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Judgment
A.C. Rao, J
By way of the present petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ‘Code’), the petitioner prays for
quashing and setting aside the F.I.R. being C.R.No.11215038200104 of 2020 dated 20/03/2020 registered with Vaasad Police Station, District : Anand
for the offences punishable under Sections 394, 365, 171, 384, 504, 506(2) and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code.
The brief facts leading to filing of the present petition are as under :
It is alleged in the complaint that on 22.11.2019, the first informant, who is doing the business of trading for commission, was travelling on his
motorcycle. He was intercepted by a car which does not bear the number plate. It is alleged that three persons came out from the said car and robbed
the informant of Rs.40,65,200/-, which he was having as a parcel of foreign currency. It is alleged that the present petitioner had asked for Rs.10 Lacs
if complainant wanted the above parcel. Therefore, the aforesaid complaint was registered by the informant against the present petitioner. However,
the present petitioner is neither arrested nor the charge-sheet is filed against him, while the charge-sheet is filed against the three co-accused.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that according to Ms. Bela Prajapati, learned advocate for the respondent No.2 i.e. original complainant, the
dispute is compromised between the parties i.e. the complainant and the present petitioner and the respondent No.2 does not have any objection if the
FIR is quashed.
At the time of arguments, Mr. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that though it is alleged by the other side that there are
14 antecedents of the present petitioner but, in most of the cases, he is acquitted. It is contended that only two minor cases are pending, wherein minor
penalty is prescribed. The learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that the present petitioner is not the main accused and he is not involved
in the alleged robbery. The only allegation against the present petitioner is that he had shown the photograph of the other co-accused and demanded
Rs. 10 Lacs by cheque from the informant to recover the robbed amount from the other co-accused. It is contended that no cheque number is
mentioned in the entire charge-sheet. It is contended that the present petitioner is involved in a minor offence of threatening and the allegation against
the present petitioner is not genuine. It is vehemently contended that at the instance of the present petitioner other co-accused were arrested. It is
contended that on the other day, the complainant himself had given a public notice, wherein he has stated that the police has written a wrong complaint
and the petitioner has not asked anything from him and neither he was intimidated by the complainant.
4.1 In support of his submission, Mr. Mangukiya, learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the judgment of Honourable Apex Court in case of Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab [2012 10 SCC 303], in case of Prabhat Ahir v. State of Gujarat [2017 (9) SCC 641], in case of Nikhil Marchant v. CBI [2008
(9) SCC 677], in case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dhruv Gujjar [2019 (5) SCC 570] and in case of State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal &
Ors. [1992 Supp(1) SCC 335].
Per contra, Mr. Patel, learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondent â€" State has opposed the present petition and contended that on the
date of incident the present petitioner was in constant touch with the other co-accused on telephone. It is contended that from the phone records of
the petitioner, it reveals that since last one year the petitioner had made more than one thousand calls to the co-accused and there are many
antecedents of the present petitioner. Even after the registration of the present FIR, two other offences are registered with Anand Police Station
against the present petitioner. The petitioner has win-over the witnesses, therefore, the complaint may not be quashed.
5.1 In support of his submissions, the learned APP has relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Prabhat Ahir Vs. State of Gujarat
reported in 2017 (9) SCC 641 and in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Dhruv Gujjar reported in 2019 (5) SCC 570.
Heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length through video conference and also perused the case papers.
After considering rival submissions on merits, at this stage, it is required to take into consideration the decisions cited by learned counsel for the
respective parties, relevant paragraphs whereof are as under:-
[a] In case of Gian Singh (supra) relevant observation is as under:
“53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding
of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby
while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although
offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case
demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No
doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society
and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid
compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no
legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family
dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact
that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding
or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not
quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each
case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.
B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2, Manoj Sharma3 and Shiji alias Pappu33 do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal proceedings
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High
Court under Section
Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi1, Nikhil Merchant2, Manoj Sharma3 and Shiji alias Pappu33, this Court has
compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence
under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section482. The two powers are distinct and
different although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or
FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences
under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding
[b] In case of Prabhat Ahir (supra) relevant observation is as under:
“14 In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley5, the court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a 4
(2016) 1 SCC 389 5 (2016)1 SCC 376 woman “who was following the command of her husband†and had signed certain documents without
being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that:
“... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented
on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is,
there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether
pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge
or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case.
We say no more on this score…†“…A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the
potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that
when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system…†15 The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions :
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High
Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the
dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity
cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They
stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and
(ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a
financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
16 Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High Court was justified
in declining to entertain the application for quashing the First Information Report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has
adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the FIR
would subserve or secure the ends of justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the court. The first is that the appellants were absconding and
warrants had been issued against them under Section 70 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The second is that the appellants have criminal
antecedents, reflected in the chart which has been extracted in the earlier part of this judgment. The High Court adverted to the modus operandi
which had been followed by the appellants in grabbing valuable parcels of land and noted that in the past as well, they were alleged to have been
connected with such nefarious activities by opening bogus bank accounts. It was in this view of the matter that the High Court observed that in a case
involving extortion, forgery and conspiracy where all the appellants were acting as a team, it was not in the interest of society to quash the FIR on the
ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. We agree with the view of the High Court. The present case, as the allegations in
the FIR would demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a land transaction between two contesting parties. The case involves
allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents, utilization of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering
authorities and the deprivation of the complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are
construed as they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles to
or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in prosecuting serious
crime. In these circumstances, the High Court was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR which had been registered under Sections 384,
467, 468, 471, 120-B and 506(2) of the Penal Code.
[c] In case of Nikhil Marchant (supra) relevant observation is as under:
“. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the
compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied
that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the
continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.â€
[d] In case of State of Madhya Pradesh (supra)) relevant observation is as under:
“16. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
has quashed the FIRs for the offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27
of the Arms Act respectively, solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and the
stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that there is no chance
of recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the
respective FIRs.
16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were noncompoundable offences as per Section 320 of the
Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the
case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it
appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has
not at all considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the
case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement.
As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and
courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective
and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the respective FIRs by the High Court in the present cases for the
offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act
respectively, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of
decisions.
16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this Court has observed and held as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to
quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a
different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in
nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal
case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the
criminal proceeding.†16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian
Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving
adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly
and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such
cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime
against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding
factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter
case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this
stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still
on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the
offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a
heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.†16.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra),
again this Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has
been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is
attracted even if the offence is non compoundable.
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High
Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent
an abuse of the process of any court.
(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the
dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.
(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity
cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences. (7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an
overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and (10) There is yet an exception to the
principle set out in Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic wellbeing of the State have implications
which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender
is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance.†16.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to
the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections 25
and 27 of the Arms Act (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013), by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the
private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that where the
accused are facing trial under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act, as the offences are
definitely against the society, accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence. 16.6 In the case of
Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically observed that as offence under Section 307 IPC is noncompoundable and as the offence under Section 307
is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not
permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in the case of Kalyan Singh (supra).
Now so far as the decisions of this Court upon which the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has placed reliance, referred to
hereinabove, are concerned, none of the decisions shall be of any assistance to the accused in the present case. In all the aforesaid cases, the dispute
was a matrimonial dispute, and/or the dispute predominantly of a civil dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrong is basically private or personal.
Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective FIRs by observing that
as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an exercise in
futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the aforesaid ground. It appears that the High
Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every
case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive
and many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and
examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil
nature and/or is not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties,
which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is
not ready to support the allegations…will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed
‘that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to that
this Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such
circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the
courts below. Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High
Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in
cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be
justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that
power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate
evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the
inherent powers may be invoked.†18.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the
parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the
dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and
grave offences, having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 of the Arms Act etc. Therefore, without proper application of
mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the respective FIRs, by
observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility. The
High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant facts and
circumstances of the case.
It is further held that The High Court has also not considered the antecedents of the accused. It has come on record that the accused persons were
facing number of trials for the serious offences. The aforesaid would be relevant factors, while exercising the inherent powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C and while considering the application for quashing the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact, in such a situation, the High Court ought to
have been more vigilant and ought to have considered relevant facts and circumstances under which the accused got the settlement entered into. The
High Court has not at all considered the aforesaid relevant circumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
At this stage, it is required to take into consideration the decision in case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. reported in 1992
Supp(1) SCC 335, the Apex Court laid down the following guidelines where the power under Section 482 should be exercised. They are:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.â€
8.1 In the decision in case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre and Ors., [(1988) 1 SCC 692,] the Apex
Court observed as follows:-
“7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to
whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features
which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the
basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.â€
8.2 In the decision in case of Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdhary & ors. [(1992) 4 SCC 305], the Apex Court observed as follows:-
 “132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though
unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of
this power is based on sound principles.â€
Thus it is clear that power of quashing should be exercised with caution.
8.3 In the decision in case of R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta & Ors. [2009 (1) SCC 616], the Apex Court observed as follows:-
“15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are:
(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent 5 (1999) 8 SCC 686 6 (2009) 1 SCC 516 jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and,
in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety,
disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go
beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to
continue.
The submissions of the petitioner that the cheque number is not collected by I.O. that the Petitioner had only intimidated the complainant and he had
not hatched conspiracy though he was in constant touch on phone with other co-accused can not be considered at this juncture as it would amount to
appreciation of evidence. It is no more res- integra that exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC to quash a criminal proceeding is only when an
allegation made in the FIR or the charge sheet constitutes the ingredients of the offence/offences alleged. Interference by the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC is to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is settled law that the evidence
produced by the accused in his defence cannot be looked into by the Court, except in very exceptional circumstances, at the initial stage of the
criminal proceedings. It is trite law that the High Court cannot embark upon the appreciation of evidence while considering the petition filed under
Section 482 CrPC for quashing criminal proceedings. It is clear from the law laid down by this Court that if a prima facie case is made out disclosing
the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused, the Court cannot quash a criminal proceeding. Notice is discharged.