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Judgment
(Per : Anil S. Kilor, J)
Heard.
RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel for the parties.
By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the judgment dated 03/11/2023, passed by Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Nagpur (MAT) in Original Application No. 997 of 2023, allowing the original application, preferred by the respondent No.3 and thereby, quashing and setting aside the transfer order of petitioner, dated 28/08/2023, from the post of Assistant Director (Leprosy), Buldhana to the post of District Health Officer, Buldhana.
The brief facts of the present case are as under:
The petitioner is the original respondent No.3 in Original Application No. 997 of 2023 which was filed by the respondent No.3 herein, challenging the aforementioned order of transfer dated 28/08/2023 on the grounds of mala fides and favouritism. The petitioner herein was transferred from the post of Assistant Director (Leprosy), Buldhana, to the post of District Health Officer, Buldhana, vide order dated 28/08/2023, replacing respondent No.3.
The respondent No.3, therefore, filed Original Application No.997 of 2023 before the MAT.
It was the case of the respondent No.3 that he was promoted as District RCH Officer, which is a Class-I post within the District Health Officer cadre. Thereafter, he was transferred at various places. Prior to the issuance of the impugned order, he had been transferred during the annual general transfers on 30/06/2023 as the District Health Officer, Buldhana on a vacant post.
Whereas, the petitioner was promoted and posted at Amravati as Assistant Director, Health Services, in May, 2023 and she was transferred vide order dated 18/05/2023 and posted as Assistant Director (Leprosy) at Buldhana on her request. Barely after two months, the petitioner was transferred to the post of District Health Officer in place of the respondent No.3 as per the impugned order.
While considering the case of the respondent No.3 on the ground of mala fides and favoritism, the learned Tribunal referred to various authorities on the point of transfer and vide judgment dated 03/11/2023, allowed the Original Application of respondent No.3 on the ground that the impugned order dated 28/08/2023 is mala fide. Hence, this petition.
We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties.
Shri Chitaley, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that primarily the complaint raised by respondent No.3 in O.A. No.997 of 2023, was in respect of displacement, it was entertained by the learned Tribunal considering the same as a transfer.
It is submitted that in absence of specific pleadings as regards mala fides, the learned Tribunal has committed error in setting aside the transfer of the petitioner on the post of District Health Officer on the grounds of mala fides.
It is submitted that the approval of the Hon’ble Chief Minister was considered as favouritism, whereas, the Hon’ble Chief Minister had, in fact merely taken cognizance of the grievance made by the petitioner regarding the breach of seniority and cadre treatment.
He further argues that there is no prohibition under the Maharashtra Government Servant Regulation of Transfer and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duty Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2005”) for mid-term transfers. It is submitted that it requires a structured decision-making process rather than granting absolute tenure immunity.
He submits that the Hon'ble Chief Minister, being the highest authority, has merely made an endorsement of the approval of the proposal to redress the grievance of the petitioner, which cannot be termed as favouritism. For this purpose, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat in the case of Sanjeev ..vs.. State of Mah.1.
Shri Chitaley further argues that, in view of the definition of ‘transfer’ provided under the Act of 2005, a transfer requires a posting from one post, office or department to another. A mere change of headquarters of reporting authority without substantive posting does not amount to transfer. He submits that the impugned order cannot be termed as transfer order. It is argued that however, Respondent No. 3 loosely referred to the same as a “transfer”. He therefore submits that the learned Tribunal has committed error in setting aside the impugned order.
Shri. Chitaley, learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the learned Tribunal has committed an error in considering every mid-term administrative adjustment as illegal unless linked to misconduct and thereby ignored the enabling Section 4 of the Act of 2005. He submits that the findings of mala fides and favouritism are without any foundational evidence or cogent material. He therefore submits that the judgment of the Tribunal needs to be quashed and set aside.
On the other hand, Ms Renuka Sirpurkar learned counsel for respondent No.3 strongly opposed the present petition. It is submitted that during pendency of the Original Application filed by respondent No.3, the petitioner was transferred as Assistant Director (Leprosy), Akola vide order dated 18/05/2023. It is submitted that the petitioner has not joined the said post till date. It is argued that the impugned order is to be treated as transfer order as the petitioner was transferred in place of respondent No.3. It is submitted that in the transfer order, more particularly, in Clause (7) there is a specific mention of name of respondent No.3 stating that she was transferred in place of respondent No.3.
It is submitted that respondent No.3 was aggrieved by the said order as he was transferred from Buldhana to Akola within few months after joining on the said post of District Health Officer, Buldhana. Whereas, the petitioner was transferred from the post of Assistant Director (Leprosy), Buldhana to the post of District Health Officer, Buldhana. It is argued that the learned Tribunal has rightly held that the transfer of the petitioner is mala fide.
It is pointed out that now the respondent No.3 is transferred from the said post and the respondent No. 4 has been transferred and has joined the said post. Whereas, the petitioner has been transferred as Assistant Director (Leprosy), Akola vide order dated 18/05/2023 where she has failed to join her duties. She further argued that in view of the transfer order dated 18/05/2023, this petition has become infructuous.
On the other hand, the learned AGP supports the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal and accordingly, pressed for dismissal of the present petition.
Having heard the rival submissions and perusal of the record, it is evident that Respondent No.3 filed Original Application raising a challenge to the order dated 28/08/2023, whereby the petitioner was transferred in place of the respondent No.3.
The impugned transfer order itself refers to the Act of 2005 which regulates the transfers of the government employees. The impugned order was issued under Section 4(4), (2) and (6) of the Act of 2005. Thus, we do not find any substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not a transfer order.
Even on reading the definition of ‘transfer’ as given in the Act of 2005, which means posting of a Government servant from one post, office or department to another post, office or department, it is clear that the impugned order is a transfer order, because the petitioner was posted from one post to another post in the same city and at the same time it was a transfer in place of the respondent No.3, who was asked to report to the office of Deputy Director Health Services, Akola Circle Akola. Thus, the learned Tribunal has not committed any error in holding the impugned order as a transfer order.
The learned Tribunal, while allowing the Original Application, filed by Respondent No.3, has recorded that the transfer of the petitioner was mala fide and the learned Tribunal has observed thus:
“20.The learned counsel for respondent no.3 has pointed out the several Judgments. He has pointed out the Judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. H.N. Kirtaniya (1989) 3 SCC,445. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that " transfer of employee on administrative ground or in public interest not open to Court's or Tribunal's interference unless malafide, illegal or in violation of statutory rules are shown." The cited Judgment is not applicable, because, the Transfer Act, 2005 enacted by the Government of Maharashtra to regulate the transfers of Government servants, therefore, the provisions are made as to how the transfers are to be made. As per the Section 3 of the Transfer Act, 2005 the tenure of transfer is three years. Before completion of the tenure of three years, the transfer cannot be made. The applicant is transferred within two months without any reason recorded by the Transferring Authority. As per Section 4 (4) (ii) of the Transfer Act, 2005 the reasons are to be recorded with the prior approval of the next higher authority for the transfer in mid-term. No such exercise is done by respondent nos.1 and 2. Therefore, it appears that it is a malafide transfer. Respondent nos.1 and 2 not complied the provisions of the Section 4 (4) and 4 (5) of the Transfer Act, 2005. Hence, the cited decision is not applicable to the case in hand.
21.to 27. ...
28.There is nothing on record to show that there was any proposal by respondent no.2 to transfer the applicant and it was submitted to respondent no.1 for approval. On the contrary, minutes /note sheet of the Chief Minister shows that the name of respondent no.3 is included and directed to transfer her in place of the applicant. No any reason is recorded for transfer. There is nothing on record to show that there was any complaint against the applicant. Hence, the impugned transfer order without complying Sections 4 (4) and 4 (5) of the Transfer Act, 2005 is malafide and therefore cited decisions are not applicable to the case in hand.
29....
30.In the present O.A., no any complaint was pointed out by any of the respondents against the applicant. Hence, the transfer of the applicant is malafide. Therefore, the cited decision is not applicable to the case in hand.
31.In other cited decisions, the same view was taken by the Hon'ble High Court that the transfer order not to be interfered by the Court or Tribunal, if it is not malafide or against the rules etc. The impugned transfer order is in the contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the Transfer Act, 2005. The applicant had not completed any normal tenure for transfer. The applicant joined on the post of District Health Officer, Buldhana as per the order dated 30/06/2023. By impugned order dated 28/08/2023, he is transferred from the said post. Within two months nothing happened to transfer him from the said post. Nothing is pointed out by respondents to show that there were any complaints or misappropriation etc. and therefore the impugned transfer order is in the breach of the statutory provisions of the Transfer Act, 2005. Moreover, it appears that it is a malafide transfer only to show favouritism to respondent no.3. Hence, the following order -
ORDER
(i)The O.A. is allowed.
(ii)The impugned transfer order dated 28/08/2023 is hereby quashed. and set aside.
(iii)No order as to costs.”
The above referred observations made by the learned Tribunal are based on the material available on the record and there is no perversity committed by the learned Tribunal in recording such findings.
In the case of Sanjeev (supra), this Court has held thus :
“11.Counsel for the petitioner was at pains to persuade us to take the view that the independent satisfaction has not been recorded by the specified Competent Authority. We have already dealt with this aspect hitherto and for the same reason, that argument will have to be negated. He also vehemently argued that no reason is recorded in the communication dated 7.2.2011 purported to be the impugned transfer order. We have already adverted to the contents of the said communication at exhibit-N. It essentially highlights that due to clerical error, incorrect place of posting of the petitioner was mentioned in the State Government communication dated 24.1.2011 for which reason, the transfer order issued against the petitioner on the basis of the said communication be cancelled and a fresh transfer order be passed against the petitioner to transfer him from M.R.A. Marg Police Station to Armed Police L-Division on non-executive post within Mumbai. On the basis of this communication, the transfer order is passed which records the reason for transfer as "for administrative reason". The proposal for transfer of petitioner mooted at the different levels right upto the Chief Minister also mentions the same reason for transferring the petitioner to another post from M.R.A. Marg Police Station. Thus, it is not a case of no reason recorded at all. The reason is found in the order itself.
The fact that the reason is noted as "for administrative reason", can be no less an exceptional circumstance or special reason or for that matter, as a special case. Whether the reason which weighed with the Authority for arriving at subjective satisfaction would qualify it as exceptional circumstance or special reason or a special case, would depend on facts of each case. It is not possible to computerise or reduce into immutable formulae the diverse considerations on the basis of which this discretion must be exercised.
Administrative reason, as aforesaid, is no less special reason or exceptional exigency to be redressed.”
There is no dispute regarding the law laid down in the above referred judgment. However, the fact remains that in a period of few months the respondent No.3 was transferred, and in his place, the petitioner was appointed. Although, the petitioner was transferred on approval of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, nothing is produced on record to justify the transfer of Respondent No.3 within a short span of two months. Admittedly, while granting approval by the Hon’ble Chief Minister, nothing was noted in support of his decision. Furthermore to justify it, the State ought to have produced relevant record in support, if something is noted in the record. Thus, the State has failed to produce the relevant records in this regard. In the circumstances, the order of the learned Tribunal cannot be considered as illegal.
Moreover, during pendency of the Original Application, the petitioner was transferred. The said order was not challenged by the petitioner till date. Though it is the case of the petitioner that she was never relieved or informed of such transfer order, the fact remains that such order was produced on record and it is now within the knowledge of the petitioner.
In the case of State of Punjab Vs. Khemi Ram1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held thus:
“17.… But once such an order is sent out, it goes out of the control of such an authority, and therefore, there would be no chance whatsoever of its changing its mind or modifying it. In our view, once an order is issued and it is sent out to the concerned government servant, it must be held to have been communicated to him, no matter when he actually received it. We find it difficult to persuade ourselves to accept the view that it is only from the date of the actual receipt by him that the order becomes effective. If that be the true meaning of communication, it would be possible for a government servant to effectively thwart an order by avoiding receipt of it by one method or the other till after the date of his retirement even though such an order is passed and despatched to him before such date. An officer against whom action is sought to be taken, thus, may go away from the address given by him for service of such orders or may deliberately give a wrong address and thus prevent or delay its receipt and be able to defeat its service on him. Such a meaning of the word “communication” ought not to be given unless the provision in question expressly so provides. Actual knowledge by him of an order where it is one of dismissal, may, perhaps, become necessary because of the consequences which the decision in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh contemplates. But such consequences would not occur in the case of an officer who has proceeded on leave and against whom an order of suspension is passed because in his case there is no question of his doing any act or passing any order and such act or order being challenged as invalid.”
The petitioner could have challenged the said order on the grounds mentioned in the additional affidavit of the petitioner for not joining the place of transfer or on the ground that such order was never served upon the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to do so. Thus, in view of the subsequent events, i.e., transfer of the petitioner, the petition needs to be dismissed on this count also.
Hence, we pass the following order :
The Writ Petition is dismissed.
Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
