Dharambir vs State of Haryana

Amar Dutt, J.—The question which requires an answer of ours in this bunch of 12 cases reads thus:

Whether the High Court will be well within its powers to quash an FIR u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the parties had entered into a

compromise and settled all their disputes.

The Background:

On 30.8.2003, a Special Lok Adalat was held at Narnaul. Following 12 criminal cases, in which applications for recording of compromise and

disposing them of came up for consideration:

(i) Criminal Misc No. 2578-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 279/337 IPC out of which Section 279 IPC is non-compoundable.

(ii) Criminal Misc No. 2579-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 457/380 IPC, which are non-compoundable.

(iii) Criminal Misc No. 2580-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 427/447/323/506/34 IPC out of which Section 506 IPC, if more than 7 years,

is non-compoundable.

(iv) Criminal Misc. No. 2581-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 148/149/323/324/325 IPC out of which Section 148 IPC is non-

compoundable.

(v) Criminal Misc. No. 2582-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 148/149/323/324/325 IPC out of which Section 148 IPC is non-

compoundable.

(vi) Criminal Misc. No. 2583-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 323/325/506/34 IPC out of which Section 506 IPC if more than 7 years is

non- compoundable.

(vii) Criminal Misc. No. 2584-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 279/337/338 IPC out of which Section 279 IPC is non-compoundable.

(viii) Criminal Misc. No. 2585-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 498A/406/506/34 IPC out of which Sections 498-A and 506 IPC, if more

than 7 years, are non-compoundable.

(ix) Criminal Misc. No. 2586-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 323/325/452/34 IPC out of which Section 452 IPC is non-compoundable.

(x) Criminal Misc. No. 2587-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 148/149/323/506 IPC out of which Sections 148 and 506 IPC, if more than 7

years, are non- compoundable.

(xi) Criminal Misc. No. 2588-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 148/149/323/506 IPC out of which Sections 148 and 506 IPC, if more than 7

years, are non-compoundable.

(xii) Criminal Misc. No. 2589-M of 2004. Offences under Sections 148/149/323 IPC out of which Section 148 IPC is non-compoundable.

2.1 After the statement of the parties had been recorded, the following order was passed as per the directions of the Hon''ble Administrative Judge

of Narnaul:

File taken up today in the Special Lok Adalat, Narnaul. Compromise filed. Statements of the parties recorded. File be sent to Hon''ble High Court

for being put up before Hon''ble Mr. Justice V.K. Bali, Judge, Punjab & Haryana High Court, Chandigarh, as desired.

2.2 Thereafter, the office registered the cases as indicated hereinbefore.

2.3 These cases eventually came up for hearing on 11.9.2003 before one of us (V.K. Bali, J.) who after adverting to the judgment of the Supreme

Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, passed the following order:

This matter was put up in the Special Lok Adalat held at Narnaul on 30.8.2003. An application has been made by the complainant and the

accused for recording compromise. Accused in this case has been challenged under Sections 279/337 IPC. Prima facie, it appears to me that out

of the offences, mentioned above, Section 279 IPC is the only offence which is non-compoundable. However, the fact remains that the accused

have been charged with petty offences, like, 279 and 337 IPC. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs.

State of Haryana and Another, has held that even where the offence may be non-compoundable but the parties have arrived at a compromise and

settled all their disputes, the High Court would be well within its powers to quash the FIR, u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure It is no doubt true

that the judgment in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) relates to offences connected with matrimonial disputes. However, it is worth examining as to

whether, when the parties may have compromised the matter and settled all their disputes, it would be within the jurisdiction of High Court u/s 482

Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR. I may mention that settlement of disputes brings amity between the parties and if, despite such a

compromise, the dispute may linger on, same may result into commission of further offences by either of the parties involved in the dispute. Further,

once the parties have settled their disputes, continuances of the trial would be mere wastage of (time) of the Court and the parties, who would have

continued financial burden as well. The trial, in the circumstances, as referred to above, shall also be a mock one.

The application for compromise be put up on judicial side by treating the same as a petition u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the

FIR, before an appropriate Bench, after obtaining necessary orders of Hon''ble the Chief Justice.

Inasmuch as this case was put up before the Special Lok Adalat and the Court is of the opinion that the matter be put up on judicial side, if there

be requirement of giving legal assistance to the parties, same may be provided by the Haryana State Legal Services Authority, Chandigarh.

Since the judicial file has been sent to this Court in original, an intimation of this order be sent to the concerned trial Magistrate.

2.4 The office placed the records before the administrative side of one of us (the Chief Justice). The cases were referred to a Division Bench.

Thereafter, the cases were directed to be placed before this Full Bench.

Lest the stand point of the applicants went unrepresented, we had requested Shri R.S. Cheema, Senior Advocate, Smt. Charu Tuli, Senior

Deputy Advocate General, Punjab, Shri Jaswant Singh, Senior Deputy Advocate General, Haryana and Shri Ajai Lamba, Standing Counsel for

Union Territory, Chandigarh, to assist us.

3.1 These learned Counsel have during the course of arguments dealt with remarkable felicity all the aspects involved in the cases.

3.2 We perused the record.

The Findings:

The facts are not in dispute. The Special Lok Adalat at Narnaul had before it 12 applications moved in criminal cases, in which the accused

were alleged to have committed the offences that were not compoundable, for bringing on record the fact that the parties in each one of these

cases had sorted out their differences. Apart from Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short ""the Code""), Sub-clause (1) of Section

320 of the Code, which specifies the cases that according to the Code, are compoundable and sub- Clause (2) thereof lists the offences, which are

compoundable with the permission of the Court, Section 320(9) of the Code makes all other cases being tried by a criminal Court non-

compoundable.

Section 19(5) of the Legal Service Authority Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ""the 1987 Act"") also provides that the Lok Adalat shall have

no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. Since there was a specific bar in regard to

compounding of non-compoundable cases, which came up before the Special Lok Adalat, the necessity was apparently felt of re-examining the

legal position in relation to the cases in hand in the light of the observations made in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra).

The decisions of the Apex Court in relation to this aspect of the matter are consistent. The Court has time and again held that in cases involving

non-compoundable offences, the High Court would not use its inherent powers u/s 482 of the Code or exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to circumvent the bar.

6.1 The earliest observations in this regard came up before a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Sankatha Singh Vs. State of U.P., wherein it

was observed as under:

It has been urged for the Appellants that Sri Tej Pal Singh could order the re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of the inherent powers which

every Court possesses in order to further the ends of justice and that Sri Tripathi was not justified in any case to sit in judgment over the order of

Sri Tej Pal Singh, an order passed within jurisdiction, even though it be erroneous. Assuming that Sri Tej Raj Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge, could

exercise inherent powers, we are of opinion that he could not pass the order of the re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when

Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. Inherent powers cannot be

exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from doing. Sri Tripathi was competent to consider when the other party raised the

objection whether the appeal was validly up for re-hearing before him. He considered the question and decided it rightly.

6.2 In Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, their Lordships were considering the bar u/s 397(2) of the Code. They observed

that it would not be possible for the Court to use Section 482 of the Code to circumvent the bar.

6.3 In State of Orissa Vs. Ram Chander Agarwala and Others, their Lordships observed as under:

Once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be

entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise

revisional jurisdiction.

xxxx xxxx

The provisions of Section 561-A cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code.

6.4 In Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal and another, AIR 1981 Supreme Court 736, it was observed as under:

A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the Court. It represents that which the Court never

intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical

error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing.

Further, the inherent power of the Court also cannot be invoked. The inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is

specifically prohibited by the Code. It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to

what is ""otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force."" Those words, however, refer to those provisions only

where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not

contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362.

6.5 In Mosst. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukerjee alias Smt. Chabbi Mukerjee and Anr. 1990 (2) RCR (Crl.) 337 (SC) : AIR 1990 SC 1605, it

was observed as follows:

The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. The inherent power u/s 482 is intended to

prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly

barred under the Code. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a

case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. If any consideration

of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to

reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the High

Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the

abuse of the process of the Court. Where there are no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed

as on the date of the earlier order, the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review,

which is expressly barred u/s 362.

6.6. In Deepti alias Arati Rai Vs. Akhil Rai and Others, , it was observed as under:

Second revision after dismissal of the first one by the Sessions Court not maintainable - Inherent power cannot be utilised for exercising powers

expressly barred by the Code.

6.7. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and others, 2000 (4) RCR (Crl.) 650 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 43, it was observed as under:

We have noted with disgust that the impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic principles of criminal law. No review of an order

is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the disposal of the main petition on 7.1.1999, there was no lis pending in the High

Court wherein the Respondent could have filed any miscellaneous petition. The filing of a miscellaneous petition not referable to any provision of

Code of Criminal Procedure or the rules of the Court, cannot be resorted to as a substitute of fresh litigation. The record of the proceedings

produced before us shows that directions in the case filed by the Respondents were issued apparently without notice to any of the Respondents in

the petition. Merely because the Respondent No. 1 was an Advocate, did not justify the issuance of directions at his request without notice of the

other side. The impugned orders dated 30th April, 1999 and 21st July, 1999 could not have been passed by the High Court under its inherent

power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of

fresh directions in such miscellaneous not referable to any statutory provisions and in substance the abuse of the process of the Court.

6.8 The latest view taken by the Apex Court in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Phulan Rani and Another, , where their Lordships were specifically

dealing with the provisions of 1987 Act too does not improve the matters. In the judgment their Lordships after dealing with the provisions of

Section 20 of the 1987 Act have specifically held that cognizance can only be taken of those cases which fall within the purview of Sub-section (1)

of Section 20 of the 1987 Act. However, Section 19(5) of the 1987 Act, which reads as under:

Organisation of Lok Adalats:

(1) to (4) xxxx xxxx xxx

(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of -

(i) any case pending before; of

(ii) any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of and is not brought before, and Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised:

Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law.

specifically debars the Lok Adalat from taking cognizance of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. The ratio

of the judgment in Phulan Rani''s case (supra) would take out of the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat the cases where the offence related to matters

which are not compoundable.

The concept of judicial precedent as emerges from the judgments referred to hereinbefore is that the High Court has to be reluctant to invoke its

inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code for granting in favour of the parties where there exists a statutory bar either in the Code or any other law,

which would disentitle the parties to the relief sought for by them.

After having examined the scope of interference by the High Court to allow compounding of non-compoundable offences while exercising its

powers u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, we may proceed to examine the question as to whether the position would be any different where

the Petitioner approaches the High Court for the grant of similar relief while invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, after taking into consideration the judgments in the cases reported as Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of

Maharashtra, , State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, and State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, , has summed

up in the case reported as State through Special Cell, State, through Special Cell, New Delhi Vs. Navjot Sandhu @ Afshan Guru and Others, has

summed up the legal position in para Nos. 28 and 29 as follows:

Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals

throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State

Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey

the law. The powers under Articles 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an

interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such

a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power

of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bound of

their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute banned the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional

circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to

circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised ""as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure starts with the words ""Nothing in this Code"". Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised even when there is a bar u/s 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure

Code. However, as is set out in Satya Narayan Sharma case this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. If

the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character, which could be corrected in exercise of revisional powers or appellate powers the High

Court must refuse to exercise its inherent power. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the

Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases

which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where

criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out

hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code

or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law

engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other

enactment.

The scope for interference by the High Court in cases where the parties have compromised in cases that were non-compoundable would be no

different whether the petition is filed before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or u/s 482 of the Code. During the

course of arguments, we had the occasion of reading in extenso the judgment in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) for on its strength alone are we are

called upon to examine the question as to whether the High court was now obliged to quash the proceedings in non-compoundable offences

because the parties had after sorting out their differences moved the Court in this regard. As already indicated by us, B.S. Joshi''s case (supra)

incorporates a notable and latest exception to a catena of judgments of the Apex Court, which expound the view that compounding of offences,

which were non-compoundable either under the Code or under any law was not permissible. B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) dealt with a criminal

complaint of the wife under Sections 406, 506 and 498-A I.P.C., which was pending against the husband and other members of his family. The

parties had admittedly, resolved their difference and moved an application bringing this settlement on the record and sought for quashing of the

criminal proceedings. The High Court had rejected the application, whereupon, in the Special Leave Petition, the Hon''ble Supreme Court

intervened in the following terms:

It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye''s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of questing (quashing ?) the criminal

proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code (or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code) or extraordinary

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing

of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending

upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High

Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect

the powers u/s 482 of the Code.

9.1 This judgment eventually carves out an exception to the rule laid down in the case reported as Madhu Limaye''s case (supra). This exception

evidently has been introduced by the Apex Court for the purpose of securing the ends of justice in the facts and circumstances of the particular

case, while exercising the constitutional powers conferred on it under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which would be a precedent binding

on High Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India being a law declared by the Apex Court in relation to criminal cases having their

origin in matrimonial disputes, which have been compromised by the spouse and would not confer on the High Court powers for reasons detailed

hereinafter akin to those available to the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

9.2 Support for this view of ours can be had from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal and Others,

wherein the wife''s complaint alleging offences under Sections 498-A, 323 and 506 I.P.C. and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was

quashed by the Uttranchal High Court holding that the alleged offences having taken place within the jurisdiction of Ram Nagar Police Station of

Bilaspur District, the Court at Rampur District did not have territorial jurisdiction and transfer the investigation of the case to Police Station

Bilaspur, District Rampur. It was challenged before the Supreme Court. Taking into account certain developments during pendency of the

proceedings in the courts below and the Supreme Court, which have a material bearing on the merits of the appeal, in order to do complete justice

to the parties quashed the proceedings after not accepting the plea taken on behalf of the Appellant that he has signed the compromise deed under

threat and coercion. The Apex Court also took note of the Appellant that she has received Stridhan and maintenance in lumpsum and that she will

not be entitled to maintenance of any kind in future besides she has undertaken to withdraw all proceedings civil and criminal filed and initiated by

her and that the husband had agreed to withdraw the petition filed by him u/s 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act and to give a consent divorce sought for

by the Appellant. This judgment was considered in Mohd. Shamim v. Nahid Begum, 2005 (1) RCR(Crl.) 697 : 2005 (1) Apex Crl. 299 (SC) :

AIR 2005 SCW 332 in which also criminal proceedings between husband and wife were quashed by the Supreme Court and the Bench while

intervening in the matter clearly mentioned that we, therefore, in the exercise of a jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code direct that the impugned

judgment be set aside.

9.3 The High Court while intervening in these matters does not have any such powers and can do so either by invoking the constitutional powers

available to it under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by falling back upon the provisions of Section 482 of the Code. The powers of the

Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution had been dilated upon in the case reported as Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of

India and Another, by a five Judges Bench of the Apex Court, wherein their Lordships observed as under:

The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are

specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes

with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers.

This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes, it stands upon the foundation and the basis for its

exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice

between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is

just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while

administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of

jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent ""clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice"". It, however,

needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by Articles 142 being curative in nature cannot be constructed as powers which

authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to

supplant"" substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court, Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude,

cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to

achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of court case by

suspending his licence to practice, as were otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also

an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally

informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to do complete justice between the parties. It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a

case of contempt of court, the contemner and the Court cannot be said to be litigating parties. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction

under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice ""between the parties in any cause or matter

pending before it"". The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it

cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating

parties by ""ironing out the creases"" in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a Court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-setting. It

is well recognised and establishment that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-setting. It is a

problem-solver in the nebulous areas"" (see K. Veeraswarni v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject-

matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers

cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise

may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.

[9.4] To the same effect are the observations made in the cases reported as AIR 2000 SC 3638 by a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court and

Chandrakant Patil Vs. State through CBI, by a two Judges Bench of the Apex Court, wherein their Lordships after observing in para No. 9 to the

following effect:

It is now well nigh settled that Supreme Court''s powers under Article 142 of the Constitution are vastly broad based. That power in its exercise is

circumscribed only by two conditions, first is, that it can be exercised only when Supreme Court otherwise exercises its jurisdiction and the other is

that the order which Supreme Court passes must be necessary for doing complete justice in the cause or matter pending before it. The first

condition is satisfied here as the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exercisable the virtue of Section 19 of TADA.

Discussing the observations made in the case reported as Goodwill Paint and Chemical Industry Vs. Union of India and another, it was finally

observed in paragraph No. 13 as under:

We are aware that powers under Article 142 are not to be exercised frequently but only sparingly. The occurrence described in this case is not the

usual type of crimes reaching this Court. When all the four accused were caught red-handed while making nocturnal movements towards some

targeted destination, in the densely crowded city with highly lethal and quickly explosive articles, it is a matter of reasonable imagination that, had

they not been timely intercepted by the alert and vigilant police force, the consequences would have been disastrous and calamitous. We have no

manner of doubt that the sentence of imprisonment of five years for the offence u/s 5 of the TADA in the circumstances of this case is too

inadequate and it warrants enhancement.

The settled position of law that clearly emerges from a reading of the aforesaid cases is that the scope of the powers conferred on the High

Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is totally different from the relief that can be granted by their Lordships while

exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Constitution does not confer on the High Court any powers akin to these

powers which empowers the Supreme Court to modulate the relief as required in any particular case nor it disputes between the parties. That

being the position as also in view of the conclusion arrived at by us hereinbefore, we feel that it would not be proper for us to hold that the powers

conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of the Code will have wider amplitude than those conferred on

the Apex Court. This Court while exercising these powers will necessarily have to bear in mind the various statutes, which relate to the matter in

issue and ensure that indiscriminate exercise of these powers does not encourage the abuse of the process of law and thereby undermine the faith

of every one in the criminal justice delivery system.

We have also to bear in mind that the legislature had in its wisdom identified the various offences in which it thought that a resolution of the

dispute would be in the interest of the society. Sub-clause (1) of Section 320 of the Code enumerates the offences, which are compoundable at the

behest of the persons identified in Column No. 3 of the Table. More serious offences, which affect the society, have been made compoundable of

the Court and are listed in Sub-clause (2) of Section 320 of the Code with the rider that the Court''s approval to the compounding is sought for.

Apart from the offences listed in Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Section 320 of the Code, no composition of an offence is permissible, though Section

321 of the Code permits the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. In this scheme of things, the law makers having identified the

offences, which, according to them, could be compromised by the parties without or with the permission of the Court, there is no scope for a

Court of law permitting the compounding of such offences merely because the parties have decided to sort their differences. In this view of ours,

we find support from the observations of Hon''ble Supreme Court of India contained in Bankat and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 (1) RCR

(Crl.) 306 : 2005 (1) Apex Crl. 199 (SC) : AIR 2004 SCW 6624 wherein it was held by their Lordships as under:

In our view, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent requires to be accepted. For compounding of the offences punishable under

the IPC, a complete scheme is provided u/s 320 of the Code. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 provides that the offences mentioned in the Table

provided thereunder can be compounded by the persons mentioned in column 3 of the said Table. Further, Sub-section (2) provides that the

offences mentioned in the Table could be compounded by the victim with the permission of the Court. As against this Sub-section (9) specifically

provides that ""no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section"". In view of the aforesaid legislative mandate, only the offences

which are covered by Table 1 or Table 2 as stated above can be compounded and the rest of the offences punishable under the IPC could not be

compounded.

It is in these circumstances that while exercising its powers u/s 482 of the Code, the Court has in given cases quashed the criminal proceedings

where it felt that the same was required to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. These

decisions would necessarily involve an appraisal of the facts and circumstances of each case and this Court cannot while interpreting the statutory

provisions take upon itself the onerous responsibility of extending the powers of compounding of offences to cases other than those listed in

Section 320(1) and (2) of the Code. While it is true that it should be the endeavour of every one to bring into operation the conciliation process

with a view to pursue consensual justice, yet for achieving this object the scope of Section 320 of the Code will have to be enlarged. Such an

enlargement though desirable being in the domain of legislative enactment would fall out of the purview of statutory interpretation at the level of the

High Court. This Court in this case does not have any material available before it to assess the utility of widening the scope of compromise in the

criminal justice system as the possibility of the same being misused by the persons having at their command greater money and muscle power

cannot be ruled out. It is because of this that we feel obliged not to extend in general terms the ambit of interest of justice as indiscriminate and

uncontrolled reliance thereon may end in the abuse of the process of law which is one of the goals, which the enactor of Section 482 of the Code,

seek to achieve. The balance in each case will have to be struck to ensure that complete justice is done between the parties and for achieving this,

each individual case will have to be scrutinised to find out whether it attracts any of the provisions incorporated in Section 482 of the Code to

impel the Court to grant relief to a party either in the exercise of the aforesaid power or under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, we would

not like to launch an exercise for determining the scope of judicial intervention as provided u/s 482 of the Code in view of the terms ""abuse of the

process of law"" and ""in the interest of justice"", as it would not be proper for us to provide a straightjacket formula for chennelising judicial

responses to the facts and the circumstances of a given case. It would be more appropriate that the interpretation of these terms is left open to the

response of an Hon''ble Judge to the facts and circumstances of a given case, as and when this Court is called upon to intervene in any matter for

preventing the abuse of the process of law and advancing the ends of justice.

One of the reasons for judicial intervention in such cases that has been drawn upon in these cases is the possibility of harassment on account of

protracted trial. While it is true that after the parties have, in reality, compromised and it is desirable that the complainant should not be forced to

resile from the statement made by him during the investigation and thereby lose whatever little human dignity that remains in him, yet this aspect of

human nature and the statutory effect of allowing persons aggrieved by an act to sort out the differences amicably, will have to be assessed by the

legislature after taking into consideration whatever material is made available to it regarding the responses of human beings in such situation. It

would, in our opinion, be out of our domain and we would not like to bum our fingers while delving with a subject for which we have no adequate

inputs. We would, however, in all humility like to commend the undertaking of this exercise to the authorities, that be (Executive and the

Legislature) so, that the requisite statutory amendment can be put into position to alleviate the problems faced by the persons, who through force of

circumstances, have fallen foul of the law and genuinely desire to redeem themselves by rectifying their mistakes.

For the reasons recorded above, we are of the considered view that there is provision of law nor does Constitution of India confer any power

on the High Court to either quash the prosecution or allow the compounding of offences, which are not declared compoundable by the Legislature.

The only exception, which can be carved out to this view is on the basis of B.S. Joshi''s case (supra), which judgment pertains to offences arising

out of marital disputes so as to enable the spouses to resolve their differences amicably in order to enable them for proceeding with their lives in

future.

We answer the reference accordingly.

Let all case(s) now be placed before the Courts having territorial jurisdiction in the matter for being disposed of in accordance with law.

JUDGMENT

V.K. Bali, J.—An elaborate and lucid judgment prepared by brother Amar Dutt, J. was received by me at 8 AM on February 10, 2005.

Immediately before that I was given to understand that judgment needs to be delivered today, i.e., February 11, 2005. On telephone, Amar Dutt,

J. has been kind to inform me today a change brought about in the judgment received by me on February 10, 2005 to the extent that judgment of

the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, carves out an exception empowering High Court to

quash FIR in a non-compoundable offence relating to matrimonial disputes only.

In the short duration, whereas, I may have sufficient time to read and grasp the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J., surely, I would have no

time to prepare my own judgment if I may not be able to persuade myself and concur with the law laid down. With utmost respect to the Hon''ble

Judge, I am unable to ascribe to the view expressed in the judgment.

In my considered view, High Court, in exercise of its powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India has ample powers to quash an FIR where the object to achieve is larger purpose of promoting peace in society in the event of

a legitimate and voluntary settlement of a dispute between private parties, subject matter of which, under the law, may even constitute non-

compoundable offence. There cannot be any strait-jacket formula nor any hard and fast category can be created where the Court may or may not

quash an FIR in non- compoundable offences. Quashing of an FIR with regard to non-compoundable offences would, thus, depend upon the facts

and circumstances of each case.

From the reference order made by me, which has since been reproduced in the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J., it is quite clear that the

judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra), related to matrimonial disputes and on the dint of judgment aforesaid, it would

always be open to the High Court to quash an FIR. Reference, thus, pertained to matters other than matrimonial disputes as would be clear from a

part of it, reproduced below:

It is no doubt true that the judgment in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) relates to offences connected with matrimonial disputes. However, it is worth

examining as to whether, when the parties may have compromised the matter and settled all their disputes, it would be within the jurisdiction of

High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR.

In my considered view, power of the High Court to quash an FIR in non- compoundable offence cannot be limited to matrimonial disputes only

and, as mentioned above, no hard and fast category can be created where the Court may or may not quash FIR in non-compoundable offence.

The conclusion drawn above, I am conscious, needs to be supported by reasons for which, for the time being, I have no time. Surely, every

endeavour shall be made to support the aforesaid conclusion by reasons as early as possible.

B.K. Roy, C.J.—V.K. Bali, J. has pronounced his order after Amar Dutt, J.

The judgment delivered by Amar Dutt, J. had full concurrence of mine and I proceed to agree with it.

I received today at about 11.10 A.M. a copy of the order prepared by V.K. Bali, J., which was perused. It appears that now there is

imperative on my part, though anguished, to put on record the following facts before parting.

Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, 2001 (3) RCR (Crl.) 722 (SC) : JT 2001(6) SC 51, laying down during what time a judgment is to be pronounced

and if a judgment is not pronounced within a reasonable time what role the Chief Justice has to play is well known to all of us.

After hearing the case at great length judgment was reserved on 19.5.2004. During hearing we had our interaction. Views expressed by me and

Amar Dutt, J. were made known to V.K. Bali, J. A draft judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J., was sent to V.K. Bali, J. several months ago. Both

of us had eagerly awaited for a copy of his proposed dissenting judgment.

However, on November 9, 2004 V.K. Bali, J. intimated in writing to me of his desire that these cases be listed for further hearing and on that

very day a direction was issued by me to the office to list these cases on 17.11.2004.

After further hearing we reserved our judgment once again on 19.1.2005. Our views remained the same.

Amar Dutt, J. recasted the judgment mentioning recent judgments of the Apex Court and it was circulated. I told Bali, J. that I had agreed with

him again. This time also Bali, J. apprised us of his dissent.

I am surprised to find that Bali, J. has expressed his desire to give detailed reasons later on. We will be obviously deprived to have a look at

that.

Practice of disposing of a case and giving reasons later was depreciated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court about 20 years ago in

State of Punjab and Others Vs. Jagdev Singh Talwandi, , arising out of a judgment of our Court, in the following words:

We would like to take this opportunity to point out that serious difficulties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High

Courts, of pronouncing the final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the High Court intends to pass should

not be announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final order without a reasoned judgment is

announced by the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the

other, or that a person accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant case, that a detenu be

released from detention. If the object of passing such orders is to ensure speedy compliance with them, that object is more often defeated by the

aggrieved party filing a SLP in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this Court in a predicament because, without the

benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order to be implemented. The result inevitably is that the

operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.

It may be thought that such orders are passed by this Court and, therefore, there is no reason why the High Courts should not do the same.

We would like to point out respectfully that the orders passed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. The Supreme Court is the

final court in the hierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are passed by this Court very rarely under exceptional

circumstances. Orders passed by the High Court are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and

other provisions of the concerned statutes. We though it necessary to make these observations in order that a practice which is not very desirable

and which achieves no useful purpose may not grow out of its present infancy.

[10.1] When the Gujarat High Court did the same thing, the Supreme Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and

Others, , once again with reference to the aforementioned judgment expressed it in following words:

Before we part with the case it would be appropriate to note some disturbing factors. The High Court after hearing the appeal directed its

dismissal on 26.12.2003 indicating in the order that the reasons were to be subsequently given, because the Court was closing for winter holidays.

This course was adopted ""due to paucity of time"". We see no perceivable reason for the hurry. The accused were not in custody. Even if they

were in custody, the course adopted was not permissible. This Court has in several cases deprecated the practice adopted by the High Court in

the present case.

Dissenting judgment as per Hon''ble Mr. Justice V.K. Bali

JUDGMENT

V.K. Bali, J.—In this country of teaming millions, which is making unabated, endeavour to bring majority of people above the poverty line,

whereas every article essential to life may be scarce but there is no dearth of pending cases. The Courts are flooded with the cases and are so

heavily loaded that the entire judicial system is threatened with collapse. Dockets of all the High Courts except the Apex Court are full, rather over

flooded. In this High Court alone, as on 31.12.2004, pendency of civil and criminal cases has touched figures of 2,64,000. Punjab Superior

Judiciary had a pendency of 47,000 cases, whereas, Punjab Subordinate Judiciary had a pendency of 5,00,000 cases. Haryana Superior Judiciary

had a pendency of 64,000 cases, whereas, Haryana Subordinate Judiciary had a pendency of 5,20,000 cases. The ratio of judicial officers

commensurate of the population is least in this country as compared to other countries in the world. The Legislature being conscious of slow and

tardy dispensation of justice, primarily for wholly inadequate strength of Judges as compared to the litigation, devised numerous measures such as,

providing alternative Forums of justice, like Central Administrative Tribunals, State Administrative Tribunals, Legal Services Authority and others.

The experiment might have proved productive but only to the extent that pendency of the cases in the High Court and the Courts subordinate to it

might have been reduced at the most by a couple of years and not beyond that.

From amongst thousands and lacs of cases pending in the country, some percentage of cases are such where the parties, either at the very

threshold or during the pendency of the lis, have arrived a legitimate and voluntary settlement of all the disputes. The question that arises for

consideration is that when the parties are locked in a criminal case and the offence(s) committed by the accused is non-compoundable and is such

that it does not shock the judicial and social conscious and when the litigation parties have arrived at a legitimate and voluntary settlement, can the

High Court, in exercise of the powers vested in it u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, quash an

FIR.

Facts of the cases, leading to the reference to be answered by the Full Bench, need no mention, suffice it, however, to say that a Special Lok

Adalat was held at Narnaul on 30.8.2003. In 12 matters in which it appeared that the disputing parties have settled all their disputes amongst

others were also put up in the Special Lok Adalat wherein, applications were made by the concerned parties for recording compromise. There

being a specific bar under the provisions of Haryana State Legal Services Authority Act for settling the disputes by way of compromise, which

involve non-compoundable offences, it was thought expedient that the matter should be put up on judicial side. Reference order has since already

been reproduced by Amar Dutt, J., in the judgment authored by him. The cases in which applications regarding compromise were made, have

since already been enumerated. It is, however, worthwhile to mention that whereas, in the first case, the only non-compoundable offence was

Section 279 of Indian Penal Code, in the second case, the non-compoundable offences were Sections 457 and 380 of Indian Penal Code. In the

list of cases mentioned at Sr. Nos. 3, 6 and 11, non-compoundable offence was Section 506 of Indian Penal Code. In the cases enumerated at Sr.

Nos. 5, 10 and 12, only non-compoundable offence was Section 148 of Indian Penal Code. In the case enumerated at Sr. No. 7, the only non-

compoundable offence was Section 279 of Indian Penal Code. In the case enumerated at Sr. No. 8, non-compoundable offences were Sections

498A and 506 of Indian Penal Code. In the case enumerated at Sr. No. 9, the only non-compoundable offence was Section 452 of Indian Penal

Code. The list of 12 cases with particulars would clearly demonstrate that applications for setting the matter by way of compromise were moved in

petty criminal matters and the non-compoundable offences were also not serious in nature at all. Vide order dated 11.9.2003, I had ordered that

the matter be put up on judicial side, after obtaining necessary order of Hon''ble the Chief Justice, who was pleased to order that the matter be put

up before me and Amar Dutt, J., vide order dated 15.1.2004. The matter, thereafter, was placed before the Division Bench of this Court for

consideration of the question as to whether the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure to quash an

FIR if the parties have entered into a compromise and settled all their disputes, even though where the offences or one of the offence with which

the accused might have been charged, was non-compoundable. In the reference order, it was clearly mentioned that Hon''ble Supreme Court in

B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, ) had quashed an FIR even where the offence was non-compoundable where the parties

arrived at compromise and settled all their disputes. It was mentioned that judgment is B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) relates to offences connected with

matrimonial disputes. It was then mentioned that it was worth examining as to whether, when the parties might have compromised the matter and

settled all their disputes, would it be within the jurisdiction of High Court u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR. Hon''ble

Supreme Court by a binding precedent had quashed the FIR, holding that the High Court under the powers vested in it u/s 482 of Code of

Criminal Procedure can quash an FIR. In the matrimonial disputes, therefore, there could have been no dispute that such a course could be

adopted. The reference, thus, primarily pertained to examine the question aforesaid related to other offences.

At the very outset, it would be appropriate to find out the provisions, which are said to have created a bar or prohibition for the Courts, insofar

as the same are relevant, for determining the question referred to the Full Bench.

Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ''Cr.P.C.''), provides a table of the offences punishable under the

Indian Penal Code which may be compounded as also the table of the offences under the Indian Penal Code, composition of which requires

permission of the Curt. Sub-section (9) of Section 320, which is reproduced below, creates a bar, for compounding the offences, except as

provided by Section 320:

(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section.

Section 362 Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits alteration or review of a signed judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct

a clerical or arithmetical error. The same reads thus:

Court not to alter judgment. - Save as otherwise provided by this Court or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court (Emphasis

supplied), when it has signed its judgment of final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or

arithmetical error.

Sub-section (2) of Section 397 prohibits revision of an interlocutory order passed in an appeal, enquiry or trial whereas, Sub-section (3) of

section aforesaid provides that if an application has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further

application by the same person shall be entertained by the either of them. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 397 reads as follows:

(2) The powers of revision conferred by Sub-section (2) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, enquiry,

trial or other proceeding.

(3) If an application under this Section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by

the same person shall be entertain by either of them.

A bare look at the aforesaid provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure providing for prohibition would show that the same are with regard to

non-compoundable offences, revision against interlocutory order, second revision and review of final judgment. There appears to be a great

distinction between bar created u/s 320, Section 397(2) and 397(3) Code of Criminal Procedure as compared to bar created u/s 362 Code of

Criminal Procedure Whereas, the bar created u/s 362 Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable to all Courts, what clearly emerges from the

language employed in other Sections is that the bar would be only for a Court trying the offence or in the matter of revision, revisional Court. Thus,

whereas no Court would have jurisdiction to review a final judgment rendered by it, same does not, however, appear to be true insofar as High

Court is concerned pertaining to bar created under Sections 320, 397(2) and 397(3) Code of Criminal Procedure.

Having examined the bare minimum provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, dealing with the subject in hand, it would be appropriate at this

stage to take into consideration the contentions of learned Counsel. It needs to be reiterated that all the learned Counsel have been requested to

assist the Court. They are not representing any of the parties. In fact, no parties are before us and it is only an academic question which is under

debate and determination. I have no hesitation whatsoever to put on record that be it Shri R.S. Cheema, Sr. Advocate or Mr. Ajai Lamba,

Advocate or for that matter others, who have assisted the Court in their endeavour for the Court to lay down correct law. It is urged in unison by

them that the High Court, in its jurisdiction vested u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should have

power to cancel or quash an FIR if the parties have arrived at a bona fide and honest compromise. It is further urged by them that this discretion

should not be exercised in heinous or serious cases but where the matters may not be very serious and offence may not be such which may shock

the conscious of the Court, such course should be adopted. They further urge that no strait-jacket formula can be made nor this can be confined to

a particular kind of cases and it should be left to the discretion of the Hon''ble Jude dealing with the matter to permit the compromise to be placed

on record and in consequence thereof, to quash the FIR if it may be in the interest of justice and to secure the ends of justice. Mr. Cheema and

Mr. Lamba have handed over to us notes in writing on two occasions, one when the judgment was reserved on 19.5.2004 and the other time

when it was reserved on 19.1.2005.

In the notes submitted by Mr. R.S. Cheema, after making a reference to the statutory provisions and the case law on the subject, the

conclusion has been drawn as follows:

On a careful reading of the case law, referred to above and briefly summarised in the note attached as Appendix A with this note, it clearly

emerges that the power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be effectively exercised in an appropriate case, for intervention to quash an

FIR, even in case disclosing a non-compoundable offence, when parties have voluntarily entered into a compromise. Shall it be in the interest of

law to lay down clearly demarcated guidelines for defining the parameters of the power.

The view against the intervention of the High Court in the compounding of non-compoundable offences is usually supported, by stating that such

compounding is against the public policy, same having not been lawfully permitted.

It is, however, noteworthy that Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been able to keep pace with the time and one is essentially

left with the realisation that even where the Section like 498-A of the Indian Penal Code are subsequently created, the draftsman simply failed to

apprise himself to the question of compoundability. Hence, the non-inclusion of an offence like Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (enacted

for the first time in the year 1983) in the Code enacted in the year 1974 may be more a case of accidental overlooking than one of conscious

application of mind.

The Courts are flooded with cases and so heavily locked that the system is threatened with a collapse. The courts cannot while interpreting the law

introduce a plea bargaining in the country but the practical realities cannot be lost sight of. There is a widespread tendency to give twists to non-

Criminal matters and create criminal liability. For illustrative purposes, we may refer to the following categories where the line between the civil

wrong and the criminal liability may be very thin and the power of quashing an F.I.R. on settlement could be liberally exercised:

a) cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case;

b) cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belaboured

dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace, and harmony to a large number

of people;

c) cases of disputes between old partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or

acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim.

It would be safe to conclude by saying that no hard and fast category should be created and the only rider may be that such intervention would not

be in the interest of justice in a case of grave nature or in a case involving the security of the State. It is, of course, a hard fact that when

compounding is not permitted lawfully, during the pendency of a trial the parties are pushed to resile from their previous writings or statements or

complaints and such course would encourage perjury.

In the subsequent note submitted by Mr. R.S. Cheema, when the judgment was reserved on 19.1.2005, it has been mentioned that whereas it

would be highly desirable for this Court in the interest of justice to intervene in permitting the compounding of even non-compoundable cases as

per the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure in appropriate cases. The question of laying down the guidelines remains very intricate. It may be

mentioned at the outset that no strait- jacket formula can be prescribed as the same transgress the ends of justice in the given situation. The

following guidelines may be kept in view:

a. Cases arising from matrimonial discord, even if other offences are introduced for aggravation of the case.

b. Cases pertaining to property disputes between close relations, which are predominantly civil in nature and they have a genuine or belaboured

dimension of criminal liability. Notwithstanding a touch of criminal liability, the settlement would bring lasting peace and harmony to a large number

of people.

c. Cases of dispute between the partners or business concerns with dealings over a long period which are predominantly civil and are given or

acquire a criminal dimension but the parties are essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claim.

d. Minor offences as u/s 279 IPC may be permitted to be compounded on the basis of legitimate settlement between the parties. Yet another

offence which remains non-compoundable is Section 506 (II) IPC which is punishable with 7 years imprisonment. It is the judicial experience that

an offence u/s 506 IPC in most cases is based on the oral declaration with different shades of intention. Another set of offences, which ought to be

liberally compounded, are Sections 147 IPC and 148 IPC, more particularly where other offences are compoundable. It may be added here that

the State of Madhya Pradesh vide MP Act No. 17 of 1999 (Section 3) has made 506 (II) IPC, 147 IPC and 148 IPC compoundable offences

by amending the schedule u/s 320 Code of Criminal Procedure

e. The offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide where the victim dies in the course of transaction would fall in the

category where compounding may not be permitted. Heinous offences like highway robbery, dacoity or a case involving clear-cut allegations of

rape should also fall in the prohibited category. Offences committed by Public Servants purporting to act in that capacity as also offences against

public servant while the victims are acting in the discharge of their duty must remain non- compoundable. Offences against the State enshrined in

chapter VI of the Penal Code as also offences under Chapter VII (relating to army, navy and air force) must remain non-compoundable.

f. That as a broad guideline the offences against human body other than murder and culpable homicide may be permitted to be compounded when

the court is in the position to record a finding that the settlement between the parties is voluntary and fair.

It is then mentioned that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the conscience of the Court. It must be just and fair besides being free from

undue pressure and the Court must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims with necessary caution. It is then mentioned that in the

present reference, all the cases would fall the criteria suggested in the guidelines that may be permitted to be compounded.

In the notes submitted by Sh. Ajai Lamba, Advocate after making reference to the relevant provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure and

judicial precedents, it has been concluded as follows:

To conclude, thus, this Hon''ble Court may lay guidelines to quash the Criminal complaint or FIR or proceeding u/s 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure despite the limitations imposed by Section 320 of the Code while considering the following facts and circumstances:

i. The court should be satisfied that the parties have in fact compromised and the complainant/informant, in particular the victims and injured, have

compounded the offences and have settled all their disputes;

ii. Quashing of the proceedings in view of the compromise and compounding shall serve the ends of justice;

iii. The continuance of proceedings shall not serve any purpose;

iv. The quashing of proceedings initiated for any offence reflected in Chapters IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII of the Indian Penal Code be

not considered.

v. The court considering the case shall consider the matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether or not to exercise

such a power.

vi. Cases involving offences of serious nature which invite abhorance in public opinion be not considered for quashing while exercising inherent

powers u/s 482 of the Code.

I have very carefully gone through the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. The question referred to the Full Bench, it appears, has been

answered primarily on the basis of judicial precedents.

After referring to Section 19(5) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which indeed provide a bar for non-compounding of the offences,

which are not compoundable, the learned Judge has dealt with the decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Various judgments of Hon''ble

Supreme Court have then been noticed and passages therefrom have been reproduced. The first judgment, relied upon by Amar Dutt, J. is

Sankatha Singh Vs. State of U.P., . The facts of the case aforesaid reveal that the Appellants were convicted by the Magistrate 1st Class for

offences under Sections 452 and 323 read with Section 34 IPC. One of the Appellants was also convicted u/s 324 IPC. They appealed against

their conviction. Appeal was fixed for hearing on November 30, 1956 when neither the Appellants nor their counsel appeared in the Court when

learned Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal. While dismissing the appeal, it was mentioned by the learned Magistrate and seen the records and

would find no ground for any interference. On December 17, 1956, an application was presented by the Appellants praying that the case be

restored to its original number so that justice may be done to them. The absence on the date when appeal was dismissed was explained. The

application was allowed on July 2, 1957 by learned Sessions Judge, Shri Tej Pal Singh, who had dismissed the appeal. A sufficient cause for non-

appearance of the Appellants primarily led to recalling of the earlier order. It is also noted that Section 323 Code of Criminal Procedure enjoined

the appellate Court to dispose of the appeal on merits after hearing the Appellant or his pleader and the Public Prosecutor and that no notice was

ever issued to the Appellants as required by Section 422 Code of Criminal Procedure Shri Tripathi, after the aforesaid order was passed, was

succeeded by Shri Tej Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge and it is before him that the appeal was put up for re-hearing. He was of the view that the

Appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal which had been disposed of and that, therefore, the order of his predecessor was

ultra vires and passed without jurisdiction. Against this order, Appellants went in revision before the High Court which agreed with the view of Shri

Tripathi and accordingly dismissed the revision application. The sole point was as to whether Shri Tej Pal Singh could set aside his first order dated

November 30, 1956, dismissing the appeal, when neither the Appellants nor their counsel appeared and could order the re-hearing of the appeal.

Hon''ble Supreme Court, while determining the question aforesaid, held that ""it has been urged for the Appellants that Sri Tej Pal Singh could order

the re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of the inherent powers which every Court possesses in order to further the ends of justice and that Shri

Tripathi was not justified in any case to sit in judgment over the order of Sri Tej Pal Singh, an order passed within jurisdiction, even though it be

erroneous. Assuming that Shri Tej Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge, could exercise inherent powers, we are of opinion that he could not pass the

order of the re-hearing of the appeal in the exercise of such powers when Section 369, read with Section 424 of the Code, specifically prohibits

the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. Inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code specifically prohibits the Court from

doing. Sri Tripathi was competent to consider when the other party raised the objection whether the appeal was validly up for re-hearing before

him. He considered the question and decided it rightly"".

This judgment, in my view, would not at all be applicable to the facts of this case. It did not deal with the powers of the High Court u/s 482

Code of Criminal Procedure nor did it even remotely mention the powers of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure The question

was with regard to powers vested with the Appellate Court, namely, the Sessions Judge, who, it need not be mentioned, would have no power

similar to the one vested in the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure Further, it was not a case where the disputing and private parties

to the litigation had arrived at a bona fide compromise. Still further, the bar under consideration pertained to review of a final judgment which, as

mentioned above, pertains to all Courts as compared to the bar created in other Sections, mentioned above, which does not pertain to High Court

at all and, thus, would be deemed to be pertaining to the Courts, where the matters are pending.

The other judgment, referred to by Amar Dutt, J. of the Hon''ble Supreme Court is in State of Orissa Vs. Ram Chander Agarwala and Others,

. The same, once again, pertains to a bar relating to review of a final judgment. Brief facts of the case reveal that vigilance police filed nine criminal

cases against certain firms and their partners or proprietors u/s 20(e) of the Foreward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. The District Magistrate

found the firms and persons, in management of the business, guilty of the offences with which they were charged and inflicted a consolidated fine of

Rs. 2000/- with the direction that they would suffer simple imprisonment for three months in default of payment of fine. This order was challenged

in an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, who dismissed the same and it was found that the law required imposition of a minimum sentence

of fine of Rs. 1000/- for each offence and as the sentence passed by the trial Court was not in accordance with law, he referred the matter to the

High Court for passing of appropriate sentence. The accused preferred revision petition against the order of learned Sessions Judge. The reference

made by the Sessions Judge as well as revision petition were heard by the High Court, which, while dismissing the revision petition, accepted

reference made by the Sessions Judge and enhanced the sentence so far as the firms were concerned in the sum of Rs. 3900/- @ Rs. 1300/- for

each offence. As regards the Managers or the Managing Partners, the High Court sentenced them to six months rigorous imprisonment, i.e., two

months for each deal. Those, who were awarded substantive sentence of imprisonment, filed Criminal Misc. Petitions before the High Court for

review of its order. The High Court accepted and petitions for review and recalled its previous judgment imposing substantive sentence of six

months RI but imposed a fine of Rs. 3900/-. Against this decision of the High Court, State of Orissa filed an appeal before the Hon''ble Supreme

Court. Once again, it is Section 369, pari materia to Section 362, which was subject matter of discussion. While dealing with the powers of the

High Court u/s 516A, equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, it was held that ""if Section 369 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure is understood as applying to judgments on appeal by the High Court, Section 561-A cannot be invoked for enabling the Court to

review its own order which is specifically prohibited by Section 369 by providing that, no court (emphasis supplied) when it has signed its

judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error"".

Once again, I am of the view that this judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. Once again, it was a bar of review

which was under consideration which no Court has power, be it Subordinate Court or High Court. Further, this was a case where conviction had

since already been ordered. It was not a case where the parties might have arrived at a compromise during the pendency of the matter either.

Another judgment referred by Amar Dutt, J. is Smt. Sooraj Devi Vs. Pyare Lal and Another, Once again, it pertains to bar created in Section

362 Code of Criminal Procedure of reviewing a final judgment. The facts of the case reveal that there was dispute was with regard to a house. A

suit was filed by a Trading Company against Jethmal Laxmi Chand which was decreed and execution proceedings were taken for attachment and

sale of the house which was owned by one Khem Raj, who died leaving a widow and others. The property was purchased by Pyare Lal. He

obtained possession through Civil Court on October 8, 1965 but in his absence Kailash Chandra Jain was stated to have removed the lock and

entered into possession. In a criminal proceeding against him on a complaint by Pyare Lal, he was ultimately convicted and sentenced by the High

Court u/s 448 IPC by an order dated September 1, 1970 under which the High Court also directed that the said house be restored to the

possession of the complainant. Pursuant to that order, Pyare Lal applied for possession. The Appellant filed an objection asserting a right to the

property. The Magistrate over-ruled her objection observing that it was open to her to establish her right by way of a suit. The rejection of her

objection was upheld by the High Court vide order dated 21.7.1978. The Appellant then filed Criminal Misc. Application before the High Court

u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she was not a party to the criminal proceedings against Kailash Chandra Jain and that she was in

possession is her own right and that the earlier order of the High Court dated 1.9.1970 directing restoration of possession to Pyare Lal be clarified

by a declaration that it was not binding on her and did not affect her possession. On 5.1.1979 the High Court dismissed the application in view of

the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa Vs. Ram Chander Agarwala and Others, It is against this order that the appeal was

filed. While dealing with the case, it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that ""a clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an

accidental slip or omission of the Court. It represents that which the Court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record

and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation and a clerical error is a mistake

in writing or typing"". Where the applicant sought that the earlier order of the High Court directing restoration of possession of the property to the

Respondent be clarified by a declaration that it was not binding on her and did not affect her possession and the Respondent disputed the

allegations, it was held that the controversy could not be brought within the description ""clerical or arithmetical error"". The applicant in fact asked

for an adjudication that a right to possession alleged by her remained unaffected by the earlier order. It was further held that the inherent power of

the Court also cannot be invoked. The inherent power of the Court, it was further held, is not invoked. The inherent power of the Court, it was

further held, is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362.

For parity of reasons given above, this judgment too would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

Learned Judge has also relied upon a judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Mosst. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherji @ Smt. Chhabbi

Mukherji and Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1605 (supra). Once again, the matter pertained to bar created in Section 362 Code of Criminal Procedure

pertaining to review of a final judgment/order. The facts of the case aforesaid reveal that a private complaint was filed for offences under Sections

452 and 323 IPC. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, in exercise of powers u/s 192(2) Code of Criminal Procedure The Court of the Second

Class Magistrate, after examining witnesses, by order dated 22.3.1985, issued process to the two accused. The order of the Magistrate issuing

process was challenged by the Respondents u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court. The main ground urged before the High

Court was that the First Class Magistrate had transferred the case without taking cognizance of the offence and the subsequent proceedings were,

therefore, illegal. The High Court, vide order dated 20.8.1988 dismissed the petition and found that there was no such illegality. The Respondents

again made an application u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure alleging, inter-alia, that record of the proceedings on close scrutiny would indicate

that the case had not been taken cognizance of before the transfer. The Leaned Single Judge accepted the case of the Respondents and quashed

the proceedings vide the impugned order.

This case pertains to power of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, in reviewing of the final judgment for which there is bar u/s

362 Code of Criminal Procedure This judgment again, in considered view of this Court, would not at all be applicable to the facts of this case.

Amar Dutt, J. has also relied upon another judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Ors.,

AIR 2001 SC 43 (supra). The case again pertains to bar created u/s 362 Code of Criminal Procedure Brief facts of the case were that Mr.

Bajwa, a practicing lawyer had filed a petition u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure seeking certain directions. Learned Single Judge disposed of

the petition by giving following directions:

After hearing the Petitioner, who is an Advocate himself, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case for direct registration of the case is

made out and a preliminary enquiry is required. In these circumstances, present petition is disposed of with the directions to the SSP, Rupnagar to

look into the allegations of the Petitioner and if he comes to the conclusion that some cognizable offence has been committed the Respondents 7 or

8 or any body else, he shall order for the registration of the case. If the allegations of the Petitioner are found to be false, the Petitioner shall be

prosecuted u/s 182 IPC. The Petitioner can lead (sic) evidence in support of his case before the SSP, who shall conclude the investigation within

three months from the receipt of the copy of the order.

After dismissal of the petition and consequent action taken in pursuance of the directions issued against the SSP, Rupnagar, Respondent No. 1

filed a Misc. Petition and which was disposed of on 30.4.1999, without notice, with the following directions:

The Petitioner submits that he had filed a criminal complaint on 9.3.1999 in the Court of Mrs. Neelam Arora, JMIC, Kharar and she had taken

cognizance and in this view of the matter he does not want to prosecute his allegations with the SSP, who may be directed not to take any action

because the matter is already subjudice before the competent Court of jurisdiction. Therefore, directions are given to SSP Rupnagar not to comply

with the directions dated 7.1.1999 and not to file any calendra u/s 182 IPC against the Petitioner.

Yet another Criminal Misc. with the prayer for quashing order dated 30.4.1999 on the ground of its being illegal and against the well

established principles of law and being a review of order dated 7.1.1999 not permissible under the criminal law was filed. The said application was

dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 21.7.1999 and it is against that order that appeal was filed before the Hon''ble Supreme Court. On the

facts, as mentioned above, it was held that ""we have noted with disgust that the impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic

principles of criminal law. No review of an order is contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. After the disposal of the main petition on

7.1.1999, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein the Respondents could have filed any misc. petition. The filing of a misc. petition not

referable to any provision of Code of Criminal Procedure or the rules of the Code cannot be restored to as a substitute of fresh litigation"".

This judgment, once again, as would be clear from the aforesaid facts, dealt with the bar created u/s 362 Code of Criminal Procedure and

would not at all be applicable to the facts of the present case.

Learned Judge has also relied upon another judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Phulan Rani and

Another, which deals with the powers of Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Authorities Act where there is bar of compounding non-

compoundable offences. There cannot be any exception nor any one from out of a learned Counsel, assisting the Court, has even remotely

suggested that the Lok Adalat would have jurisdiction to compound a non-compoundable offence.

Learned Judge has also relied upon two judgments in Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, and Deepti alias Arati Rai

Vs. Akhil Rai and Others, pertaining to bar of entertaining a revision against an interlocutory order being so prohibited u/s 397(2) in context of

powers of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure Before, however, I might advert to these two judgments, I would like to mention

that Sub-section (2) of Section 397 bars a revision against interlocutory order. In the context of the present case, the question would be as to

whether any order, though interlocutory, could be set aside in exercise of powers u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure The matter, it appears, has

been examined by the Supreme Court holding that power u/s 482 could and should be exercised to meet the ends of justice. In Madhu Limaye v.

State of Maharshtra, AIR 1978 SC 46 (supra), a Bench, consisting of three Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court, held that ""on a plain reading of

Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include Sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, ""shall be deemed to limit

or affect the inherent powers of the High Court"", the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional

power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in

accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code

for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be

corrected in exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power.

But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the

ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of

the inherent powers by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very

sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally vexatiously or as being without

jurisdiction. The bar u/s 397(2) will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice"".

Briefly put the facts of the aforesaid case are that objections filed by Madhu Limaye for framing of charges against him u/s 500 IPC, were

rejected and charge was framed. He challenged order of the Sessions Judge in revision filed by him in the High Court. High Court, without going

into the merits of the case, upheld the preliminary objection of the other side as to maintainability of the revision petition. It is in these circumstances

that Madhu Limaye challenged the said order in the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The point which fell for determination, it was observed by the

Hon''ble Supreme Court, was squarely covered by decision of the Supreme Court in Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, .

The Court, however, still observed that on a careful consideration of the matter and on hearing learned Counsel for the parties in the appeal, they

had thought it advisable to enunciate and reiterate the view taken by two Judges of the Court in Amar Nath''s case but in a somewhat modified and

modulated form. The two points, it was observed, were decided in Amar Nath''s case (supra). The same are as follows:

(1) While we fully, agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that where a revision to the High Court against the order of Subordinate Judge

is expressly barred under Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the 1973 Code the inherent powers contained in Section 482 would not be available

to defeat the bar contained in Section 397(2).

(2) The impugned order of the Magistrate, however, was not an interlocutory order.

It is interesting to note that for the reasons given in the judgment, a larger Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court, consisting of three Hon''ble

Judges clearly observed that the statement of the law apropos point No. 1 is not quite accurate and needs some modulation. They, however,

affirmed the decisions of the Court on the second point, as mentioned above. In ultimate analysis, it was held that ""but in case the impugned order

clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the

High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High

Court"". It may now be mentioned that the Hon''ble Judge has relied upon judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Amar Nath''s case (supra)

which, on the specific question under debate, has not only been watered down or modified in a later judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court

consisting of three Hon''ble Judge in Madhu Limaye''s case (supra), it can well be said to have been overruled. It is clearly mentioned that point

No. 1 is not quite accurate and needs modification. In my considered view, decision in Amar Nath''s case (supra) could not be relied upon to

answer the question and to hold that bar created under the statute cannot be overreached by the provisions of Section 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure.

In Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State and Others, once again, it was held that ""inherent power of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure does not stand repealed when revision power u/s 397 overlaps. Nothing in the Code, not even Section 397, can effect the amplitude of

the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so when a specific provision is made, easy resort to inherent

power is not right except under compelling circumstance"". While holding so, Hon''ble Supreme Court also relied upon its judgment in Madhu

Limaye''s case (supra). This judgment, once again, protects and preserves the power of the High Court conferred upon it u/s 482 Code of

Criminal Procedure even with regard to bar contained in Section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure.

Under the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 397, there is a bar of second revision. On a plain reading of Sub-section (3) of Section 397

it appears to be mandatory that when an aggrieved party challenges an order in a revision and fails, there is a complete bar to the second revision.

As a necessary corollary, resort to Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure would apparently defeat the bar. Hence, the question whether it is

open to the High Court to intervene in exercise of powers u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure where a party had failed to get the desired relief in

a revision, now appears to be finally settled that power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure can be validly exercised even on dismissal of the first

revision notwithstanding the bar of Section 397(3) Code of Criminal Procedure provided the case calls for intervention within the parameters of the

power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure Reference in this connection may be made to judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Krishnan

and another Vs. Krishnaveni and another, and Ganesh Narayan Hegde Vs. S. Bangarappa and Others, In Krishnan''s case (supra), which is a

judgment consisting of three Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court, it was held that ""though Section 397(1) is prohibited by Sub-section (3)

thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available u/s 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuance superintendence of the

High Court u/s 483, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the orders of the

Courts below"". It was further held that ""the object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power u/s 397 read with

Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of

the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent powers of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High

Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and consciously when the Sessions Judge has

simultaneously exercised revisional power u/s 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of

judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process

of miscarriage of justice or to correct the irregularities, in correctness committed by inferior criminal court in its juridicial process or illegality of

sentence or order"".

In Ganesh Narayan Hegde''s case (supra), it was once again held that dismissal of revision by Sessions Judge does not bar a person from

invoking the power of the High Court u/s 482. Amar Dutt, J., while answering the question referred to the Full Bench, for the purpose of law laid

down by him, has also relied upon judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Deepti alias Arati Rai Vs. Akhil Rai and Others, pertaining to bar of

second revision contained in Section 397(3) Code of Criminal Procedure The facts of the said case would reveal that a complaint was made

pertaining to demand of dowry, harassment and cruelty by the accused. The police, after making investigation, filed a charge-sheet indicating

commission of offence u/s 498-A IPC. The learned Magistrate, after supplying copies of the charge-sheet and other documents and hearing the

learned Advocate for the accused, framed charge u/s 498-A. It is this order that was challenged by way of revision before the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, who was of the view that there was sufficient material to frame charge against all the accused and, therefore, dismissed the revision

application. Thereafter, the accused approached the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to quash the said charge and

proceedings instituted on the basis of the aforesaid charge- sheet. High Court referred to its earlier order dated 29.10.1993 whereby the

Respondent 1st application for quashing the charge was rejected. It then proceeded to consider the application of Respondents 2 and 3 for

quashing the charge and observed as follows:

On perusal of the record, it transpires that no specific overt act is attributed to applicants 2 and 3 who are in-laws of the informant. The allegation

that she was subjected to physical and mental torture are attributed to her husband who is not an applicant in this case.

High Court then referred to the concession made by the Deputy Government Advocate that there was no material for framing of charge against

the applicants u/s 498-A IPC. On these grounds, High Court allowed the application and quashed the charge framed u/s 498-A against applicants

2 and 3. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High Court, wife approached the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Hon''ble

Supreme Court primarily dealt with the matter on facts of the said case pertaining to there being evidence of cruelty and after discussing the

relevant evidence, it held that ""from what we have pointed out, it becomes apparent that there was sufficient material for the learned Magistrate for

framing a charge u/s 498-A even against Respondents 2 and 3. It further appears to us that the learned Government Advocate, who appeared on

behalf of the State before the High Court made the concession without going through the record. We are constrained to observe that the learned

Government Advocate should have conducted the case in a more responsible manner considering the nature of the case. The High Court also

should have taken care to verify the record before accepting the concession made by the learned Government Advocate. After so observing, the

judgment proceeds further wherein it is recorded as follows:

It should have also applied its mind to the aspect that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by Sessions Court is not

maintainable and that inherent power u/s 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising the powers which are expressly barred by the Code. As

we find that the order passed by the High Court is not legal and just, it will have to be set aside.

A reading of the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Deepti''s case (supra) would demonstrate that the power of High Court to

interfere u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure in wake of bar of second revision u/s 397(2) was not a matter of debate. No arguments for and

against the said provision were raised. Even though, it may be correct that in the last four lines, the Hon''ble Supreme Court itself took the point

and held that second revision was not maintainable and that inherent powers of the High Court u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be

utilised, but before so holding, there was no debate. In considered view of this Court, the observation made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court,

which, as mentioned above, is without any debate on the subject, would not be law laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The

judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court would be in pre-curiam. In any case since a larger Bench taking a contrary view of the Hon''ble Supreme

Court is there and which was not taken into consideration or referred to, it shall be legally permissible for this Court to follow the larger Bench. I

would like to mention that but for this judgment, no order single judgment has been referred by Amar Dutt, J. which may be on the same very

subject and the same very bar.

On the basis of the judgments relied upon by Amar Dutt, J., as fully detailed above, the conclusion drawn in paragraph 7 of the judgment is

that the conceptus of judicial precedent as emerges from the judgments referred to hereinbefore is that the High Court has to be reluctant to invoke

its inherent jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code for granting in favour of the parties where there exists a statutory bar either in the Code or any other

law, which would disentitle the parties to the relief sought for by them. With utmost respect to the Hon''ble Judge, it rather appears to me that

conceptus of the judicial precedents, as emerges from the judgments, referred to by me, would rather manifest that when it is necessary to do real

justice between the parties or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, the High Court would have ample power u/s 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure despite various bars created under the situation, as mentioned above, but for the bar created u/s 362 Code of Criminal Procedure It

further appears to me that if a final judgment is reviewed, it would rather work injustice and would be an abuse of the process of law inasmuch as if

final decisions are to be recalled, the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that trials once over and final decisions should not be opened,

would be a casualty, No one then would be safe even in those matters which have resulted into acquittal. In fact, it is only Section 362 Code of

Criminal Procedure whereas in the matter of other bars, as mentioned above, it is Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure which would take

precedence. Review of a final judgment, I reiterate, would do far more harm that the good it may do sometimes.

Once it is held that the High Court has power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure itself to quash FIR pertaining to a non-compoundable

offence if the facts and circumstances may so warrant, there is no need to go into the question as to whether such power can be used in exercise of

powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Reference, however, may be made to a judgment

of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, wherein it was held that in the kind of categories

mentioned in the judgment, High Court may, in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure, interfere in the proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice, even though the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rate cases. It is relevant to mention here that it is in a

Civil Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India that Division Bench of this Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings

inclusive of registration of the FIR and directed the Respondent Dharam Pal in the said case, to pay costs of the first Respondent- Ch. Bhajan Lal.

After general elections, there were number of criminal proceedings between the parties, one of which was a criminal prosecution against Dharam

Pal u/s 307 IPC. When the case was on, Dharam Pal presented a complaint before Ch. Devi Lal making certain serious allegations against Bhajan

Lal. On the complaint made by Dharam Pal, the Officer on Special Duty in the Chief Minister''s Secretariat made an endorsement on 12.11.1987

to the effect that let appropriate action be taken and marked the same to the Director General of Police, who in turn made an endorsement to the

effect, ""Please look into this, take necessary action under report"" and marked to SP, Hisar. SP, Hisar made his endorsement that ""please register a

case and investigate"". It is in wake of the circumstances, as mentioned above, that Bhajan Lal filed a writ petition seeking issuance of writ in the

nature of certiorari so as to quash the FIR. While dealing with the matter, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in the categories, as enumerated,

the High Court may in exercise of powers under Article 226 or u/s 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure interfere in proceedings relating to

cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is, thus, clear that the High Court

would have ample power and would be well within its jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings even under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India.

Insofar as bar created u/s 320(9) Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, only two judgments have been referred to by learned Counsel

assisting the Court. Both these judgments have since been referred to by Amar Dutt, J. In Ram Lal and Another Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir,

, it was held that the offence which is not compoundable u/s 320, cannot be made compoundable with the permission of the Court. It is a short

judgment. The facts of the case show that Ram Lal was convicted of an offence u/s 326 IPC and was sentenced to undergo three years rigorous

imprisonment. The parties compromised the matter and a petition for compounding was filed. It appears that this compromise came about when

the matter was pending in the Hon''ble Supreme Court. Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the request for compounding of the offence pertaining to

Section 326 could not be acceded as the same is non-compoundable offence. Counsel while pleading for permission to compound the offence,

relied upon judgments in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 (3) RCR (Crl.) 332 (SC) : 1990 (Suppl) SCC 681 and Y. Suresh Babu v.

State of A.P., (1987)2 JT 361 (SC), wherein, non-compoundable offence was allowed to be compounded. Hon''ble Supreme, however, while

dealing with the case in Y. Suresh Babu''s case (supra) observed that the said case shall not be treated as a precedent and in the latter case offence

u/s 307 IPC was permitted to be compounded by observing as under:

We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the

nature of the case and circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial Court shall permit them to compound

the offence.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court then observed that the said decision shall not be treated as a binding precedent. Considering the facts of the case

and that the parties had arrived at a settlement and that the victim had no grievance sentence imposed upon the Appellant was reduced to the one

already undergone. This judgment, in my view, is not at all on the proposition as to whether the High Court, in exercise of the powers vested in it

u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure can over-come the hurdle created by Section 320(9) Code of Criminal Procedure as the point was neither

debated nor adjudicated upon. Further, the compromise was arrived after conviction. Hon''ble Supreme Court, however, reduced the sentence to

the one already undergone which resulted in achieving the same object as, by no means, the convicts could be restored to their earlier position at

the time when they were undergoing trial as by the time compromise was arrived at, a part of sentence imposed upon them had already been

undergone by them. Net result in any case was recognition of a settlement between the parties and which was taken to its logical ends as well.

The other judgment is the one on the basis of which a reference to the larger Bench was made. This appears to be a direct judgment for the

proposition that High Court would have ample power to quash an FIR where the parties might have arrived at an honest and bona fide settlement

to settle their disputes.

judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, (supra), begins by framing a question for

determination with regard to ambit of inherent powers of the High Court u/s 428 Code of Criminal Procedure read with Articles 226 and 227 of

the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings. The scope and ambit of power u/s 482 in the context of the said case did pertain to

matrimonial disputes and for that reason it was mentioned that scope and ambit has been examined by the Court in catina of earlier decisions and

the present case requires to be considered in relation to Matrimonial disputes. A petition filed u/s 482 for quashing criminal proceedings under

Sections 498- A/406 IPC was dismissed by the High Court as, in its view, offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were non-compoundable

and inherent provisions of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure could not be invoked. The pertinent question for decision was, thus, the bar

created u/s 320(9) of the Code. The High Court, while dismissing the petition had relied upon judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Madhu

Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, and Surendra Nath Mohanty and Anr Vs.

State of Orissa, . The High Court, after reproducing seven categories of cases, as given in para 102 of Bhajan Lal''s case (supra) held that the

parameters, principles and guidelines for quashing of complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings have been settled in terms

thereof and concluded therefrom that the instant case does not fall in any of the said categories. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court

lost sight of the earlier part of para 102 which made it abundantly clear that the said categories of cases were being given by way of illustration.

Neither the categories or cases given were exhaustive nor it could be so. The Hon''ble Supreme Court then quoted the observations made in

Bhajan Lal''s case (supra). It then referred to the Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, wherein the Hon''ble

Supreme Court, with reference to Bhajan Lal''s case (supra) observed that the guidelines laid down therein as to where the Court would exercise

jurisdiction u/s 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formula to be followed by the Courts. Exercise of such power would depend

upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to secure the ends of justice. It was well settled that these powers have no

limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. The Hon''ble

Supreme Court then observed that the High Court has misread and misapplied its decision in Madhu Limaye''s case (supra) while coming to the

conclusion that offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC were non-compoundable, it would not be permissible to quash FIR. The question

considered in Madhu Limaye''s case (supra) was when there was a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an

appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings, what would be its effect on exercise of power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court then

referred to the observations made in G.V. Rao Vs. L.H.V. Prasad and Others, pertaining to matrimonial disputes. In the operative part of the

judgment, it was held that ""in law of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal

proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers u/s 482 of the Code"".

The question framed and answered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) pertinently relates to powers of the High Court

u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the bar created by Section 320(9) Code of Criminal

Procedure, even though, as stated earlier, the matter pertained to matrimonial disputes. In my considered view, judgment in B.S. Joshi''s case

(supra), cannot be treated to be the only exception vesting the power with the High Court u/s 482 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India where

FIR can be quashed relating to non-compoundable offence. In other words, it is not an exception to the power of the High Court u/s 482 of Code

of Criminal Procedure relating to matrimonial disputes. To illustrate, if it was a case u/s 304-B IPC where wife had died due to torture meted to

her on account of demand of dowry, could it be said to be a dispute relating to matrimonial dispute where a compromise should be permitted and

FIR quashed ? If it was a case of cold blooded murder of wife by the husband for non-fullfilment of his demands relating to dowry, could on

compromise the High Court quash the FIR ? In both the events, as mentioned above, answer to the question, to this Court, appears to be in the

negative. To further illustrate by examples of disputes other than relating to marriage, like civil disputes between two brothers which had criminal

overtones as well, would the decision in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) not apply ? Where the property in dispute between close relatives, which is

primarily of civil nature and has also genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability, could the decision be otherwise ? If the dispute may

pertain to old parents or business concerns with dealings over a long period which were predominantly civil and were given or acquired a criminal

dimension but the parties were essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claims, could, the decision be otherwise. I have no

doubt in my mind that in the matters related to the kind of categories mentioned above, the decision would have been the same. If that be so, B.S.

Joshi''s case (supra) cannot be treated an exception for permitting the parties to command non-compoundable offence by permitting the High

Court to quash FIR u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.

Amar Dutt, J., while dealing with case u/s 306 read with Section 34 IPC in Criminal Misc. No. 43882-M of 2002, quashed the FIR when

brother of the deceased reported compromise. Learned Judge even though in a case where death had taken place, while relying upon the

judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, , State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and

others, 1997 (3) SCR 143 (supra) as also B.S. Joshi''s case (supra), observed as follows:

In the light of the above observations, I find that in the case in hand I am dealing with a situation herein after the alleged committing of suicide by

Gurmit Kaur, her brother Gurmej Singh has found it appropriate that in the interest of the progeny of the couple not to pursue the prosecution and

the stand of his is being supported by his father leaving no witnesses, who would support the case of the prosecution as was initially put forth in the

FIR. This resolution of differences is probably the manifestation of the desire of the parties to avoid protracted litigation, which may not bear fruit

and would only result in delaying rehabilitation of their grand children, who were 8 and 5 years old at the time of the death of their mother Gurmit

Kaur. It is in these circumstances submitted that following the principles enunciated in the case reported as B.S. Joshi (supra) and treating this case

as an existence of the law, which has been culled out by the Apex Court with a view to smoothen out matrimonial discord and permit the family to

resume normal life so that their rancours against each other do not affect the lives of their loved ones, both immediate and removed. There is,

therefore, no possibility of the State is successfully prosecuting the case against the Petitioners and allowing any further investigation into the FIR is

likely to prove to be waste of time of the investigating team which could be better used for other law enforcement.

judgment in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra) in tune with the submissions made by learned Counsel has been treated as an extension of law laid down

in Chaudhary Bhajan Lal''s case (supra) and not an exception by the same Hon''ble Judge, even though in a case where death had taken place in a

non-compoundable offence, on genuine compromise reported by the parties, the FIR was quashed. Learned Single Judge of this Court in Subhash

Chandar v. State of Punjab, 2001 (1) RCR (Criminal) 353 and Sharan Deep Singh v. State (U.T. Chandigarh), 2001 (4) RCR(Criminal) 331, in

the petitions filed u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties, quashed FI Rs, even with

regard to an offence u/s 376 IPC. Without adverting to the facts of the cases, mentioned above, I would give an illustration where in order to do

justice, it may be possible to quash an FIR even in a rape case. ""A"", a lady is in love with ""B"". She is, however, minor and has to attain majority

within two days when she elopes with her lower. The parents of ""A"" lodge an FIR of kidnapping and rape. ""A"" and ""B"", at a place far off from their

native house, tie a nuptial knot and are blessed with a child. Consequent upon investigation of the case, ""A"" and ""B"" are found living in a house with

a child after a year. ""A"", under the pressure of her parents supports their plea at that stage for kidnapping and rape but realizes in due course of

time that she had voluntarily gone with B and married him and, thus, wants that trial against her husband should come to an end. B files a petition

u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure during the course of which A appears and states that she is still in love with B and for her welfare as also that

of ''B'' and their child, she would not like to continue with the case. B is in judicial lock-up. If, plea of ''B'' for quashing FIR is to be declined,

would it not work complete injustice to the parties and ruin the lives of three including an infant ? It is while taking into consideration such cases that

it has been observed time and again by this Court as also Apex Court that powers u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure are exercised by the High

Court to either give effect to an order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and it

is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment

dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Court, therefore, has inherent powers apart from express provisions of

law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in

Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Court. The powers are exercised ex

debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.

I conclude to hold that no hard and fast category should be created and only rider may be that the High Court shall intervene in the interest of

justice. One may broadly talk of categories where FIR should not be quashed even on a compromise, like, cases of grave and serious nature of

involving security of the State as also broad category of litigation, where FIR should be quashed, such as between close relations, brothers, but the

categories can be only broadly stated as in a given case, in an offence, like 326 IPC, which is not a very serious offence, relating to hurt matters,

the Court may even on a bona fide settlement of dispute, still not like to quash the FIR. To illustrate, if the allegations against the accused be such

that with the help of others, who are catching hold of the victim, the said accused poked his fingers in the eyes of the victim and gauged the same,

offence would be Section 326 IPC. It would shock the conscience of every one and no court will perhaps permit the compounding of the offence.

Again, if one of the accused, with the help of others, may try to put acid in the mouth of the victim, which the victim may resist, thus, spilling the

acid on the eyes, with the result victim might lose both the eyes, offence may be u/s 326 or 307 IPC. No Court would, perhaps quash the FIR

even on bona fide settlement (illustration in both the cases on actual facts). It would be hazardous to categorise the cases in which the High Court

should exercise power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR on the parties settling their disputes, even though it has to be said

that power cannot be exercised in serious matters.

The law has to be administered according to the laws made by the LegisIature. Where, however, there is a scope, howsoever little it may be,

to interfere to impart full justice, the legislative enactment should be liberally interpreted. Narrow construction leading to total injustice has to be

avoided. When there is no semblance of success of the prosecution case, coupled with the object of providing peace and tranquility to the litigants,

in the interest of justice and the like, High court would certainly be justified in quashing the FIR in exercise of its powers u/s 482 Code of Criminal

Procedure in the event of a compromise between the parties. The ends of justice are always higher than mere law.

Massive pendency of the cases with no immediate ray of hope in reducing the backlog, a futile exercise of going through an agonising

protracted trial where in the event of a compromise, witnesses are likely to purge, harmony between the parties providing them a chance to

progress in their lives rather than wasting their time in useless litigation are, indeed, the guiding factors and have to be kept in mind while deciding

the cases of the kind in hand.

Before I conclude, I would like to quote Hon''ble Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer from Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney Vs. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and

Others, as under:

The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.

Having held that the High Court would be well within its jurisdiction to set aside or quash an FIR in the powers vested in it u/s 482 Code of

Criminal Procedure and Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, there is no need, at all, to ponder over the question as to whether the

High Court would have power akin to the powers vested in the Hon''ble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Suffice it,

however, to say that even though in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and others, it was observed in paragraph 23 that power to do complete

justice also inheres in every Court not to speak of a court of plenary jurisdiction of a High Court. In a later judgment in Sanchalakshri and Another

Vs. Vijayakumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta and Another, it was held that it could not be inferred therefrom that the High Court possessed any power

similar to one under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It was also held in AIR 2000 SC 3638 that there is no power like the one conferred

on the Apex Court under Articles 142 of the Constitution of India conferred on the High Court.

Before I may part with this order, I would like to mention that when the judgment was pronounced in the open Court on 11.2.2005, Hon''ble

Chief Justice from the prepared notes that he had with him, appended a note which, being already part of record, need not be reproduced.

Judicial propriety and etiquette''s ingrained in all of us guided me not to react. However, inasmuch as, anguish expressed by Hon''ble Chief

Justice in my humble opinion is based upon the facts, which are against the records, I had no choice at that stage but for to append my own note,

which reads as follows:

I was neither told nor apprised that the Hon''ble Chief Justice would append a note on his own while pronouncing the judgment. I have heard in

open Court the note appended by the Chief Justice with regard to how the case progressed from time to time. I would not comment anything on

the note appended by Hon''ble the Chief Justice at this stage and would prefer to say whatever may be appropriate when I write the main

judgment.

The anguish caused to Hon''ble Chief Justice was widely published in the news papers and, in particular, Hindustan Times dated 12.2.2005

with the Caption ""CJ gets tough with Justice Bali"" ""REACTS SHARPLY TO ''DELAYED REASONING'' (IN RED COLOUR) IN

JUDGMENT"".

While dictating the main judgment, I have pondered over the issue time and again as to whether I should make any comment on the note

appended by Hon''ble Chief Justice. On every such consideration in my mind, my conscious has not permitted me to transgress judicial norms,

values of mutual trust and respect between the functionaries, nurtured by tradition pertaining to inter-se relationship of Judges. I would indeed

make a mention of such values of mutual trust and respect but before I do that, I must mention that the note appended by Hon''ble Chief Justice

has left me with no choice whatsoever but for to, at least, straighten the facts which would demonstrate for any one to decide as to whether the

anguish expressed by Hon''ble Chief Justice was justified or not. While doing so, however, I would meticulously eschew the reasons as to why the

remarks were given.

The inter-se relations between the constitutional functionaries adorning high judicial forums came to be focussed in a recent judgment rendered

by Hon''ble Supreme Court in Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, . There is no need to give backdrop

of the facts that necessitated the Hon''ble Supreme Court to delve on the judicial norms, values of mutual trust and respect between the judicial

functionaries. Suffice it, however, to mention that while dealing with the writ pertaining to public interest litigation some builders/developers, who

were adversely affected becaused of some interim directions issued by Patna High Court, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, which was

dismissed with liberty to the builders to approach the High Court for expediting the hearing of the matter. The Hon''ble Supreme Court also hoped

and trusted that the matter would be decided at an earlier date. When, application filed by them, pursuant to orders passed by Hon''ble Supreme

Court, brought no tangible results, they again approached the Hon''ble Supreme Court. The Bench, seized of the matter, after hearing learned

Counsel for the parties and in its anxiety for ascertaining the truthfulness in the averments made by the Petitioners, called for a response from the

High Court. The Court wished to ascertain if the Petitioners had filed any application and if the same was not listed for hearing. When the matter

came up before the Patna High Court, some harsh remarks with regard to response sought by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, came to be made by

it. The said remarks need not be reproduced.

On receipt of response of the High Court, when the Supreme Court went through the observations made by the High Court, it formed its

opinion that some objections arise and one of the questions was as to whether Division Bench of High Court was justified in law and on

considerations of propriety to make all those observations. The other question, which may also be somewhat relevant was that what is the

relationship of the Supreme Court with High Courts as two august judicial institutions functioning under the Constitution. On the later question, as

mentioned above, it was held that Supreme Court and the High Courts both are thought to be brothers in the administration of justice, even though

Supreme Court shall remain an elder brother. If the status of a Judge of the Supreme Court and High Court is the same, the Judge of Supreme

Court, being an elder brother, the same, at least, has to be true between the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court.

Hon''ble Chief Justice, in my view, is indeed first among equals but while discharging judicial functions, he is equal in status to a Judge of High

Court.

Addressing on the question as to how the Supreme Court and the High Courts have to deal with each others, it was, inter alia, observed as

under:

The Constitution has clearly divided the jurisdiction between the two institutions and while doing so these institutions have to have mutual respect

for each other. The framers of the Constitution did not think it necessary to specifically confer power on the Supreme Court to give a command to

the High Court for they were men of vision and foresight. They knew that all the constitutional functionaries and institutions would act in the best

interest of norms and traditions consistent with democracy and constitutionalism, set down in and discernible from the Constitution and as handed

down by history and generations of judges. Everyone would, it was expected, keep within its bounds and would not overstep its limits so that the

ideals and the values remain a living reality and do not become either an intrusion or an illusion. The constitutional and democratic institutions,

complementing and supplementing each other, would lend strength to these handed down traditions and would also contribute to developing such

rich traditions as would be respected and hailed by posterity. This would result in strengthening the working of the Constitution. In the realms of

constitutionalism the values of mutual trust and respect between the functionaries, nurtured by transition, alleviate the need to codify the rules of the

relationship. Experience shows that any rigid codification of such delicate relationship is advantageous to those bent upon vilification. A rigid written

law makes it difficult to maintain that dignity which is better and rightly left to be perceived by right-minded people who zealously uphold the dignity

of others as they do their own.

It was further held that an institution dealing with another institution under the Constitution shall have to observe grace and courtesy. No judge

shall criticise another judge and certainly not strongly. Any departure therefrom needs to be corrected at the earliest and in the larger interest. Then

with regard to corrective step, it has been observed that the same have been taken carefully with courtesy and respect and not by way of harsh

criticism. The Court quoted an instance of David Pannick wherein, in a 1971 case Mr. Justice Lawson gave his reasons for doubting the

correctness of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, he concluded, I am bound by the decision in the earlier case, although I am

compelled to say, again with the greatest respect, that I believe it to have been wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal was very unhappy. Lord

Justice Davies replied, with the greatest respect to Lawson, J., that he thought that those observations were out of place. It is unusual, and, I am

bound to say, undesirable, in my opinion, for a judge sitting at first instance to express the opinion, although accepting that he is bound by it, that a

decision, and a fairly recent decision, of this Court was wrong. Hon''ble Supreme Court then made a mention of known jurist Benjamin N.

Cardozo, who said that there have been judges in the past who suffered a disaster. Supreme Court then quoted from the selected writing of

Benjamin N. Cardozo as follows:

What Cardozo has in mind is something more than the egotism that displays itself in harsh and overberances such as these are at times the

explosive vigour of voice, etc. Exuberances such as these are at times then result of infirmities of temper not unknown altogether to the Bench

though happily uncommon; more often they are the defensive appliances of weakness or incapacity, conscious of its failings, and hopeful to divert

attention by what seems to be a manifestation of its strength. The slumbering beast is in us, and may be waked to life and fury if we feed him

overmuch. The ravening official will seek to swallow up the man. I interpret the invitation to be with you today as an expression of your judgment

that whatever mistakes I may have made - and I know that they have been more than I like to figure or remember - I have at least avoided this

one, I have not allowed the official to swallow up the man. I don''t mean that I am entitled to a great deal of credit for so modest an achievement.

In a court where the tradition of courtesy and equity is so ingrained and inveterate as it is in the Court of Appeals, one would have to be a pretty

hardened sort of sinner to be guilty of the particular form of wrong doing that has its origin in the pride of office. But then, when you come to think

of it, virtues are important in the inverse order to the credit that is due to those who cultivate and practice them. No one of us struts about with

satisfaction for the self-restraint involved in refraining from the crime of homicide, yet if the importance of the virtue were the measure of the credit

we should all be crowing and cawing with the pride of moral excellence. So I don''t assume to price myself on the very modest virtue of being

merely a human being.

The Court also referred to three instances of Indian judiciary and then observed that ""the practice has developed and gained ground as

tradition. Barring may be an instance or two, which too must have been avoidable, there has been no occasion either for any disrespect having

been shown by the Supreme Court to the High Court or vice versa or for this Court having been called upon to take cognisance of any instance of

disrespect shown to it by any High Court."" The Supreme Court then quoted from the book ""Judicial Norms: A Judge''s Perspectives"", Washington

University School of Law. The passage extracted is as follows:

... an aspect of judicial practice that has seemed increasingly important to me over the last decade; the practice of collegiality. By collegiality I mean

an attitude among judges that says, we may disagree on some substantive issues, but we all have a common interest and goal in getting the law

right... We are, in a word, one another''s colleagues. An attitude of collegiality means, in practice, that we respect one another''s views, listen to

one another, and, where possible, aim to identify areas of agreement.... Collegiality does mean, however, that, even when I disagree with another

judge, I recognize that we are part of a common endeavour, and that each of us is, almost always, acting in good faith according to his or her own

view of what the law requires.... Because I see myself as engaged in a common endeavour with my judicial colleagues, it follows that I have the

interests of the judiciary as a whole at heart.... When there is little or no judicial collegiality, there is less incentive for judges to exercise self-

restraint.... Collegiality is important not only for working together effectively, but also at a deeper structural level. An attitude of judicial collegiality

helps reinforce judges'' incentives to behave in a principled and responsible fashion. I think that any discussion of judicial independence, either at

the level of institutions of individuals, should take this practice of collegiality into account.

Supreme Court ended the discussion by quoting following extract what Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, when he was to be shortly elevated to

Supreme Court of the United States:

I ask myself, what is there to show for this half lifetime that has passed ? I look into my book in which I keep a docket of the decisions of the full

court which falls to me to write, and find about a thousand cases. A thousand cases, many of them upon trifling or transitory matters, to represent

nearly a half a lifetime. A thousand cases when one would have liked to study to the bottom and say his say on every question which the law has

presented... I often imagine Shakespeare of Napoleon summing himself up and thinking: ""Yes, I have written 5000 lines of solid gold and a good

deal of padding, who would have covered the milky way with words that outshone the stars. We are lucky enough if we can give a sample of our

best and if in our hearts we can feel that it has been nobly done.

Age old traditions of acting in best interest of the norms and decisions consistent with democracy and constitutionalism, have to be followed

similarly as law has to be followed. Without once again making any comment upon the note prepared by Hon''ble Chief Justice, I have only stated

the law which is binding on all, be it Chief Justice or the Judges. I close the matter at that insofar as judicial norms are concerned.

The facts leading to the culmination of the judgment pronounced on 11.2.2005, need to be mentioned with a view to straighten records. A

special Lok Adalat was held at Narnaul on 30.8.2003 in which, besides others, 12 matters, referred to above, were also put up for hearing where

parties sought to finish their continuous agony by way of compromise. Vide order dated 11.9.2003, I, in my capacity as a Judge as also Executive

Chairman of Legal Services Authority, Haryana, ordered that the matter be put up on judicial side after obtaining necessary order of Hon''ble the

Chief Justice. Hon''ble the Chief Justice was pleased to constitute a Division Bench consisting of myself and Amar Dutt, J., on 15.1.2004. When

the matter came up before a Division Bench on 23.1.2004, following order was passed:

In the context of the order dated September 11, 2003, which is self-speaking, we are of the view that we require assistance of Advocate General,

Punjab, Advocate General, Haryana and Standing Counsel of Union Territory, Chandigarh in this case. We would also request Shri R.S. Cheema,

Senior Advocate, to assist the Court as Amicus Curaie.

The matter was posted for hearing on 20.2.2004. It is in between 23.1.2004 and 20.2.2004 that Hon''ble Chief Justice, it appears, constituted

a Full Bench for determining the question required to be answered. The matter, thus, came up for hearing before the Full Bench for the first time on

20.2.2004 on which date, on the request made by Mr. R.S. Cheema, the matter was adjourned to 19.3.2004. On the adjourned date, the matter

did not come up for hearing and instead, came up for hearing on 23.3.2004. On 23.3.2004, however, on the request made by Mr. K.S. Nalwa,

the matter was adjourned to 28.4.2004 Arguments of Mr. R.S. Cheema, Amicus Curaie, were heard in part and on his request, the case was

adjourned to 12.5.2004. The arguments, in my memory, had not lasted for more than half an hour and the Court had put a question to the counsel

as to whether the High Court would possess the powers akin to the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The counsel

was not prepared on the point and, thus, sought an adjournment. Order dated 28.4.2004 reads thus:

Heard Mr. R.S. Cheema, learned Amicus Curiae in part. As requested by him, put up on 12.5.2004, inter-alia, to satisfy the Court as to whether

we possess powers akin to their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

No arguments were heard on 12.5.2004 as an adjournment was sought on behalf of Mr. Ajay Lamba, on the ground of his illness. The matter

was, thus, adjourned to 19.5.2004, on which date as well, no provision of Statute, be it Code of Criminal Procedure or any other enactment was

read nor any judgment but for to B.S. Joshi and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another, , rendered by the Supreme Court, was read in the

Court. The judgment was reserved on that very date.

There was no interaction after conclusion of the arguments, either with regard to the respective views of the Members of the Bench or with

regard to as to who is to be the author of the judgment. It is during the vacation in October, 2004, that my Secretary received a message from the

Secretary of Hon''ble Chief Justice from Patna that in the pending judgments of Full Bench, where I was a Member, I would author the same. On

my Secretary giving information, I got my message conveyed to Secretary of Hon''ble Chief Justice that insofar as judgment in FAO No. 120 of

2001 is concerned, I would author the judgment. In that case the judgment was reserved recently on 6.10.2004 and, therefore, I remembered

everything. I had indeed, authored the judgment and sent it for circulation on 5.11.2004 and the judgment was pronounced on 8.11.2004. Insofar

as present case is concerned, arguments had concluded on 19.5.2004 and, thus, a considerable time had gone by and in my humble view

arguments had not been heard in the way, at least, I wanted to hear, it would not be possible for me to author the judgment and the matter shall

require to be re-heard. My Secretary/Court Reader got a message on 25.10.2004 that the judgment shall be authored by Amar Dutt, J. Entries to

the effect aforesaid made by my Court Reader in the register bear testimony to what has been stated above. Same read thus:

Crl. Misc, 2579-M-2004 & 11 other cases.

R (means reserved) on 19.5.2004.

Intimation re: the judgment on 25/x/04.

Being dic. By Hon''ble Amar Dutt, J.

(A photo copy of the register containing entries as mentioned above, is annexed with the present judgment).

It also contains an entry of 8.11, which means that judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J., was received in my court on 8.11.2004. The draft

judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. mentions November....2004 and the same is annexed with this judgment. The other entry is for listing the

matter for re-hearing on 17.11.2004 on which date, the Bench, however, did not meet. Having received draft judgment prepared by Amar Dutt,

J., on 8.11.2004, I could not have got time to reiterate my view for listing the matter for re-hearing before 9.11.2004 and it is on that day itself that

I made a mention to Hon''ble Chief Justice to the effect aforesaid, who ordered it for re-hearing on the date as mentioned above. Register

maintained by my Court Reader contains entries with regard to FAO No. 102 of 2001 as well but the same need not be reproduced. Suffice it,

however, to say that immediately on intimation to me that I have to author the judgment, I did my duty and sent the judgment for circulation on

5.11.2004 and the judgment was, indeed, pronounced on 8.11.2004. It is at that time when the judgment in the case aforesaid was pronounced,

that I made a request to Hon''ble Chief Justice for re-hearing the present case.

I may mention here that I have come to know now on enquiries made from other Hon''ble Judges, who constituted different Full Benches with

Hon''ble Chief Justice, that they had also received similar messages from the Secretary of Hon''ble Chief Justice and some Judges. I know now as

a matter of fact, after making enquiries, had expressed similar views for re-hearing and such matters were put up for re-hearing as well. One Full

Bench matter has come to my notice, wherein, an Hon''ble Judge, constituting Full Bench, on a letter written by Hon''ble Chief Judge, had in

writing denied having been asked to write the judgment.

From the facts, as mentioned above, which are based on records, it would, thus, transpire that a draft judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J.

was received by me for the first time on 8.11.2004. Despite that, it has been mentioned in para No. 5 of the note prepared by the Chief Justice

that ""draft judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. was sent to V.K. Bali, J. several months ago"" and in paragraph 6 that ""however on 9.11.2004,

V.K. Bali, J. intimated in writing to me of his desire that these cases be listed for further hearing"". The fact of the matter is that I had made a

request for re-hearing of the case the very next day when I had received the draft judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. and I reiterate that it is after

several months that draft judgment was received by me from the date it was reserved.

Out of several adjournments, as mentioned above, it would, transpire that arguments were heard only on two occasions, i.e., partly on

28.4.2004 and on 19.5.2004. I have already mentioned the way and manner in which the case had proceeded till such time judgment was

reserved. It may be the view of the Hon''ble Chief Justice that arguments were heard at great length as stated by him in the appended note. Once

again, it would not be in tune with the judicial norms and etiquettes to controvert the said fact and, thus, the time consumed in arguments may be of

great length but that may be for the reason that it all depends from person to person, like, in a given set of facts and circumstances, one may take

hours to understand and come to a conclusion on the question being debated in the Court. The same very person, in a different set of facts and

circumstances, may consume less than half the time. Yet again, it is not unknown that someone may take half an hour to understand a proposition,

the other may understand the same proposition within an hour and the third one may smell the half and conclude the rest.

Hon''ble Chief Justice also mentioned in his note that during the course of hearing his views and views of Amar Dutt, J. were known to me. It is

clear from the note and which is a fact also that there was no interaction between Hon''ble the Chief Justice and the Judges constituting the Bench

at any time after the judgment was reserved either on 19.5.2004 or 19.1.2005. The note is clearly suggestive of the fact that the views of the Chief

Justice and Amar Dutt, J. were known to me and same became known to me during the course of hearing only. It may be the understanding of the

Hon''ble Chief Justice and other Hon''ble Judge constituting the Bench but how, simply in view of the observations made during the course of

hearing, which were both for and against, a conclusion has been drawn that their views were known to me, is not understandable to me atleast.

The observations made in the Court are always tentative.

Be that as it may, after conclusion of the arguments, on either of the occasions, as mentioned above, there was no discussion in the chamber on

that date or at any point of time thereafter.

At this stage, I would like to make a mention of a similar situation which arose when one of the most important judgments was to be delivered

by Hon''ble Supreme Court in Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, . This judgment has a similar dissenting note as given by

me by Hon''ble Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar (as he then was). This is a decision by a Constitution Bench and was heard for a long time, during the

course of which, it is quite understandable, that all the Judges, constituting the Bench, must have made their observations. It is quite clear from

reading of the minority view recorded by Hon''ble Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar that the Hon''ble Judges, holding the majority view and those, who

were holding the minority view, was known, even though it is not true in the present case. Hon''ble Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar received the

judgment prepared by majority of the Judges on a day Hon''ble Chief Justice was to retire. When the judgment of majority was circulated and

came before Hon''ble Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar, he recorded as follows:

Challappan having held the field for such a long time, it would have been appropriate if a meeting of the Judges constituting the Bench had been

convened to seriously deliberate and evolve a consensus as to whether or not to over-rule it. A give and take of ideas, with due respect for the

holders of the opposite point of view (in a true democratic spirit of tolerance), with willingness to accord due consideration to the same, would not

have impaired the search for the true solution. Or hurt the cause of justice. The holders of the rival view points could have, perhaps successfully

persuaded and converted the holders of the opposite point of view. Or got themselves persuaded and converted to the other point of view.

Hon''ble Judge then mentioned the similar feelings expressed by Justice Madon, to whom the judgment was assigned by the learned Chief Justice

and mentioned that he too appears to suffer heart-ache on the same score, for, in his covering letter dated July 6, 1985, forwarding the first

instalment of judgment, he had mentioned as under:

I regret to state that the draft judgment could not be sent to you earlier. The reason was that as we did not have a meeting to discuss this matter, I

did not know what would be the view of my other brothers on the large number of points which fall to be determined in these cases, except partly

in the case of two my Brothers with whom by change I got an opportunity to discuss certain broad aspects.

... If only there had been a meeting in order to have a dialogue, there might have been a meeting of minds, and we might have spoken in one voice.

Failing which, the holders of the dissenting view point could have prepared their dissenting opinions. That was not to be. On the other hand, it has

so transpired, that, the full draft judgment running into 237 pages has come to be circulated in the morning of July 11, 1985, less than 3 hours

before the deadline for pronouncing the judgment. There is a time-compulsion to pronounce the judgment, on 11th July, 1985, as the learned Chief

Justice who has presided over the Constitution Bench is due to retire on the day, and the judge-time invested by the five Judges would be wasted if

it is not pronounced before his retirement. The judge-time would be so wasted because the entire exercise would have to be done afresh. The

neck-to-neck race against time and circumstances is so keen that it is impossible to prepare an elaborate judgment presenting the other point of

view within hours and circulate the same amongst all the Judges constituting the Bench in this important matter which was heard for months, moths

ago. I am, therefore, adopting the only course open to me in under taking the present exercise.

Hon''ble Mr. Justice M.P. Thakkar, in the circumstance, as made out from the quoted passages above, dissented with the majority view and

was not able to give a reasoned order.

As mentioned above, from the note appended by Hon''ble Chief Justice, it is quite apparent that there was no interaction between the Judges

at any given point of time. The observations for and against on both occasions when arguments were heard, were made by all the Judges.

Assuming such observations represented only one point of view, how a conclusion could be drawn that the maker of the observation had a fixed

mind. There was no occasion whatsoever for me, in the facts and circumstances, as mentioned above, to conclude, on my own, without being told,

that view of Hon''ble the Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J. was that the High Court would have no power u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash an FIR with regard to non-compoundable offence, even when the parties have settled their

disputes.

Re-hearing of the case on 19.1.2005, it appears, resulted into modification of the draft judgment by incorporating the following paragraph,

which is in tune with my views, even though effect of the same was diluted in subsequent paragraphs:

Therefore, we would not like to launch an exercise for determining the scope of judicial intervention as provided u/s 482 of the Code in view of the

terms ""abuse of the process of law"" and ""in the interest of justice"", as it would not be proper for us to provide a straightjacket formula for

channelising judicial responses to the facts and the circumstances of a given case. It would be more appropriate that the interpretation of these

terms is left open to the response of an Hon''ble Judge to the facts and circumstances of a given case, as and when this Court is called upon to

intervene in any matter for preventing the abuse of the process of law and advancing the ends of justice.

Amar Dutt, J. telephoned me on 11.2.2005 at 8.30 AM that he was changing his judgment by providing an exception when High Court could

quash an FIR which would be with regard to matrimonial disputes in view of the judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi''s case (supra).

Assuming that even the views of the Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J. were known to me, it is too well known that it would have been

impossible for me to write a dissenting note if I was not to go through the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. Was it not possible for me to agree

with the views expressed by Amar Dutt, J. despite my view to the contrary if the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J., was so persuasive so as to

leave no scope for dissent ? Again, while dissenting, was it possible for me, without coming to know the exact reasons, on the basis of which view

in law had been taken by Amar Dutt, J. to record my own reasons ? In no circumstances, I state, I could prepare a judgment without receiving the

judgment taking a contrary view.

The records based facts, as fully detailed above, would manifest that observations of Hon''ble Chief Justice, that the draft judgment was sent to

me several months ago is not correct. The desire to re-hear the matter was made by me in fact immediately after receipt of the draft judgment

which was received on 8.11.2004 and re-hearing order was passed on 9.11.2004. It would further show that the information in the note prepared

by Hon''ble Chief Justice with regard to Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J. having expressed their views, at the most, is an impression gathered by

them and even if the same may be true, it was not possible for me to write the judgment unless I was to receive the reasoned majority judgment.

In wake of the facts and circumstances of the case, as mentioned above, when I was told on telephone at 8 AM on 10.2.2005 by Hon''ble the

Chief Justice that he had received the judgment prepared by Amar Dutt, J. and the same has to be pronounced on 11.2.2005, all that I could say

was that if, after re- hearing of the case, there may be change of view from the one taken in the draft judgment, there would be no difficulty in my

reading the judgment and pronouncing the same on 11.2.2005, but, in case, the view that might have been taken even after re-hearing, was to be

the same, I shall have to write my own judgment, which shall take time. Neither at that time nor at 3.45 PM on the same day, when I was asked to

discuss some Legal Services Authority matter with Hon''ble the Chief Justice in his chamber, I was ever told that the reasons for my view to be

given later, would cause anguish to Hon''ble the Chief Justice. My humble request for pronouncing the judgment on 14.2.2005, during which

period I would have given my reasoned judgment, was not acceded to on the ground of indefinite availability of Hon''ble the Chief Justice on the

said date, even though an important judgment was pronounced by Hon''ble the Chief Justice on 14.2.2005.

Hon''ble the Chief Justice, in the note appended by him has referred to judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar,

dealing with delay in delivery of judgments and role of the Chief Justice. How would this judgment have any bearing on the facts of this case, is not

understandable to me. All reserved judgments, that came to be disposed of by a Full Bench, in which I was member with Hon''ble the Chief Justice

or by a Division Bench consisting of myself and Chief Justice, but for one, have been authorised (authored ?) by me. judgments in all these matters

were circulated by me in a matter of days. It is a different matter that the pronouncements took place later because of paucity of time with Hon''ble

Chief Justice to read those judgments. In the present case, a draft judgment, changed later on twice over, was received by me on 8.11.2004. The

facts of the case, detailed above, do reveal clearly as to who delayed the judgments and it is for that reason that I am saying that judgment of the

Hon''ble Supreme Court in Awani Rai''s case (supra) has no parity on facts with the present case.

Hon''ble the Chief Justice has also referred to another judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Jagdev

Singh Talwandi, . The matter therein pertained to detention of Shri Jagdev Singh Talwandi. Detention matters, every one knows, are so urgent that

they are listed on top priority inasmuch as liberty of an individual is involved in such cases. The writ filed by him was dismissed by the High Court

without giving reasons. How could that judgment have any bearing on the facts of the present case, is again not understandable to me. Hon''ble

Chief Justice has also referred to a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Zahira Habibula H. Sheikh''s case (supra). The same too would have

no bearing upon the facts of this case. In the present matter, only an academic question was under debate which was to be determined. As

mentioned above, there were no parties before us. Reference was made by me from some matters pending in the trial Court at Narnaul. There was

absolutely no urgency in determining the question of law, even though it is a different matter that every lis in the Court needs expeditious disposal.

Hon''ble the Chief Justice, speaking for himself and Amar Dutt, J., has said in the note that their views were known to me during the course of

hearing. I have already made my comments with regard to the same and observations made by the Judges, constituting the Bench, during the

course of hearing. If, however, the views of Hon''ble the Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J., which are said to have been made known to me were so

static that there was no scope even for a pin to go, even after reading my judgment, then, with utmost respect, I state, it cannot be a case where

Hon''ble the Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J. might have been deprived of reading the reasoned judgment that I have prepared now. Reading of

such judgment would have been only a casual one, without the consequences, which normally are attached in reading the judgment before

pronouncement. Factually, however, it remains true that Hon''ble Chief Justice and Amar Dutt, J. have not gone through the judgment prepared by

me.

Order accordingly.