Divisional Railway Manager [Commercial] vs Tirupur Railway Station

S. Nagamuthu, J.—The petitioner is the sole defendant in O.S. No. 291 of 2006 on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge,

Tirupur. The respondent is the plaintiff in the said suit. The respondent claims to be an association known as ""Tirupur Railway Station, Daily

Commuters'' Association"". The said association/plaintiff has filed the suit for the following relief:

(a) declaring that the classification of the Tirupur Railway Station parking area as Grade ''A'' as illegal, arbitrary, excessive and void.

(b) Consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant from calling for tender in respect of the Vehicle Parking area at Tirupur Railway

station on the classification as ''A'' Grade on 07.12.2006 as published in the tender notice No. J/C 300/P/VOL-V dated 06.11.2006.

Along with the said suit, the respondent filed an interlocutory application in I.A. No. 1273 of 2006 seeking temporary injunction restraining the

respondent from calling for tender to lease out the vehicle parking area at Tirupur Railway Station. An order of temporary injunction was granted

by the trial court on 05.12.2006 and it was periodically extended till 19.04.2007. On 19.04.2007, it was extended until further orders. However,

I.A. No. 1273 of 2006 was closed on 11.07.2011 on the ground that the suit itself was ripe for trial. A contempt application was filed by the

respondent herein against the petitioner herein in I.A. No. 1364 of 2006 and the same was dismissed on 14.09.2011. Because of the pendency of

the contempt proceedings, the trial of the suit could not be taken up. At that stage, the respondent again filed an interlocutory application in I.A.

No. 1574 of 2011 seeking to reopen I.A. No. 1273 of 2006. The learned Principal Subordinate Judge allowed the said application, by order

dated 09.01.2012, as a result the trial could not be taken up again. At that stage, the petitioner has come up with this civil revision petition

challenging the order in I.A. No. 1574 of 2011 dated 09.01.2012 reopening the interlocutory application in I.A. No. 1273 of 2006.

I have heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent and also perused the records carefully.

Though the challenge in this civil revision petition is only to the order made in I.A. No. 1574 of 2011, during the course of argument, since this

court had doubt about the very maintainability of the suit, exercising its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,

this court invited the counsel on either side to advance their arguments in respect of the maintainability of the suit itself.

The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that classification of a railway station parking area under various grades is a policy

matter of the Southern Railways and the same will not give rise to any civil litigation. The learned counsel would nextly contend that the petitioner

has got nothing to do with either parking area of the railway station or with the tender to be floated by the petitioner. The learned senior counsel for

the petitioner would nextly point out that this is not a public interest litigation, nor the said suit has been filed in representative capacity. The learned

counsel would further submit that Section 80 of CPC was also not complied with.

The learned senior counsel would lastly submit that this suit is a clear abuse of process of court and to allow the suit to remain on the file of the

trial court for any more time would only be a wastage of valuable time of the court. For all these reasons, the learned senior counsel would pray for

quashing the entire proceedings in O.S. No. 291 of 2006 pending on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupur.

The learned counsel for the respondent would, however, oppose this revision. According to him, the said suit has been pending from the year

2006 and because there was no judicial officer presiding over the said court for a long time, the trial could not be commenced soon. Now, the suit

is ripe for trial and the trial is going to commence. The learned counsel would further submit that all along the respondent has been enjoying order

of interim injunction and, therefore, it will be in the interest of justice to permit the respondent to have the said suit contested and decided on merits.

The learned counsel would, however, tacitly admit that Section 80 of CPC was not complied with and the suit is not in representative capacity

so as to follow Order 1, Rule 8 of CPC. At any rate, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, the suit cannot be stated to be an abuse

of process of court as there are contentious issues. Thus, according to him, this civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

I have considered the above submissions.

At the outset, I have to state that admittedly this is not a public interest litigation, nor the suit has been filed in representative capacity.

Admittedly, Order 1, Rule 8 of CPC has not been followed. The respondent association has got no personal right in respect of the reliefs sought

for. After all, it is an association of Daily Commuters'' which has got nothing to do with the classification of the parking area of the railway station

and the tender to be floated by the railways for awarding contract to run the parking area.

When the respondent/plaintiff association has got no civil right in respect of the reliefs sought for, in my considered opinion, this is a clear abuse

of process of court. Apart from that, as has been rightly stated by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Section 80 of CPC was also not

complied with. From the records, it could be seen that the respondent, who has got nothing to do with the classification of the railway station, has

been successful enough to have the order of interim injunction for such a long time so as to prevent the railway authorities from awarding lease in

respect of the vehicle parking area. Thus, the income which could have been derived by the railways and also convenience of the general public

have been very much disturbed for such a long time. For this reason also, I have to hold that the suit is a clear abuse of process of court.

Above all, whether a railway station is to be classified as Grade ''A'' or some other Grade is a policy matter of the railway authorities and no

individual can have any civil right in respect of the same. If any individual has got any public interest in respect the said classification, the remedy lies

elsewhere to workout. I only say that in the present suit, the respondent/plaintiff has got no civil dispute at all giving jurisdiction u/s 9 of CPC to the

civil court. For all these reasons, in my considered opinion, allowing the suit to remain on the file of the trial court any more will only further waste

the valuable time of the trial court.

When the courts are flooded with lot of litigations and when there are number of litigations involving substantial legal rights, no court can afford

to waste its precious time in these kinds of unnecessary, vexatious and motivated litigations. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the

respondent that at this length of time, it may not be conducive to quash the proceedings and instead, the parties may be directed to go before the

trial court to have the trial of the suit, cannot be accepted. Thus, looking from any angle, I find no justification at all to allow the suit to remain on

the file of the trial court. To repeat, I want to state that this suit is a classic example as to how the process of the court can be abused and a public

authority can be prevented from discharging its official functions resulting in inconvenience to the general public and monetary loss to the public

authority. Thus, in my considered opinion, the civil revision petition must succeed and heavy cost is to be imposed on the respondent/plaintiff.

At this juncture, we may quickly look into the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Vinod Seth Vs. Devinder Bajaj and another

reported in Vinod Seth Vs. Devinder Bajaj and Another, wherein, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has expressed the need for reforms in the

provisions of CPC relating to imposing of costs and compensatory costs by Civil Courts. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has deduced that the

provision for costs is intended to achieve the following goals viz.,

(a) It should act as a deterrent to vexatious, frivolous and speculative litigations or defences. The specter of being made liable to pay actual costs

should be such, as to make every litigant think twice before putting forth a vexatious, frivolous or speculative claim or defence.

(b) Costs should ensure that the provisions of the Code, Evidence Act and other laws governing procedure are scrupulously and strictly complied

with and that parties do not adopt delaying tactics or mislead the court.

(c) Costs should provide adequate indemnity to the successful litigant for the expenditure incurred by him for the litigation. This necessitates the

award of actual costs of litigation as contrasted from nominal or fixed or unrealistic costs.

(d) The provision for costs should be an incentive for each litigant to adopt alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes and arrive at a

settlement before the trial commences in most of the cases. In many other jurisdictions, in view of the existence of appropriate and adequate

provisions for costs, the litigants are persuaded to settle nearly 90% of the civil suits before they come up to trial.

(e) The provisions relating to costs should not however obstruct access to courts and justice. Under no circumstances the costs should be a

deterrent, to a citizen with a genuine or bonafide claim, or to any person belonging to the weaker sections whose rights have been affected, from

approaching the courts.

As far as Section 35 of the CPC is concerned, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has expressed that the said provision does not impose any ceiling

and so the desired object can be achieved by following (i) Courts levying costs, following the result, in all cases (non-levy of costs should be

supported by reasons); and (ii) appropriate amendment to Civil Rules of Practice relating to taxation of costs, to make it more realistic in

commercial litigation. In paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment, while dealing with Section 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Hon''ble

Supreme Court has held as follows:

The provision relating to compensatory costs (Section 35A of the Code) in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences has become

virtually infructuous and ineffective, on account of inflation. Under the said section, award of compensatory costs in false and vexatious litigation, is

subject to a ceiling of Rs. 3,000/-. This requires a realistic revision keeping in view, the observations in Salem Advocates Bar Association (supra).

Section 35B providing for costs for causing delay is seldom invoked. It should be regularly employed, to reduce delay.

The lack of appropriate provisions relating to costs has resulted in a steady increase in malicious, vexatious, false, frivolous and speculative

suits, apart from rendering Section 89 of the Code ineffective. Any attempt to reduce the pendency or encourage alternative dispute resolution

processes or to streamline the civil justice system will fail in the absence of appropriate provisions relating to costs. There is therefore an urgent

need for the legislature and the Law Commission of India to re-visit the provisions relating to costs and compensatory costs contained in Section

35 and 35A of the Code.

Though this judgment was delivered on 05.07.2010 by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, i.e. almost three years before, the Legislature has not

revisited the provisions contained in Sections 35 and 35-A of the Code.

In the case on hand, it needs to be noted that this is not either a first appeal or a second appeal or a revision u/s 115 of C.P.C. so as to

contend that this Court can impose cost of the suit or proceedings as provided u/s 35 of C.P.C. or compensatory costs subject to the maximum

ceiling of Rs. 3,000/- as provided u/s 35-A of the Code. Here is a case where the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India has been invoked. Therefore, there can be no ceiling suggested on the power of this Court in respect of the quantum of the cost which can be

imposed on a party while disposing of the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this case, because of the vexatious suit filed

before the lower Court which has been pending for about seven years, the railways could not award fresh lease and thus the railways has lost its

income. The public have also put to lot of inconvenience because no improvement appears to have been made in the parking area. Therefore, I am

of the view that imposition of costs of Rs. 25,000/-(Rupees twenty five thousand only) alone would meet the ends of justice. In the result, the civil

revision petition is allowed and the suit in O.S. No. 291 of 2006 pending on the file of the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Tirupur, is quashed

in its entirety. The respondent/plaintiff is hereby directed to pay a cost of Rs. 25,000/-[Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only] to the

petitioner/defendant on or before 26.04.2013 and report compliance to the Registry of this court and in the event, the compliance is not reported

within the time prescribed, the Registry shall list this case on 29.04.2013 for further action. Consequently, connected MP is closed.