Dilpreet Singh vs State of Punjab

Sabina, J.—Petitioner has filed this petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the order dated 19.8.2013 (Annexure P-1). I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record available on the file carefully.

The impugned order dated 19.8.2013 (Annexure P-1) reads as under:-

Arguments heard on the application moved by the accused Dilpreet Singh for not recording the evidence of Charanjit Singh. File perused.

It is alleged by the applicant-accused that in a well planned conspiracy hatched by DSP Bakhshish Singh, accused Charanjit Singh subsequently turned approver and was summoned as a prosecution witness. The accused are facing trial for offences punishable under Sections 292/293 IPC and Section 67 of I.T. Act. The punishment prescribed for committing these offences for the first time is imprisonment up to three years and fine. But as per Section 306(2)(b) Cr.P.C., this section applies to any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend up to seven years or with a more severe sentence.

In the reply filed by the prosecution, the application is challenged on the ground of maintainability. It is averred that vide order dated 26.4.2006 of the then Ld. CJM, Faridkot, tender of pardon was granted to the accomplice Charanjit Singh. Since then, no appeal or revision against the said order has been filed by any of the accused. Accordingly, this application is sought to be dismissed.

During arguments, learned counsel for the applicant-accused as well as learned APP for the State reiterated the facts contained in the application/reply.

In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the applicant-accused has relied upon 2001 Supp 2 Bom CR 83. It has been observed by the Hon''ble High Court of Bombay that offence for tendering pardon had to be only of those categories which are mentioned in Section 306(2)(b) of the Code which state that the offence should be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or a more severe sentence. The object of the provisions is to allow pardon to be tendered in cases where grave offences are alleged to have been committed by several persons so that with the aid of the evidence of the person pardoned, the offence could be brought home to the rest. The gravity is to be determined with the sentence to be awarded. Thus, the jurisdiction to tender to an accused is to be restricted to such offences.

While relying upon aforesaid ratio of law, learned defence counsel vehemently argued that charge in the present case was framed against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 292/293 IPC and Section 67 of I.T. Act which are not the offences for which the prescribed punishment is up to seven years. Consequently, approver is not competent to depose as per the provisions of Section 306(2) (b) of the Code.

A perusal of the file reveals that vide detailed order dated 26.04.2006 tender of pardon was to be granted to the accused Charanjit Singh under the conditions laid down u/s 306 Cr.P.C. As is revealed from the said order, it was passed even before the filing of report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. by the concerned police station. Further, it is revealed that charge against the present accused for offences punishable u/s 292/293 IPC and Section 67 of the I.T. Act was framed on 29.08.2008 Neither the order dated 26.4.2006 of the then Ld. CJM, Faridkot nor the order dated 29.8.2008 of the then Ld. CJM, Faridkot were ever challenged or got upset from any Superior Court by any of the accused. It is only on 5.3.2013, i.e. after the lapse of approximately more than 4-1/2 years when the present application has been moved. If any accused felt aggrieved with the tender of pardon and inclusion of Charanjit Singh as approver/prosecution witness, then they could have availed the remedy available to them before the appropriate forum within reasonable period. Till date, the prosecution has already examined several witness. In these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that law laid down in the judicial authority cited by the learned counsel for the applicant-accused is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand especially when the reasonable period for claiming the relief sought through the present application has been considerably delayed. Accordingly, application of the applicant-accused stands dismissed.

The reasons given by the Trial court while dismissing the application moved by the petitioner for not recording evidence of Charanjit Singh are sound reasons.

No ground for interference is made out. Dismissed.