High CourtsSingle Bench(1985) 09 P&H CK 0131

Dr. Parmatma Dwivedi vs The Council Of Scientfic And Industrial Research Rafi-Marg, New Delhi

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 27 September 1985

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rajendra Nath Mittal, J
CASE NUMBER
Regular First Appeal No. 722 of 1976

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Judgment

14 paragraphs · 1,691 words

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This appeal has been filed by the Defendant against the judgment and decree of the Senior Sub Judge, Chandigarh dated 11th June, 1976.

2.

Briefly the case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant was appointed by it as a scientist on probation for a period of one year with effect from 24th April, 1971. One of the conditions of his appoint-ment was that his services could be terminated during the period of probation without assigning any reason. He was entitled to get VI type quarter for residential purposes on payment of 10 per cent of his pay as license fee. As no accommodation of that type was available, so as a special case he was allotted a portion of Director''s bungalow. Later the whole of the bungalow was allotted to him with effect from 31st December, 1971.

3.

It is further pleaded that the services of the Defendant were terminated during his period of probation on 3rd April, 1972. He was entitled to retain the premises on concessional license fee for a period of one month after the termination of his services and was liable to hand over the premises to the Plaintiff thereafter He did not vacate the premises after the expiry of the period of one month from the date of termination of his services. According to the rules of allotment, after the termination of his services, be was liable to pay damages at the market rate which was Rs. 1047/- per mensem. The Plaintiff has claimed a sum of Rs. 142.58 P. on account of damages for the period from 1st April, 1972 to 3rd May, 1972 at the rate of 10 per cent of the pay and a sum of Rs. 15080 18 P. as damages at the rate of Rs. 1047/- per mensem for the period from 4th May, 1972 to 15th July, 1973, from the Defendant. In addition to the said amount, it has claimed interest amounting to Rs. 1032 86 P. at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the said amount . Thus the Plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 16,255.62 P. and for permanent mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the premises.

4.

The suit was contested by the Defendant who inter alia pleaded that the Plaintiff was not entitled to charge damages for use and occupation of the premises at the enhanced rate ''from 4th May, 1972 to 15th Juiy, 1973. He also took various other pleas but these do not survive in the appeal.

5.

The trial Court held that the services of the Defendant were terminated in pursuance of the order of the Vice-President of the Plaintiff and that the Plaintiff was entitled to damages for the unauthorized use and occupation of the premises from 4th May, 1972 to 15th July, 1973 at the rate of Rs. 1047/ per mensem and Rs. 142 58 P. as license fee for the period from 1st April, 1972, to 3rd May, 1972. Regarding the interest it was held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the same. It was also held that the Plaintiff was entitled to a decree for mandatory injunction requiring the Defendant to vacate the premises. Consequently it passed the decree for mandatory injunction requiring the Defendant to vacate the premises and for recovery of Rs. 15,222 76 P in favour of the Plaintiff . The Defendant has come up in appeal to this Court

6.

The following three contentions have been raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. Firstly, that according to the rules of allotment the damages were to be fixed by the Director but the amount of Rs. 1047/- per mensem was not fixed by him. Secondly, the Appellant was a tenant and not a licensee in the premises as these were not given to him as a condition of service for the performance of his duties and Thirdly, that the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are applicable to the case and, therefore, the Respondent could not charge rent at a higher rate.

7.

The first question that arises for determination is as to whether the damages were fixed by the director or not. The Plaintiff examined Gurmukh Singh, Executive Engineer C P Division No. 1, P W 7, who assessed the market rent of the bunglow. The report is Exhibit P. 30. According to the report, he assessed its market rent at the rate of Rs. 1047/- per mensem Uma Shanker Sexena (P W 8) is the Upper Division Clerk of the Plaintiff He deposed that he dealt with the case of allotment of house to the Defendant and the note Exhibit P-31 was in his hand. Dr. Mangal was the then Head of the Organization at Chandigarh. Exhibit P 32 was in the hand writing of Dr. Mangal.

8.

Exhibit P 31 is the note of Uma Shanker Sexena on the report of the Executive Engineer. By this note he put up the case Before the higher authorities for approval He also worked out the total amount of damages from 4.4.1972 to 31.12.1972. The note was approved by Dr. Mangal on 24.1.1973 vide Exhibit P 32. In the aforesaid circumstances, it is established beyond doubt that the amount of damages (market rent) of the bungalow at the rate of Rs. 1047/- per mensem was approved by the then Head of the Department, Dr. Mangal. Consequently, I rejected the submission of the learned Counsel.

9.

The second question that requires determination is whether the Appellant was a tenant and not a licensee in the bungalow. The Plaintiff in the plaint specifically mentioned that the Defendant was given bungalow as a licensee under the rules for the allotment of residential accommodation to the staff The Defendant in the written statement did not say that was handed over the bungalow as a tenant. However, be pleaded that he was liable to pay rent of the premises. At the time of framing the issues, he did not claim any specific issue to the effect that he was tenant in the premises. No evidence has been brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the Appellant to the effect that he was handed over the bungalow as a tenant. The Plaintiff has framed rules for the allotment of accommodation to the staff employed by it. The copy of the said rules in Exhibit P-21. In Clause (a) of Rule 4 the word ''allotment'' has been defined as follows:

''Allotment'' means the grant of license to occupy a residence within the provisions of these rules.

Rules 11 relates to the period for which allotment subsists and the concessional period for further retention. It inter alia provides that an allotment shall be effective from the date on which it is accepted by the officer and shall continue in force until the expiry of the concessional period permissible. In case of the Defendant-Appellant, according to the sub-rule the concessional period was one month after his services were terminated According to the said rule therefore, the Appellant could retain the premises after termination of the services, for a period of one month Rule 21 provides that where an allotment is deemed to be cancelled under any provisions contained in the rules and residence has remained in occupation of the officer to whom it was allotted, such officer would be liable to pay damages for the use and occupation of the residence, services, furniture and garden trees if any, equal to the market rent as may be determined by the head of the Laboratory/Institute from time to time. From the circumstances of the case and a reading of the abovesaid rules, it is evident that the Appellant was a licensee in the bungalow and that he was liable to pay damages at the market rate after the expiry of the concessional period for which he could retain it

10.

Mr. Sharma has placed reliance on AIR 1944 42 (Privy Council) . and Governor-General of India in Council Vs. Corporation of Calcutta, . The question in the former case before the Privy Council was whether for the purpose of the assessment to the consolidated rate of a house in Calcutta owned by the Provincial Government and occupied by the Commissioner of the Presidency Division in Bengal, the annual value would fall to be calculated under Sub-section (a) or under Sub-section (b) of Section 127 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. It was observed therein that the mere fact that it is convenient 10 both parties that the servant should occupy a particular house and that he is put in possession of it for that reason ,does not prevent him from being a tenant; his possession is that of a tenant unless he is required to occupy the premises for the better performance of his duties though his residence is not necessary for that purpose or if his residence there be necessary for the performance of his duties though not specifically required. From the above facts it is evident that the question before their Lordships was different. In my view, the above observations were made in the context of that case and they are not applicable to the facts, of the present case. Similar question was involved in Governor-General of India in Council''s case (supra). While deciding the case the learned Bench placed reliance on the observations of the Privy Council in Corporation of Calcutta''s ease (supra) For similar reasons as given above, Mr. Sharma cannot get any benefit from the observations in that case toe.

11.

The last question that arises for determination is whether the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are applicable to the present case. The question does not require any discussion as it has already been held by me that the applicant was a licensee in the bungalow and not a tenant. It is well settled that the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act are not applicable in the case of licenses.

12.

For the aforesaid reasons I do not find any merit in the appeal and dismiss the same with costs.