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Judgment
Khan J.
The short point that falls for consideration in this appeal is: Whether Sections 5 and 14 of the State Limitation Act, are available in computing the
period of Limitation of an appeal under the Central public premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short, the Central Act)?
It arises in this way: Appellant is a licensee of a shop in Hotel Ashok, Jammu, belonging to respondent No. 1. His license was to last for three
years vide agreement dated 141983expirableon3131986. On the expiry of his license, eviction proceedings were initiated against him by the
Estates Officer under the Central Act. He reacted by filing writ petition No. 957/86 in this Court and obtained interim stay order against his
eviction. This order was subsequently modified by a Division Bench of this Court providing as under:
.....Respondent (TTDQ shall be at liberty to take possession of the shop in question from the petitioner subject to the result of writ petition in
accordance with the procedure established by law...
It appears that pursuant thereto fresh eviction proceedings were taken against the appellant and the order of eviction passed on 361988. He
appealed against this order before District Judge, Delhi, on 1661988, when under Sec.9 of the Central Act, he was required to file this appeal
before the District Judge where the premises was situated i.e., District Judge, Jammu. This appeal naturally was dismissed on 981988 on the point
of lack of jurisdiction.
Appellant thereafter filed a fresh appeal on 1381988 before Addl. District Judge, Jammu, and Awhile doing so, did not seek condonation of
delay. However, he filed an application for condonation of delay on 1811989 under Sees. 5 and 14 of th3 State Limitation Act. On consideration,
his appeal was dismissed as time barred by order dated 1991992 on the ground that neither of the two sections were applicable in computing the
period of limitation for filing appeal. Aggrieved by this he filed O.W.P. No.889/92inthis Court which was also dismissed vide order dated
1721994 upholding the stand taken by the Addl. District Judge. He has now filed this appeal to assail the order of learned Single Judge on variety
of grounds. Some of the relevant grounds taken are: (a) that the impugned Judgment had been passed without hearing on 1721994 and no
rejoinder was obtained from the appellant; (b) that the appeal is a continuation of the suit and consequently Sec. 14 of the State Limitation Act was
available for computation of the period of limitation of appeal; (c) that even in the absence of Sec. 14 the Courts below should have condoned the
delay under Sec. 5 as good cause had been shown by the appellant; and (d) that the appellant could not be punished for the wrong advice of his
advocate.
Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant pressed only two grounds into service. According to him, even when Sec. 14 was not attracted,
the appellate Court should have condoned the delay keeping in regard the circumstances provided in Sec. 5 of the State Limitation Act.
Alternatively he urged that the appeal being continuation of the suit, there was no impediment in the application of Sec. 14 while computing the
period of limitation of the appeal. He relied upon AIR 1962 SC 361, AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana 229 and some Judgments of this Court
including 1983 KLJ 18, 1981 KLJ 42 and 1979 JKLR 686.
The grounds taken and the submissions made, in our view, are misconceived and misdirected. It should be taken well settled by now that
Section 14 in terms does not apply in computing the period of limitation of an appeal. This is clear from the text of the provision itself clauses (!)
and (2) of which significantly omit the Appeal from its purview and specifically make it applicable only to a suit and an application. The relevant
portion of these clauses is extracted as hereunder:
14(l) Income putting the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence
another civil proceeding....
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant had been prosecuting with due diligence
an other civil proceeding...
A bare perusal of these provisions goes to show that the Appeal is specifically excluded from their purview. Holding otherwise would be to rewrite
these provisions and to provide for which was not intended by the legislation.
Mr. Gupta's submission that the appeal is the continuation of a suit may be correct in principle. But, it cannot be stretched to apply the
provisions of the Limitation Act where such provisions are not specifically applicable when the Act itself makes a segregation and categorization of
the types of proceedings. This would be dear from the three different divisions contained in 1st Schedule appended to the State Act as also from
its substantive provisions making dear distinction between the Suits, Appeals and Applications. If Mr. Gupta's contention was to be accepted, the
provisions relating to suits would ipso facto become applicable to Appeals rendering the provisions regarding Appeals redundant. This surely is not
the intent and scheme of the Act.
The next argument that the appellate Court should have taken in regard the requirements of Sec.5 in the event of nonapplication of Sec. 14, is
also misdirected. It requires to be borne in mind that though Sec.5 of the Act, is applicable to Appeals but its operation in respect of special laws is
exuded by Sec. 29 of the Act. This Section makes the provisions contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 only applicable to Special Acts to the
extent they are not expressly exuded by such Act. There is no dispute that the Central public premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, is
a Special Act attracting the provisions of the State Limitation Act only to the extent provided in Sec. 29. Therefore, once Sec. 29 excludes the
application of Sec.5, its provisions cannot be pressed in aid for condonation of delay. In the circumstances we hold that the provisions of Sections
5 and 14 of the State limitation Act have no application for the purposes of computing the period of limitation of an Appeal under the Central Act.
It is a different matter that under Sec.9 of the Central Act, appellant could have sought condonation of delay by satisfying the appellate Court
that he was prevented from filing the appeal within time by a sufficient cause. He has admittedly not done so. If his application be treated as an
application under this provision, it does not dispose any sufficient cause. We have perused this application wherein the only case set up by him was
that he had filed the appeal in the Court of District Judge at Delhi, under the mistaken advice of his lawyer. This application is not supported by any
affidavit of the lawyer concerned and, therefore, lacks in bona fides. It appears to us in the totality of circumstances that the appellant has been
resting his eviction on one plank or the other and that even when the Appeal made under the Central Act was provided before the District Judge at
Jammu, it seems to have been filed at Delhi to gain time and prolong the eviction. Appellant's diversion, therefore, to file the Appeal at Delhi does
not appeal to be wellintentional and smacks of his design to avoid the inevitable. In the circumstances we are of the view that the appellant has
failed to make out any sufficient cause for the delay in filling his Appeal before the Competent Forum.
We, therefore, reject this appeal in limine without any order as to costs.