Dharoi Jalashya Matsya Udyog Sahakari Mandli Ltd. vs Gujrat Kendriya Matsya Udyog Sanstha

A.P. Ravani, J.—Here, there is a dispute between different co- operative bodies as to the meaning of the term " dispute ". Instead of co-operation, there is dispute as regards their business. Even so, in a genuine spirit of co-operation, they have assisted the court (through their counsel) in giving the correct meaning to the expression " dispute " occurring in section 96 of the Gujrat Co-operative Society Act, 1961. While disposing of the case, may I ask, will they not resolve their dispute in a genuine spirit of co-operation instead of dragging their feet to court every now and then ?

Now, let the question be examined.

The petitioners are original-defendants who succeeded before the trial court in resisting the application, exhibit 5, for an injunction restraining them from catching fish from Dharoi Reservoir. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit and prayed that the aforesaid petitioners be restrained from catching fish from Dhroi Reservoir. Considering the pleadings, the relevant documents placed on record and after hearing the parties, the trial court, as per its order dated December 31, 1987, rejected the application filed by the respondent-plaintiff. The plaintiff preferred a civil miscellaneous appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Banaskantha. The appeal was heard by the learned Assistant Judge who reserved the order passed by the trial court and allowed the appeal as per his order dated February 5, 1988. Hence, this revision application challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Banaskantha at Palanpur.

The plaintiff and the defendants are co-operative societies registered under the provisions of the Gujrat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The plaintiff is apex society of which members can be other societies as well as individuals. Defendant NO. 2, i. e., Palanpur Vibhagiya Matsya Udyog Sahakari Mandli Ltd., is a member of the plaintiff-society while defendant No. 1, i.e., Dharoi Jalashya Matsya Udyog Sahakari Mandali Ltd., is not member of the plaintiff society. It is an undisputed position that the main function of the plaintiff-society is to catch fish from Government fishing lakes and to sell the same. Thus, the business of the plaintiff is essentially the defendants- petitioners-society is also to collect fish from the lakes and sell the same. The plaintiff contended in teh suit that by virtue of a lease agreement with the Government, it had the exclusive right to catch fish from the Dharoi lake reservoir sand the defendants were, without the the permission of the plaintiff, catching fish unlawful from the Dharoi lake reservoir and, therefore, they should be restrained from catching fish from Dharoi lake reservoir. Before the trial court, several contentions were raised by teh defendants, including the question with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil court. The contention regarding jurisdiction ws raised on the basis of the provisions of section 96 of the Gujrat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. The trial court held that hte plaintiff had prima facie failed to establish an exclusive right to catch fish from the Dharoi lake reservoir. The trial court also held that the dispute between the parties is covered by the provisions of section 96 of the Act. The lower appellate court held that the plaintiff had the exclusive right to catch fish from the Dharoi lake reservoir and that the dispute between the parties was not touching the business of the society and, therefore, the same was not covered by the provisions of section 96 of the Act.

Learned counsel appearing for the parties have confined their arguments to the point of jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit and grant an injunction in respect of the disputes between the parties. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff contended that defendant No. 1 is not a member of the plaintiff society and, therefore, the provisions of section 96 of the Act would not be attracted. However, the contention cannot be accepted. For the applicability of the provisions of section 96 of the Act, it is not necessary that any other society with which there may be a dispute should also be a member of the plaintiff-society. The dispute should be " touching the constitution, management or business of a society " and the parties thereto should be from amongst the persons (natural as well as juridical) mentioned in clause (a) to (e) of section 96(1) of the Act, Clause (a) of sub- section- (1) of section 96 of the Act reads as follows :

" 96 (1)(a) any other society, or the liquidator of such a society. "

The aforesaid clause clearly covers te dispute with defendant No. 1 which is not a member of the plaintiff society but admittedly it is a society registered under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the contention that because defendant No. 1 society is not a member of the plaintiff-society the dispute is not covered by the provisions of section 96 of the Act cannot be accepted.

Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submitted that the term " dispute " should be narrowly construed. In his submission, unless the dispute arises out of transactions entered into between the two, it cannot be said that the dispute is touching the business of the society. It is argued that in the instant case, the dispute between the parties is as regards the right to explore the waters of the Dharoi lae reservoir for the purpose of catching fish. There is no dispute with regard to the transactions between the parties and, therefore, the provisions of section 96 of the Act are not applicable. The aforesaid contention cannot be accepted. There is no reason why the term " dispute " should be construed so narrowly. A dispute between two parties arises when one asserts a particular proposition and the other denies the same. This may cover the entire range from genuine different of opinion to a fierce controversy. The meaning of the term " dispute " as per the Concise Oxford Dictionary is as follows :

"Controversy, debate, heated contention, quarrel, difference of opinion. "

There is no dispute with regard to the fact the term " dispute " has not been defined under the Act. Therefore, it has does to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning. There is no reason why either from the context or from a reading of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 96 of the Act, a narrow meaning to the term " dispute " is to be given. This is much more so when the term " dispute " is prefixed by the word " any ". The word " any " which precedes the term " dispute " indicates that each and every dispute which touches the constitution, management or business of the society is covered by the provisions of section 96(1) of the Act. Therefore, the dispute between teh parties, though not arising out of any transactions entered into between the parties, is covered by the term " dispute " occurring in section 96 of the Act.

Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the second condition is not satisfied, namely, that the dispute is not touching on the business of the society. As observed by the trial court in para 13 of its order, the plaintiff itself has stated in para 2 of the plaint that the function of the plaintiff-society is to catch fish from Government-owned lakes and to sell the same. A similar observation is made by the learned Assistant Judge in para 3 of his order. On the other hand, the defendants also stated that they are societies registered under the provisions of the Act of which the main function is to catch fish and to sell the same. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the main object with which all the three societies, i. e., the plaintiff as well as the defendants societies have been constituted is to do business in fish by catching the same from lakes and thereafter selling the same. The distinction sought to be made by the learned Extra Assistant Judge that the dispute is about the civil right of the parties and not with regard to the business of the parties comes later on. Once the dispute between the parties concerns the business of the society, the jurisdiction of the civil court would be ousted. There is nothing in the Act to show that the dispute should be regarding contractual rights of the parties. Such disputes can be with regard to their respective civil right also. However, the same should be concerned with the business of the society. At this stage , I am not entering into the controversy as to whether the plaintiff has got the exclusive right to catch fish form the Dharoi lake reservoir . In fact , both learned counsel appearing for the parties have requested me not to decide that question on merits . Therefore , suffice it to say that once there is a dispute concerning the business of the society between the plaintiff and the defendant-societies , it has got to be hald that the dispute pertains to the business of the society and , therefore , covered by the provisions of section 96 of the Act.

learned counsel for the petitioners-defendants has relied on the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs. P.R. Mankad and Others, . That case related to a dispute between an employee of a co-operative society and the society . Therein , the expression "any dispute touching the business of the society" came up for consideration . The Supreme Court observed that the aforesaid expression is limited to disputes directly relating to the actual trading or commercial activities of a society . The aforesaid expression does not take within its sweep a dispute between a society and its employee relating to the conditions of his employment which would include termination of his employment also . The aforesaid observation made by the supreme Court , though in a different context , lends support to the interpretation given to the expression "any dispute touching the business of the society".

In the case of M . G . Patel and Co. v. Alka Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. [1980] 2 GLR 498 , a Division Bench of this High Court considered the expression "touching the business of society " and held that if purchase of land is one of the main objects of the society , then any cause of action that has got a direct bearing with the purchase of land has to be considered as "touching" has been construed to mean "concerning". In the above view of the matter. on first principles as well as on the basis of the aforesaid decisions . there is no scope for giving a narrow interpretation to the term "dispute" as well as to the words "touching the business of the society" .

Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal and Others, . In that case , certain disputes between the employees of a co-operative society and the co-operative society and the co-operative society have not been held to be falling with the scope of the phrase "any dispute touching the business of society". But the interpretation given and the principles laid down therein do not in any way run counter to the interpretation of section 96 of the Act, as indicated hereinabove.

Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Vs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain and Others, . Therein, the question was regarding the dispute between the tenant of a member of the bank in the building acquired by the co-operative bank. However, therein also the term "business", even while interpreted in narrower sense has been interpreted to mean the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the Act and the Rules and its bye-laws. This decision, the the contrary, helps the petitioners, original defendants. The interpretation given to the term "business" and "any dispute" hereinabove is in consonance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in this case.

Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Cooperative Cane Union Federation Ltd. and Another Vs. Liladhar and Others, . Therein, the dispute had arisen out of the disciplinary proceeding taken against an employee by the society. The disciplinary proceedings resulted in dismissal of a godownkeeper of the society. The Supreme Court held that such dispute cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the society. The decision does not help the respondent-plaintiff.

No other contention is raised. In the above view of the matter, it is clear that the dispute between the parties is covered by the provisions of section 96 of the Act and, therefore, the civil court will not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff.

In the result, the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the learned Assistant Judge in Civil Misc. Appeal No.1 of 1988 is quashed and set aside and the application, exhibit 5, in regular Civil Suit No.252 of 1987 stands rejected. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.

When the order is pronounced in the open court today, learned counsel for the respondents requests that the operation and implementation of the aforesaid order be stayed for some time so as to enable the respondent to challenge the same before the appropriate forum. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the aforesaid order shall remain in abeyance up to April 20, 1988.