Dinesh Kumar Vyas vs Chairman, JVVNL and Others

Gopal Krishan Vyas, J.—Heard learned counsel for the parties.

Instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 19.07.2000 (Annex. 7) and order dated 17.07.2000 whereby, the penalty of stoppage of one grade increment was imposed against the petitioner.

As per facts of the fact, when petitioner was working as UDC (Checking clerk) in the year 1993-94 in the office of Assistant Engineer (CSD) II, Jodhpur he was chargesheeted vide charge memo dated 28.05.1994 in which an allegation was leveled against him for committing serious irregularities in as much as for the charges of embezzlement, under Regulation 7 of Employees (Classification Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1962 and Conduct Regulations, 1976, however, after filing reply by the petitioner, chargesheet was converted from Regulation 7 to Regulation 6 of the Regulations of 1962 for imposing minor penalty.

The petitioner was granted an opportunity to file additional reply again after converting the proceedings from Regulation 7 to Regulation 6. After considering reply filed by the petitioner, the order of punishment was passed by the then Rajasthan State Electricity Board vide order dated 19.07.2000. In this writ petition, petitioner has prayed that order impugned dated 19.07.2000 imposing penalty of stoppage one grade increment without cumulative effect, is totally contrary to law because the order of punishment has been passed in mechanical and arbitrary manner that too without application of mind, therefore, the order impugned is sustainable in law.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that none of the ground raised by the petitioner in his reply were considered by the disciplinary authority and discussing the grounds taken by the petitioner in the reply, the order impugned was passed, therefore, the order impugned is contrary to basic principles of law so also the order of imposing penalty is a non-speaking order, therefore, the order impugned may be quashed with all consequential benefits.

In reply filed by the respondents, it is specifically pleaded that the penalty of stoppage of one grade increment without cumulative effect was imposed against the petitioner for alleged misconduct committed by him after considering entire evidence on record, therefore, it cannot be said that any illegality is committed by the respondents in passing order of punishment so also to make recovery of Rs. 3216/- from the pension of the petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that against the order of punishment, a representation was filed by the petitioner but the said representation was time barred as it was filed after 30 days from the date of passing the order, therefore the filing of representation has no consequence, therefore, this writ petition may be dismissed.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the impugned order dated 19.07.2000 (Annex. 7). It is true that the author of the order has inflicted penalty against the petitioner for stoppage of one grade increment but in the order, none of the grounds raised by the petitioner in his reply are discussed or even taken note, more so, the author of order observed in the order that during personal hearing, the delinquent has reiterated the same facts as has been stated in the reply, therefore, after careful consideration of all the relevant record/documents, reply and personal submission made by the petitioner, the allegations were found to be true. In my opinion, the order date 19.07.2000 passed by the respondents is not sustainable in law in view of the judgment of constitutional Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 : (1990) CriLJ 2148(1) : (1990) 3 JT 630 : (1990) 4 SCC 594 : (1990) 1 SCR 44 Supp : (1991) 1 SLJ 1 in which the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that authority exercising quasi judicial powers must record reasons for its decision irrespective of whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. Further it is specifically held that reasons should be clear and explicit though may not be elaborative but here in this case no reasons are incorporated nor any discussion is there with regard to the grounds taken by the petitioner in his reply. The relevant Para 36 and 39 of the judgment rendered in the case of S.N. Mukherjee (Supra) is reproduced hereunder :-

"36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a Court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge.

The object underlying the rules of natural justice "is to prevent miscarriage of justice" and secure "fair play in action." As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that affect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case."

In the light of above adjudication, I deem it appropriate to reproduce the order dated 19.07.2000 which reads as under :-

"ORDER

Sh. Dinesh Kumar while working as UDC office of the Astt. Engineer (CSD)-II, RSEB, Jodhpur during the year 1993-94, he did not follow the provisions of Revenue Manual and Board''s orders which resulted in the embezzlement of Board''s Money of Rs. 100/-

For the above misconduct, a chargesheet under Regulation No. 7 of RSEB Employees (CCA) Regulations 1962 has been served vide memorandum No. RSEB/Eng./C-5671/D.1413 dated 23.5.94. He has submitted defence reply. The disciplinary authority after taking a lenient view has converted proceedings from Reg. 7 to Regulation No. 6 of RSEB Employees (CC), Regulation 1962 vide letter No. 1469 dated 15.6.95. He has submitted additional reply. He was given personal hearing on 19.5.2000 by the disciplinary authority i.e. Member (D). During personal hearing he reiterated the same facts as had been stated in the reply. The disciplinary authority i.e. member (D), after careful consideration of all relevant records/documents, reply and personal submission made by Sh. Dinesh Kumar, UDC has observed that allegation are proved. He has, therefore, ordered on 17.7.2k to impose a penalty of stoppage of one annual grade increment without cumulative effect.

Accordingly, a penalty of stoppage of one annual grade increment without cumulative effect is hereby imposed upon Sh. Dinesh Kumar U.D.C

By Order Sd/- Dy. Secretary (Enq)"

Upon perusal of impugned order, this Court is of the opinion that the order is non-speaking order, hence, not sustainable in law in view of above judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee (Supra). The order has been passed without application of mind that too without considering the grounds taken by the petitioner in his reply. Consequently, this writ petition is allowed, the order dated 19.07.2000 is hereby quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits. The respondents are directed to release all the consequential financial benefits arising out from this order, within a period of three months.