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Judgment
Bijitendra Mohan Mitra, J.—In this writ proceeding a challenge is thrown for issuance of writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Respondents to set aside and/or recall the exparte award dated July 31, 1995 and the order No. 16, dated. April 4, 1996 passed by the learned Judge, First Industrial Tribunal. By the impugned order the learned Judge dismisses the application for review of the exparte award. It appears from the recitals of the case that a notice in form D 2 was sent by this Tribunal but the same was returned with the postal remark ''Not Available''. Thereafter, fresh notice of Summons dated April 28, 1995 was issued through process server who has submitted report dated May 15, 1995. As the Union office was found closed the same was hung on the door-step of the Union Office in presence of two witnesses and the connected case was fixed for hearing and in fact, it was heard exparte on merits on July 31, 1995. The exparte award was passed on July 31, 1995. The said award was published in the official gazette on December 6, 1995. The Petitioner has filed the petition for setting aside the exparte award under Rule 27 of the West Bengal Industrial Dispute Rules on March 4, 1996.
The moot point which deserves consideration in the pending proceeding is as to whether an exparte award can be set aside by the learned Tribunal even after the award becomes enforceable u/s 17A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The application under Rule 27 of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958 was caused to be made incorporating the grounds taken by the said Respondents and it is significant to refer before dilating into details that the caption of Rule 27, as aforesaid, has (1) correction of errors and (2) review of an award. The ambit of correction of errors has been adumberated in Clause I to III of Rule 27 itself and that is of wide amplitude. Even the expression ''for sufficient reason'' is required to be interpreted in consonance with the principle of ''Ejusdem Generis''. There is another dimension being founded about the review of an award. The Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the said question in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, It is salient to refer to the penultimate paragraph which is quoted hereunder:
Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date when the award becomes enforceable u/s 17A. u/s 17A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication u/s 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference u/s 10 of the Act are therefore not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the disputes referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has a power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute.
Next decision may be referred to the case of Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), where a reference was made to the earlier decision of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. Supra and after due consideration of the judgment passed therein concurrence was expressed by making reference to the observation of the court that if the Tribunal has the power to proceed exparte as provided by Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes and Central Rules, 1957, it should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary and incidental powers as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. If Rule 22, as aforesaid, unequivocally confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to proceed exparte, then, Tribunal seems to have a power to set aside such exparte order. There does not appear to be a direct dissent from the view expressed in the earlier decision of the Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. Supra case by the Apex Court that proceedings with regard to a reference u/s 10 of the Act are therefore not deemed to be concluded until expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction of the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has a power to entertain the application in connection with such dispute. A further reference may be made to the case of Warring Cooperative Agricultural Services Society Limited v. State of Punjab 1987 Lab. I.C. 359 and reliance may be placed to para.10 of the said judgment to indicate that proceedings in a reference u/s 10 of the Act are not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days after the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute impliedly thereafter it becomes functus officio and cannot entertain an application for setting aside an exparte award. A further reference can be made to the case of Anil Sood and Ors. v. Sarvania and Ors. 97 I L.L.J. 1006 where the division Bench of Delhi High Court observed that the ratio of relevant decision as referred to therein was clear that the Industrial Tribunal retains jurisdiction to deal with an application for setting aside the exparte award only until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. The satute has made the outer limit restricted to 30 days from the publication of the award and thereafter it becomes functus officio. As soon as publication in the award is made it becomes a matter of public knowledge. Even after dawning of public knowledge about the passing of the impugned order after publication of a gress period has been contemplated u/s 20(3) of the Act so long as Tribunal retains power to set aside the award. The statute does not seem to have envisaged granting of a longer time then the time prescribed as otherwise anybody being a party to such a controversy of Industrial dispute will remain seated in a musical chair and can try to have it revised at any point of time. Here, the point of time for setting aside an exparte award cannot be equated to that of reasonable time as the time has been earmarked by the statute being 30 days, after publication of the award in terms of Section 10 of the Act. After the expiry of the said period the Tribunal in terms of statutory operation cannot but relegate itself to the position of a functus officio. The preponderence of decisions even of different High Courts on different angles do not show the proper signal to illumine the gray region save and except the construction made by the Supreme Court in the reported decision Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. Supra and proposition of ratio of law as indicated therein on that particular dimension of the aspect does not seem to have been departed from in the case of Satnam Verma v. Union of India Supra. In a recent unreported decision of this Court in the case of Ranigunj Chemicals Works v. Learned Judge, 4th Industrial Tribunal and Ors. delivered on September 2, 1997, this Court has held that the Industrial Tribunal retains its jurisdiction to deal with an application for setting aside an exparte award only until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Thereafter, the said Tribunal is relegated to the position of functus officio.
As such, for the reasons as aforesaid, this Court cannot but concur with the finding of the Tribunal that it has lost its jurisdiction to entertain such prayer of review after expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award in the official gazette on placement of its reliance of the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. Supra. This Court concurs with the reasoning and is of the further view that it has rightly rejected the petition for review for the reasons as exemplified hereinbefore. In view of the agreement of this Court with the order passed by the Tribunal it cannot interfere with the said order. Accordingly, the writ petition stands liable to be dismissed after hearing on contest. Interim order, if any, still stands vacated.