Dinesh Sah @ Dinesh Kumar & Anr. vs The State Of Bihar & Ors.

“….For setting aside the order dated 26.09.2012 passed in Confiscation Case No. 13/2008-09 passed by the learned Collector, Muzaffarpur by which he was pleased to confiscate 55 bags of rice (27 quintals 50Kg) and 130 bags of wheat each of 50Kg (65 quintals) was order to be confiscated in terms of Section 6A of the E.C. Act and further for quashing the appellate order dated 24.09.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur by which he was pleased to dismissed the appeal in terms of Section 6C of the E.C. Act.”

“10.

The decision of the third point raised by Mr. Bharuka rests on the decision of the question whether the expression “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act is comprehensive enough to include an order of the nature passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13th of February, 1976 accepting the final report submitted by the Police. The expression “acquitted” or “acquittal” has not been defined in the Act, nor the word “discharge” has been defined in the Act. Neither of these two words “acquittal” and “discharge” has been defined in the Central General Clauses Act (Act 10 of 1897) or the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act (Act 1 of 1917). According to dictionaries, the two words are almost synonyms. “Acquit” means to free : to release : to release from an accusation, and “acquittal” means a judicial discharge from an accusation. “Discharge” means to set free : to acquit Prima facie, therefore the expression “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act should be construed to be comprehensive enough to include any judicial order passed at any stage of the proceeding setting free the accused of the accusation. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, submitted that the words “discharge” and “acquittal” have been used in two different senses in the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the expression “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act ought not to include an order of discharge. Learned counsel for the State drew our attention to Sections 227, 239 and 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) where the expression “discharge” has been used and Sections 232, 248 and 255 where the expression “acquittal” has been used. From a perusal of these sections it will appear that in the procedure prescribed for trial of summons cases only the word acquittal has been used for there is no express provision for framing of charges in summons cases. So far as sessions trials and trials in warrant cases are concerned, both the expression ‘discharge’ and ‘acquittal’ have been used. When on perusal of the materials on the record or examination of the evidence led by the prosecution in warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report, the court of session or the Magistrate considers that no case against the accused has been made out, he would discharge the accused, but if he frames charges and thereafter on taking further evidence finds the accused not guilty he is required to record, an order of “acquittal”. It would thus appear that for the purposes of the Code “acquittal” means an order setting free the accused of accusation after full-dress trial, whereas “discharge” means setting free the accused of accusation without a full-dress trial. In my opinion, however, this distinction between the meaning of the two words as used in the Code cannot be relevant for the purposes of construing the meaning of the term “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that where some expression is used in it and it is not defined therein the dictionary meaning of the expression has to be given to it while construing it. Further if the word “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act is to be given a meaning setting free the accused from accusation after full-dress trial, that will lead to results which may not be good for the ends of justice. A closer examination of the Code will show that in sessions cases or warrant cases an order of discharge is to be recorded when the Sessions Judge or the Magistrate finds that the prosecution case is wholly worthless and no charge need be framed, whereas in cases where there is some substance in the prosecution case charge is framed and after trial if the accused is not found guilty he is acquitted. It will be against principle of justice to hold that an order of discharge is disadvantageous to him than an order of acquittal. Of course, in some cases where an accused is discharged on soma technical grounds such as want of sanction etc., the case stands on different footing. But that in itself cannot be a ground for holding that in all cases orders of discharge should be disadvantageous to the accused than the order of acquittal. That will amount to giving some advantage to the prosecution in cases which are wholly worthless than in cases which Prima facie appear to have some substance. In the instant case, if the State was dissatisfied with the final report of the police, it should have filed a protest petition before the Magistrate or if it was dissatisfied with the order passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate accepting the final report, it should have moved the superior courts for setting aside that order. But having not done so, the State or the respondent no. 3 cannot be allowed to urge that the word “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act should be given a limited meaning as net to include order dated 13th of February, 1976 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate accepting the final report. Undoubtedly the order amounted to an order of judicial discharge of the accused from an accusation which is the dictionary meaning of the term “acquittal”. In my opinion, therefore, there is substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bharuka and the application must succeed on that ground.”

11.

It may be stated here that Sections 6A and 6C of the Act have been amended by the Essential Commodities (Bihar Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1976—Bihar Ordinance No. 123 of 1976. They were also amended by an earlier Ordinance, such as Bihar Ordinance No. 41 of 1976, but these amendments have got no bearing on the interpretation of the term “acquitted” in Section 6C(2) of the Act.

12.

In the result, the application is allowed and the orders of respondent no. 3 as contained in Annexures 2 and 6 are quashed. Respondent no. 3 is directed to return to the petitioner the maize, Masur Chhanti and Masur seized.