Dorik Sao vs The State Of Bihar

Heard Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae for the Appellant and Mr. Bipin Kumar, learned counsel for the State.

The present appeal has been preferred against the Judgment of Conviction dated 09.02.2004 and Order of Sentence dated 10.02.2004 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. II, Jamui, in Sessions Trial No. 434 of 1995 arising out of Jhajha P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993, whereby the appellant was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life.

The prosecution case, as unfolded in the fardbayan of the informant, Ramdeo Sao, son of Late Chano Sao, recorded at Bhadaria (Jamuni Jore) Road by S.I. B. Roy of Jhajha P.S. on 05.08.1993 at about 2:00 P.M., is that the father of the informant i.e., Chano Sao (deceased) along with the accused Dorik Sao had gone to Tarkeshwar (Chhapadanga), West Bengal and had taken with him a bundle of ‘Bidi'’. As per the informant Chano Sao had promised to come back on 04.08.1993 and as such the informant waited for the arrival of his father that day. As his father failed to come back to the house on 04.08.1993, he started searching for him. It is alleged that, during the search, the informant came to know that a dead body is lying at Bhadaria forest on the road situated downwards to church. Upon receiving the said information, he reached at the spot and saw the dead body of his father lying on the road. He saw that his throat was slit, and there were cut wounds on the right side of stomach and on the head. The informant further added that his cousin Karu Sao had told him that the accused Dorik Sao, on being questioned, had revealed that he (Dorik Sao) had alighted down at Narganzo station alongwith Chano Sao i.e. the father of the informant at 9.15 AM on 04.08.1993 after which Chano Sao told Dorik Sao to go ahead he (Chano Sao) will catch up to him on the way. The said Dorik Sao (accused) later reached to his house at 2:00 PM on 04.08.1993. The Informant has further revealed in his Fard-Beyan that his father and Dorik Sao (accused) were working under the same owner and used to deliver 'Bidi' after making the same. About 1 and 1/2 month prior to this occurrence, the said owner had deducted Rs. two thousand from the amount standing in the name of the accused Dorik Sao & had directed to hand over ‘SUKHA’ to Chano Sao (deceased) & not to make ‘BIDI’, in future, because of this the accused Dorik Sao had a strong belief that the said direction of the owner was the result of the complaint made by Chano (deceased) to the owner concerned. The Informant has further revealed that, earlier he had gone to the house of Dorik Sao(accused) for demanding of ‘SUKHA’ as per order of his father but Dorik refused to hand over the ‘SUKHA’ to him. Informant has further revealed that it came to his knowledge that the son of Anwar Hussain (Mukhia of Baliaddh) had also gotten off at Narganzo station along with his father and accused Dorik Sao. The Informant then expressed full suspicion over accused Dorik Sao for getting his father murdered after hatching a pre-planned conspiracy. It was further asserted by the Informant that the ‘owner’ of his father had not done full payment for ‘BEEDI’ for the last three times and had assured his father that he will pay all the dues.

On the basis of the aforesaid fardbayan, Jhajha P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993, dated 05.08.1993, was registered against the present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Upon completion of the investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet no. 65/94 dated 16.05.1994 against the present appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Thereafter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and the case was committed to the Court of Session on 22.08.1995. Upon commitment, charges under Sections 302 & 120(b) of IPC were framed against the appellant Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao. The charges were read over and explained to them in Hindi, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

It is pertinent to note that one of the accused Dingan Sao died and proceeding against him was dropped vide order dated 11.12.2001 passed by the then 3^rd Additional Session Judge, Jamui.

The prosecution in order to substantiate its case, has examined as many as eight witnesses and exhibited some documents on its behalf. List of prosecution witnesses and exhibits are being mentioned hereunder in tabular form.

After closure of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13.11.2002. The appellant denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and claimed innocence.

Learned Amicus Curiae, Ms. Smriti Singh, appearing on behalf of the appellant, has, at the outset, submitted that the prosecution’s attempt to rely on the legal doctrine of “last seen together” completely collapses due to glaring contradictions in the witness testimonies as PW6, stated that he was informed by PW5 that the deceased and the appellant were seen together at the station. At the same time this claim is fatally contradicted by PW5’s actual court deposition, in which PW5 is completely silent on this crucial aspect and utters not a single word to corroborate PW6’s statement. Consequently, the “last seen theory” remains unproven and legally baseless. Learned counsel for the Appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Venkatesan V/s State of Tamil Nadu.

It was further submitted that the prosecution’s case is fundamentally crippled by the absolute lack of any eyewitness to the alleged incident. In the complete absence of direct evidence, the appellant has been named and implicated entirely on the basis of mere suspicion and conjecture.

Learned counsel next submitted that the prosecution has inexplicably failed to produce and examine the Investigating Officer (I.O.) during the trial. This is a severe, fatal flaw that causes immense prejudice to the defense. By withholding the I.O., the defense has been deliberately deprived of its vital right to cross-examine the officer regarding the glaring procedural lapses, contradictions, and obvious flaws in the investigative process.

It was further submitted the credibility of the prosecution's targeted narrative against the appellant is further diluted by the fact that the co-accused, Dingan Sao, has been explicitly identified by several witnesses as an individual with a known criminal nature. This established fact introduces a highly plausible alternative hypothesis regarding the true perpetrators of the crime, thereby creating a substantial dent in the prosecution's specific allegations against the current appellant.

It was also been submitted that the prosecution itself had submitted that there was a dispute pertaining to the bidi business which was mentioned as the motive behind the causing of alleged occurrence. However, in a shocking display of investigative negligence, the police neither investigated nor examined the owner of the bidi company. Failing to bring the central figure of the alleged dispute to the witness stand leaves the prosecution’s stated motive completely uncorroborated and hence exposing the superficial and incomplete nature of the police investigation.

Lastly, it was submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as the conviction rests on weak, uncorroborated circumstantial evidence without forming a complete, unbroken chain pointing exclusively to guilt, contrary to the settled principle reiterated in Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State reported in [2021 (5) SCC 626]. The learned Amicus Curiae further relied on Munna Lal v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 18 SCC 661, wherein the Apex Court held that evidence must be weighed, not counted— quality being paramount over quantity—so that a single reliable witness can sustain a murder conviction, but where testimony lacks reliability, courts must seek corroboration from reliable direct or circumstantial evidence as a rule of prudence.

Finally, she concluded that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is fit to be set aside as the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State, while opposing the appeal submitted that the learned District court, after considering all the evidences on record and exhibits has rightly convicted the appellant as the offences alleged against the appellant appears to be serious in nature. It is contended that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charges beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that any apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses are minor and trivial in nature, which do not affect the core of the prosecution case or the overall credibility of the witness. Such discrepancies, it is urged, are liable to be disregarded in the interest of justice.

It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence do not suffer from any legal infirmity, or irregularity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The appeal is devoid of any merit and fit to be dismissed.

Heard the parties and perused the materials available on records as well as lower court records and proceedings and also taken note of the arguments canvassed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

It would be apposite to discuss the oral/documentary evidences as available on record to re appreciate the evidences for just and proper disposal of the present appeal.

PW–1 (co-villager), in his examination-in-chief, deposed that the incident had occurred approximately eight and a half years prior, on a Wednesday around 12:00 noon. PW1 stated that he was near his hut when the accused, Dorik Sao, approached him and asked for water to drink. The witness testified that he provided water to the accused. He further noted that at the time, Dorik Sao was wearing a pajama and a shirt, and explicitly pointed out that there were bloodstains on the garments. After drinking the water, the accused departed from the location. PW1 additionally testified that on the following day, a local rumor (hulla) circulated in the area claiming that Chano Sao had died and that Dorik Sao was responsible for his murder. Elaborating on the background of the two men, the witness stated that Dorik Sao and Chano Sao used to do a business of bidi in Calcutta. He established their usual route by noting that they would frequently pass right in front of his house on their way to catch the train at Narganzo station. Finally, during the course of his testimony in court, PW1 formally identified the accused, Dorik Sao.

In his cross-examination by the prosecution, PW–1 stated that he could not recall the exact date or year of the incident. He stated that his hut was situated in a deserted dohan (jungle valley), at about half a mile from his village, with no other houses nearby. On the day of the incident, he had arrived at the dohan at 8:00 AM to graze cattle. He testified that his wife, delivered his food around 11:00 AM and then returned home. He recalled spending about an hour brushing his teeth with a twig and eating his meal around 12:00 noon. PW1 testified that while the path near his hut was busy during the day, making it hard to track everyone who passed, he specifically remembered the accused, Dorik Sao, stopping by just long enough to drink water. When PW1 asked where he was coming from, Dorik replied that he was returning from Calcutta. Dorik further explained that he had not eaten at Narganzo station because a theft on the train had left him frightened. PW1 reiterated his earlier statement that Dorik was wearing a bright white shirt and pajamas and carrying a bag. He clarified that he did not see any physical injuries on Dorik's body, only scattered bloodstains on his clothing.

Regarding the deceased, Chano Sao, PW1 confirmed they were from the same village. Chano had previously told him about his bidi business in Calcutta and would occasionally give PW1 bidis to smoke, though they had no other prior dealings. PW1 noted that the incident occurred on a Wednesday and that he had seen Chano the previous Tuesday morning traveling with a person named Goga. He also brought up a man named Chhita Sao from a neighboring village who traveled to Calcutta and was notoriously involved in extortion (Rangdari).

Addressing the aftermath of the crime, PW-1 deposed that he later heard a rumor (hulla) from the local Teli community that Chano had died and that Dorik had murdered him. He also mentioned his understanding that Dorik Sao was a cousin of Ramdev. About a week after the murder, the police visited his village to question him, and at that time he informed the Daroga (Sub-Inspector) about the bloodstains he had seen on Dorik's clothes.

Finally, regarding his presence in court, PW1 admitted that he knew two of Chano's four sons, Ramdev and Majo, and acknowledged that they had brought him to court to testify and had paid for his food and drink expenses. However, he firmly denied the defense's suggestion that he was giving false testimony out of greed for money or at the instruction of Ramdev and Majo.

PW-2 (chowkidar no. 2/3), in his examination-in-chief, deposed that the incident occurred eight years prior, on a Tuesday or Wednesday. He testified that around 12:00 to 1:00, he received information that a man was lying dead near a location called Jamuniya Jor. He went to the spot and saw the corpse. Following this, he proceeded to the police station to inform the authorities and subsequently returned to the location of the body. He noted that at the time of initial discovery, it was not known whose corpse it was and he later came to know that the body belonged to Chano Sao. He further testified that the body was then taken to the Police Station from where it was sent to Jamui for conducting Post-mortem. PW- 2 also stated that he saw Ramdeo Sao (PW-6) near the dead body.

In his cross-examination PW-2 provided more precise details regarding the timeline, geography of the area etc., and deposed that he first heard the hulla about the dead body from villagers heading towards the jungle around 10:00 AM. He arrived at the scene by 10:30 AM and found the corpse lying in the middle of a north-south road, positioned east-to-west with the head facing west and the feet facing east. He specifically noted the deceased's clothing i.e., a plain colored dhoti and plain colored shirt and confirmed there was no luggage near the body. Furthermore, he testified that upon his initial arrival at 10:30 AM, contrary to his examination-in-chief, no one else was present near the corpse. He then testified that he traveled on foot and reached the police station at 11:45 AM. He estimated the police station to be about 4 to 4.5 kos away from the corpse, he stated that he stayed at the Police Station for about half an hour and then came back with the Sub-Inspector (daroga ji). He clarified that when he first visited the spot where the body was he did not know to whom the body belonged to and it was during the second visit that he got to know that it was Chano Sao. He noted that upon their arrival, Ramdeo Sao was the only person present near the body. PW-2 stated that he did not have any conversation with Ramdeo Sao at that time.

PW-3, in his examination-in-chief, deposed that, he had a tea and paan shop in Narganzo. People pass by this very shop while coming and going to the Narganzo station. He did not know anything about the incident. The witness was declared hostile at the request of the prosecution.

In his cross-examination, PW-3 deposed that the Sub-Inspector (Daroga ji) had not interrogated him. He denied having stated that the previous day he was at his tea shop near the Narganzo station. He further denied stating that Chano Sao and others take bidis to West Bengal and travel together. However, he stated that on the previous day he did not see either of them near his shop, nor did either of them come near his shop, and that that morning, he heard a commotion that a man's dead body was lying on the road in the Bhadauria jungle. He added that his son, Baalmukund Pandit, runs the tea and paan shop and that he himself has never run the said shop.

PW-4, the Medical Officer who had conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, Chano Sao, in line with the case of the prosecution proved the post-mortem report, asserting that the same was in his handwriting and bore his signature. The post-mortem report was accordingly marked as Exhibit-1. According to PW-4, on August 6, 1993, while being posted as a Civil Assistant Surgeon (C.A.S.) at the Sub-divisional Hospital, Jamui, he conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Chano Sao, son of the late Kalar Sao, resident of Village Dario, Police Station Jhajha, District Jamui, aged about 55 years. The dead body was identified and produced before him by Constable No. 20 Mundrika Singh, Chaukidar 2/3 Latru Rai, and Ramdeo Sao. PW-4 recorded his findings as follows:: —

Incised wound 8"x3"x deep to cervical vertebra, cutting the trachea completely, muscles, vessels and nerves in the anterior compartment of neck and haematoma on the floor of wound.

Incised wound 4"x½"x deep to muscles with haematoma in the floor of wound over right-lower chest. On dissection no any other injury was found.

PW-4 opined that the aforementioned injuries were ante-mortem in nature, caused by a sharp-cutting weapon, and that death was instantaneous due to the severing of the windpipe and the major vessels of the neck. This witness further opined that the time elapsed since death prior to the post-mortem examination was between 48 and 72 hours.

In his cross-examination PW-4, stated that apart from the aforesaid injuries he did not find any other injuries on the body of the deceased. He further deposed that he had not mentioned anything about the clothes worn by the deceased in the Post-mortem report and that during the summer season, maggots begin to appear after 48 hours, and the decomposition process typically starts after 36 hours. He added that decomposition begins later in the winter season and earlier in the summer season. Lastly, he deposed that he had not mentioned any identification mark of the dead body but had mentioned its gray hair.

PW-5 (nephew of the deceased), in his examination-in-chief, deposed that the incident had occurred approximately seven years prior to his deposition, when a rumour (hulla) had spread in the village that Chano Sao had been murdered, and it was also being said that the accused Dorik Sao, along with Dingan Sao, had killed him. He testified that upon learning that a dead body had been thrown near Jamunia Jor, he went to the spot and found the said body to be that of Chano Sao, with the head lying towards the south and the feet towards the north. He noticed an incised injury on the right side of the ribcage caused by a sharp-edged weapon, an incised wound on the throat, and a bone protruding on the right side of the forehead.

PW-5 further deposed that the Sub-Inspector (Daroga ji), who had reached the spot, prepared the inquest report of the dead body before him and Arjun Sao, upon which he put his signature, the Sub-Inspector also seized blood-stained, gravelly soil from the spot and prepared a seizure list, which likewise bore his signature. PW-5 attributed the murder of Chano Sao to the accused Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao, stating that it arose out of a dispute concerning dry bidi. He added that the co-accused, Dingan Sao, had since died, and he further identified the accused, Dorik Sao, present in court.

In his cross-examination, PW-5 stated that he could not recollect the exact date, month, or year of the occurrence. He deposed that the deceased, Chano Sao, was his uncle, and that the informant, Ramdeo Sao, was his brother. He admitted that he could not recall from whom he first heard that a dead body was lying at Jamunia Jor, though he stated that a commotion (hulla) had spread throughout the village; he was also unable to state who had named Dorik Sao and Dingan Sao as the assailants, or on which day he came to hear of the incident. He testified that he was at home when he heard the commotion, though he could not specify the time, and that he thereafter proceeded to Jamunia Jor along with several other villagers. PW-5 admitted that he was illiterate and knew only how to sign his name; he stated that he had not read the inquest report or the seizure list prepared by the Daroga ji, but had signed both documents on the latter's instruction, without asking that their contents be read out to him.

PW-5 further deposed that a dispute had been going on between the deceased and the accused for several days prior to the occurrence, though he was unable to state whose bidis the deceased and the accused used to sell. He admitted that Dingan Sao was locally reputed to be a man of criminal/notorious disposition, and stated that he was unaware whether Dingan Sao himself had been murdered or what had befallen him. Lastly, PW-5 denied the suggestion put to him that he had deposed falsely merely by virtue of being the nephew of the deceased and the brother of the informant.

PW-6 (son of the deceased), in his examination-in-chief, deposed that on 3.8.1993, the deceased, Chano Sao, had gone to Tarkeshwar Chapa-danga carrying bidis, accompanied by the accused, Dorik Sao, and that the two had boarded the train together at Narganjo station. He stated that his father had told him he would return the following day but failed to do so. On the deceased failing to return by 04.08.1993, PW-6 deposed that he began searching for him, and that while proceeding towards the Uppertola of village Dario, an old man informed him that a dead body was lying in the Bhadwaria jungle, to the south of the church. Upon receiving this information, he reached the spot near the church and found the dead body to be that of his father, with the neck cut and injuries on the right side of the stomach and on the head. He deposed that his cousin, Karu Sao, was also present at the spot, and that Karu Sao informed him that he had seen the deceased in the company of the accused, Dorik Sao, at about 9:15 a.m. at the station on 4.8.1993. He further deposed that Karu Sao had gone to the house of the accused and inquired about the deceased, whereupon the accused had stated that the deceased would return.

PW-6 further deposed that the deceased and the accused used to get bidis made and deliver them to the same company (master). He stated that about a month prior to the occurrence, the deceased and the accused had gone to the master along with the bidis so prepared, where the bidis made by the accused were found not to be up to the mark, resulting in a reduction of their value; the master thereupon directed the accused to hand over the 'sukha' (raw material) to the deceased and directed the accused to discontinue the bidi work. PW-6 deposed that when he went to collect the 'sukha' from the accused, the accused, in an angry tone, stated that his dues had been cut on account of the deceased, and that he causes harm to those who act against his interest. PW-6 further deposed that the accused was under the impression that the deceased had lodged a complaint against him, causing him financial loss. He stated, vide paragraph 11 of his deposition, that he is confident that the accused, Dorik Sao, has murdered his father, Chano Sao, or has got him murdered.

PW-6, in his cross-examination, deposed that 03.08.1993 was a Monday. He stated that he was unable to name the person for whom his father used to make bidis at Chapadanga, nor could he state the name of the company. He admitted that he had never gone to the bidi company owner prior to the occurrence, and that he went there only about two months after the occurrence, on which occasion too he did not ask the name of the company or its owner. He stated that the 'sukha' (raw material) used to be supplied by the master, while all the labour was performed by his father. He stated that he could not say whether the company's licence stood in his father's name, adding that his father alone knew all such particulars and that he himself had no knowledge thereof. He was unable to state the date on which his father had commenced the bidi business, though he stated that his father had been engaged in the trade for the preceding five to six years. He admitted that his father and the accused, Dorik Sao, used to deliver bidis at Chapadanga, but stated that he could not name any other persons who did so along with them. He admitted that there was no document relating to his father's bidi business, nor any document evidencing that his father used to deliver bidis at Chapadanga. He deposed that he waited for his father till the night of Tuesday (4.8.1993), and that no information was received regarding his father on that day. He admitted that Karu Sao had met his father at Narganjo station on Tuesday, but stated that he himself had no conversation with Karu Sao at that time. He stated that when his father did not return on Tuesday, he made efforts to trace him on Wednesday, whereupon he learnt that a dead body was lying [in the jungle]. He deposed that he left home at about 8:00-8:30 a.m. on Wednesday to search for his father, and went first to Uppertola, where a passer-by told him that a dead body was lying in the jungle; he stated that he could not name the said passer-by. He testified that he thereafter proceeded directly to the Bhadwariya jungle, and that he did not meet anyone on the way. He deposed that upon reaching the spot, no one was present there except the dead body of his father; he stated that he wept there for about ten minutes, following which some villagers, including Karu Sao, arrived, and that he thereupon lost consciousness and subsequently regained it. He stated that although a number of persons had gathered at the spot, he was unable to name them, as he was in a state of shock. He deposed that the villagers remained at the spot for about two to two-and-a-half hours, following which the chaukidar (village watchman) arrived and reported the matter to the police station. He stated that he had informed both the villagers and the Investigating Officer (Daroga ji) as to who had killed his father and why. With regard to the position of the body, PW-6 stated that it was lying to the south of the road, at a distance of about two to three hands (spans), in a supine position, with the head towards the south. He stated that apart from the body, he saw blood at the spot and his father's slippers, but nothing else. He deposed that the chaukidar arrived first, at about 12:00-1:00 p.m. (though he clarified that he had no watch with him at the time); that he disclosed nothing to the chaukidar until he identified the body as that of his father and gave his own name, whereupon the chaukidar stated that the matter would have to be reported to the police station. He stated that the chaukidar remained at the spot for about half an hour before proceeding to Jhajha, while the villagers stayed on at the spot. He stated that the place where the body was found was situated at a distance of five to seven kilometres from the Jhajha police station, and that the Investigating Officer arrived at the spot within about half an hour of the chaukidar's departure.

PW-6 further deposed that the Investigating Officer recorded his statement, and also examined Karu Sao and Rupesh Yadav, though he could not recollect who else had been examined or whose statements had been recorded, nor could he state whose signatures, other than his own, had been obtained by the Investigating Officer. He stated that the Investigating Officer brought the dead body to Jamui at about 8:00-9:00 p.m., and that besides himself, the chaukidar and his brother, Balram, among others, had accompanied the body. He deposed that the post-mortem examination was conducted at about 8:30-9:00. He further deposed that the Investigating Officer visited his house two to three days thereafter and questioned him alone. He stated that he subsequently had conversations with the villagers, initially at his own house, though he clarified that he had not gone from door to door in the village to inform people of the occurrence; he admitted that no villager, even upon visiting his house, disclosed anything about the occurrence to him, nor did any person of the locality provide any information in that regard. He stated that his village falls within Vorna Panchayat, whose Mukhiya (village head) had died at the relevant time. PW-6 admitted that the chaukidar had informed him that the co-accused, Dingan Sao, upon being apprehended, had admitted that he, along with Dorik Sao, had committed the murder. He denied the suggestion that he had implicated Dingan Sao and Dorik Sao on the basis of the chaukidar's statement, asserting that he had already lodged the case prior thereto. He admitted that Dingan Sao was a man of criminal disposition, and stated that he could not say whether Dingan Sao himself had been murdered. He was unable to recollect the exact date on which he had gone to collect the 'sukha', though he stated that it was about one-and-a-half months prior to the occurrence. Lastly, PW-6 denied the suggestion that he had given false testimony and had falsely implicated the innocent accused, Dorik Sao.

PW-7, in his examination-in-chief, stated that on 30.07.1994, he was posted at Jhajha Police Station and, on that date, he took over the investigation of the present case. Prior to him, the investigation had been conducted by Sri B. H. Baitha, the previous Investigating Officer, who had already submitted a charge-sheet against the accused. He stated that accused Dingan Sah had been arrested by the previous Investigating Officer and forwarded to jail. PW-7 further stated that, on the basis of the investigation conducted by the previous Investigating Officer, he verified the case against accused Dingan Sah by examining other witnesses. Those witnesses supported the statements recorded during the earlier investigation. He also recorded the statements of the informant, Balram Shah, Rajendra Shah, and other witnesses. After considering the earlier investigation, the statements recorded by him, the materials collected during the investigation, and the directions of his superior police officer, PW-7 submitted a charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.

In his cross-examination, PW-7 stated that he had not made any inquiry from the bidi company in relation to the deceased, Chando Sah. Although the deceased was engaged in the manufacture of bidis, PW-7 had not investigated whether the deceased possessed any licence or examined any other matter connected with the manufacture of bidis. He further admitted that he had not investigated the allegation that the deceased had loaded bidis onto a train at Narganzo Railway Station and transported them by rail. PW-7 further stated that the previous Investigating Officer had also not conducted any investigation regarding the accused. He stated that Balram Shah had informed him that he believed accused Dingan Sah had a hand in the murder of his father. Other witnesses had also stated that accused Dingan Sah was a person of antisocial character. PW-7 stated that he had mentioned the criminal antecedents of accused Dingan Sah in paragraph 88 of the case diary. According to him, cases including Jhajha P.S. Case No. 11 of 1983 and Jhajha P.S. Case No. 399 of 1984 had been registered against the accused. He denied the suggestion that he had not conducted the investigation fairly and impartially or that he had submitted a false charge-sheet against accused Dingan Sah.

PW-8 in his Examination-in-Chief stated that the case diary relating to Jhajha P.S. Case No. 121 of 1993 was in the handwriting of Ram Prasad Singh, who was the Investigating Officer of the said case from Paragraphs 1 to 58 and Paragraphs 59 to 84 of the case diary were in the handwriting of Sri B. H. Baitha, which he identified. He also stated that both of the aforesaid police officers had retired from service. The case diary was marked as Exhibit-5.

In cross-examination, PW-8 stated that he had seen both of the aforesaid officers writing and reading and was, therefore, able to identify their handwriting. He further stated that the case diary had not been written in his presence.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties and given our careful consideration to the entire body of oral and documentary evidence discussed hereinabove, as also the rival submissions canvassed on behalf of the Appellant and the State. Before proceeding to re-appreciate the evidence, it is necessary to isolate what is not seriously in dispute on this record which is the fact that Chano Sao met a homicidal death, and that admittedly there is no eyewitness to the actual commission of the offence. The prosecution's case, as the learned Trial Court itself acknowledged, rests entirely on a chain of circumstances. The real and only question for determination, therefore, is whether that chain is complete and conclusive enough to rule out any reasonable possibility of the Appellant Dorik Sao's innocence, and to point clearly to his guilt alone. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that a conviction for murder under Section 302 of IPC on circumstantial evidence requires an unbroken, complete chain of circumstances that points only to the guilt of the accused and excludes any possibility of innocence.

The five golden principles (Panchsheel of proof) established by the Supreme Court of India, the prosecution must satisfy these conditions:

It is pertinent to mention that there are certain common links in the chain which need to be established. These links are: (i) Last seen theory, (ii) Motive, (iii) Recovery of weapons or property (iv) Medical and forensic evidence, (v) Conduct of the accused.

The first and, in our view, the most fatal infirmity in the prosecution's chain concerns the “last seen together” circumstance. PW6 (Ramdeo Sao, the informant and son of the deceased) deposed that he learnt from his cousin, Karu Sao (PW5), that the deceased and the accused Dorik Sao had been seen together at Narganzo station at about 9:15 a.m. on 04.08.1993. However, PW5, when independently examined, made no such statement; his testimony, as it stands on record, speaks only of a village rumour (“hulla”) that the deceased had been murdered by the accused, and is completely silent on having personally seen the two men together at the station. What was relied upon by the Trial Court as “last seen together” evidence is thus, at its highest, hearsay upon hearsay, a circumstance neither PW5 nor PW6 could speak to from personal knowledge, and one that consequently collapses for want of any direct source.

Even assuming the “last seen” circumstance had been proved in its strongest, first-hand form, it is well settled that this circumstance, by itself, is a weak piece of evidence incapable of sustaining a conviction. In Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 21 held that,

This position has been reiterated still further in Munu Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2026 INSC 780, where the Hon’ble Supreme Court while setting aside a conviction founded solely on last-seen testimony, held in terms that “there can be no conviction merely on the basis of the last-seen theory without any other incriminating circumstance, and that testimony found not to inspire confidence cannot found a conviction even where some of the witnesses speaking to it are themselves less than wholly reliable”.

Applying this line of authority to the present case, the "last seen" theory, in this case, can be summarized as an attempt to prove that the deceased was alive in the company of the Appellant shortly before the death. However, "last seen" alone is often an unsafe basis for conviction without corroborating evidence, and even here, the testimony relied upon is not first-hand but hearsay, being what PW6 claims PW5 told him — a claim which PW5's own deposition does not support. The "last seen theory" must therefore be held wholly unproved, and incapable of forming any link, let alone the principal one, in the chain against the Appellant.

The second infirmity concerns the nature of PW6's testimony. PW6 is not an independent witness rather he is the deceased’s own son, and in his deposition he admitted he was "confident" that the Appellant has murdered his father, Chano Sao, or has got him murdered. It is his account alone which is uncorroborated by anyone with independent, first-hand knowledge and that supplies both the motive theory (the dispute over the Rs. 2,000 deduction and the 'sukha') and the alleged extra-judicial admission of PW-6 attributed to the Appellant. It is important to note here that the law requires that such a related witness's testimony be approached with greater caution. In Esakkimuthu v. State represented by the inspector of police, reported in 2025 INSC 880, the Supreme Court granted acquittal after holding that “where the key witnesses are the son and wife of the deceased, being “very well-interested witnesses in the case,” their testimonies “shall have to be treated with great caution” and must meet a stricter standard of proof”.

Applying the same standard to PW6, his testimony find no independent corroboration whatsoever; whether as to the alleged last seen, the motive, or the alleged extra-judicial admission and hence, the absence of corroborating material is what renders his testimony unsafe and cannot completely form the basis of conviction.

The third infirmity, which compounds the two discussed above, is the prosecution's failure to examine the Investigating Officer who initiated the investigation and submitted the chargesheet. The non-examination of the I.O. is not a mere technical omission; it has caused serious and demonstrable prejudice to the defence. The Appellant has thereby been deprived of the valuable right to confront the I.O. with the material contradictions between the depositions of PW5 and PW6 on the “last seen” aspect, to test the manner in which the investigation into the alleged motive was (or was not) conducted, and to probe the circumstances in which the seizure and inquest proceedings were carried out.

The fourth infirmity concerns the alleged motive. The prosecution's own case is that the motive for the murder lay in a business dispute over 'bidi', specifically, the deduction of Rs. 2,000 from the accused's dues and the master's direction to hand over 'sukha' to the deceased. It is quite strange that the police neither investigated nor examined the owner of the bidi company, who alone could have given the true picture of the dispute. It is well settled that while motive assumes real importance in a case resting on circumstantial evidence, it alone cannot sustain a criminal conviction and must be well corroborated by independent, concrete evidence linking the accused to the crime.

In case of Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 626, the Supreme Court held that “motive plays an important link to complete the chain of circumstances” in a case of circumstantial evidence, and went on to acquit the accused therein precisely because the alleged motive remained unproved. Further, in the case of Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2020) 10 SCC 166, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows;

The same infirmity afflicts the present case: the prosecution's stated motive rests entirely on the uncorroborated word of a related witness (PW6), and the one person capable of giving true picture was never examined or brought to the witness box. This lapse can be viewed as a weakness in the prosecution’s proof.

It is also important to note the distinction the Supreme Court has drawn between “normal discrepancies” and “material discrepancies” in the testimony of a witness — a distinction that determines whether a contradiction merely reflects the ordinary fallibility of human memory or instead strikes at the credibility of the witness's account. Not every contradiction is fatal; what matters is whether the discrepancy touches the core of the witness's version or is merely incidental to it. On perusal of the deposition of PW-2, it is quite clear that at least one contradiction goes well beyond what can be classified as normal or natural, namely, the difference between the timing of his coming to know of the body as stated in his examination-in-chief (where he spoke of receiving the information at around 12:00 to 1:00 p.m.) and as stated in his cross-examination (where he deposed to first hearing the “hulla” at around 10:00 a.m. and reaching the spot by 10:30 a.m.).

The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, reported in (1981) 2 SCC 752, has held that discrepancies arising from normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, and mental disposition such as shock at the time of the occurrence are to be treated as natural and do not affect credibility, but drew a clear line for discrepancies that are not normal and not expected of a normal person. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

(Emphasis Supplied)

The contradiction in PW-2's account of the timing of the discovery of the body does not appear to be a normal discrepancies attributable to lapse of memory, and it therefore falls outside the protective umbrella carved out in Kalki. This contradiction is, in our view, amounts to material discrepancies, sufficient to cast serious doubt on the reliability of PW-2's account of the discovery of the body, and his testimony on this aspect cannot be accepted without independent corroboration — corroboration which, for the reasons already discussed, is conspicuously absent from this record.

Further, It is well settled that Indian law does not treat circumstantial evidence as inherently inferior to direct testimony, but it does insist on a considerably stricter standard where there is no eyewitness to the act itself. The foundational test was laid down by the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1952 SCR 1091, where it was held that “the circumstances from which guilt is sought to be inferred must be fully established, and must form “a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused”, such that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused and none other.” This test was crystallised into the five-fold “Panchsheel” principles in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, which require, among other things, that the circumstances relied upon “must be” and not merely “may be” established, that they be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, and that they exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.

Measured against this standard, the chain relied upon by the learned Trial Court falls apart at more than one link. The “last seen” circumstance is unproved, being hearsay contradicted by its own purported source. The motive is unproved, the one independent witness capable of establishing it having never been examined. The star witness, PW6, is a related witness whose uncorroborated account cannot by itself close these gaps, and the non-examination of the I.O. has foreclosed the defense’s ability to test the investigation itself. What remains principally is the recovery of blood-stained clothing spoken to by PW1, is at best, suggestive and falls well short of the “conclusive nature and tendency” that the Panchsheel test demands. As held in State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 254, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof — a caution that applies with particular force where, as here, there is no eyewitness at all to anchor the case.

The bloodstain evidence spoken to by PW1 requires separate mention, as it is the only material circumstance that survives independently of PW6. PW1 deposed to have seen bloodstains on the Appellant's clothes on the day of the occurrence, but this identification is that of a lay witness, made visually, with no seizure of the garments and no forensic or serological examination of any kind connecting the stains to the deceased. Even where a weapon or article is seized and forensically tested, the Supreme Court has held that a positive finding is not, by itself, sufficient to sustain a murder conviction. In Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2024) 3 SCC 481, it was held that “mere recovery of a blood-stained weapon even bearing the same blood group as that of the victim is not enough to sustain a conviction for murder”, hence a lay witness’s account without seizure and examination of disputed articles can be fatal to the prosecution if the remaining evidence lacks strong corroboration or independent reliability.

Because of the nature of evidence, which is available on record, the least, which ought to have been done by the learned Trial Court, was to accord the benefit of reasonable doubt to the appellant inasmuch as I am clearly of the view that in the light of the evidence on record, which I have discussed above, it was not proper to convict the appellant. The benefit of such a situation ought to have been given to the appellant. The Infirmities in the Prosecution’s Case which lead to Reasonable Doubt are flaws that fail to meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the ultimate standard of proof in the legal system. It means that the prosecution must prove guilt conclusively, such that no reasonable or rational person could arrive at another explanation based on the evidence.

The ultimate benchmark of “beyond a reasonable doubt” upholds the presumption of innocence in the legal system that we follow. The presumption of innocence is the absolute bedrock of a fair criminal justice system. It protects individuals from wrongful, arbitrary imprisonment by requiring the State to bear the burden of proof and to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than placing the burden on the accused to prove his innocence. It is pertinent to discuss here the landmark judgment of Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in (1972) 2 SCC 808, which is a cornerstone of Indian criminal jurisprudence for its emphasis on the ‘presumption of innocence’ and ‘the strict standard of proof in criminal trials’, and hence one of the most celebrated judgments on the ‘benefit of doubt’ and the ‘presumption of innocence’ in Indian legal history. The said judgment was rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein, in para 25, the Court held that:

Having examined the evidence as a whole, this Court finds that the prosecution case suffers from a number of defects, each significant in itself and, when taken together, fatal to the conviction: (i) the "last seen together" circumstance rests not on direct testimony but on hearsay attributed by PW6 to PW5, a claim which PW5's own deposition does not bear out; (ii) PW6 — the sole substantive witness, whose account alone supplies both the motive theory and the alleged extra-judicial admission — is a related witness, being the deceased's own son, and his assertions find no independent corroboration whatsoever; (iii) the testimony of PW-2 discloses a material and unexplained discrepancy as to the timing of the discovery of the body (iv) neither the Investigating Officer who conducted the investigation nor the owner of the bidi company i.e., the one person capable of independently verifying the alleged motive — has been examined, without any explanation whatsoever; and (v) the sole surviving physical circumstance, the blood-stained clothing spoken to by PW1, rests on nothing more than a lay witness's visual identification, unsupported by any forensic or serological report connecting the stains to the deceased.

In the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, the appellants ought to have been accorded benefit of reasonable doubt in as much as the prosecution had failed, in the light of the discussion of the evidence on record, to bring home the charges against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt.

In the result and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is allowed. The impugned conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed against him by the judgment and order, under appeals are hereby set aside. The Appellants are not found guilty of the offence, which they stand convicted of, and they are hereby acquitted of the same under benefit of doubt.

Since, the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are hereby cancelled and his sureties shall stand discharged.

I put on record words of appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae, to this Court in arriving at the proper conclusion for deciding the instant appeal. We direct the High Court Legal Services Authority to pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to Ms. Smriti Singh, learned Amicus Curiae, for service rendered by her.

The Registry shall, forthwith, send a copy of this Judgment and order to the learned Trial Court along with the Lower Court’s Records.