Divisional Controller vs Said Khan

Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties.

The present petition challenges the judgment dated 22.12.2023, passed by the Member, Industrial Court, Akola in Revision (ULP) No. 25 of 2016. By way of the said judgment, the Industrial Court has rejected the Revision filed by the petitioner and confirmed the order of the Labour Court, Buldhana, in Complaint (ULP) No. 231 of 2004.

Facts, as can be seen from the memo of petition, are as under:

The respondent herein is working as Art 'C' Mechanic at the Divisional Workshop at Buldhana since 1978. Since he remained absent from 07.07.1991 for a period of 39 days, he was proceeded departmentally and was dismissed from service vide order dated 10.12.1991.

The respondent challenged the said dismissal order in Complaint (ULP) No.231 of 2004 before the Labour Court, Bhandara. The said complaint was partly allowed by the Labour Court vide judgment and order dated 13.04.2004, thereby directing the petitioner to pay 50% back wages.

The petitioner, being aggrieved, challenged the said decision before the Industrial Court in Revision (ULP) No.107 of 2005. The Industrial Court remanded the matter to the Labour Court for fresh adjudication.

On remand, the Labour Court decided Complaint (ULP) again and quashed the dismissal order dated 01.12.1991 and inflicted a punishment of warning to the respondent and granted full back-wages from 10.12.1991 till 02.11.2000.

The petitioner again chose to challenge the said judgment by filing a revision before the Industrial Court bearing Revision (ULP) No.25 of 2016. On 22^nd December 2023, the Industrial Court dismissed the revision. The said judgment, as stated supra, is challenged in the present petition.

I have heard Mr. P.S. Gawai, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.N. Varma, learned counsel for the respondent.

It is the contention of Mr. P.S. Gavai, learned counsel for the petitioner that the Labour Court ought not to have interfered in the quantum of punishment, which is the sole prerogative of the employer. He also submits that the Industrial Court has confirmed the order mechanically without applying its mind independently and dismissed the Revision erroneously. He submits that both Courts have committed a grave error of law in imposing the punishment of warning on a premise that the same is shockingly disproportionate.

He places reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s. Rifilis Engineering Private Limited Vs.. Arjun Gupta, reported in 2026 KLT (OnLine) 4306 and more particularly para 9 thereof to draw home his conclusion. He also relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Shivaji Daulat Dadar Vs. Divisional Controller and others, reported in 2016 (2) Mh.L.J. 87, and the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Ex-Constable Ram Karan, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 373, in support of his submissions.

Per contra, Mr. P.N. Varma, learned counsel for the respondent justifies and supports the orders of the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court. He submits that the judgment of the Labour Court is perfectly correct and cannot be termed as an erroneous. He points me out the issues framed by the Labour Court, more particularly Issue No.2. The said issue pertains as to whether the respondent proves misconduct of the complainant before the Court. The said issue was answered in the affirmative to the extent of the charge of absenteeism only. It is therefore his submission that since the issue is answered only as far as charge of absenteeism is concerned, the Labour Court was well within its jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment.

He also points me out the order of remand by the Industrial Court in the earlier round of litigation to highlight the fact that a specific and limited remand was made by the Industrial Court with a direction to decide the question of interference in punishment as awarded. He therefore submits that the Labour Court, having found that only the issue of absenteeism stood proved, it was within his rights to interfere in the punishment. He, therefore, submits that the judgment cannot be said to be perverse.

In rebuttal, Mr. Gavai submits that the default card which is placed at page 60 shows that there were various misconducts against the respondent employee, and therefore, the Labour Court could not have interfered in the quantum of punishment looking to the track record.

Mr. P.N. Varma, learned counsel for the respondent counters this and states that the default which is alleged is of absenteeism and the date of committing the said misconduct is 08.07.1991. Prior misconducts are trivial in nature inasmuch as only a nominal fine of Rs.25/- is imposed on one occasion, while a warning is issued on the other. He therefore submits that the said misconducts being trivial in nature could not have been taken into account.

I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsels for the respective parties and, with their able assistance gone through the record of the matter.

As can be seen from the judgment of the Labour Court, in para 20 it has recorded that from a perusal of the dismissal order dated 10.12.1991, the competent authority has relied on the back-track record of the respondent employee. The Labour Court has also rightly observed that there is no record of prior punishment before the Enquiry Officer and in absence of any such record the impugned dismissal order is shockingly disproportionate. It has therefore recorded a finding that even though he agrees with the charge of absenteeism, the punishment of dismissal for such first misconduct is said to be grossly disproportionate. It has also given elaborate reasoning in para 23 of the said judgment.

Considering all aspects on record, the Labour Court partly allowed the complaint, thereby setting aside the dismissal order dated 10.12.1991. The respondent are further directed to inflict punishment while issuing appropriate warning to the complainant.

The Industrial Court has also confirmed the said findings by applying its mind looking to the limited jurisdiction available under Section 44 of the MRTU & PULP Act. I find nothing wrong in the judgment of the Labour Court as confirmed by the Industrial Court. Both courts have given elaborate reasoning in support of their conclusions. It therefore cannot be said that the judgments of the Labour Court and Industrial Court are suffer from any perversity.

As far as the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said judgment is totally flows on a different premise and lays down propositions of law which cannot be disputed. However, in the present case, the Labour Court has given elaborate reasoning, more particularly looking to the limited remand done by the Industrial Court in the first round of litigation. No perversity has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition is therefore meritless and is liable to be rejected. I, therefore, pass the following order :