioner had demonstrated a specific and legitimate necessity for examining the landlord’s witnesses. It is this question, rather than the mere existence of the direction for expeditious disposal, that falls for consideration.

The chronology of the proceedings assumes significance in examining the petitioner's request. The affidavits of the landlord's witnesses, P.W.-1 to P.W.-6, were filed on 02.08.2018. The petitioner thereafter filed the affidavits of his own witnesses, D.W.-1 to D.W.-4, on 18.12.2019. The matter was fixed for final arguments with effect from 06.01.2020. The application seeking permission to cross-examine the landlord's witnesses was moved substantially thereafter, when the proceedings had already advanced to the stage of final arguments and had remained pending at that stage for several years. Thus, the request was not made contemporaneously with the filing of the landlord's evidence, but sought to reopen the evidentiary stage at a considerably belated point in the proceedings.

The mere delay in seeking cross-examination would not, by itself, be sufficient to reject the application if examination of a witness were shown to be necessary for the proper adjudication of a material controversy. The significance of the delay lies in the absence of any explanation identifying a subsequent development, a previously undiscovered matter, or any other circumstance accounting for why the need for cross-examination arose only after the parties had filed their respective affidavits and the matter had been set down for final arguments. The timing of the application must, therefore, be considered alongside the specific purpose for which cross-examination was sought and the necessity of reopening the evidentiary stage.

The grounds advanced by the petitioner principally concern the landlord's alleged bona fide need, the availability of other properties, the business activities of the landlord and his family members, and the alleged letting of other premises. These matters may be relevant to the adjudication of the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act of 1972. Their relevance to the ultimate controversy, however, does not, by itself, establish the necessity of permitting cross-examination of every witness whose affidavit has been filed by the landlord. The petitioner was required to demonstrate how the proposed examination would assist in resolving a specific disputed factual question bearing upon the determination of the release application, and why that question could not adequately be addressed on the basis of the material already available on record.

The petitioner has also questioned the testimony of the landlord's witnesses on the ground that P.W.-2 and P.W.-3 are the parents of P.W.-1 and that the remaining witnesses are interested in the landlord. The relationship of a witness with a party, or the circumstance that a witness may be interested in the outcome of the proceedings, may be relevant to the assessment of the credibility and evidentiary weight of the testimony. Such circumstances do not, however, automatically render cross-examination indispensable. The petitioner was required to identify the particular statements made by the concerned witnesses that called for clarification or challenge and explain why the alleged relationship or interest gave rise to a material factual controversy that could not adequately be assessed on the basis of the evidence already on record. A general challenge to the independence or credibility of the witnesses, without identifying the specific matters requiring examination, does not by itself establish the necessity of reopening the evidentiary stage.

The allegations concerning the business carried on under the name and style of Bangla Sweet, the availability of other properties, and the alleged letting of premises situated on the first floor behind the disputed shop may be taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority while determining the question of bona fide need, subject to the pleadings and evidence on record. The materiality of these allegations to the release application must, however, be distinguished from the necessity of examining each of the landlord's witnesses in relation to them. The petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated why the proposed examination of all six witnesses is required to establish or test these matters, nor has the application adequately identified the particular factual assertion attributable to each witness that necessitates such examination. The existence of disputed questions concerning the landlord's need or the availability of other premises does not, without more, justify a general request to cross-examine every witness.

Particular reliance has been placed upon the statement of P.W.-4, Mudit Agrawal, concerning the alleged letting of the premises situated on the first floor behind the disputed shop. Even assuming that the statement raises a factual issue relevant to the determination of the release application, the petitioner was required to identify the precise ambiguity, inconsistency or factual assertion requiring clarification and explain why examination of the concerned witness was necessary for its resolution. If the request is founded upon an apparent inconsistency in the evidence, the application must disclose the nature of that inconsistency and the purpose for which further examination is sought. Reliance upon a statement made by one witness does not, without further justification, establish the necessity of cross-examining all six witnesses. The scope of any proposed further examination must bear a demonstrable relationship to the material controversy sought to be resolved.

The Prescribed Authority has further recorded that the petitioner had addressed the allegations concerning the matters on which cross-examination was sought through the affidavits of D.W.-1 to D.W.-4. The fact that the petitioner has already led evidence in defence does not, by itself, preclude him from seeking cross-examination where a genuine necessity for such examination is established. Equally, the filing of defence affidavits cannot be treated as a substitute for cross-examination if the latter is otherwise necessary for the just determination of a material factual controversy. The significance of the petitioner's defence evidence in the present case lies in the fact that the petitioner had already placed his version of the disputed matters on record, while the application does not sufficiently explain why the material already available is inadequate for the adjudication of those matters or why further oral examination of the landlord's witnesses is indispensable.

The application, therefore, cannot be sustained merely on the ground that the petitioner disputes the statements made by the landlord's witnesses or wishes to test their veracity. The right to seek permission for cross-examination must be distinguished from an entitlement to obtain such permission irrespective of the purpose, necessity or stage of the proceedings. Where the evidentiary stage has already concluded and a party seeks to reopen it for further cross-examination, the application must disclose not only the material factual issue sought to be addressed but also a sufficient justification for the proposed examination at that stage. In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated such necessity with sufficient specificity in relation to the proposed examination of all six witnesses. Nor has a satisfactory explanation been furnished for seeking to undertake the examination after the matter had remained at the stage of arguments for several years.

The stage at which the application was moved, the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the fact that the parties had already filed their respective evidence, and the failure to establish the specific necessity for the proposed further cross-examination, when considered cumulatively, support the conclusion reached by the Prescribed Authority. The rejection of the application is not being sustained merely on account of delay, the summary nature of the proceedings, or the fact that the petitioner has already filed defence evidence. It is sustained on the cumulative effect of these circumstances, particularly the failure to demonstrate why the proposed examination is necessary for the just determination of a material controversy and why the evidentiary stage should be reopened after such a prolonged interval. The material placed before the Court does not disclose a sufficient basis for concluding that refusal of the requested further examination would, in the circumstances of the case, result in the denial of a necessary opportunity to address a material factual issue.

The question whether the impugned order warrants interference must be examined within the limits of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Such jurisdiction is not intended to substitute the assessment of the subordinate court merely because another view may be possible. Interference is warranted where the subordinate court has acted beyond its jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it, or committed a material illegality or procedural irregularity warranting supervisory correction. In examining the impugned procedural order, the Court must, therefore, determine whether the discretion exercised by the Prescribed Authority suffers from any such infirmity.

In the present case, the Prescribed Authority considered the nature of the application, the stage reached in the proceedings and the evidence already placed on record by the parties. For the reasons discussed above, the petitioner has not demonstrated that the refusal to permit cross-examination resulted in any jurisdictional error, material illegality or procedural irregularity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The rejection of the application does not, however, determine the merits of the petitioner's objections concerning the landlord's bona fide need or the availability of other premises. Those matters shall be considered by the Prescribed Authority in accordance with law, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record.

Accordingly, no jurisdictional error, material illegality or procedural irregularity warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been established.

In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no sufficient ground to interfere with the order dated 03.08.2026 passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-II, Hapur, in P.A. Case No. 02 of 2018, whereby the petitioner's application, Paper No. 76-Ga, seeking permission to cross-examine P.W.-1 to P.W.-6, was rejected.

The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

The Prescribed Authority shall proceed with the release proceedings and endeavour to decide the same expeditiously, in accordance with law. The proceedings shall be decided on the basis of the pleadings and evidence on record, uninfluenced by any observation made in this judgment concerning the merits of the parties' respective claims regarding bona fide need.

There shall be no order as to costs.