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Judgment
M. Karpagavinayagam, J.—The detenu has been detained by the order dated 02.06.2003 branding him as a goonda. The impugned order is sought to be quashed in this Habeas Corpus Petition by the wife of the detenu.
The ground urged in this Habeas Corpus Petition is that there is only a solitary instance, which culminated into registration of the case u/s 397 IPC and other adverse cases would relate to the incidents which took place on various dates, for which three cases have been registered u/s 379 IPC.
On going through the records, we are of the view that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2003 SCC (Cri) 537) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case. The relevant observation made by the Supreme Court is thus:
In the present case, the three alleged incidents to which the Commissioner of Police has referred to are thefts arising u/s 379 IPC and, therefore, there is only a solitary instance wherein the detenu is alleged to have robbed in a public place, one Kumar. Therefore, there is no material on record to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community in the locality or disturb general peace and tranquility or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. Though in the grounds of detention the detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected the even tempo of life of the community, but citation of these words in the order of detention is more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any significance to the content of the matter Thus, a solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for the purpose of preventing the Petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This ground is enough to quash the order of detention made by the Respondents.
In the facts of the present case, there are three adverse cases, which would relate to the offence of theft arising u/s 379 IPC. As such, the ground case is only a solitary instance, wherein the case has been registered u/s 397 IPC. The facts of the case before the Supreme Court referred to above, are more or less same as in the ground case. As observed by the Supreme Court, a solitary instance of robbery, which is mentioned in the grounds of detention, cannot be said to be relevant for sustaining the impugned order of detention. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the order of detention is vitiated.
Therefore, in our view, the detention order would get vitiated. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless he is required in connection with any other case.