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Judgment
S.S. Parkar
All these writ petitions involve common facts and raise a common question of law with regard to the stage at which a Court can in the exercise of power u/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act call upon the accused to give his specimen signature or handwriting and refer it for the opinion of the handwriting expert. The said question arose pursuant to the applications filed by the petitioner complainant in private complaints filed by her against Respondent No. 1, who is her husband, in which she made applications to the trial Court to obtain her signature in the handwriting of the accused and the contents of the disputed letters in his handwriting for sending to the Additional Chief State Examiner of Documents, C.I.D., Bombay, for his opinion. Few facts which led to the present controversy, briefly stated, are as follows.
The petitioner - wife had purchased shares of different companies jointly in her name and in the name of her husband. Her name stood first in all shares while the name of the respondent-accused stood second as a joint shareholder. As the name of the petitioner stood first in share certificates she used to get dividends from the companies. It is alleged that subsequently the husband made applications to the different companies in name of the petitioner forging her signature on the said applications requesting the companies for transposing his name first on all the share certificate in place of the names of the petitioner. As a result of this accused received dividends on those shares. When the petitioner discovered this she filed Criminal Cases Nos. 126, 127, 128, 129 and 130 all of the year 1984 in the Court of the J.M.F.C., 1st Court Nasik. The said complaints are pending for trial in the said Court.
In the aforesaid complaints process was issued to the respondent-accused and the evidence was being led before charge in all the matters. After the evidence of some of the company officials was recorded, the petitioner made applications in the above cases with a request to obtain the specimen signature and writing of the petitioner herself as well as that of the Respondent No. 1-accused and refer them to the Government handwriting expert along with the disputed signature and writing and obtain the expert''s opinion for the purpose of comparison ultimately by the Court u/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. The said applications were contested on behalf of the respondent-accused.
After hearing both the sides the -learned J.M.F.C. granted those applications by his order dated 18th June, 1988. The said orders in all the above five matters were challenged before the Sessions Court at Nashik in Criminal Revision Application Nos. 266 to 270 of 1988 which were heard by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Nashik and were disposed of by his common judgement and order dated 12th June, 1990. The learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed the Criminal Revision Applications and set aside the orders of the learned J.M.F.C. and remanded the matters back to the lower Court for deciding the matters afresh in the light of the observations made in his judgment. According to the learned Additional Sessions Judge it was incumbent upon the trial Court to examine the complainants first and then to take specimen writings and refer them to handwriting expert, if necessary. According to him the learned Magistrate gave those directions at premature stage of the trial as according to him the trial Court ought not to have granted those applications before recording the evidence of the petitioner-complainant.
Mr. Angal the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner challenged the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge firstly on the ground that the revision application was incompetent as barred u/s 397(2) of Cr.P.C. as the same was not competent having been filed against interlocutory order. Secondly Mr. Angal contended that the Criminal Procedure Code does not lay down the stage at which the specimen handwriting of the accused could be obtained by any court. Referring to Section 244 of the Cr.P.C. regarding evidence for prosecution in cases instituted otherwise on a police report, Mr. Angal contended that the Magistrate had power to proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution and for this purpose, on the application of the prosecution, the learned Magistrate had the power to issue summons to any of the witnesses directing him to attend or to produce any document before the court. The said provision is followed by Section 45 which empowers the Magistrate to consider all the evidence referred to in Section 244 and if he finds that no case was made out against the accused, which if un rebutted would warrant his conviction, the: accused should be discharged. Mr. Angal also relied on Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. which empowers the Magistrate to summon any person as witness at any stage of inquiry or trial and examine any person in attendance though not summoned as witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined, if it appears that his evidence is essential to the just decision of the case. Mr. Angal also relied on Section 165 of the Evidence Act which empowers the court to put questions to the witnesses or order production of documents or thing. According to Mr. Angal no prejudice was caused to the accused by the order passed by the learned Magistrate granting the application for obtaining the signature and handwriting of the accused and referring it to the handwriting expert and therefore the learned Addl. Sessions Judge erred in interfering with the order of the Magistrate in his revisional jurisdiction.
On the other hand Mr. Thorat, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 tried to support the order of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge and raised same contentions which were raised before the Seasons Court viz. (i) that the Magistrate had no right to take handwriting of the accused as it would be hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India being testimonial compulsion and (ii) secondly, according to him provision u/s 73 of the Evidence Act could be invoked at the final stage only as it is meant to assist the court to come to the correct conclusion after the entire evidence is led before him. He objected to the specimen signature and the writing to be forwarded to the handwriting expert at the instance of the complainant before framing of the charge as according to him that would help the prosecution to prove its case which is not the object of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. According to him the prosecution has to first satisfy the trial court by leading prima facie evidence and the assistance of the handwriting expert could be taken only after the framing of the charge, for the purpose of assisting the court to find out the truth. He contended that obtaining the handwriting of the accused at this stage and referring it to handwriting expert would be to fill the lacuna of the prosecution case which is not the intendment of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. In that view of the matter he submitted that the Sessions Court was right when it held that it was not the proper stage to obtain handwriting and refer it to the handwriting expert.
In my view no fault would be found with the order of the learned Magistrate issuing directions to obtain the specimen signature arid the handwriting of the accused and referring the same to the Government Handwriting Expert for his opinion at the stage when the witnesses of the complainant were being examined.
So far as the contention with regard to the testimonial compulsion being barred under Article 20(3) of the Constitution is concerned, the question should not detain me any longer since the Full Bench of Supreme Court of India in the case of The State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and Others, has held that there is no infringement of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India by directing an accused person to give his specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or for the purpose of comparison under the provisions of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
As regards the power of the Court u/s 73 of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned the same has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of The State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram, . In that case the accused were facing offences u/s 120-B for conspiracy, 420 for cheating 477-A, 467 and 471 for forgery and using forged documents under I.P.C. before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi, case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and the Magistrate had started enquiry u/s 207-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After most of the prosecution evidence had been recorded an application was made on behalf of the prosecution to obtain the specimen writings of accused Paliram and forward the same along with disputed documents to the Government Expert for opinion. The said application, though strenuously opposed on behalf of the accused, was granted. The revision preferred against the said order by accused Paliram to the Sessions Court was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Against the said dismissal order the accused preferred revision before the High Court where the matter was referred to the Division Bench in view of the importance of the question which was raised. The Division Bench of the High Court Set aside the orders of the lower Court holding that the provisions of Section 73 are meant to enable the Court to compare the disputed handwriting with the admitted or specimen writing and not to enable any of the parties to get the said writing compared from the handwriting expert of that party. The Supreme Court reversed the Delhi High Court judgement and restored the order of the Magistrate allowing the application made on behalf of the prosecution. In my judgment the said decision squarely covers the points raised in those group of petitions.
The question which fell for determination before the Supreme Court in Paliram''s case (supra) has been mentioned in para 10 of the Judgment which reads as follows:
Whether a Magistrate in the course of an enquiry or trial on being moved by the prosecution, is competent u/s 73 (of the) Evidence Act, to direct the accused person to give his specimen handwriting so that the same may bo sent along with the disputed writing to the Government Expert of Questioned Documents for examination, "with a view to have the necessary comparison ?
After considering the various divergence of judicial opinions expressed by the different High Courts, the Supreme Court answered the aforesaid question in the affirmative holding, in para 25 of the judgment as follows :
Section 73 is therefore to be read as a whole, in the light of Section 45. Thus read it is clear that a Court holding an inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of an offence triable by itself or by the Court of Session, does not exceed its powers u/s 73 if, in the interests of justice, it directs an accused person appearing before it, to give his sample writing to enabling the same to be compared by a handwriting expert chosen or approved by the Court, irrespective of whether his name was suggested by the prosecution or the defence, because even in adopting this course, the purpose is to enable the Court before which he is ultimately put up for trial to compare the disputed writing with his (accused) admitted writing and to reach its own conclusion with the assistance of the expert.
The aforesaid observations made in the facts of that case answer the questions raised on behalf of the accused in these petitions. In the instant cases the applications were made on behalf of the complainant at the stage when the witnesses of the complainant were being examined before framing of the charge. The said stage could be called as inquiry stage. When the power is given to the Court u/s 73, which is not disputed on behalf of the accused, the exercise of the power cannot be faulted with simply because that power was exercised on the application made on behalf of the prosecution in this case by a complainant. Since the process was issued by the Magistrate the cognizance was taken and the matter was at the inquiry stage. The learned Magistrate in his order dated 18th June, 1988 while rejecting the submission made on behalf of the accused that there is no necessity in obtaining handwriting of the accused before the court and to send it to handwriting expert along with admitted signature of the complainant, observed as follows :
...in the absence of expert''s opinion on this point it will be unsafe to compare admitted signature of the complainant with disputed signature u/s 73 of the Evidence Act.
This would show that after the application was moved on behalf of the complainant the Magistrate himself was satisfied that the expert''s opinion was necessary in the absence of which it was unsafe to compare admitted signature of the complainant with the disputed signature u/s 73 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court, in fact, in para 32 of the aforesaid judgment has observed that even after obtaining the opinion of the handwriting expert it is ultimately the Court who has to use its own eyes and mind to compare the admitted writing with the disputed one to verify and reach its own conclusion. When a Court seized of a case, directs an accused person present before it to write down a sample writing, such direction in the ultimate analysis is for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare" the writing so written with the writing alleged to have been written by such person, within the contemplation of Section 73. In the case before the Supreme Court also an application was moved on behalf of the prosecution which, according to the Supreme Court, was rightly granted because the obtaining of the signature or writing of the accused and sending it for the opinion of the handwriting expert is ultimately to assist the Court to achieve the objective laid down u/s 73 of the Act. One has to bear in mind that the opinion of the handwriting expert is only an opinion which the Court uses by way of an assistance for making its own comparison between the disputed and admitted or specimen handwriting.
The view taken by the Supreme Court in Paliram''s case had been cited with approval by the Apex Court in later judgments. In the case of Sukhvinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, reported in 1994 (2) Crimes 904 it had been held by the apex Court that the recourse to Section 73 of the Evidence Act could be had at the stage of inquiry or trial only by the Court before which the enquiry or the trial is pending. In the: recent case of O. Bharatan Vs. K. Sudhakaran and another, the Supreme Court held that though Section 73 permits the Court to make its own comparison between the disputed and admitted handwriting, it was held that it was hazardous for the Court to take upon itself the task of adjudicating upon the genuineness and authenticity of signatures in question without the assistance of a skilled and trained person whose services could have been availed of by the Court. In other words according to the Supreme Court, the Court should not venture to give its own opinion with regard to the disputed handwriting by comparing it with the admitted handwriting without the assistance of a handwriting expert as per the principles laid down in Paliram''s case.
The reliance of Mr. Thorat on the decision of the Single Judge of this Court in the case of R.B. Khqjotia v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1973 ML.J. 326 will be of no help to him in the face of the subsequent decisions of the Apex Court referred to above. In Khqjotia''s case it was held that Section 73 of the Evidence Act limits the power of the Court to direct the accused to give his specimen handwriting only where the Court itself is of the view that it is necessary for its own purposes to take such writing in order to compare it with the disputed writing alleged to be that of the accused but this power did not extend to directing the specimen so taken in Court to be sent to the handwriting expert for the purpose of helping the prosecution. The said decision in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in Paliram''s case and reiterated in Sukhvinder Singh''s case 1994 (2) Crimes 904 and reaffirmed in O. Bharathan''s case is no longer good in law.
In this case the allegation of the complainant is that the accused, who is her husband, had made applications to the companies forging her signature for transposing the husband as the main shareholder. The complainant or the prosecution could not have otherwise obtained admitted signature of the complainant made by the accused and, therefore, the only course open was to have the specimen signatures which could only be had either by the police during the investigation or through the direction of the Court at the time of enquiry or trial.
Mr. Angal rightly relied on Section 165 of the Evidence Act empowering the Court to order production of documents and Section 311 of Cr.P.C. to summon material witnesses or examine person present at any stage of any enquiry, trial or other proceeding if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case. The aforesaid provisions empower the Court to'' call and examine anyone as a witness, at any stage of the enquiry, if in the opinion of the Court his examination is necessary, when the Magistrate passed aforesaid order he was surely acting within the limits of powers conferred on him under the aforesaid provisions in addition to Sections 73 and 45 of the Evidence Act.
In view of the above, the interference by the Additional Sessions Judge by the order dated 12th June, 1990 setting aside the learned J.M.F.C.''s orders dated 18th June, 1988 was uncalled for and is liable to be set aside. The said order cannot also be sustained in view of the bar laid down u/s 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. under which revisional power cannot be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings. The order of the learned J.M.F.C. dated 18th June, 1988 was surely an interlocutory order which the Magistrate found necessary to pass in order to compare the disputed handwriting and signature with the specimen handwriting and signature. The said order could have been passed as held by the Apex Court, at the enquiry stage as done by the learned Magistrate. In fact, the exercise of that power by the learned Magistrate would help even the accused if it is found by the learned Magistrate that the disputed handwriting and the signature could not be attributed to the accused, as in that case, accused could be discharged at that stage itself before framing the charge. This order of the learned Magistrate, far from causing prejudice to the accused, and helping the prosecution as alleged, could even fortify the defence of innocence pleaded by the accused if at the enquiry stage itself the Court finds on comparison that the disputed handwriting was not that of the accused. In view of the above, the interference by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge was not only illegal but unjust.
Hence these writ petitions are allowed and the rule is made absolute. The judgments and orders dated 12th June, 1990 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge in all the above criminal revision applications are quashed and set aside and the orders of the learned J.M.F.C. Nashik dated 18th June, 1988 are restored, the learned J.M.F.C. Nashik may repeat his direction to the accused to give his sample signature and handwriting and write the contents of the disputed letter before the Court and refer the same to the Government Handwriting Expert for his opinion as directed earlier. If the Respondent No. 1 -accused refuses to comply with the directions, the Court concerned to draw such adverse presumption u/s 114 of the Evidence Act as may be appropriate in the circumstances.
Since the matters are unduly delayed owing to the aforesaid controversy, it is imperative that further proceedings in the matters are proceeded with utmost expedition. All the above criminal cases pending before the learned J.M.F.C., Nashik are expedited. Writs in all matters are expedited.