Dhanraj vs State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Heard.

Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with consent of learned counsel for the respective parties.

The present revision is filed against the order dated 24.11.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Court, Amravati in Criminal Appeal No.100 of 2023 thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the applicant, against the order dated 20.04.2023 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati, in Regular Criminal Case No.665 of 2014, whereby the non-applicant/accused was acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”).

The First Information Report being Crime No.282 of 2013 was filed in pursuant to order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Amravati under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking directions to register the FIR for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 406 of the IPC.

The complainant Dhanraj Nagdive had alleged that non-applicant No.2/accused Rambhau Patil was the President of the Pradnya Magasvargiya Gruh Nirman Sahakari Sanstha, Amravati. The plot No.8-B of the said society was sold to one Harihar Anasane for a consideration of Rs.70,000/- without obtaining consent of the other members of the society by preparing false and forged documents. It was the allegations in the FIR that the said plot was originally allotted to one Chandrapal Meshram. The chargesheet came to be filed after completion of investigation and the non-applicant Rambhau Patil was charged for the aforesaid offences. The prosecution has examined four witnesses and the complainant was one of the witnesses. After conducting the trial, the learned trial Court was pleased to acquit non-applicant No.2 vide judgment and order dated 20.04.2023.

The complainant has thereafter filed an appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being Criminal Appeal No.100 of 2023. During the pendency of such appeal, application under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. was filed seeking permission from the Appellate Court to lead additional evidence by examining the alleged original purchaser Chandrapal Meshram.

The said application Exh.21 filed under Section 391 of the Cr.P.C. for permission to lead additional evidence for examining Chandrapal Meshram came to be rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati vide order dated 21.07.2025. The applicant challenged the said order by filing writ petition before this Court being Criminal Writ Petition No.694 of 2025. This Court vide its order dated 09.09.2025, dismissed the writ petition by holding that the petitioner cannot be permitted to lead additional evidence at the appellate stage, as the petitioner was part and parcel of the entire criminal proceedings since inception and failed to exercise due diligence. The application for leading additional evidence would amount to filing up lacuna in the prosecution case to the complainant.

The Criminal Appeal No.100 of 2020 was thus decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati vide impugned judgment dated 24.11.2025 as per evidence available on record. The appellant is thus challenging the said acquittal by filing the present revision.

The learned counsel for the applicant submits that the delay in filing an application for leading evidence cannot be attributed to the complainant as though the offence was registered on 22.05.2013, the chargesheet was filed on 21.07.2014, the charges came to be framed on 11.02.2021. The complainant was examined on 19.03.2022 and the judgment of the trial Court was pronounced on 24.04.2023. It is only after the judgment was passed by the learned trial Court on 24.04.2023 acquitting the respondent accused on the ground that Chandrapal Meshram was not examined, gave a cause of action to the applicant to file an application. The fact that the applicant has filed the application belatedly could not have been a ground for rejection of the appeal against acquittal. Even otherwise, the applicant was able to show that the respondent accused has forged the document and audit report of the year 2006-07 only with an intention to commit fraud and cheat the society. The impugned order of acquittal therefore calls for interference of this Court under its revisional jurisdiction. He therefore prays for setting aside impugned order of acquittal.

As against this, the learned counsel for the non-applicant No.2/respondent No.2 Mr. Yash Bhelande strongly opposes the present application. The learned counsel for the respondent No.2 submits that the Appellate Court has applied its mind to the entire evidence led by the prosecution. The applicant has examined four witnesses including himself and after evaluating the evidence led by the complainant, the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent as the complainant failed to establish the guilt beyond doubt. The learned trial Court has not acquitted the respondent only on the ground of non-examination of Chandrapal Meshram. However, the learned trial Court has also recorded the fact that in the cross-examination of the complainant, the complainant has admitted that there was no complaint made either by the auditor or the District Deputy Registrar about tampering of the records by the applicant. The complainant has however admitted in his cross-examination that though transaction pertaining to the plot of Anasane and Meshram was undertaken however there was no such complaint filed by them. The non-examination of Chandrapal Meshram was only one of the grounds on which the learned trial Court has acquitted the applicant amoungst several such consideration as reflected in the impugned judgment dated 20.04.2023 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati in R.C.C. No.665 of 2014. The Appellate Court had also applied its mind to the fact that the respondent was acquitted and considering the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, has dismissed appeal by detailed order. The Appellate Court has specifically observed that the prosecution, i.e., the complainant herein, has failed to examine the auditor and the witnesses whose names the appellant had referred to in his evidence. Therefore, the evidence of appellant being hearsay is not sufficient to prove the charges against respondent No.2. Upon such consideration, the appeal came to be rejected.

The contention of the applicant that the appeal came to be rejected on the ground that this Court had dismissed the writ petition challenging the rejection of the application filed under Section 391 of Cr.P.C. is therefore misconceived and liable to be rejected. The revision application being devoid of substance and merit deserves to be dismissed.

I have gone through the impugned judgment dated 24.11.2025 as well as the judgment dated 20.04.2023 thereby acquitting the respondent accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatesan ..vs.. Rani and another^{11.2013 SCC OnLine SC 743} was pleased to observe that the scope for interference in the appeal against acquittal is very limited. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatesan (supra) was pleased to observed as under:-

Thus, from perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it can be held that a revision can be entertained and the impugned order of acquittal can be interfered only if there is any procedural irregularity or material evidence which has been overlooked or misdirected by the subordinate Court. After reappraisal of the evidence, if two views are possible, it is not permissible even for the appellate Court in appeal against acquittal to interfere with the same much less in the revision where the powers are much narrow. Perusal of both the judgments passed by the learned trial Court dated 24.11.2025 passed in Criminal Appeal No.100 of 2023 and judgment dated 20.04.2023 passed in R.C.C. No.665 of 2014 does not show any material, irregularity or perversity which would result in miscarriage of justice. The applicant herein has failed to examine not only the attesting witnesses but also the so called purchaser of the plot. The complainant has given several admissions in his cross-examination which are referred to and relied upon by the trial Court to acquit the respondent. There is no error on the face of record. The applicant has thus failed to make out any case for interference of this Court under the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. The application is therefore devoid of substance of merit and is hereby dismissed.

Rule is discharged.