Dhananjoy Tripura And Ors vs State Of Tripura

[1] On the basis of written complaint dated 19th May, 2019, an FIR was registered at East Agartala Women P.S. Case No.19/2019, under Sections 417/376 IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

[2] The complainant being Smt. Sumi Debbarma and the accused being Sri Dhananjoy Tripura, both as petitioners in the present petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seek quashing of the very same FIR.

[3] It is a matter of record that anticipatory bail filed by the first petitioner namely, Sri Dhananjoy Tripura was rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 31st May, 2019 in A.B. No.45 of 2019 titled as Sri Dhananjoy Tripura Versus The State of Tripura for the reason that the investigation was at premature stage and it was to be ascertained as to whether petitioner No.2, namely, Smt. Sumi Debbarma had surrendered her chastity on the basis of misconception of fact in his favour or not.

[4] It is also a matter of record that since the year 2011, both the parties have been maintaining extremely personal and cordial relationship. They have been living together with breaks, for a sufficiently long period of time. Also some time in the year 2017, ceremony of engagement was solemnized, whereafter, allegedly for the reason that petitioner No.1 namely, Sri Dhananjoy Tripura was elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), he refused to solemnize the marriage.

[5] From the joint petition filed by the parties, it is apparent that on 12th July, 2019 parties have solemnized their marriage and are happily residing together. Such marriage stands registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. Also parties have requested for closure of the proceedings pending investigation.

[6] The State has no objection to the quashing of the FIR.

[7] The sole issue which arises for consideration in this petition is, as to whether at the time of the petitioner wife, submitting her chastity to her husband, her consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact arising out of promise to marry or not. Precisely was it a false promise or not.

[8] The law on quashing of the FIR is now well settled.

[9] The Apex Court way back in State of Haryana & others Versus Bhajan Lal & others, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 (2 Judge Bench) has extensively dealt with the cases where quashing may be appropriate which reads under :

"102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

[10] The principle stands reiterated in Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar Versus State of Maharashtra & Others (2019) CRI. L. J. 1169 (2 Judge Bench) which is reproduced as under :

"it is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the compliant do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers."

[11] Significantly, the Apex Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar versus The State of Maharashtra & others, MANU/SC/1142/2019 (2 Judge Bench) had the occasion to deal with a case similar to the one in hand. There the parties were seeking quashing of FIR registered under Sections 376, 417, 504 and 506(2) IPC and Sections 3(1)(u)(w) and 3(2)(vii) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 and after considering its several decisions rendered in, Kaini Rajan Versus State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113 (2 Judge Bench), Anurag Soni Versus State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2019 SC 1857 (2 Judge Bench), Deepak Gulati Versus State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675 (2 Judge Bench), Yedla Srinivasa Rao Versus State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 11 SCC 615 (2 Judge Bench), Uday Versus State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 (2 Judge Bench) by summarizing the law in the following terms, quashed the FIR :

"To summarize the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."

[12] Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the considered view that the prayer needs to be allowed. It is an admitted case of the parties that since the year 2011, parties had acquired familiarity and developed personal relationship, both emotional and physical. Since then, they have been maintaining relationship and at times the wife has been visiting the house of her husband, "as if they were unmarried at that time" and spending days maintaining all sorts of relationship. The engagement took place much thereafter. Both were in love with each other and as is so submitted by Sri P.K. Biswas learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, it was subsequently that they decided to marry. Also the allegation of dowry demand is not borne out from the record or prima facie found to be correct by the investigator. The consent was not obtained by a misconception of fact arising out of promise to marry.

[13] As such, this Court finds no hurdle in accepting the prayer as prayed for, and quashing the FIR. Ordered accordingly.

[14] As such FIR No.19/2019, registered at East Agartala Women Police Station under Sections 417/376 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, stands quashed and set aside.

[15] In view of above, petition stands disposed of. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. Record be sent back immediately.