Dr. Ashis Kr. Rakshit vs State of Tripura and Others

D. Biswas, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 19.9.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.412/ 2000.

The appellant herein, as writ petitioner, filed the aforesaid writ petition challenging his order of transfer from I.G.M. Hospital, Agartala to Kanchanpur Hospital vide Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The said transfer order was challenged mainly on the ground that he is an M.D. in Obstetrics and Gynaecology and this degree he obtained on being deputed by the State Government on the promise that after getting the training at the A1IMS he will be suitably employed by the sponsoring authority to work in the speciality in which training was provided at the AIIMS.

We have heard Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. U.V. Saha, the learned senior Govt. Advocate assisted by Mr. T.D, Majumder, Advocate for the respondents.

Before we deal with the prime question involved in this case, it would be pertinent to mention here that the appellant was a Medical Officer in Grade-IV of Tripura Health Services and as per provision in the Recruitment Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution the post held by him is transferable. Transfer is, therefore, an incident of service of the appellant. In this connection, we would like to conveniently quote a decision of this court rendered in Narayan Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura (1988) 2 GLR 247 which reads as follows:

"(a) The Government or its functionaries have power to transfer its employees employed in a transferable post as transfer is an incident of service to meet the exigencies of the administration. No right is conferred on a Government servant for being posted at a specified place.

(b) The authorities in-charge of an employee are the sole Judges about the necessity or desirability of such transfer as they have to decide how to distribute and utilise the service of their employees. The provision of transfer is intended to check creation of vested interest, nepotism and corruption."

It would, therefore, appear that as per condition of service he is still holding a transferable post. Whether this power of the Government to transfer him has any way been curtailed because of the alleged promise made by them while deputing him to undergo training in the AIIMS. We would, therefore, like to examine the nature of the promise relied upon by the appellant to stall his order of transfer.

The certificate furnished by the State sponsoring candidate and signed by the Director of Tripura Health Services reads as follows:-

"CERTIFICATE TO BE FURNISHED BY STATE SPONSORED CANDIDATES

Certified that Dr. (Miss/Mrs./Mr.) Ashish Kumar Rakshit is sponsored for training leading to the award of MD/MS/DM/MCH/ MHA degree All India Institute of Medical Sciences for session January. 1994.

Dr. Ashis Kumar Rakshit is a permanent employee of the State of Tripura.

That he/she after getting the training at the AIIMS will be suitably employed by the sponsoring authority to work in the speciality in which training is provided at the AIIMS.

That the candidate will not be paid any emoluments by the Institute during the entire training period. Such payment will be the responsibility of the sponsoring authority.

OFFICE SEAL Signature ................

Sponsoring Authority (Name in Block letter) SEAL & SIGNATURE OF DIRECTOR."

It would appear from the language ''employed'' in the certificate quoted above that the sponsoring authority indicated a desire to employ the appellant after completion of training suitably in this speciality in which training is provided to him. There is obviously no promise in specific terms that he would be employed only in those institutions/medical units where adequate infrastructural facilities in the speciality of training are available. The promise, if any, at all made by the Director of H.S. is to the extent that he would be suitably employed.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that after completion of the training the appellant was posted at I.G.M. Hospital, Agartala where all infrastructural facilities are available and he has already spent 3 1/2 years in this Institution. Thereafter, the State authority decided to transfer him to Kanchanpur in the interest of public service. What would be in aid and conducive to the interest of public is a matter to be taken care of by the State Government in its executive discretion. There being no express promise that he would be accommodated only in the institution/medical unit having adequate infrastructural facilities, his transfer to Kanchanpur cannot be interfered with. Suitability is a matter which the court cannot decide for lack of expertise and information about the ground reality i.e. the need in remote places for posting of experienced doctors.

We arc further of the opinion that we are not inclined to accept the certificate as a promise in any form made by the State Government since it does not appear to have been signed by the Secretary or any other Officer authorised to sign on behalf of the State. The Director of the Health Services not being a duly authorised authority cannot hold any promise on behalf of the State, specially when the order of transfer of the appellant has been issued by the Governor of Tripura in the interest of public service.

We have taken into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel for the appellant, which are as follows:-

Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., ;

AIR 1968 SC 718 (The union of lndia and others, appellants v. M/s Anglo Afghan Agencies etc. Respondents) ;

D.C.M. Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ;

4 Bhim Singh and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, ; and

Paradise Printers and Others Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh and Others, respondents).

Our opinion is that there is no dispute that when a promise is held by the State through a competent authority, the State cannot resile from the promise unless it is shown that such resilement would be detrimental to the interest of the promisee. The above decisions, therefore, cannot be of any assistance to salvage the situation for the appellant. We are in full agreement with the learned Single Judge that this is not a case fit for interference in exercise of the discretionary powers of this court.

For reasons above, the appeal stands dismissed, No order as to costs.