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Judgment
Varadarajan, J.—This writ petition is by the owner of Ramakrishna Talkies situate in Tennur High Road, Tiruchirappalli, for the issue of a writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate order or direction calling for the records relating to the ciders of the Commissioner of Land Revenue, Prohibition and Excise, Board of Revenue, Madras, the first Respondent herein, and quash the same. The writ miscellaneous petitions are to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased third Respondent as Respondents 4 to 7 and to appoint the 4th Respondent as the guardian of the minor Respondents 5 to 7 and for an injunction restraining the second Respondent from further renewing the licence in the name of the third Respondent''s legal representatives or any other person and to substitute Respondents 4 to 7 in the place of the third Respondent, respectively.
The first Respondent''s order No. B.P. Rt. 3229 of 1976 (L), dated 19th July, 1976, was passed on the appeal filed by Krishnamurthy, the third Respondent (row deceased), the temporary licencee of Ramakrishna Talkies, against the Collector''s order refusing renewal of the C form licence for the cinema. The prior regular C form licence had been renewed upto 31st December, 1974 and it steed in the name of Krishnamurthy, the deceased, third Respondent. Further renewal of the C form licence was pending before the Collector for rectification of certain defects and the cinema had been running on temporary permits issued every month. The writ Petitioner had constructed the Ramakrishna Talkies and had in July, 1935 the C form licence issued in his favour under Public Resorts Act II of 1888, as also the permit issued by the Electricity Department under the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules. Section 12(1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, provides for the licensing authority granting the licence under Part III of the Act relating to regulation of exhibitions by means of cinematographs, if it is satisfied that the rules made under that part had been substantially complied with. Section 12(3) of the Act provides for an appeal to the State Government or to such officer as the State Government may specify in this behalf and the State Government or the Officer, as the case may be, may make such order in the case as it or he thinks fit. Under Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957, if the Applicant for the licence is the owner of the site, building and equipment, he shall produce to the licensing authority the necessary records relating to his ownership and possession thereof, and if he is not the owner, he shall, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment.
The writ Petitioner was running the cinema under the name and style of Ramakrishna Talkies in his name from 1935 to 1945, and his brother was running the cinema with licence standing in his name thereafter, until about 1947. There is no dispute between the parties about the facts thus far referred to. Subsequently, the Petitioner and the third Respondent''s father, Ramasubramania Iyer entered into an agreement of lease, dated 15th October, 1947 in respect of the Ramakrishna Talkies for a period of five years from 1st April, 1947. The lease deed, dated 15th October, 1947 has been produced before us. But objection was taken on behalf of the contesting Respondents about that document being looked into by this Court, on the ground that, it has not formed part of the records either before the Collector or before the first Respondent. Subsequent to that lease, there was a supplemental agreement between the Petitioner and Ramasubramania Iyer for apportioning the rent of Rs. 1,200 per month into Rs. 600 representing the rental for the theatre building and Rs. 600 representing the hire charges for the furniture, fans, bulbs, fixatures, electrical fittings, stage materials and other equipments required for fulfilling the regulations and requirements of District Magistrate''s Electrical Inspector''s, Fire Brigade Officer''s and Public Resort Act''s licences needed for a pucka licensed theatre, and also for the goodwill of the business as a going concern run under the name and style of Ramakrishna Talkies covered by all the requisite licences. Thereafter, there was a further lease under the document, dated. 10th July, 1965 by the Petitioner in favour of R. Krishnamurthy, the third Respondent herein and the son of the pervious lessee, of the same property described in the schedule to the document, as a running concern for a sum of Rs. 1,500 per mensem for a period of ten years ending with 30th September, 1975. According to Clause 18 of that agreement out of the sum of Rs. 1,500, Rs. 600 represents the rental for the theatre building and Rs. 900 represents the hire charges for the furniture, fans, fittings and. also for the goodwill of the business as a running concern called Ramakrishna Talkies fully covered by all the necessary licences. The affidavit filed in support of the writ petition discloses that at the request of Ramasubramania Iyer before the expiry of the lease on 30th September, 1965, the Petitioner bad agreed for the transfer of the lease to his son Krishnamurthy, the third Respondent and hid also given the necessary consent letter for the transfer of the licences and certificates required in favour of Krishnamurthy and that after the expiry of that lease, the subsequent lease agreement, dated 10th July, 1975, referred to above, was entered into.
When the matter of the issue of a regular C form licence was pending before the Collector, after the expiry of the period of the last lease on 30th September, 1975, the Petitioner raised an objection for the renewal of the C form licence saying that the lease expired on 30th September, 1975 and that it was of a composite nature not falling with in the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, and that on the expiry of the lease, the lessee could not claim to be in law full possession of the property and therefore the requirement of Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1957, was not satisfied. Therefore, the question for consideration by the Collector, the Licensing Authority, was whether the lessee was in lawful possession as required by Rule 13 of the Rules and he thought that the licensee cannot be considered to be in lawful possession unless the tenancy is either covered by the lease document or the tenant continues to be in occupation as a statutory tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Collector found the point against Krishnamurthy, observing:
It is clear beyond any doubt that the lease has been only of a running business as a Cinema Theatre and not of the building as such. Thus, Section 30(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Pert Control) Act directly applies to this case where the object of the tenant was to run the business or industry and not to use the building as accommodation. In fact the leasee took over a running cinema theatre and, as admitted by him, only the Projector was changed. I am unable to accept the arguments of the lessee, that the failure to mention the cinema projector by itself will take the lease outside the purview of Section 30(iii) of the Act...The theatre was running even before the lessee took it over and the lease taken by him was of the entire business. Just because the projector was changed, it does not detract from the nature of a composite lease...I find no reason to doubt the fact that the lease was a composite one. It is also not covered under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act and according to its amended Section 30(iii). As such, the lessee cannot establish law ful possession after the expiry of the lease as required under Rule 13 of the Cinema (Regulation) Rules and his application for renewal of the licence is, therefore, refused,
As already stated, the third Respondent filed an appeal before the first Respondent against the Collector''s order and it was contended before the first Respondent that the lease was not a composite one inasmuch as the projector are the loudspeakers, amplifiers and other cinema equipments had to be provided, by the lessee himself. The Respondent accepted that contention and allowed the appeal and. directed the Collector to issue the C form licence to the third Respondent observing:
It has been admitted by the Respondent that he has not provided, apart from the fire extinguishers and a cinema screen, any other machinery or equipment. These terms are net enough to run the cinema. The essential equipment for running a cinema is the projector together with loud-speakers and amplifier. It is admitted by the Respondent that these items have been provided by the Appellant himself. In view of this. I cannot accept the argument that the lease is that of the running concern. The mere mention of the word ''good'' will'' in the lease does not make it the lease of a running concern....
The counsel for the Appellant has also cited the judgment of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1640 and 1641 of 1968 K. Kuppusamy Gounder v. The Board of Revenue represented by Commissioner of Land Revenue and Food Production and another in the case of Ambikai Talkies, Karur, Tiruchirappali District in which it has been held that if the equipment does, cot belong to the lessor the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, will apply I, therefore, hold that the lease is purely that of the building and it is not a composite lease. As such the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and rent Control) Act will be applicable in this case and therefore, the lessee will be come entitled to protection under the above Act. That being the case, it cannot be said that he was in illegal possession of the building after 30th September, 1975.
The Petitioner had sent a lawyer''s notice, dated 3rd October, 1975 to the Collector, as required by Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, saying that the lease was of the building alone and not a composite lease. The first Respondent had taken that circumstance also into consideration, though he had felt that it need not act as estoppel against the Petitioner.
In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the Petitioner has stated thus in paragraph 3:
It is necessary to state that until 31st October, 1947 my theatre was equipped with a projector which included also the sound equipment. At the request of the lease, I had consented to his replacing the single projector and the sound equipment with a double projector and sound equipment. This was the only equipment which he replaced, and all the other furniture, fittings, machinery, equipment etc., which are required for running the cinema theatre, were all part of the lease.
There is no specific denial of this allegation in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. Therefore, it has to be taken t hat it is admitted that at the time of the original lease and until 31st October 1947, the theatre had been equipped with a single projector and sound, equipment, that at the request of the lessee Ramasubramania Iyer the Petitioner consented to his replacing the single projector and the sound equipment with a double projector and sound equipment and that it was the only equipment which the lessee replaced, and all ether furniture, fittings, machinery, equipment, etc., required for the running of the cinema theatre were all parts of the lease. It is necessary to state in this connection that it was conceded by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that there is no reference to the projector and sound equipment in any of the leases In favour of Ramasubramania Iyer and the third Respondent. But the fourth Respondent has stated in the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition that admittedly the main cinema projector and sound equipment belonged to her. She has further contended that the lease of a cinema business without a projector and sound equipment would be meaningless, that a perusal of the lease deed would show that neither the talkies equipment nor the projector was included in the lease, and that in fact the Petitioner has admitted in the affidavit that the lessee has provided the projector which included sound equipment.
Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, a Central enactment, governs leases of immovable property. Transfer of property is in the concurrent list forming entry 6 in List 3 of schedule VII. Therefore, the State can also legislate regarding leases. The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 was passed to amend and, consolidate the law relating to letting of residential and nonresidential buildings and the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants there from in the State of Tamil Nadu. Section 1(2) of the Act defines a building as:
building means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separate by for residential or non-residential purposes and includes-
(a) the garden, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building, but or part of such building or hut and let or to be let along with such building or hut (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut, but does, not include a room in a Hotel or boarding house.
Clause (iii) of Section 30, which has been introduced by the Tamil Nadu Act XXIII of 1973 and which came it-to force with effect from 30th June, 1973, says that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to:
Any lease of a building under which the object of the tenant is to run the business or industry with the fixtures, machinery, furniture or other articles belonging to the landlord and situated in such bulking.
Illustration (2) to this sub-section sets out that:
Where the lease is of land and building together with fixatures, fittings, cinematograph talkies equipments machinery and other articles, the Act does not apply to such building.
The learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents submitted that what docs not fall within Clause (iii) of Section 30 and Illustration (2) to that section would fall within the ambit of the enactment. We are unable to accept this argument. We find the following passage in Lucy v. W.T. Henleys Telegraph Works Co. Ltd. (1969) 3 All. E.R. 456 464, (C.A.)
The contents of the ''Report of the Committee on Limitation of Actions in Cases of Personal Injury cannot, under our present law, be adverted to in construing the Act which followed it within less than a year.
The Supreme Court has observed in Dwarka Prasad Vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, that;
It is settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment...To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the provisions against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the question, whether the lease is protected by Act or not will have to be decided with reference to the main provisions of the Act itself and not with reference to Section 30 and the illustrations thereto, which are in the nature of provisos.
If the lease is governed by the Tami Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, the third Respondent''s legal representative associated with the business carried on in the building would also be tenants within the meaning of Section 2(8) of the Act, for, the definition of a tenant in Section 2(8) of the Act both before and after its amendment by the Tamil Nadu Act XXIII of 1973, indices any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for the building, and also the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who in the case of non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of currying the business of the tenant up to the death of the tenant and continued to carry on such business thereafter. In Jagdish Chander Chatterjee and Others Vs. Shri Kishan and Another, . it is observed:
It is now settled that after the termination of the contractual tenancy the statutory tenant has only a personal right to continue in possession till evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is pointed out by this Court in Anand Nivas (Private) Ltd. Vs. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhi and Others, A person remaining in occupation of the permit seslet to him after the determination or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant". Such a person is not a tenant at all; he has no estate or inter cut in the premises occupied by him. He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be turned cut so long as he pays the standard lent and permitted increases if any, and performs the other condition of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the Determination of the contractual tenancy is personal it is not capable of being transferred or assignee, are devolves on his death only in the manner pro video by the statute.
These observations have been made with reference to the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. In Uttamchand Vs. S.M. Lalwani, which arose under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act XXIII of 1955, the folic wire observe liens of Jenkins J., in Levermore v. Jobey (1956) 2 All. E.R. 362. has been extrated:
For the purpose of construing the lease and in particular the tenant''s covenant it is permissible for the Court, and indeed obligatory on the court, to pay regard to the surrounding circumstances with reference to which the lease was entered into, and in particular to look at the nature of the subject-matter of the letting.
Basing himself on that observation, Mr. B.R.L. Iyengar who appeared for the Appellant in that case, contended that in construing the nature of the lease the Court must not lose sight of the fact that the lease in that case in terms purports to be of the Dal Mill building and that the machinery comes under the lease only incidentally as having been fixed in the said building. The Supreme Court has observed in that decisions:
Mr. Iyengar has also relied on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Venkayya v. Thammanna Peda Venkatasubba Rao AIR 1957 A.P. 619, 626, Dealing with the question as to the nature of the lease with which the Court was concerned in that case, Viswanatha Sastri, J., observed that there is an immense variety of structures which could be styled buildings, and added,
We are unable to accede to the proposition that every enclosure of brick, stone work or mud walls covered in by roof irrespective of the purpose for which, it is used and let, is a building within the meaning of the Act.
The learned Judge has also remarked that so to construe the Act would being within its operation all factories and mills which are invariably located in buildings The question in each case would be what is the dominant part of the demise and what is the purpose for which the building was constructed and let out...Mr. Iyengar contends that in construing the lease before us, we must apply the test of the dominant intention of the parties. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded, and so, we must determine the character of the tease by asking ourselves as to what was the dominant intention of the parties in executing the document. As we have already noticed, Section 3(a)(y)(3) takes within the definition of accommodation any building or part of a building, including any fitting a affixed to inch budding or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof. There can be no doubt that tie fittings of the machinery in the present case cannot be said to be fittings which had been fixed for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building. The fittings to which Section 3(a)(y)(3) refers are obviously fittings made in the building to afford incidental amenities for the person occupying the buildings. That being go, it is clear that the fittings in question do not fall u/s 3(a)(y)(3). If the fittings in question had attracted the previsions of Section 3(a)(y)(3) there would have been no difficulty in holding that the lease is in respect of accommodation as defined by the said provision.
What then was the dominant intention of the parties when they entered into present transaction? We have already set out the material terms of the lease and it seems to us plain that the dominant intention of the Appellant in accepting the lease from the Respondent was to use the building is a Dal Mill...The fact that the Appellant contends that the machinery which was transferred to him under the lease was Found to be not very serviceable and that he had to bring his own machinery, would not alter the character of the transaction...The fixture described in the schedule to the lease art in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building...The fact that a Mill situated in a building it not expressly exempted by Section 2(1) would hardly make any difference, because no lea se can attract the provisions of the Act under it is shown that it is in respect of accommodation as defined by Section 3(a) and that must inevitably take us to the question as to whether the present lease falls u/s 3(a)(y)(3) . If the answer to this question is in the negative, it make no difference at all, because, if the lease is not in respect of accommodation, it is hardly necessary to enquire whether it has been exempted from the operation of the Act.
The Supreme Court has observed in Dwarka Prasad Vs. Dwarka Das Saraf, referred to above, thus;
The building covered by the suit is admittedly one built and adapted for screening films. The Plaintiff had been carrying CH a cinema business in this theatre for a long number of years but, when he discontinued, the Defendant approached him in January, 1952 for the grant of a lease of the building with all the equipment and fittings and furniture necessary for this operating the cinema...Therefore, once the lease for the entire building and cinema projector, accessories and the like was finalised, the deed of demise was actually executed...The core of the controversy here is (a) whether the lease is of the building, the fittings and other fixatures merely making for the beneficial enjoyment of and ancillary to the building, as urged by the tenant, or whether the building provides a bare, though appropriately designed, enclosure to house an enterprise, the dominant purpose or real subject of the lease being the cinema, apparatus and fittings, including subsidiary and incidentally, though necessarily, the structure of brick and mortar and (b) whether the cinema, to fall within the exclusionary clause added by the Amending Act, must be actually a going concern with all the licenses for showing films and running the theatre being In the name of the lessor....
Looking at the three problems posed ,unaided by the many decisions cited by counsel, we are inclined to the view that a lease of an ''accommodation'' must essentially be of a building not a business or industry together with the building in which it is situated...where the lease is composite and has a plurality of purposes, the decisive test is the dominant purpose of the demise...The law sought to rescue exploited tenants of buildings. If this be a sound reading of the mind of the legislature it is fair to hold that the protected category of accommodation was residential and non-residential buildings and not business houses...in this statutory context, gardens, out-houses, furniture and fittings mean annexures for the better enjoyment of the building. In this sense, the dominant intention must be to lease the building qua building. If that be the intention, the rent control law protects. On the other hand, if a going undertaking such as a running or ready-to-launch and fully equipped cinema house is covered by the provision, the emphasis is not so much on the building but on the business, actual or imminent. There is nothing in the present definition which helps this shift in accent.
The terms of the lease deed in that case were these:
We have taken a Cinema hall known as Dwaraka Prasad Theatre Hall...for running a cinema...on a monthly rent of Rs. 200 commencing from March 25th, 1953.
On the same day the Defendants in the suit executed another lease deed stating that they had taken the Dwaraka Theatre Hall on a rent of Rs. 200 per month and that in that building there were new furniture fitted for about 500 seats with ceiling and fittings of electric light and fans, complete machinery, ceiling fans and operating machine together with all articles present in the hall of the theatre, a list whereof had been duly signed by the executant and that they had taken that also en a monthly rent of Rs. 1,100 besides the rent of the building. The Defendants stated, in that lease deed that they had taken the building on rent to continue running a cinema. The Supreme Court had held that the lease sued on does net fall within the scope of the definition of accommodation in the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, (3 of 1947).
The inventory taken as per clause 15 of the lease deed, dated 10th July, 1965 in the present cases shows that a long with the building of Ramakrishna Talkies the Petitioner had leased 91 wooden benches, 41 back benches with iron stand 40 teak- weed aim chairs, 40 iron chairs with back, one teak wood table with drawers, one teak wood telephone table, one wiring diagram plan, one set of framed cinematograph rules, one framed fire-flighting process, exist and no exist boards on doorways and windows, one seating capacity board, two framed Lakshmi and Saraswathi pictures, five fire extinguishers with refills with three spare refills for fire extinguishers, seven fire buckets two iron stands for fire buckets in auditorium, seven ceiling fans with suspending pipes and separate regulators, one electric calling tell, two big ladders, one projection screen, two G.I. pipes required for the projection screen, ore wooden frame border for projection screen, two big main switch boards and complete wiring system through cut the theatre with light points throughout the Auditorium, exits, outside walls cabin room, verandahs, waiting sheds, tea stalls, booking officers, to, and permanent serial lighting points in gable wall in front and in cabin room, verandahs and stair steps with blue cloth curtains for doorways and windows suspended fix m iron rods fixed to the doorways and windows and celotex fittings and two long benches and back benches. These articles are in no sense intended for the more beneficial enjoyment of the building and would be properly required only for the purpose of running the cinema. The fact that the income from the tea-shop, pan-shop and cycle-stand are also covered by the lease, that the property leased has been described in the schedule to the lease deed as a running concern, that the monthly rental of Rs. 1,500 has been fixed representing Rs. 600 being the rental for the theatre building and Rs. 900 being the hire charges for the furniture and fittings and also for the goodwill of the business as a running concern bearing the name and style of Ramakrishna Talkies fully covered by all the necessary licences and that the lessee has to make his own arrangements to obtain the renewal of the licences every year for conducting show etc., and was bound to hand back the theatre; after the lease period was ever fully covered by all the necessary licences in favor if the lessor, so that shows can be conducted on the very day of the expiry of the lease in continuation, shows that what had been leased is not the mere Ramakrishna Talkies building, but Ramakrishna Talkies business with the necessary licences and all the equipments except the single procedure and the sound equipment which belonged to the lesser and by consent of the parties to the lease deed had been replaced by the lessee by a double projector and sound equipment. Great Stress was laid by the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents en the fact that the cinematograph projector and sound equipment used in the theatre since the date of commencement of the lease belonged to the lessee and not to the lessor and it was contended that it must be sufficient to hold that the lease was not of a running concern but only of a building. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand Vs. S.M. Lalwani, which we have underlined that the fact that the machinery which was transferred to the lessee under the lease was found to be not very serviceable and that he had to bring in his own machinery would net alter the nature of the transaction, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the single projector and the sound equipment which the Petitioner was using until the date of the lease in favour of Ramasubramania Iyer had not been leased butted been replaced by the double projector and sound equipment belonging to the lessee by consent of the parties to the lease would not alter the nature of the transaction in this case. The dominant purpose of the lease, as disclosed by the apportionment of the rental of Rs. 1,500 into Rs. 600 being the rental for the theatre building and Rs. 900 being the hire charges for furniture, fens, fittings and also for the goodwill of the business as a running concern, would also show that the lease was of the Ramakrishna Talkies as a running concern together with, the building in which it was being run by the Petitioner until the date of the lease and net of the mere building. Therefore, it would, follow that the lease is a composite one and that it is not governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The possession of the third Respondent after the expiry of the lease on 30th September 1975 was not other under any subsisting contract of lease or under any lease coming within the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Therefore, the possession of the third Respondent after 30th September, 1975 was net lawful possession and consequently he had net satisfied the requirement of Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Cinemas (Regulation Sales, 1957, and he was not entitled to have the C form licence granted by the Collector for running the cinema business in the building.
The learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents submitted that it is net for this Court to interfere with the view of the first Respondent en facts. The conclusion of the first Respondent that the property leased is a building falling within the definition of building in Section 2(2) of the Act and not one of a composite nature not governed by the previsions of that Act, is based on an erroneous view of the law, and his order directing the Collector to issue the C form licence to the deceased third Respondent has exceeded his power sunder the law. Where the Executive has exceeded its powers under the law or has abused such powers by exercising them for an ulterior purpose not sanctioned by the law, the action of the Executive can be interfered with by the Court; and to that extent the position of an Executive body and that of a judicial or quasi-judicial body are not different, [vide] (1967) 69 P.L.R. 377 We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents that it is not open for this Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the view of the first Respondent that the lease is of a building to which the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, applies and not a composite lease which is not governed by the Provisions of that Act. The order of the first Respondent allowing the third Respondents appeal and directing the Collector to grant the C form licence to the third Respondent cannot therefore, be sustained in law and has to beset aside.
The petition is accordingly allowed with costs, payable by the contesting Respondents Advocate''s fee of Rs. 500. The first Respondent''s order is set aside and the clear of the Collector of Tiruchirappalli refusing to grant the C form licence to the third Respondent is restored.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioner and the contesting Respondents had no objection to the legal representatives of the third Respondent being brought en record, and the question whether the fourth Respondent was associated with the business carried on by the third Respondent and was entitled to the licence may be left open for consideration by the authorities below in the event of the Petitioner failing in his contention that the lease is a composite one and not governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and that the third Respondent is not entitled to have the C form licence renewed in his favour. Writ Miscellaneous
Petition Nos. 6952, 6953 and 6975 of 1976 are allowed and the relations of the third, Respondent are brought on record as his legal representative as prayed for and. the third Respondent''s name is directed to be removed from the cause title. Writ Miscellanies Petition No. 6954 of 1976 is dismissed as no longer necessity. There is no need to leave open the question whether the fourth Respondent is associated with the third Respondent in carrying the business and is entitled to have the C form licence transferred, in her favor, as the Petitioner has succeeded in the writ petition. Then will he re order as to costs in the writ miscellaneous petitions.