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Judgment
Markandey Katju, C.J.—This writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 23.1.2004.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the records.
The writ petitioner was the second transferee of a licence granted for exporting leather and leather products by the Export and Import Control
Trade Organisation, Chennai, on 22.9.1999. Originally, the licence was granted for the period from 22.9.1999 to 20.2.2001. Subsequently, it was
transferred to one M/s. M.B. Vir Enterprises on 20.2.2001 and the period of the licence was extended, in terms of the policy, till 20.8.2001.
The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence seized several licences including the licence in question on 23.4.2001 on the allegation of tampering.
The licence in question was found to be in order and therefore, returned to the writ petitioner on 16.8.2001. His licence period was to expire on
20.8.2001. He made an application for extension of period of the licence. That application was rejected on 29.1.2002 on the ground that the
Handbook of procedures does not permit extension of period of licence in the event of transfer of licence.
The writ petitioner filed the writ petition, on which, the impugned order has been passed.
The learned single Judge has directed extension of the period of the licence for the equivalent period during which the writ petitioner was
prevented to operate.
In our opinion, a Court cannot direct extension of period of a licence, lease or other grant where it is for a fixed period. For instance, if a licence
or lease is granted for the period from 1.1.2004 till 31.12.2004, the Court cannot direct that the period of the licence or lease should be extended
beyond 31.12.2004 merely because for a part of this period, the licensee or lessee was prevented, for reason beyond his control, to operate. If the
licensee or lessee was prevented to operate for a part of the period of the licence or lease, then his remedy is to get refund of proportionate
amount of licence or lease fee or compensation for any damage he might have suffered, but the period of licence or lease cannot certainly be
extended by the Court.
We have already held in Rama Muthuramalingam, State Propaganda Committee Member Vs. The Deputy Superintendent of Police and Others,
that Courts must exercise self restraint and should not encroach into the domain of the Executive or the Legislature. We reiterate the view
expressed in the aforesaid judgment.
Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (first respondent in this appeal) has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ajay Industrial
Corporation Vs. Union of India (UOI), , in which the Delhi High Court directed invalidation of the licence for a period of seven months. With
respect, we cannot agree with the view expressed by the Delhi High Court. Against the judgment of the Delhi High Court, a SLP was filed before
the Supreme Court which was dismissed by the Supreme Court by the following order:
Delay condoned.
Having regard to the facts of this case, no interference is required. The question of law is left open for decision in an appropriate case. The SLP is
dismissed.
A perusal of the order of the Supreme Court itself shows that the question of law has been left open for decision in an appropriate case. Hence
the order of the Supreme Court cannot amount to a precedent binding on us as the Supreme Court itself left the question of law open.
No doubt, in Beg Raj Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , the Supreme Court directed extension of the period of mining lease for the period
for which it remained un-operated due to the State Government''s intervention, but in our opinion, the aforesaid decision is confined to the facts of
that particular case and does not lay down any principle of law that a Court can extend the period of licence or lease.
We reiterate that Courts have to maintain judicial restraint and cannot encroach into the domain of the Executive or the Legislature. It is entirely
for the authorities to decide for what period a licence or lease is to be granted and it is not open to the Court to extend the period of licence or
lease.
For the reasons given above, we set aside the impugned order. The writ appeal is allowed. Consequently, W.A.M.P. No. 7366 of 2004 for
stay is closed. However if the writ petitioner makes an application to the authority concerned, the said authority may consider as to what
appropriate compensation the writ petitioner should be given on the facts of the case, preferably within a period of two months from the date of
receipt of such application.