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Judgment
D.H. Waghela, C.J.—The appellants, original petitioners have called in question the order dated 11-2-2013 of learned Single Judge of this Court whereby, their petitions challenging the election of respondents 7 and 8 were dismissed. There is no dispute about the fact that the Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had by its order dated 30-3-2012 decided the disputes raised by the petitioners with the overall conclusion that the procedure adopted for holding the election to Central Council of Indian Medicine from the State of Karnataka was in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 (48 of 1970) (in short ''the IMCC Act'') and the Rules made thereunder. On the basis of allegations made and the issues raised by the appellants regarding conduct of election to the Central Council for Indian Medicine, the Writ Petitions were dismissed.
Learned Senior Counsel, Sri S.M. Chandrashekar advanced only two arguments, the first being that, learned Single Judge having recorded that prima facie it appeared that the Central Government having not independently assigned reasons for coming to the aforesaid conclusion, order impugned in the petition was required to be set aside only on that ground and the matter remitted for a fresh consideration. However, learned Single Judge has recorded in express terms in the impugned order and it was fairly conceded by learned Counsel that, learned Counsel appearing for both sides before learned Single Judge had specifically requested the Court to finally dispose of the matter on merits rather than on the technical ground. Therefore, all the arguments addressed before learned Single Judge have been dealt with in detail in the impugned judgment.
The second argument for the appellant was reiteration of the same objection to the effect that, respondents 7 and 8 who were declared elected at the election in question were not practitioners of any system of medicine but, they were academicians on account of being part of different faculties at the College and they were Pathologists and Pharmacists who could not be called Medical Practitioners in the traditional sense.
Learned Counsel relied upon the provisions of the Karnataka Ayurvedic, Naturopathy, Siddha, Unani and Yoga Practitioners'' Registration and Medical Practitioners'' Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1961 in support of submission that, ''Practitioner'' as defined in that Act means a person who practices any system of medicine as his principal occupation and only such practitioner could be a registered Practitioner within the meaning and definition of that Act. It was on that basis, vehemently argued that respondents 7 and 8 could not have been allowed to contest the election in the constituency carved in the provisions of Section 3(1)(a) of the IMCC Act.
It is however seen from a bare perusal of the relevant provisions of Section 3(1)(a) that, the Central Council under the Act was required to be constituted and five or less members thereon were required to be elected from each State from amongst the persons enrolled on the register maintained in the respective State as State Register of Indian Medicine. Therefore, the only requirement for being elected or being a voter in the constituency covered u/s 3(1)(a) was that, the candidate or the voter has to be enrolled on the register of practitioners of Ayurveda, Naturopathy, Siddha or Unani, as the case may be.
In the facts of the present case, there is no dispute about the fact that, respondents 7 and 8 were enrolled as Practitioners in the State Register of Indian Medicine maintained by the State. Elaborating on the factual aspect, it is further noticed in the impugned judgment that, respondents 7 and 8, not only were registered practitioners, they had opted to work in the teaching hospitals as Doctors and were squarely falling within the definition of ''Registered Practitioner'' as defined u/s 2(h) of the State Act. In the above facts and circumstances, no further factual enquiry was required to be held at any level for upholding the election of respondents 7 and 8. Accordingly, we do not find any substance in the argument addressed on behalf of the appellants and hence the appeals are summarily dismissed along with interim applications made therein.