High CourtsSingle Bench(2013) 08 MP CK 0308

Devesh Dubey vs Sunil

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 5 August 2013

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.D. Rathi, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Cr.A No. 2613 of 2011

CourtKutchehry membership

More clarity. Every judgment.

Download court copies, explore connected cases and make more of every research session.

Loading membership options…

Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

9 paragraphs · 629 words

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This appeal has been preferred u/s 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 12.9.2011 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sohagpur, District Hoshangabad, in Sessions Trial No. 159/10, whereby respondent nos. 1 to 6 have been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 307, in alternative 307 /149, 294, 144 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short), while respondent nos. 4 to 6 have also been acquitted of the offence u/s 341 of the IPC. By that judgment only, respondent nos. 1 to 3 have been convicted under Sections 325 and 341 of the IPC and sentenced accordingly.

2.

Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 26.12.2009 at about 6 pm when appellant Devesh Dubey with his friend Pancham Gujar was returning from the Tahsil Office, Sohagpur on a Motorcycle, Sunil Purvaiya, Raghubir @ Raghav Purvaiya and Arvind Purvaiya intercepted the vehicle by giving a Lathi blow. When appellant tried to escape, the accused persons surrounded and beat him by Lathis whereby his hands and legs got broken. Thereafter, presuming that he had died, accused persons while abusing filthily, fled from the spot. Thereafter, appellant somehow managed to make a mobile call to his brother Dipesh as well as at Police Station Pipariya, on which Dipesh and his friend Aslam came and took him to Sohagpur hospital for treatment from where he was referred to Hoshangabad Hospital and on the next day, he was taken to Nagpur for treatment.

3.

Learned counsel for the appellant, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the impugned judgment deserves to be interfered with.

4.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the parties, we have gone through the impugned judgment and evidence on record.

5.

On going through the impugned judgment, it is apparent that the cause of incident was that.

6.

From perusal of the record, it is apparent that the incident took place on 26/12/09 and the statement of appellant was recorded on 17/2/10 i.e. after 11/2 months. In the said statement also, the appellant has not disclosed the names of respondent nos. 4 to 6 despite being acquainted with them. Further, Pancham Singh (PW7), examined as eye-witness to the incident, did not support the prosecution story and was declared hostile. Dipesh Dubey (PW6) testified that he was telephonically informed by his brother that he was beaten only by the three miscreants, who have already been convicted by the impugned judgment itself. Story of the prosecution that mobile phone was snatched from the pocket of appellant could also not be substantiated in absence of corresponding recital of the appellant in his police statement recorded u/s 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So far as the medical evidence is concerned, the doctor did not opine that the injuries sustained by the appellant were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause his death. Considering all this, the trial Court discarded the case of the prosecution and acquitted the respondents.

7.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

8.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

9.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The appeal, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.