High CourtsSingle Bench(2026) 09 CHH CK 1959

Digrilal Sidar vs State Of Chhattisgarh & Ors.

Chhattisgarh High Court · Decided on 10 September 2026

HON’BLE JUDGES
Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J
CASE NUMBER
WPC No. 4664 of 2026

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Judgment

37 paragraphs · 3,661 words
1.

By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner calls in question the order/notice dated 02.09.2026 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer cum Prescribed Authority, Raigarh C.G. by which, a meeting of no-confidence motion has been directed to be convened on 10.09.2026 at 12:00 afternoon against the petitioner/Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Tarapur.

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Petitioner is duly elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Tarapur, Janpad Panchayat Raigarh, District Raigarh, and is presently discharging his statutory duties and functions as Sarpanch in accordance with the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and the Rules framed thereunder. Respondent Nos.5 to 12, submitted a purported application/proposal seeking initiation of a no-confidence motion against the Petitioner. The said application dated 27.07.2026 contains certain allegations against the functioning of the petitioner as Sarpanch. Hence this petition.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the purported proposal/notice for moving a motion of no-confidence was signed on 27.07.2026 but was sought to be acted upon only on 19.08.2026. A notice intended to constitute the statutory foundation for initiating proceedings cannot be kept alive indefinitely and thereafter resurrected on a subsequent date. The statutory scheme contemplates a live and legally valid notice before the Prescribed Authority; the Authority cannot treat a stale proposal as a perpetual authority to initiate proceedings at a time of its own choosing. If the signatories intended to move the motion on 19.08.2026, a fresh notice complying with Rule 3(1), including the requirement of support of not less than one-third of the total elected members, ought to have been submitted on that date. The statutory clock under Rule 3(3) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastava ) Niyam, 1994 runs from the date of receipt of a legally admissible notice and not from a stale document subsequently relied upon by the Authority. Reliance is placed on Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P., {2000 (4) MPHT 69}, which recognises the time-bound character of the statutory procedure governing no-confidence proceedings. Further, Rule 3(1) requires a notice of no-confidence to be signed by not less than one-third of the total elected members, and Rule 3(3) requires the Prescribed Authority to satisfy itself as to the admissibility of the notice before convening the meeting. The record does not disclose how many elected members actually presented the proposal on 19.08.2026, does not disclose the identity or number of such members, contains no categorical finding that the signatories constituted one-third of the total elected members, and reflects no verification of continuing support of the original signatories. The jurisdictional condition precedent therefore stands unestablished. He further submits that the fifteen-day period is intended to ensure that Prescribed Authority acts expeditiously upon a legally admissible notice, while also protecting the elected office-bearer from an indefinite and unregulated cloud of proceedings. The Full Bench in Bhulin Dewangan (supra), recognised the time-bound nature of the Rules. The Authority cannot selectively enforce the Rule to the disadvantage of the elected office-holder while disregarding it when compliance would protect that office-holder.

4.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Petitioner received the notice only on 07.09.2026, whereas the meeting was fixed for 10.09.2026, in breach of the mandatory requirement that notice be despatched seven clear days before the meeting. The right in question is not a bare right to be present, but a right to participate effectively, understand the basis of the motion, and marshal facts in defence of the electoral mandate. Reliance is placed on Sau. Sangeeta w/o Sunil Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, Civil Appeal No. 5059 of 2021 (decided 01.09.2021), which underscores adherence to the prescribed democratic procedure governing no-confidence proceedings. The short and insufficient notice denied the Petitioner a meaningful opportunity to examine the record, obtain legal advice and avail of the remedy in law, causing actual and substantial prejudice.

5.

Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the no-confidence proceedings have been initiated strictly in accordance with law. It is submitted that the proposal dated 27.07.2026 was submitted before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Raigarh, and out of 10 elected members, including the Up-Sarpanch and Panchas, 8 members had signed the proposal. It is, therefore, submitted that the statutory requirement regarding the requisite number of members stood duly satisfied.

6.

Counsel for Respondent No.5 on caveat would support the impugned order/notice.

7.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed with the petition carefully.

8.

This Court in the matter of Smt. Janki Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh in WPC No.2757 of 2021, decided on 25.07.2023 has observed in paragraph Nos.11 to 17 as under;-

“11.

With respect to other grounds raised by learned counsel for petitioner that S.D.O. has got the signature of Panchas who submitted application for convening no confidence motion through Chief Executive Officer is in violation of Rule 3 (2) and 3 of the Rules of 1994. Perusal of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules of 1994 would show that requirement under the said rules is only that Prescribed Authority has to satisfy himself about the admissibility of the notice with reference to Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993. Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993 is extracted below for ready reference :-

“21. No-confidence motion against Sarpanch and Up-

Sarpanch. - (1) On a motion of no-confidence being passed by the Gram Panchayat by a resolution passed by majority of not less than three fourth of Panchas present and voting and such majority is more than two third of the total number of Panchas constituting the Gram Panchayat for the time being, the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom such motion is passed, shall cease to hold office forthwith.

(2)

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or an Up-Sarpanch shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no-confidence is discussed against him. Such meeting shall be convened in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be presided over by an officer of the Government as the Prescribed Authority may appoint. The Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case may be, shall have a right to speak at, or otherwise to take part in, the proceeding of the meeting.

(3)

No-confidence motion shall not lie against the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch within a period of,-

(i)

one year from the date on which the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch enter their respective office;

(ii)

six months preceding the date on which the term of office of the Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, as the case may be, expires:

(iii)

one year from the date on which previous motion of no-confidence was rejected.

(4)

If the Sarpanch or the Up-Sarpanch, as the case may be, desires to challenge the validity of the motion carried out under sub-section (1), he shall, within seven days from the date on which such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the Collector who shall decide it, as far as possible, within thirty days from the date on which it was received by him, and his decision shall be final.”

12.

Challenge to the proceedings of no confidence motion is not on the ground that it was convened contrary to the provisions as mentioned under Section 21 (3) of the Act of 1993. In the Case at hand, the Prescribed Authority for his satisfaction have got the signatures of the Panchas in the application placed before him verified. After satisfying, he proceeded for convening the no confidence motion. There is no specific provision in this regard and therefore, once the Prescribed Authority recorded his satisfaction that the application is in accordance with the provisions under Section 21 of the Act of 1993, the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that entire proceedings is vitiated as Prescribed Authority has not verified the signatures himself is also not sustainable.

13.

The petitioner in this writ petition has not pleaded that she suffered serious prejudice at any stage of proceeding. In absence of any serious prejudice shown, pleaded, no confidence motion carried out by majority can not be interfered with. In democratic system when majority of elected Panchas have posed no confidence motion on petitioner. Provision under Section 21 of the Act of 1993 and the Rules of 1994 only provides that no confidence motion can be requested before the Prescribed Authority and it has to be convened in accordance with the Rules of 1994 subject to application is not falling within the Sub-Section 3 of Section 21 of the Act of 1993.

14.

In case of Bhulin Dewangan vs State of MP & Others {2000 (4) MPHT 69}, Full Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh considered the non-compliance of the Rules of 1994 and observed thus :-

“15.

The general rule is that non-compliance of mandatory requirement results in nullification of the Act. There are, however, several exceptions to the same. If certain requirements or conditions are provided by statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by him if no public interest are involved and in such a case the act done will be valid even if the requirements or conditions have not been performed. This appears to be the reason for learned C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P. (1997 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 49) which was followed by R.S. Garg, J., in Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa (1998 (1) JLJ 113) for holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the rule in fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of the motion of no-confidence would not invalidate the whole proceedings. In case of Dhumadhandin (supra), the Sarpanch did not question the validity of the notice calling the meeting of no-confidence and in fact had taken chance by facing the motion. R.S. Garg, J., in Mahavir Saket (supra) placed reliance on the decision of C.K. Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin (supra) to up-hold the passing of the no-confidence motion in the adjourned meeting as in the meeting called within the prescribed fifteen days the Presiding Officer was not available. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 permits reference of a dispute to the Collector by Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom a notice of no confidence motion had been passed. The proceedings of the no-confidence motion or other proceedings under the Act are also assailable in this Court as Constitutional Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As has been construed by us, even though second part of the rule requiring dispatch of notice of the meeting to the member is mandatory, yet in every case of challenge to the proceeding of no-confidence motion either before the Collector or this Court, it would still be open to the Collector or this Court to find out whether in a given case non-compliance of any part of the rule has in fact resulted in any failure of justice or has caused any serious prejudice to any of the parties. The general rule is that a mandatory provision of law requires strict compliance and the directory one only substantial. But even where the provision is mandatory, every non-compliance of the same need not necessarily result in nullification of the whole action. In a given situation even for non-fulfillment of mandatory requirement, the authority empowered to take a decision may refuse to nullify the action on the ground that no substantial prejudice had been caused to the party affected or to any other party which would have any other substantial interest in the proceeding. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has also a discretion not to interfere even though a mandatory requirement of law has not been strictly complied with as thereby no serious prejudice or failure of justice has been caused. This is how various Single Bench decisions in which even after finding some infraction of the second part of Rule 3 (3) of the Rules of 1994, the resolution of no-confidence motion passed was not invalidated on the ground that no substantial prejudice thereby was caused to the affected parties. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3 (3) framed thereunder. The provisions do evince an intention that a meeting of the no-confidence motion be called within a reasonable period of not later than 15 days and every member has to be informed of the same seven days in advance. A notice of no-confidence motion is required to be moved by not less than 1/3rd of the total number of elected members as required by first Proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 and can be lawfully carried by a resolution passed by majority of not less than 3/4th of the Panchas present and voting and such majority has to be more than 2/3rd of the total number of Panchas constituting the Panchayat in accordance with subsection (1) of Section 21 of the Act. This being the substance of the provisions under the Act and the rules, a mere non-compliance of second part of Sub-rule (3) would not in every case invalidate the action unless the Collector while deciding the dispute under Sub-section (4) of Section 21 or this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution comes to the conclusion that such non-compliance has caused serious prejudice to the affected office bearer or has otherwise resulted in failure of justice.

15.

In case of Sahasram Jangde & Ors vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others {2013 (4) CGLJ 526}, this Court observed as under :-

"6.

When the law laid down by the full Bench of M.P. High Court and Division Bench of this Court is applied to the facts of the present case, it is to be seen that respondent No.6 Sarpanch has not raised any ground before the Additional Collector that because of the fact that meeting was convened on 8th day from the date of dispatch of notice and not on 9th day, and thus clear 7 days notice was not issued, she has suffered grave prejudice in preparing herself for the meeting and there being no such finding by the Additional Collector in the impugned order, it will be taken as if no prejudice has been caused to respondent No.6 Sarpanch and thus in absence of prejudice or failure of justice, the Additional Collector has wrongly set aside the resolution of the Gram Panchayat declaring the no-confidence motion to be passed. It is also to be seen that once this Court in the earlier writ petition has held that the earlier resolution of the Gram Panchayat passing no-confidence motion in May, 2011 having been annulled on technical grounds, the bar against moving of another motion within one year would not apply, the SDO(Revenue) should not have sought opinion from the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat or from the Deputy Director Panchayat. However, by doing so, he wasted 7 days in the process. Therefore, once the no confidence motion has been passed the democratic norms and the statutory provisions cannot be left at the mercy of the prescribed authority when the law is well settled in the case of Bhulin Dewangan(Supra). Declaring the resolution of the Gram Panchayat which has passed the no confidence motion by majority as illegal would render the wish of the house nugatory and the Sarpanch who has lost the confidence of the house shall be allowed to function without any mandate in her favour. Such interpretation of Rule is neither permissible nor contemplated and this Court will not allow such effort of the prescribed authority to frustrate the will of the house by adopting dilatory tactics on the pretext of seeking legal opinion or opinion from the higher authorities. Learned counsel for respondent No.6 has relied on judgment of M.P. High Court in the matter of Jugraj Singh Markam Vs. Dhannalal Maravi and others : 2003 (4) MPLJ 378. However, in view of the discussion made above, and particularly the law laid down by the Full Bench of the M.P. High Court and the peculiar facts of this case, the said judgment relied upon by respondent No.6 has no application and is distinguishable. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dt. 28.06.2012 passed by the Additional Collector is set aside. Consequently respondent No.6 no longer remains as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Dahida, Tahsil Sarangarh District Raigarh."

16.

In the aforementioned decision, the Court have held that every non-compliance of mandatory provisions need not necessarily resulted nullification of the whole action and in the given situation of non-fulfillment of the mandatory provisions the authority empowered to take decision may refuse to nullify the action on the ground that no substantial prejudice has been caused to the party affected.

17.

In absence of raising any specific grounds that members against whom no confidence motion is carried stating that she suffered grave prejudice in the procedure adopted for convening the no confidence meeting no such finding can be recorded.

9.

The principal contention of the petitioner is that the proposal dated 27.07.2026 could not have been acted upon on 19.08.2026 and that there was no proper satisfaction by the Prescribed Authority regarding compliance with Rule 3(1) of the Rules of 1994.

10.

This Court, in Smt. Janki Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, WPC No.2757 of 2021, decided on 25.07.2023, after considering Section 21 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 and Rule 3 of the Rules of 1994, has held that the requirement under Rule 3(3) is that the Prescribed Authority must satisfy himself regarding the admissibility of the notice with reference to Section 21(3) of the Act. It was further held that where the Prescribed Authority had satisfied himself regarding the admissibility of the application and had proceeded to convene the meeting, a challenge merely on the ground that the signatures were not personally verified by the Prescribed Authority was not sustainable.

11.

In the present case, the State has specifically stated that the proposal was supported by 8 out of 10 elected members. Thus, the statutory requirement regarding the minimum number of members supporting the proposal is prima facie satisfied. The petitioner has not placed any material on record to demonstrate that the persons who signed the proposal were not elected members of the Gram Panchayat or that the proposal did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 3(1). Mere absence of a separate recital in the order regarding the number of supporting members, in the facts of the present case, would not by itself render the entire proceedings without jurisdiction.

12.

The petitioner has also relied upon the time prescribed under Rule 3(3) and the decision in Bhulin Dewangan (supra). The said decision, however, also makes it clear that while the procedural requirements under the Rules are intended to ensure expeditious consideration of a no-confidence motion, the effect of an alleged procedural infraction has to be examined in the context of the prejudice, if any, caused to the affected office-bearer.

13.

The more substantial contention raised by the petitioner is regarding the alleged failure to provide seven clear days' notice of the meeting. The petitioner asserts that the impugned notice/order was received by him on 07.09.2026 and the meeting was scheduled for 10.09.2026. However, the material placed on record does not establish that the petitioner was wholly prevented from participating in the proceedings or that any specific prejudice, beyond the assertion of insufficient time, has actually been caused to him.

14.

In Bhulin Dewangan (supra), the Full Bench has held that although the requirement regarding dispatch of notice of the meeting to the members is mandatory, every instance of non-compliance would not necessarily result in nullification of the entire proceedings. The Court is required to examine whether such non-compliance has caused serious prejudice or resulted in failure of justice.

15.

Similarly, in Sahasram Jangde & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2013 (4) CGLJ 526, this Court, while considering the requirement of notice in no-confidence proceedings, reiterated that the effect of procedural non-compliance has to be considered with reference to actual prejudice and failure of justice. The democratic mandate reflected through a no-confidence motion passed by the requisite majority cannot ordinarily be defeated merely on technical grounds where no substantial prejudice is demonstrated.

16.

In the present case, the no-confidence motion is yet to be considered by the Gram Panchayat. At this stage, the petitioner seeks to interdicted the very meeting on the basis of alleged procedural irregularities. The material on record does not demonstrate any such circumstance which would establish that the petitioner has been rendered incapable of participating in the meeting or putting forth his case before the elected members.

17.

It is also relevant that Section 21(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 expressly confers upon the Sarpanch against whom the no-confidence motion is proposed a right to speak at, or otherwise take part in, the proceedings of the meeting. The petitioner can, therefore, place his case before the meeting in accordance with law.

18.

The judgments relied upon by the petitioner do not lay down an absolute proposition that every procedural deviation in a no-confidence proceeding must necessarily result in quashing of the proposed meeting irrespective of the prejudice caused. On the contrary, the decisions relied upon by the petitioner themselves have to be understood in the context of the statutory scheme and the requirement of examining failure of justice and substantial prejudice.

19.

Having regard to the aforesaid legal position and considering the fact that the proposal has admittedly been supported by the requisite number of elected members and no substantial prejudice or failure of justice has been demonstrated so as to warrant interference at this stage, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order/notice dated 02.09.2026.

20.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.