Dilip Kumar M. Patel vs Kanugu Shankar and Others

V. Rajagopala Reddy, J.—The plaintiff in O.S. No.15 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif, Medak, is the petitioner. His father was initially the tenant and the father of the 1st respondent and the grand-father of the 2nd respondent and the father-in-law of the 3rd respondent, was the landlord of the premises. The premises was obtained on lease on executing a lease deed dt.12-9-1971, on a monthly rent basis and the father of the petitioner started a Saw-Mill business therein. After his father''s death, the petitioner has been in possession of the premises by paying monthly rent to the respondents, who became the absolute owners after the death of the father of the 1st respondent. Alleging that the respondents threatened the petitioner to close the business and vacate the premises, the petitioner filed the suit for perpetual injunction and pending the suit he filed LA. No. 65/96 seeking temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the premises. The trial Court granted the temporary injunction. The respondents carried the matter in appeal in C.M.A. No. 8/96 before the Subordinate Judge, Medak, who, having considered the material on record, allowed the C.M.A. and dismissed the LA. Challenging the order passed in the C.M.A., the petitioner filed this revision petition.

It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondents cannot interfere with the possession of the premises by the petitioner without resorting to the due procedure of issuing notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy and they cannot be allowed to take the law into their hands.

Learned Counsel for the respondents urged that no injunction can be granted against true owners. It is the case of the petitioner himself that he has agreed to vacate the premises and in that direction he has taken steps for shifting the machinery etc., to the new premises, which indicates that there was an agreement entered into by the petitioner with the respondents agreeing to vacate the premises and as per Ex.B-2 he agreed to vacate the premises by February, 1996. In view of the above agreement, the petitioner ceased to be a tenant and he was staying in the premises with the consent of the landlord upto February, 1996. Hence, the question of termination of tenancy by resorting to Section 106 of T.P. Act does not arise. He cited several decisions in support of his contention.

The only point to be considered is whether the petitioner was entitled for the grant of temporary injunction pending the suit.

Admittedly the petitioner''s father was the original tenant, who executed the lease deed dt.12-9-1971, for a period of 9 years. A partition took place in the family of the respondents in 1990, when the petitioner''s father was asked to vacate the premises and thereafter the suit premises was also partitioned. The petitioner''s father agreed to vacate the premises in 1990 after the partition. It is also admitted in the pleading that there was an agreement between the parties to vacate the premises, by February, 1996. It is also an admitted fact that no fresh lease deed of tenancy has been entered into between the parties. The lower appellate Court having considered Exs.B-1 to B-5, prima facie, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had executed an agreement to vacate the premises by February, 1996 and having agreed to vacate the premises, it is not open to him to claim that he continues to be the tenant of the premises seeking all rights of tenancy.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged before me that after the expiry of the lease deed the petitioner became a tenant holding-over and he could not be evicted unless following the due procedure of law. He cited in support of his contention, the decisions in Vemulapalli China Kondayya v. District Collector, W.G. District at Eluru, 1981 (1) An.W.R. 22; Mogilipuvvu Annapurnaiah Vs. Malampati Narasimha Rao and Another, ; Patil Exhibitors (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. The Corporation of the City of Bangalore, . These decisions, I am afraid, may not assist the case of the petitioner in view of the ''prima facie'' finding arrived at by the lower Appellate Court that the petitioner had agreed to vacate the premises. There is nothing to show on record that the said prima facie finding is baseless. In that view of the matter the petitioner cannot insist upon notice under Sec. 106 of T.P. Act, since he was continuing in the premises only as a licensee. His status of tenant came to an end no sooner than he entered into an agreement to vacate. The petitioner cannot blow hot and cold having agreed to vacate the premises. He is bound under law to vacate the same. The decisions cited by the learned Counsel for the respondents in D.T.T.D.C. Vs. D.R. Mehra and Sons, ; P. Ravindra Reddy and Others Vs. The Election Commission and Others, tend to support the case of the respondents. No error of jurisdiction or law has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the order of the lower appellate Court.

In the circumstances the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed and in the circumstances, without costs.