Dnyandeo S/o. Methaji Tarfe vs The State Of Maharashtra & Ors.

Heard Mr. Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Joshi, learned AGP for the respondent Nos.1 and 3/State.

On 11.06.2026, when the matter was listed for final hearing, this Court recorded that respondent No.2 is not appearing in the matter, therefore, to grant him one more opportunity to remain present before this Court, the matter was adjourned to 22.06.2026. However, when this matter was listed on 22.06.2026, nobody appeared on behalf of respondent No.2, hence, the petition was further adjourned by this Court to 23.06.2026. Thereafter, the matter was lastly listed on 10.08.2026, but the respondent No.2 who was duly served on merits, did not appear before this Court. It is therefore, clear that respondent No.2 is not interested to prosecute the present petition.

By the present petition, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 10.06.2014 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur in Appeal No.APL/S.T./YAV-2/2014 and order dated 27.12.2013 passed by the Tahsildar, Pusad, in Rev. Case No.16/LND-31/2012-13, whereby, the learned Authorities below directed the petitioner to hand over the land which is in his possession to respondent No.2, in pursuance of the lease deed executed in the year 1994, as said transaction is contrary to the provisions of Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short “the MLR Code”).

The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that respondent No.2 who is the owner of the field Survey No.96/2 situated at Village Nanad, Taluka Pusad, which has now a new Survey No.11/2, area admeasuring 1.22 H.R. was allotted to respondent No.2 in ceiling proceedings bearing No.7/60-A(6)/75-76 vide order dated 22.04.1976. It is stated that on 17.01.1994, the respondent No.2 executed the lease patta in favour of petitioner and the possession was delivered to him. After executing this lease deed in the year 1994, which was for a period of 99 years, the respondent No.2 in the year 2013 approached before the learned Tahsildar, by filing the proceedings to state that the transfer / lease, which was executed between them is hit by the provisions of the MLR Code, and therefore, possession of land be restored to him.

The present petitioner appeared before the learned Tahsildar and contested the said proceedings. However, by order dated 27.12.2013, the learned Tahsildar, upheld the case of the respondent No.2 and directed the petitioner to handover the possession of land bearing Survey No.11/2 of Mouza : Nanad area admeasuring 1.22 H.R. to respondent No.2.

Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Tahsildar, the petitioner preferred a Statutory Appeal before the learned Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur, and raised substantial grounds. One of the ground which was raised by the petitioner before the learned Tribunal, was that the provisions of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (for short “the Act, 1974”) are not applicable in the matter, as the petitioner himself belongs to the Tribal Community. It is further pointed out that the lease patta was dated 17.01.1994 and therefore, as per the definition of “transfer” as contemplated under the provisions of the Act, 1974, this lease deed does not cover under the definition of the “transfer”. On this ground, he states that the order passed by the learned Tahsildar, deserves to be quashed and set-aside.

The learned Tribunal, by the impugned judgment and order dated 10.06.2014, decided the appeal preferred by the petitioner. However, while deciding the appeal did not record finding on the submissions of the petitioner in the matter. In respect of lease deed, which was executed in the year 1994, the learned Tribunal recorded a findings that as the agricultural land was allotted to respondent No.2 in a ceiling proceedings, the lease deed, did not come under the definition of the “transfer”. Therefore, learned Tribunal has dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the learned Tahsildar.

The learned AGP who has filed a reply affidavit in this matter, has supported the order passed by the learned Tribunal. He submits that the agricultural land was transferred to respondent No.2 in ceiling proceedings vide order dated 22.04.1976 and that as per the terms and conditions of the said allotment, the land in question was not transferable. According to him, the reasons recorded by the learned Tribunal are correct and therefore, there is no need of any interference of this Court in the matter.

In light of the observations made by the learned Tribunal and the submissions of the learned AGP that by an Order dated 22.04.1976 under the ceiling proceedings, the land was allotted to respondent No.2 and therefore, lease deed executed do not come under the purview of definition of “transfer” of the Act 1974, it is submitted by the petitioner that the restrictions which are imposed for transfer of land are under the provisions of The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 (for short “the Act, 1961”). However, in the present matter proceeding being initiated under the MLR Code, the provisions of Act, 1961, are not applicable in the matter.

In the light of aforesaid submission, it would be pertinent to note that respondent No.2 filed an application before the learned Tahsildar, by stating that as per Section 36-A of the MLR Code, the execution of the lease deed between the respondent No.2 and the petitioner, being illegal, as the petitioner did not belong to a Tribal Caste/Community, the land be restored to him. As such, on the basis of this application, the proceedings came to be initiated.

The learned Tahsildar, who was supposed to decide the application by exercising the powers under Section 36-A of the MLR Code, while dealing with the application filed by respondent No.2, has held that as per Rule 80 of The Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Lands) Rules, 1971, the land belonging to the backward class persons are protected. Accordingly, while considering the application filed by the respondent No.2, learned Tahsildar passed the order of restoration of the possession of land to respondent No.2. So also the learned Tahsildar has recorded that as per the provisions of the Act, 1974, it was necessary to hand over the possession of land to respondent No.2. Thus, by relying upon the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, The Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Lands) Rules, 1971 and Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, has exercised its jurisdiction in the matter.

The learned Tribunal has confirmed the order passed by the learned Tahsildar, mainly on the ground that as the land was allotted to respondent No.2 under the ceiling proceedings and as per the terms and conditions of the allotment therein the land was not transferable. Consequently, learned Tribunal recorded the finding that the lease deed which was effected between the petitioner and respondent No.2 did not come under the purview of “transfer” as defined under the provisions of the Act, 1974, and thereby, dismissed the appeal.

In the present matter, undisputedly the application was filed by respondent No.2 under the provisions of MLR Code. His only contention was that the petitioner did not belong to the Tribal Caste/Community and therefore, the lease deed which was executed was bad in law, illegal and thereby, the land in question be restored to respondent No.2. In the present matter, neither the provisions of the Act, 1974, nor the provisions of The Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Lands) Rules, 1971 were invoked by the petitioner. However, learned Tahsildar while passing the order dated 27.12.2013 has referred the aforesaid provisions of different Act and Rules and decided the application.

In the entire matter, the important aspect whether the petitioner belongs to a Tribal Caste/Community or not, was not dealt with by both the Authorities below. The petitioner states that he has specifically brought this fact to the notice of learned Tribunal, in his appeal. But to this aspect there is no consideration in the matter. Therefore, his submission that as he belongs to Schedule Tribe, the provisions of Section 36-A of the MLR Code are not applicable and on this sole ground, the impugned orders passed by the Authorities below are liable to be quashed and set-aside.

In respect of the findings recorded by the learned Authorities below, it is contended that the said aspect comes under the provisions of the Act, 1961. Under the Act, 1961, the Authorities are at liberty to invoke the provisions of the said Act, if the lease deed which was executed between the petitioner and respondent No.2 is found to be contrary to the provisions of law. But in the present matter, proceedings which were initiated under MLR Code are not sustainable in the eyes of law.

According to the petitioner, there is no allegation that the lease deed which was effected between the petitioner and respondent No.2 in the year 1994 is hit by any of the provisions of the Act, 1961 and therefore, the said issue is not relevant in the matter. It is also pointed out that while deciding the proceedings under the MLR Code, the learned Tahsildar, is the Authority to decide the issue whereas, under the Act, 1961, the Authority to decide the issue is different Authority. Therefore, issues mixed up by learned Tahsildar, in the present matter is per se illegal. Learned Tahsildar seems to have exceeded his power while deciding the proceeding under Section 36A of the MLR Code.

In these circumstances, this Court come to the conclusion that lease deed executed on 17.01.1994 is not hit by the provision of 36-A of the MLR Code, as both the petitioner and respondent No.2 belonged to Scheduled Tribes. The proceeding filed by respondent No.2 under Section 36A of the MLR Code, are not tenable and consequently, same deserves to be quashed and set aside.

In my considered opinion, both the Authorities below have failed to consider this material aspect of the matter. Therefore, interference of this Court would be necessary in the matter. Hence, I pass the following Order :-

The writ petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.