High CourtsDivision Bench(2020) 01 DEL CK 1784

DG, Doordarshan & Anr. vs Karan Singh

Delhi High Court · Decided on 14 January 2020

HON’BLE JUDGES
S. Muralidhar, J · Talwant Singh, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
W.P.(C) 9194/2018, CM APPLs. 35380/2018 (stay) and 35381/2018 (delay); W.P.(C) 9199/2018, CM APPLs. 35393/2018 (stay) and 35394/2018 (delay)

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Judgment

17 paragraphs · 1,685 words
1.

The Director General, Doordarshan, and the Union of India through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting have filed the present petitions challenging a common order dated 28th April, 2017 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi ('CAT') disposing of OA Nos. 3891/2014 and 3892/2014 filed by the Respondents herein with a direction to the Petitioners to grant to the Respondents the same benefit of regularization as was granted to 2 other persons, Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma and Mr. K. L. Kamboj, who were the juniors of the 2 Respondents in the same department.

2.

At the outset, it requires to be noticed that along with the present petitions, the Petitioners have filed CM APPLs. 35381/2018 and 35394/2018 seeking condonation of delay of 362 days in filing these petitions.

3.

According to learned counsel for the Petitioners, this Court had, on the very first date, i.e. 31st August, 2019, condoned the delay. However, the order dated 31st August, 2019 reflects notice having been issued in the main writ petition as well as the application for stay and condonation of delay. There is no subsequent order of this Court actually condoning the delay.

4.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners then drew the attention of the Court to a “brief chronology”, which was handed over across the bar, purporting to explain the delay. This was felt necessary to explain the inordinate delay in filing the writ petitions, for which sufficient reasons had not been provided in the applications for condonation of delay itself. The chronology reflects that after the impugned order was passed by the CAT on 28th April, 2017, it took nearly 6 months, i.e. until 11th October, 2017 for even a decision to be taken by the Petitioners to file the present writ petitions challenging the decision of the CAT. This delay of nearly 6 months has not been explained except by saying that the “department followed due procedure” to bring the impugned order to the knowledge of the competent authorities. The delay thereafter, i.e. from 11th October, 2017 to 29th May, 2018, when the writ petitions were actually filed, has again not been satisfactorily explained. All that has been said is that various reminders were sent to the Standing Counsel for the Petitioners to draft and file the petition.

5.

The Supreme Court has in a series of orders explained the need for the Department to explain every day’s delay, and has further held that delay on account of administrative reasons will not be accepted as a satisfactory explanation. This is the position that emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563. There, the Supreme Court discussed a series of its earlier decisions on the circumstances in which delay in filing by Government Departments could be condoned and observed as under:

“12.

It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a Special Leave Petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with Court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

13.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government Departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.”

6.

The Supreme Court has in State of UP through Executive Engineer v. Amar Nath Yadav (2014) 2 SCC 422 following the aforesaid position laid down in Living Media India (supra) declined to condone the delay by the State of UP in filing its Special Leave Petition. More recently in its order dated 9th May 2019 in SLP (C) 13348 of 2019 (State of Bihar v. Deo Kumar Singh), while declining to condone the delay in filing the said SLP, the Supreme Court observed:

“We are of the view that a clear signal has to sent to the Government Authorities that they cannot approach the Court as and when they please, on account of gross incompetence of their officers and that too without taking any action against the concerned officers.”

7.

Consequently, the Court is not satisfied with the explanation offered for the inordinate delay in filing the petitions.

8.

Nevertheless, the petitions have also been examined on merits. The short issue before the Tribunal was whether the 2 Respondents herein, both of whom were appointed on 1st December, 1983 i.e. more than 3 decades prior to the filing of their original applications in the CAT, as casual artists, were entitled to regularization in terms of a scheme dated 9th June, 1992 formulated for that purpose. Both the Respondents relied on the fact that in an earlier OA No. 2484/1993 filed by one Mr. K. L. Kamboj, another casual Artist and Floor Assistant, the CAT had granted the relief of regularization by an order dated 14th July, 1999 from the date of the initial engagement, i.e. 1st October, 1985. Another person, namely Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma had also filed an OA No. 466/2010 for the same relief, which had again been allowed by the CAT. Both those orders were not challenged by the Petitioners and were implemented. It was able to be demonstrated by the present Respondents before the CAT that both Mr. K. L. Kamboj and Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma had been engaged after the present Respondents had been engaged. In other words, they were junior to the present Respondents.

9.

The Court finds that the objection taken by the Petitioners herein to the prayer made by the Respondents was on the basis that they were overage at the time of their initial engagement and further that Mr. K. L. Kamboj belonged to the Scheduled Caste ('SC') category in which there were vacancies available as on the initial date of his engagement. In fact, the Court finds that the plea of the Respondents being overage was taken in an entirely different context by the present Petitioners in their counter affidavit before the CAT. The precise averment in this regard in the counter affidavit reads thus:

“8.

That only when the Scheme was subsequently modified in 1994 that the services of the appellant were regularised from 01.11.1994. That Para 4 of the minutes of the regularization scheme dated 17.03.1994 provides that "the fault of recruiting over aged candidates lies with the Kendra and hot with the candidates. As such it would not be fair to deny regularization in such cases on this account. It was decided that the period for which the candidate was over-age at the time of initial recruitment should be condoned," That the services of the appellant in light of the abovementioned proviso was regularised as per the scheme of 1994.”

10.

It is thus seen that a conscious decision in terms of the regularization scheme was taken to condone the crossing of the age limit at the time of initial recruitment. That being the position, the first objection is not tenable. As far as the second objection is concerned, notwithstanding that Mr. K. L. Kamboj may have belonged to the SC category, the Petitioners are unable to deny that Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma was indeed granted the benefit of regularisation.

11.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court dated 25th April, 2007 in Civil Appeal No.1020/2005 (Nadia District Primary School Council v. Sristidhar Bisawas) submitted that the orders of this Court in W.P.(C) 8655/2011 (The Director General, Doordarshan v. Sudhir Kumar Sharma) had expressly stated that “this order shall not be treated as a precedent” and, therefore, the CAT was in error in relying upon the said order.

12.

Irrespective of the order of this Court in Director General, Doordarshan v. Sudhir Kumar Sharma, the Court finds that there was no justification for denying the Respondents herein the benefit of regularisation. Clearly, with the Respondents having been engaged earlier than Mr. Sudhir Kumar Sharma and with the relief granted to Mr. Sharma actually being implemented by the Petitioners, there is no reason why the same benefit ought not to be given to the Respondents here.

13.

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds no grounds made out for interference with the impugned order of the CAT on merits. The petition is dismissed both on the grounds of delay and on merits. The pending applications are also disposed of.