Dilip Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

Per: Justice B.P. Sharma

This appeal under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 has been preferred against the order dated 03.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.23445/2025 whereby the writ petition preferred by the appellant challenging the order dated 14.06.2025 directing his absorption/transfer from District Singrauli to District Mandla came to be dismissed.

The appellant, a Patwari holding a district cadre post and posted in District Singrauli, was absorbed to District Mandla by departmental order dated 14.06.2025 issued under the absorption policy dated 07.05.2025 framed by the Department of Revenue itself traceable to Clause 2 of the transfer policy dated 29.04.2025 issued by the Department of General Administration and was consequently relieved from Singrauli vide order dated 17.06.2025; he challenged both orders in W.P. No.23445/2025 contending that the absorption policy permitted absorption only upon an employee's own application and not on administrative grounds, but the learned Single Judge, reading Clauses 1.4 and 6.2 of the absorption policy with Clauses 2 and 13 of the transfer policy and relying on Deepti Durve v. State of M.P. (W.P. No.22728/2022) , held that the absorption policy was an offshoot of the transfer policy and that Clause 6.2 itself presupposed absorption on administrative grounds, and dismissed the writ petition by judgment dated 03.07.2025; during the pendency of the present appeal this Court on 24.07.2025 recorded that the appellant's seniority stood protected and called for the State's instructions on his promotional prospects, even as, a day earlier on 23.07.2025, the appellant had been placed under suspension under Rule 9 of the M.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 for failing to join Mandla for over a month after being relieved from Singrauli.

According to the appellant, the impugned order amounted to compulsory absorption without authority of law and was liable to be set aside. Reliance was also placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mangulal Chunilal v. Manilal Maganlal, AIR 1968 SC 822 , laying down that where a statute or policy prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done only in that manner, and upon the decision of this Court in Awadesh Kumar Shrivastava v. State of M.P., 2012 (1) MPLJ 365 , to contend that the said judgment was distinguishable and did not authorise compulsory absorption. The appellant further alleged mala fides on the ground that he had earlier been sought to be transferred to District Jhabua, which order was stayed by this Court, and despite the pendency of those proceedings, another order transferring him to District Mandla had been issued. It was also urged that the respondents failed to disclose, despite information sought under the Right to Information Act, the number of Patwaris transferred on administrative grounds and the number transferred on applications, thereby rendering the impugned action arbitrary.

4 . Per contra, the respondents supported the order of the learned Single Judge and submitted that the learned Single Judge had correctly interpreted the Transfer Policy dated 29.04.2025 and the Absorption Policy dated 07.05.2025. It was contended that the policy itself, particularly Clauses 1.4 and 6.2, when read in conjunction with the General Transfer Policy, empowered the State Government to issue orders of absorption on administrative grounds. The respondents further clarified, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court during the pendency of the appeal, that the gradation list of Patwaris is maintained at the State level and the appellant continues to occupy Serial No.1375 in the State gradation list. It was also explained that promotions to the post of Revenue Inspector are made from the common State gradation list under the notification dated 18.06.2018 and, therefore, the appellant's promotional prospects, seniority, pay, status and other service benefits would remain wholly unaffected despite his transfer to District Mandla. The respondents further pointed out that the appellant had deliberately failed to comply with the transfer order, whereafter he was placed under suspension by order dated 23.07.2025 under Rule 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. It was submitted that vague allegations of mala fide and victimisation, unsupported by any specific pleadings or evidence, could not invalidate an administrative order issued in public interest.

Heard the Learned counsel of the parties and have perused the record.

The challenge of the appellant essentially rests upon an interpretation of the Absorption Policy dated 07.05.2025 that only voluntary absorption upon application is permissible. However, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the Absorption Policy cannot be construed in isolation and has to be read harmoniously with the General Administration Department Transfer Policy dated 29.04.2025. The latter policy expressly authorised departments to formulate separate policies to meet administrative requirements, and the Absorption Policy was framed pursuant to the said authority. A cumulative reading of Clauses 1.4 and 6.2 of the Absorption Policy unmistakably indicates that there is no embargo upon the competent authority in directing inter-district absorption on administrative grounds. Acceptance of the interpretation canvassed by the appellant would render the very object of the policy unworkable and would deprive the administration of its authority to deploy Patwaris according to administrative exigencies.

The submission that Patwari is a district cadre post also does not advance the appellant's case. The material placed by the respondents clearly establishes that although postings continue to be district-wise, the gradation list is maintained at the State level. The appellant continues to retain his original seniority and occupies the same position in the common State gradation list. More importantly, promotions to the post of Revenue Inspector are regulated on the basis of the State gradation list and not district-wise seniority. Consequently, the appellant neither loses his seniority nor suffers any diminution in his promotional prospects. The apprehension sought to be projected by him is thus entirely unfounded.

The contention that the impugned order amounts to punishment because Clause 6.1 of the policy restricts future change of district is equally misconceived. The said clause merely regulates future administrative adjustments after absorption and cannot be equated with imposition of a penalty. Likewise, the allegation of mala fide has remained wholly unsubstantiated. Except referring to the earlier transfer order relating to District Jhabua, the appellant has not pleaded or established any factual foundation from which mala fide exercise of power could reasonably be inferred. Mere issuance of another transfer order does not by itself establish victimisation or colourable exercise of power.

We also find no substance in the appellant's reliance upon the information sought under the Right to Information Act. Whether or not statistical details regarding transfers were furnished under the RTI Act has no bearing upon the legality of the impugned administrative action. Similarly, the contention that the order itself does not expressly state whether the transfer is on administrative grounds or otherwise loses significance once the respondents have consistently explained in their pleadings that the order was issued in administrative exigency and the learned Single Judge has examined the matter on the said premise.

The decisions cited by the appellant also do not assist him. The principle laid down in Mangulal Chunilal (supra) applies where the prescribed statutory procedure has been violated. In the present case, we are satisfied that there has been no departure from the governing policy and that the Absorption Policy itself authorises administrative absorption when read harmoniously with the Transfer Policy. Similarly, the judgment in Awadesh Kumar Shrivastava (supra), rather than supporting the appellant, fortifies the stand of the respondents. In the said decision, this Court held that seniority is not a fundamental or constitutional right and that transfer from one seniority unit to another, while protecting seniority, does not amount to alteration of service conditions to the detriment of the employee. Judicial interference with transfer orders is warranted only where the order is contrary to statutory provisions, vitiated by mala fides or passed by an incompetent authority. In the present case, the appellant's seniority stands fully protected and the State has affirmatively established that his future promotions shall also be governed by the same State gradation list. Therefore, the ratio of Awadesh Kumar (supra) squarely supports the respondents.

We are also unable to overlook the conduct of the appellant in not complying with the transfer order despite its issuance, which ultimately resulted in his suspension under the provisions of the CCA Rules. Although the validity of the suspension order is not directly in issue before us, the said circumstance reinforces the respondents' contention that the appellant deliberately chose not to obey a lawful administrative order. Such conduct cannot furnish a ground for interference with an otherwise valid order of transfer.

The scope of an intra-Court appeal is limited. Unless the judgment of the learned Single Judge is shown to suffer from patent illegality, perversity or manifest error of law, interference is unwarranted. On a careful examination of the entire material placed on record, we find that the learned Single Judge has correctly appreciated the factual and legal position, has harmoniously interpreted the governing policies and has assigned cogent reasons while declining interference. The appellant has failed to establish violation of any statutory provision, breach of any mandatory policy condition, prejudice to his seniority or promotional prospects, or any mala fide exercise of administrative power.

Consequently, we hold that the order of absorption dated 14.06.2025 has been issued in accordance with the applicable policy and in administrative exigency and, therefore, no legal right of the appellant stands infringed. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the reasoning recorded by the learned Single Judge and are of the opinion that no case is made out for interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. The order dated 03.07.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.23445/2025 is hereby affirmed.