Dharminder Singh vs The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Union Territory and Another

Mahesh Grover, J.—The Petitioner is aggrieved by the award of the Labour Court, Union Territory, Chandigarh dated 4.6.2010.

After having raised a demand the reference was forwarded to the Labour Court to determine the issue which is extracted here below:

Whether the services of Shri Dharminder Singh s/o Shri Lachhman Singh, Ex. Temporary Conductor No. 30, Chandigarh Transport Undertaking, Chandigarh c/o Shri R.P. Rana, House No. 2360, Sector 38-C, Chandigarh were terminated illegally by the Director Transport, Union Territory, Chandigarh, 701, Industrial Area, Phase-I, Chandigarh, Chandigarh Transport Undertaking, Chandigarh, if so, what relief he is entitled to?

The case of the Petitioner is that he was appointed as a Conductor by the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking after the names were requisitioned through the Employment Exchange and pursuant to an interview held by the Selection Committee on 11.12.1998. His appointment was for a period of 89 days on contractual basis on a consolidated salary of Rs. 2,144/- per month. He continued to work till 13.7.1999 when he had completed 210 days. His services were terminated without any reason and despite the fact that the work was available with the Respondent No. 2 and regular posts were lying vacant. He pleaded that there has been a violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') and alleged that the Respondent No. 2 had indulged in unfair labour practice. He was reinstated with effect from 16.9.1999 but was being given lesser pay. His services were then terminated on 9.10.2000 without complying with the provisions of the Act and without paying any retrenchment compensation. He further pleaded that the management had retained number of persons junior to the Petitioner in service and thus alleged that there has been violation of the provisions of Section 25-H of the Act. In short, he pleaded that he had completed more than 210 days and was a workman within the provisions of the Act and the Respondent No. 2 terminated his services in violation of the provisions of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Act.

The Respondent No. 2 contested the case by filing written statement and raising objections therein. It was pleaded by the Respondent No. 2 that the Petitioner had been appointed purely on contractual basis on 11.12.1998 for a period of 89 days and upon completion of this period, his contract was further extended until his services were finally dispensed with on 12.7.1999. Some of the appointees similarly placed as the Petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh by filing an application before it. The Tribunal vide its order dated 2.9.1999 allowed the Petitioner, who was an applicant before it, to continue in service till the regular appointments were made by the department. A direction was issued that their services will not be replaced by any other adhoc employees. The said application was disposed of by the Tribunal allowing the prayer partly and while doing so the Tribunal observed as follows:

In view of the above agreed stand of the learned Counsel for the parties and the matter having been concluded by a decision of the High Court in the case of Rawel Singh (supra) the OA is partly allowed and the applicants are held entitled to the minimum of the pay scale plus dearness allowance admissible thereon for the period they worked with the Chandigarh Administration as Conductors...

In the meantime, the Respondent No. 2 also filled up the vacancies on regular basis after receiving applications in view of the advertisement made by them on 22.5.1999 extended upto 28.5.1999. The drivers who were similarly placed as the Conductors raised a demand notice on the similar grounds which demand notice was rejected. Thereafter it was challenged before the High Court and the decision of the Respondent No. 2 was upheld. It was pleaded that no right accrued to the Petitioner on account of nature of employment.

The Tribunal concluded that the Petitioner had not completed 240 days in a year preceding his termination and had merely completed 210 days when his services had been terminated. The remaining services of the Petitioner were on account of interim direction given by the Tribunal and, therefore, no right accrued in favour of the Petitioner on account of his continuation in service on the strength of the orders of a Court. The Tribunal further concluded that the nature of employment of the Petitioner was purely contractual and this also did not confer any right upon him to insist that the Respondent No. 2 continue and persist with the employment of the Petitioner. It also noticed with approval the fact that two other persons whose services were terminated raised a demand which was rejected by the Secretary of the Labour Department of Chandigarh Administration. The order of rejection was challenged before the High Court in CWP No. 4685 of 2002 which was dismissed with the following observations:

The workmen were appointed on 5th December, 1998. As they apprehended that their services would be terminated, they got a stay order from the Central Administrative Tribunal on 2nd September, 1999. They admittedly have continued in service on account of the stay order granted. The order dated 27th February, 2002 (Annexure P/3) is therefore, correct inas much as no benefit can be taken by the workman on account of the stay granted by the Tribunal.

Once the rejection of the dispute as determined by the Secretary, Transport Department of U.T, Chandigarh was approved by the High Court in the aforesaid writ petition, this meant the end of the road for the Petitioner. The Petitioner concededly had not completed 240 days, as even as per his own showing he had completed 210 days when his services were terminated. The remaining services which he rendered were on the strength of the order of the Court for which no benefit can be given to the Petitioner. There is no denial to the fact that the services of the Petitioner were purely on contractual basis, therefore, these findings recorded by the Tribunal on the aforesaid issues can hardly be termed to be unjust in the given set of circumstances of the case.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner would then contend that there has been violation of Section 25H of the Act. It is contended that the matter was raised in the demand notice but has not been answered by the Tribunal. Upon perusal of the award I do not find any reason to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner for the simple reason that the Petitioner has failed to bring any material on record in support of his plea of violation of the provisions of Section 25H. A mere mention in the demand notice without such a plea being substantiated by any material can be of no avail to a person who raises such a contention.

Consequently, the instant writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed.