High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 11 BOM CK 1965

Divisional Controller, MSRTC vs Sk. Nazir Sk. Rehman

Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench · Decided on 3 November 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Nandesh S. Deshpande, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 8221 of 2025

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Judgment

45 paragraphs · 2,067 words

Heard.

(2)

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

(3)

The present petition, seeks to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 17.01.2025, passed by the Appellate Authority, as also seeks to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 11.03.2024, passed by the Controlling Authority, thereby directing the petitioner-Corporation to grant payment of gratuity to the respondent. The Petition also seeks to dismiss the application PGA No.255/2009 dated 08.04.2009 filed by the respondent before the learned Controller demanding payment of gratuity.

(4)

The facts, giving rise to the present petition, are as follows:

(4.1) The respondent was working as a bus conductor at Khamgaon Depot, Buldhana Division since 01.06.1971 and due to some deficiency in services was terminated from services on 27.05.1995.

(4.2) Pursuant to such termination, he filed an application for gratuity on 08.04.2009 before the learned Controller Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Subsequently, the application was allowed and respondent was granted gratuity.

(5)

Aggrieved by the said decision, the present petitioner-Corporation preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority, Akola. The appeal was dismissed vide order dated 17.01.2025, upholding the order of the learned Controlling Authority.

(6)

Aggrieved by both the orders above, the petitioner-Corporation has filed the present petition seeking quashing of the orders above.

(7)

I have heard Mr. P.S. Gawai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, as also, Mr. P. N. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

(8)

The learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation, submits that the law favours one who is indolent and diligent and the delay of 14 years of filing of application for Payment of Gratuity by the respondent is ground for non-entitlement of any interest/payment.

(9)

For support of his claims, the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation, is relying on the following judgments:

1.

Union Bank of India and anr. Vs. D. C. Chaturvedi and anr., reported in 2022 Supreme (del) 167, Writ Petition No. 4486/2021, decided on 24.03.2022.

2.

Union of India vs. Tarem Singh, 2008 (8) SCC 648

3.

Western Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. Manohar Govinda Fulzele and anr. In Civil Appeal No. 2608/2025 and Special Leave Petition(C) No. 10088 of 2020

4.

Chanda Khand Sahakari Shetkari Kharedi Vikri Sanstha Vs. Shri Dattatraya Ramchandra Gaund and anr. In Writ Petition No. 1362/2009 decided on 16.09.2015

5.

Divisional Controller vs. Govind Sambhaji Hanumante, reported in 2017(2) MHLJ 49

(10)

Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order. He states that the Payment of Gratuity Act, is a beneficial legislation and it does not prescribe any specific period of limitation for filing application for gratuity.

(11)

In order to support his claims, the learned counsel for the respondent relies on the following judgments:

1.

Dr. Panjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth, Akola and anr. Vs. Smt. Gangu Anand Ingle and other connected Writ Petitions, decided on 09.07.2025 by Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench

2.

Union Bank of India & Ors. vs. C.G. Ajay babu & anr., reported in AIR 2018 SC 3792;

3.

Dr. Shah Faesal & Ors. Vs. Union of India & anr, reported in (2020) 4 SCC 1

4.

Tasleem Ahmed Vs. State of Govt. Of NCT of Delhi, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1707

5.

Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. Vs. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 336

6.

Chairman & managing Director, bank of Maharashtra Pune & Anr. Vs. Shri. Kishor S/o Shankarrao Khadtatkar, Nagpur & anr, reported in 2023 I CLR 362

7.

State of Jharkhand & ors. Vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr., reported in (2013) 12 SCC 210

8.

Vasant B. Bhijbal Vs. Controlling Authority, reported in 2020 (166) FLR 948;

9.

Shapoor M. Mehta Vs. Allahbad Bank, reported in 2012 (3) Mh.L.J.126;

10.

Managing Director (M.D.), Maharashtra State Co-operative Tribal Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Purushottam S/o Asaram Raut & Ors., reported in 2015 (4) Mh.L.J 342;

11.

Transport Manager, Kolhapur Municipal Transport Undertaking, Kolhapur Vs. Pravin Bhabhutlal Shah & Ors., reported in 2005 (104) FLR 1009;

12.

Manager R.B.I Bangalore Vs. S. Mani & Ors, reported in 2005 (105) FLR 1067;

13.

Vishnu Ramchandra Joshi vs. Maharashtra State Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2006 I CLR 110;

14.

H. Gangahanume Gowda Vs. Karnataka Agrp Industries Corporation Ltd., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 40

15.

Dr. Panjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth & anr. Vs. Smt. Gangu Ananda Ingle, Writ Petition No. 2395 of 2012, Hon’ble Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench)

(12)

I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsels for the respective parties and also gone through the record. The fact that the respondent-employee herein retired on 27.05.1995 and filed an application for gratuity on 08.04.2009 is not a matter in dispute. Even though the Gratuity Act is a piece of beneficial legislation and there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing of such an application, it would not mean that such an application can be filed at any point of time. True it is that the Payment of Gratuity Act being a beneficial legislation has to be construed in favour of the employee/respondent herein, it could not ipso facto clothe him with a right to file the application at any point of time. In my considered opinion, firstly such an application has to be filed within a reasonable time and the justification or the reasons caused for filing the said application belatedly has to be stated in the said application itself.

(13)

If the application filed by the respondent before the Controlling Authority under Section 7(4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, is seen, the same does not even whisper about any explanation of delay caused in filing the appeal. A slipshod application as is filed in the present case cannot give a right to the concerned employee even though the payment of gratuity is a right vested in the employee. The said right can is only be availed, if the concerned employee approaches the authority within a reasonable period and with a plausible explanation for approaching the said authority belatedly. No explanation, much less a justifiable one, can be seen from the said application. In my considered opinion, therefore, the application was clearly time barred. However, the Gratuity Act is a beneficial legislation and therefore, is to be interpreted in favour of employee. The authorities before here therefore was correct in entertaining the application filed by the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent has rightly relied upon the judgment of Dr. Panjabrao Krishi Vidyapeeth referred supra. In the said judgment, the plea of limitation was not raised by the employer as is in the present case.

(14)

Coming to the merits of the matter and more particularly, the impugned order passed by the Controlling Authority, it has went on to interpret Section 4(6) of the Gratuity Act and states that only when the concerned employee has been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss or destruction of any property, then in that event, the gratuity can be forfeited. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 provides that the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited, if the services of that employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude. The Controlling Authority has, therefore, held that only when such a contingency has arisen then the gratuity can be forfeited in its entirety or partially.

(15)

In the present case, it was an admitted position on record that the concerned employee was terminated from service on the ground of misconduct which included misappropriation. Furthermore, this fact was also admitted by the concerned employee during his cross examination which was conducted before the controlling authority. In my considered opinion, therefore, the finding the authority below is not correct.

(16)

The learned counsel for the respondent had tried to argue that as per the discipline and appeal procedure of the petitioner - Corporation the misconducts as provided under Clause (7) and 12(b) were only charged upon the employee. It is, therefore, his submission that moral turpitude is a separate misconduct as per Clause 18 of the said Discipline and Appeal Procedure and therefore, it cannot be stretched that extent for withholding the gratuity. I have carefully perused the said Discipline and Appeal Procedure. Clause 7(A) provides for omission to issue tickets without any plausible reason and Clause 12(b) provides for misappropriation. Both these clauses would in fact amount to moral turpitude since the term moral turpitude would certainly take into its sweep the clauses as mentioned supra. In that sense, moral turpitude is an all-exclusive term and misappropriation would be certainly one of the facet of moral turpitude. The argument of the respondent, therefore, cannot be countenanced.

(17)

The learned counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Western Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2025 to state that conviction of a concerned employee on the basis of offence is not a condition precedent for attracting the rigours of Clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. In para 10 of the said Judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the very argument as has been sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent. He has tried to differentiate that the judgment of WCL supra cannot be read as a binding precedent since the said Judgment is of a bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court while the judgment of Union of India and Ors. Vs. C.G. Ajay Babu, reported in AIR 2018 SCC 3792 is also of the same strength. However, the said argument is made for rejection only. The subsequent judgment of the WCL only clarifies the position and therefore, has to be read as a binding precedent.

(18)

Furthermore, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, that the gratuity cannot be forfeited without issuing show cause notice both on forfeiture and quantum of forfeiture is also misconceived and the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No.1362/2009, Chanda Khand Sahakari Shetkari Kharedi Vikri Sanstha, Chandrapur Vs. Shri Dattatraya Ramchandra Gaund and anr., decided on 16.09.2015, relied upon by the learned counsel in that regard is entirely misplaced.

(19)

It is an admitted position on record, that there was an inordinate delay in approaching the controlling authority for payment of gratuity. Likewise, it is also admitted position on record that the respondent employee herein was terminated for misappropriation and the termination had attained finality since it was not challenged. Furthermore, the fact that he was terminated for misappropriation in of amount is also been admitted by the respondent itself. As far as the judgment of the appellate authority is concerned, it does not take into consideration the specific grounds raised by the petitioner herein. The judgment of the appellate authority also flows on an incorrect premise that the present petitioner has failed to show any documentary proof or evidence with respect to grievous misconduct by the respondent. In my considered opinion, it was an admitted position and as can be seen from the record that the respondent herein was terminated on the grave charge of misappropriation and therefore, there was no need for placing such material on record as is stated by the judgment of the appellate Court.

(20)

Taking overall view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the order of the controlling authority and the judgment of the appellate Court suffers from grave perversity since they do not consider the correct position of law as enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In that view of the matter, the said judgments are liable to be quashed and set aside. In that view of the matter, following order is passed : -

(i)

The writ petition is allowed.

(ii)

The judgment and order dated 17.01.2025 passed by the Appellate Authority in Appeal PGA No.19 of 2024 is quashed and set aside. Likewise the judgment and order dated 11.03.2024 passed by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, in Application PGA No.255 of 2009 is also quashed and set aside. The said application PGA No.255 of 2009 is rejected.

(21)

Rule is made absolute in above terms.