Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition No.2) -Mumbai Suburban District Officer vs M/s. Vasinaka Sahakari Mandal & Anr.

This Land Reference is filed under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the claimants asking for higher compensation than what was granted in the Award. The acquired land is situated at Village Marvali, Taluka Kurla, Mumbai Suburban District. It was acquired for the public purpose of constructing the Mahul. Ghatkopar Road up to Panjarpole Junction as part of the Eastern Freeway project of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority. The acquisition process started on the basis of the notifications dated 3 April 1998 and 19 September 2011 issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No. 2, Mumbai Suburban District passed Award No. LAQ/SR-546 on 30 June 2012 and awarded compensation of Rs.2,44,65,435/-. The said amount was paid on 16 August 2012 to M/s. Vasinaka Sahakari Mandal. Notice of the Award under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was served upon the claimants on 6 September 2012. Possession of the acquired land had been taken on 12 July 2012 and was handed over to the acquiring body. As the claimants were not satisfied with the amount of compensation awarded, they submitted an application dated 21 August 2012 seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for determination of proper and fair compensation by this Court.

The facts leading to the present reference are these. The claimant is the owner of land bearing CTS Nos. 156 and 156/1 to 156/15, having a total area of 2641.2 square metres, situated at Village Marvali, Taluka Kurla, Chembur, Mumbai Suburban District. This land is referred to as the acquired land. Two declarations are relevant in the present case. The first is the Declaration dated 3 April 1998, which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 April 1998 and is referred to as the First Declaration or the 1998 Declaration. The second is the Declaration dated 19 September 2011, which was published in the Official Gazette on 29 September 2011 and is referred to as the Second Declaration or the 2011 Declaration. The Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No. 2, Mumbai Suburban District passed the Award on 30 June 2012. Thereafter, on 5 July 2012, the claimants received notices under Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Possession of the acquired land was taken from them on 12 July 2012. The Award was communicated to the claimants on 6 September 2012. Before that, on 16 August 2012, compensation of Rs.2,44,65,435/- was paid to the claimants. The amount was accepted without prejudice to their rights and contentions raised in Writ Petition No.1010 of 2010, in which they had challenged the acquisition proceedings on several grounds, including the contention that the acquisition had become invalid because of inordinate and unreasonable delay. During the pendency of the above Writ Petition, the claimants, by their letter dated 21 August 2012, sought a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Subsequently, by judgment dated 13 December 2023, the Division Bench disposed of Writ Petition No.1010 of 2010 and directed the Reference Court to decide the issues raised in the petition in terms of the amended prayer clauses (Aa) to (Ad), along with all other issues arising in the reference proceedings. Thereafter, the Special Leave Petition filed by the claimants, being SLP (C) Diary No.29820 of 2024, came to be dismissed on 29 July 2024. However, the Supreme Court expressly kept all issues open for consideration by the Reference Court, including the issue regarding the notification which should be treated as the relevant date for determination of compensation. Later, on 11 December 2025, the learned Single Judge of this Court rejected the preliminary objection raised by the MMRDA.

Mr. C.G. Gavnekar, learned Advocate appearing for the claimants, first invited my attention to Issue No. (i), namely, whether the document described as Corrigendum dated 19 September 2011, published on 21 September 2011, is merely a document correcting the designation of the authority which issued the notification dated 3 April 1998, published on 23 April 1998, or whether it is an independent declaration having its own effect. While dealing with this issue, learned counsel referred to the scheme of the MRTP Act and its relationship with the Land Acquisition Act. According to him, Chapter VII of the MRTP Act, consisting of Sections 125 to 129 read with Section 151, forms a code for implementing the objects of the Act, namely planned development of land and compulsory acquisition of land required for public purposes under the planning scheme. He submitted that Section 125 declares that land reserved or designated for a public purpose in a Regional Plan, Development Plan or Town Planning Scheme is deemed to be land required for a public purpose. Section 126(1) gives power to the Planning Authority or Development Authority to acquire such land by the methods prescribed therein or by making an application to the State Government. Under Section 126(2), the State Government is empowered to issue a declaration in the Official Gazette, though such declaration has to be made within one year, subject to Section 126(4). It was argued that Section 126(4) authorises the State Government to issue a fresh declaration if the earlier declaration is not made within the prescribed period, and provides that "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette for acquiring the land afresh." Learned counsel submitted that, unlike the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where strict timelines are prescribed between the notifications and the Award and failure to follow those timelines results in lapse of acquisition proceedings, acquisitions under the MRTP Act are regulated by its own provisions and the Land Acquisition Act applies only to a limited extent. He pointed out that Section 129 of the MRTP Act contains provisions relating to urgent acquisition and enables possession to be taken by applying the urgency provisions contained in Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, while requiring advance payment of compensation under Section 129(3). It was submitted that Section 151 empowers the State Government to delegate its powers under the Act by issuing a notification. According to the claimants, both the declarations dated 3 April 1998 and 19 September 2011 were issued by authorities acting under delegated powers conferred under Section 151. Therefore, each declaration is an independent notification having effect.

Learned counsel explained the meaning of the word "Corrigendum". He submitted that according to Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, a corrigendum means an error in a printed work discovered after publication and is described as an "Erratum". He relied upon the definition contained in Law Lexicon by Justice C.K. Thakker, Volume I, Page 1243, where "Corrigendum" is explained as "An additional message by way of printing for correction, depicting errors in the original printing or publication and giving details of correction". On the basis of these definitions, it was argued that a corrigendum is meant only to correct an existing error and cannot be treated as a fresh declaration unless its contents show that a new declaration has been made. In support of this submission, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Oil Mills Limited vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), reported in AIR 1990 SC 731. He submitted that the Supreme Court has held that the true nature of a notification must be gathered from its contents, and it has to be examined whether it merely corrects an error in the earlier notification or whether it brings about substantial changes affecting the entire character of the acquisition. Applying this principle, learned counsel argued that the declaration dated 19 September 2011, though described as a Corrigendum, does not correct any mistake or omission in the declaration dated 3 April 1998 because no such error existed. According to him, the declaration altered the earlier declaration and therefore amounts to a fresh declaration contemplated by law for acquisition of the land.

Learned counsel compared the language and contents of both declarations. He pointed out that the declaration dated 3 April 1998 was issued by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District, whereas the declaration dated 19 September 2011 was issued by the Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division. He submitted that the 1998 declaration was issued under Section 126(4) read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and records the satisfaction of the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District. In contrast, the 2011 declaration records the satisfaction of the Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division. Relying once again upon the decision in Hindustan Oil Mills Limited, it was argued that these changes are substantial in nature and are not mere corrections. According to the claimants, the declaration dated 19 September 2011 cannot therefore be treated as a simple corrigendum but must be regarded as a fresh declaration made in accordance with law.

Learned counsel submitted that a close reading of both declarations shows that they are and independent notifications. According to him, the 1998 declaration was issued by the Collector, Mumbai Suburban District, whereas the 2011 declaration was issued by the Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division. He pointed out that the first declaration was issued under Section 126(4) read with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act and records the satisfaction of the Collector. The second declaration, however, was issued under Sections 126(1), (2) and (4) read with Section 129, Sub Sections (1), (2) and (3) of the MRTP Act together with Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. He submitted that once it is accepted that Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act was invoked while issuing the second declaration, the consequence follows because the section provides that "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh". Learned counsel pointed out that the urgency provisions under Section 129 of the MRTP Act were invoked only in the second declaration and not in the first declaration. According to him, this shows that the second declaration was intended to operate independently. He submitted that the first declaration related to acquisition of 13,482 square metres of land for construction of the Mahul. Ghatkopar Road up to Panjarpole Junction for the Eastern Freeway. He pointed out that some of the awards passed pursuant to that acquisition had been challenged before this Court, including Land Reference No.1 of 2000.

On the basis of these submissions, learned counsel contended that Issue No.1 deserves to be answered in favour of the claimants by holding that the declaration dated 19 September 2011, though described as a Corrigendum, is in fact an independent declaration. According to him, that declaration constitutes the relevant date for determining the market value of the acquired land while calculating compensation. Learned counsel then invited my attention to Issue No. (ii), namely, whether, if the document dated 19 September 2011 is held to be an independent declaration and not merely a corrigendum, the market value of the acquired land is required to be determined with reference to that declaration, which was published in the Official Gazette on 21 September 2011.

Learned counsel submitted that Sub Section (4) of Section 126 of the MRTP Act permits the State Government to issue successive declarations. According to him, such a declaration becomes necessary when the concerned authority fails to the acquisition proceedings on the basis of the earlier declaration by passing the Award and paying compensation to the land owner. He submitted that there is no dispute that acquisition proceedings must be completed within a reasonable time. It was argued that even under the MRTP Act, 1966, the Courts have held that such proceedings are expected to be completed within two years. It was submitted that whenever a fresh declaration is issued under Section 126(4), the law provides that the market value of the acquired land has to be determined with reference to the date of the fresh declaration published in the Official Gazette for acquiring the land again. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhimandas Ambwani (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Delhi Power Company Limited & Ors., reported in (2013) 1 SCR 996. He submitted that while dealing with the Land Acquisition Act, the Supreme Court has held that:

On the strength of the above decision, learned counsel argued that once a subsequent declaration is issued by the competent authority, the earlier declaration loses its effect and stands superseded. According to him, in the present case , the market value of the acquired land must therefore be determined with reference to the second declaration dated 19 September 2011, published on 21 September 2011.

Determination of Market Value Learned counsel submitted that if Issue No.1 is answered in favour of the claimants, then the basis adopted by the Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) No.2 while passing the Award dated 30 June 2012 becomes unsustainable because the Award proceeds on the footing that the relevant date for determining market value was the declaration of 1998. According to him, once the second declaration is treated as an independent declaration, the market value has to be determined with reference to that declaration and not with reference to the earlier one.

Learned counsel submitted that the principles regulating compulsory acquisition of private property, particularly where there is an unreasonable delay in passing the Award, have been explained by the Supreme Court in Ramchand & Ors. v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44. According to him, the Supreme Court has held that where the Award is not made within a reasonable time and the acquisition proceedings are unduly delayed, the Court should balance the equities by granting damages under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 at the rate of 12% per annum, wherever such provision has been introduced by the concerned State. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions in support of the above submissions:

Learned counsel submitted that while deciding this issue, Articles 31A and 300A of the Constitution of India are required to be kept in view. According to him, although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a constitutional right. Therefore, whenever the State acquires private property without the owner's consent, the owner is entitled to receive just, fair and adequate compensation. He submitted that such compensation must represent the true market value of the land on the relevant date of acquisition and should be as close as possible to the date on which the Award is made. Learned counsel argued that the law expects an Award based on a declaration or notification to be passed within a reasonable period. According to him, the value of money decreases with the passage of time. Therefore, if an Award is passed after an unreasonable delay, the compensation awarded becomes only illusory and fails to adequately compensate the landowner, thereby violating the constitutional protection available under the above Articles.

Learned counsel submitted that in the present case the Award dated 30 June 2012 determines the market value on the basis of the declaration issued in 1998, though compensation was awarded only in the year 2012. According to him, because of this long delay, the compensation awarded has become wholly inadequate and merely illusory. It was submitted that if Issue No. (i) is decided in favour of the claimants and the second declaration is held to be an independent declaration, then the only consequence would be that the market value of the acquired land has to be determined with reference to the declaration issued in the year 2011.

Learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and Anr., reported in AIR 1988 SC 1652. He submitted that this judgment lays down the principles regulating proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. According to him, the Supreme Court has held that the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer is merely an offer and the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be considered by the Reference Court unless it is properly produced and proved before the Court. He submitted that a reference under Section 18 is an original proceeding in which the Court is required to determine the market value independently on the basis of the evidence placed before it. Proceeding on this basis, learned counsel argued that the acquiring body has failed to establish that the document described as "Corrigendum" dated 19 September 2011, published on 21 September 2011, merely corrected the designation of the competent authority. According to him, the claimants have successfully established that the said document is an independent declaration. He therefore submitted that this Court must determine the market value with reference to the declaration dated 19 September 2011. Consequently, the compensation offered under the Award dated 30 June 2012 cannot be treated as proper or adequate since it does not represent real, fair and just compensation, and therefore deserves to be enhanced. Learned counsel submitted that the claimant's land came under acquisition proceedings much earlier, namely from 4 March 1994, when the land was reserved for a public purpose under the Development Plan of M Ward, Mumbai, and the relevant notification was published in the Government Gazette.

It was submitted that under the provisions of the MRTP Act, 1966, the acquisition proceedings commenced from 4 March 1994. According to learned counsel, since the authorities failed to issue a notification under Section 126(2) within one year, they lost the right to acquire the land in the manner contemplated under Section 126(3)(i), (ii) and (iii). He argued that the proviso to Section 126(2) permitted the State Government to continue the acquisition only on the condition that compensation would be determined on the basis of the market value prevailing on the date of the declaration issued under Section 126(4). Therefore, instead of determining the market value as on 4 March 1994, it became necessary to determine the market value on the date of the declaration issued under Section 126(4), namely 3 April 1998, which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 April 1998. Learned counsel submitted that even after publication of the said declaration, the authorities failed to the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable time. According to him, the Supreme Court has held that such delayed proceedings become liable to be quashed. He relied upon the observations of the House of Lords in Birmingham City Corp. v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn. (Inc), (1969) 3 All ER; (1969) 3 WLR 389, wherein it was observed that acquisition proceedings should be conducted in such a manner that the owner receives the same value of the land as would have been available on the date of dispossession. In that context, the House of Lords observed:

Learned counsel submitted that the Supreme Court has observed that if private property is acquired under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act, 1966, the owner is entitled to receive compensation based upon the value of the property prevailing on the date of such declaration. According to learned counsel, in the present case the authorities failed to the acquisition proceedings within a reasonable period and thereby delayed payment of the market value to the claimants. He submitted that such delay has been held to be unreasonable, particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. regulateor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285, where completion of acquisition proceedings within two years was emphasised.

Learned counsel relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in K. Krishna Reddy v. Collector (LA), particularly paragraph 12, wherein it has been held:

Learned counsel therefore submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, particularly in Ram Chand & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 44, the claimants are entitled to claim damages on account of the inordinate and unreasonable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings. According to him, since the proceedings continued beyond two years from the date of publication of the declaration, the claimants became entitled to compensation for the loss suffered because of such delay. He submitted that such damages can be awarded under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act as compensation payable under Section 48A. According to him, while determining the total compensation, the Court must consider the loss suffered by the landowner because of the prolonged delay in completion of the acquisition proceedings.

Learned counsel lastly submitted that the State Government publishes Ready Reckoner values eyear for different properties situated in various cities, districts, and talukas. He pointed out that Ready Reckoner values relating to Mumbai for the years 2011 and 2012, together with the relevant sale instances, have been placed on record. According to him, on the basis of those sale instances and Ready Reckoner values, the average market value of land situated at Village Marvali has been worked out in the Statement of Claim. He submitted that the State Government generally adopts three methods while awarding compensation to landowners. The claimants are willing to accept compensation on the basis of the Ready Reckoner value or the Government Guidance Value. He submitted that, apart from such compensation, the claimants are entitled to damages for the delay in making the Award and are entitled to additional compensation on the value of the property together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum and all other benefits. It is for these reasons that the present reference has been filed.

Mr. Saket Mone, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the acquiring body, namely MMRDA, opposed the reference. He submitted that the corrigendum dated 19 September 2011 merely changed the designation of the authority issuing the notification and did nothing more. According to him, except for the change in the name of the authority, there was no alteration in the area of the land, its extent or any other material particulars. In support of this submission, he relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Raghunath and Others. Referring to the facts of that case, he submitted that a notification under Section 4 had been issued on 22 June 1982 and was followed by a declaration under Section 6 on 15 March 1983. another notification came to be issued in respect of some common lands. According to him, the Supreme Court treated the subsequent notification as a fresh notification because proceedings under Section 6 were required to be undertaken pursuant to that notification. Learned counsel then relied upon the decision in Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. and Another. He pointed out that in that case an original notification under Section 4 was issued on 26 April 1961, an erratum was published on 22 November 1962 and a fresh notification was issued on 28 February 1963, changing the extent of the land proposed to be acquired. He submitted that the Supreme Court held that the three notifications had changed the entire nature of the acquisition and therefore the fresh notification superseded the earlier one.

Learned counsel relied upon the judgment in Akkalkot Municipal Council. Referring to paragraph 36 of that decision, he submitted that the Division Bench found that the corrigendum had altered the extent of the land covered by the original notification and, therefore, the second notification was treated as superseding the earlier one. According to learned counsel, the present case stands on a different footing because the corrigendum dated 19 September 2011 has not changed the extent of the land, the area acquired or any other material particulars. He therefore submitted that the claimants are entitled only to compensation based upon the market value prevailing on the date of the first declaration and not on the basis of the declaration issued in the year 2011.

It appears that this issue affects entire Reference because on its answer depends from which date market value of acquired land is required to be taken. The dispute is whether document dated 19 September 2011, though described as "Corrigendum", was only made for correcting earlier declaration dated 3 April 1998 or whether it became one fresh declaration issued under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act. Therefore, before this Court starts examining evidence relating to market value, it first becomes necessary to find out the nature and effect of document dated 19 September .2011.

The learned Advocate appearing for the Claimants submitted that only heading written on a document cannot decide what that document is in law. According to him, though the document carries the name "Corrigendum", the Court has to see its substance, under which provision power is exercised, which authority has issued it and what consequence comes because of it. On the other hand, learned Advocate appearing for MMRDA argued that the document has done nothing except correcting designation of the competent authority. According to him, there is no change in land, no change in area, no change in reservation and no change in public purpose. Therefore, according to him, the declaration dated 3 April 1998 continues to remain the relevant declaration for deciding market value.

At the beginning, it becomes necessary to examine the scheme contained in Chapter VII of the MRTP Act because the answer to the present controversy has to come from the provisions enacted by the Legislature. Section 125 provides that where land is reserved or designated in the Regional Plan or Development Plan for public purpose, such land is treated as land required for public purpose. Thereafter, Section 126 provides different methods by which such land may be acquired. Under Section 126(2), the State Government gets authority to issue declaration in the Official Gazette if it is satisfied that such land is required for public purpose. However, the proviso to Section 126(2) places restriction that such declaration should not be made after expiry of one year from publication of draft plan, subject, however, to Section 126(4). In my view, Section 126(4) becomes important while deciding this issue. This provision says that where declaration is not made within prescribed period, the State Government may issue a fresh declaration and provides that "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh." The Legislature has used the words "fresh declaration". Immediately after that, it again uses the words "acquiring the land afresh". These expressions cannot be ignored as unnecessary words. Every expression used by Legislature is presumed to have some purpose. Therefore, whenever Section 126(4) is invoked, the scheme appears to contemplate acquisition by issuing a fresh declaration, and it shifts the relevant date for determining market value.

The learned counsel appearing for the claimants therefore argued that once Section 126(4) comes into operation, consequence follows and market value shifts to the date of fresh declaration. This submission, to some extent, follows the plain wording of Section 126(4). Even then, merely because Section 126(4) is referred to in a notification, it does not mean that every notification becomes an independent declaration. The Court has to examine the language used in the notification, its object and its overall effect. Therefore, this submission needs to be accepted only to that limited extent.

The next submission made by the claimants is that the document dated 19 September 2011 cannot be treated as a corrigendum because there was no mistake at all in declaration dated 3 April 1998 requiring correction. For supporting this contention, reliance was placed upon the meaning of the word "Corrigendum" in Black's Law Dictionary and Law Lexicon. According to those definitions, corrigendum means correction of an error occurring in an earlier publication. These meanings explain the ordinary understanding of the expression. However, dictionary meaning by cannot conclude the controversy where provisions require interpretation. Such meanings only provide guidance. Therefore, though these definitions support the submission of the claimants, the answer depends upon proper examination of the notification.

The learned counsel appearing for MMRDA submitted that except change in designation of the competent authority, nothing substantial has been changed. According to him, merely because another authority has issued the declaration, it cannot become a fresh declaration. Public purpose remains same. Land remains same. Acquisition remains same. At first reading, this submission appears to carry some force. However, after closer examination and after considering authorities relied upon by both sides, it requires deeper scrutiny.

The first judgment relied upon is Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra. The Supreme Court in paragraph 9 observed:

The above observations show that where the notification covers the earlier acquisition, the earlier notification may stand superseded. However, this judgment cannot be read from its own facts. In that case there were two independent notifications issued under Section 4. Therefore, what comes from paragraph 9 is that supersession depends upon the nature and effect of the notification and not merely because another notification has come into existence.

The next judgment requiring examination is Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. Both parties have strongly relied upon paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment. After reading those paragraphs, it appears that the Supreme Court has nowhere laid down any general principle that every amendment becomes a fresh notification or that every corrigendum loses its original character. On the contrary, the Supreme Court administered caution in paragraph 9 by observing:

Immediately thereafter, the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 laid down the regulating principle by observing:

In my opinion, paragraph 9 lays down the controlling test applicable even in the present controversy. Therefore, title of notification is not decisive. Only calling the document a "Corrigendum" is not enough. Likewise, mere reference to Section 126(4) by is not sufficient. The Court has to examine whether the notification merely corrects an earlier mistake or whether it changes the complexion of acquisition. In my opinion, this principle answers the two submissions advanced by both parties. The claimants argued that invocation of Section 126(4) results into fresh acquisition. MMRDA argued that every corrigendum remains only a correction. Neither of these broad propositions appears acceptable in absolute terms. The regulating test remains the one laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. The Division Bench of this Court in Akkalkot Municipal Council examined both Raghunath and Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. In paragraph 34, the Division Bench reproduced observations from paragraph 9 of Raghunath. Thereafter, in paragraph 35, the Division Bench reproduced paragraphs 8 and 9 of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. More importantly, paragraphs 36 to 40 explain how those principles are required to be applied. In paragraph 36, the Division Bench noticed that the corrigendum had changed "the extent of the land". Thereafter, paragraph 37 records that because of such change the landowners could not know from the original notification what land was proposed to be acquired. Again, paragraph 38 records an important finding: "The corrigendum therefore did not rectify any error in the earlier notification but changed the extent of the land to be acquired." Lastly, paragraph 40 concludes that the Land Acquisition Act being a welfare legislation, interpretation favourable to the landowner deserves preference and accordingly the date of corrigendum became the material date. The above judgment, however, nowhere lays down that every corrigendum must become a fresh notification. Similarly, it does not state that only change in extent of land can amount to a fresh declaration. Reading paragraphs 36 to 40 together, what appears is that the Court has to examine the substance of the notification and its effect.

The learned Advocate for the claimants argued that in the present case the second declaration invokes Sections 126(1), 126(2), 126(4) and Section 129 of the MRTP Act whereas the earlier declaration did not invoke urgency provisions. It is submitted that the second declaration records satisfaction of the Additional Commissioner whereas the earlier declaration records satisfaction of the Collector. These differences indicate that both declarations are not similar. However, every reference to a different provision or every change in the authority issuing the notification cannot by establish commencement of a fresh acquisition. These are relevant circumstances. Still, none of them becomes conclusive.

Another important submission advanced by the claimants is that acquisition proceedings remained pending for many years and therefore the Legislature intended fresh declaration so that compensation may continue to reflect fair market value. This submission gets support from the language. Section 126(4) consciously shifts market value to the date of fresh declaration. The Supreme Court in Ram Chand recognised prejudice resulting from unreasonable delay. Similarly, while explaining the effect of delayed compensation, the Supreme Court in K. Krishna Reddy observed: "After all money is what money buys." The Supreme Court noticed that with passage of time purchasing power of money goes down and therefore compensation paid after many years gradually loses its value. These observations support the legislative object behind Section 126(4). Therefore, the submission of MMRDA that compensation should remain tied to the declaration of 1998 merely because the land remained same cannot be accepted without first examining the consequence flowing from Section 126(4).

One more aspect deserves consideration. Section 126(4) does not merely authorise another declaration. It simultaneously shifts the valuation date . If every declaration issued under Section 126(4) is treated only as a clerical correction, then the latter part of Section 126(4), namely "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh", would become meaningless. Ordinarily, no provision should be interpreted in such a way that one part of it becomes redundant. At the same time, this Court cannot ignore the observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. that every amendment should not be treated as a fresh notification. Therefore, the proper approach appears to be examination of the language and overall effect of the notification.

The declaration dated 19 September 2011 has been issued by another delegated authority. It invokes different provisions including Section 126(4) and Section 129. It records fresh satisfaction. It is not confined merely to correction of any typographical or clerical mistake. It operates within a framework which contemplates acquisition "afresh". When all these circumstances are looked at together, the notification appears to possess an independent character.

The submission made on behalf of MMRDA that only the designation of the authority has changed does not explain why Section 126(4) has been invoked or why fresh satisfaction has been recorded. Therefore, after overall examination of the provisions, language used in both declarations and the principles laid down in paragraph 9 of Raghunath, paragraphs 8 and 9 of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. and paragraphs 34 to 40 of Akkalkot Municipal Council, this Court is satisfied that the present issue cannot be decided merely by looking at the heading "Corrigendum". Its effect has to prevail over its nomenclature. Accordingly, the submission advanced by the claimants that the document dated 19 September 2011 possesses an independent effect needs to be accepted. However, the submission that every corrigendum must amount to a fresh declaration cannot be accepted.

Likewise, the submission of MMRDA that the document remains merely a correction because there is no change in public purpose or description of land cannot be accepted because the regulating test is wider than those individual circumstances. Considering the scheme contained in Section 126(4), the language used in the second declaration, the nature of powers exercised thereunder and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 of Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. and by the Division Bench in paragraphs 34 to 40 of Akkalkot Municipal Council, I hold that the declaration dated 19 September 2011 cannot be treated merely as a corrigendum correcting the designation of the competent authority. It operates as an independent declaration under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act and becomes the relevant declaration for determining market value under the scheme. Accordingly, Issue No. (i) is answered in the above terms.

The question is whether, after holding that declaration dated 19 September 2011 is an independent declaration issued under Section 126(4) of the MRTP Act, the market value of the acquired land has to be taken from that declaration or whether the earlier declaration dated 3 April 1998 has to be taken as the relevant date for fixing market value. The learned Advocate appearing for the claimants submitted that once Section 126(4) comes into operation, not much dispute survives because the statute gives the answer. According to him, the Legislature has provided that where a fresh declaration is issued under Section 126(4), "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh." Therefore, according to him, neither the Collector nor this Reference Court gets any choice to adopt some different date while determining market value. On the other side, the learned counsel appearing for MMRDA submitted that the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is proper and according to law. According to him, declaration dated 19 September 2011 never replaced the earlier declaration dated 3 April 1998. Therefore, according to him, the Land Acquisition Officer rightly determined market value by taking declaration dated 3 April 1998. He argued that since there was no substantial change in the acquired land, its area or even the public purpose, there was no reason for shifting the valuation date to the year 2011.

Section 126(4) does not merely permit issuance of another declaration. It provides what consequence follows after such declaration is made. The Legislature has enacted that "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh."The use of the expression "shall" assumes importance. Normally, unless the statute indicates something different, the word "shall" is understood as mandatory. Nothing appearing in Section 126(4) indicates that the Court has been given discretion either to ignore the fresh declaration or to continue with an earlier valuation date after such fresh declaration comes into existence. Therefore, once Section 126(4) becomes applicable, the statute shifts the relevant valuation date. To that extent, the submission advanced on behalf of the claimants needs to be accepted.

The submission made on behalf of MMRDA that market value should continue to be determined by taking declaration dated 3 April 1998 cannot be accepted. If such submission is accepted, then the latter part of Section 126(4), namely "the market value of the land shall be the market value at the date of declaration in the Official Gazette, made for acquiring the land afresh", will become without any effect. It is well settled that every provision enacted by the Legislature should be given some meaning and one part of the statute should not be interpreted in a manner making another part redundant. The object behind Section 126(4) deserves consideration. Under the original scheme contained in Section 126(3), market value remains connected with the earlier planning notification. However, Section 126(4) creates one situation. Where acquisition proceedings do not get completed within the prescribed period and a fresh declaration becomes necessary, the Legislature shifts the relevant date for valuation. This appears to have been done so that the owner of the land may not receive compensation based upon an old market value after long delay in completing acquisition proceedings.

The learned counsel for the claimants submitted that this object receives support from the judgments of the Supreme Court dealing with delayed acquisition proceedings. Reliance was placed upon Ram Chand & Ors.. According to the claimants, the Supreme Court recognised that unreasonable delay in completing acquisition proceedings causes serious prejudice to the land owner and observed that the Court should balance the equities by awarding appropriate compensation wherever such delay has resulted in loss. Reliance was placed upon K. Krishna Reddy v. Collector (LA). In paragraph 12, the Supreme Court observed:

These observations, though made in another background, explain the basic principle that compensation paid after several years may lose much of its value because the purchasing power of money decreases with passage of time.

The learned counsel for the claimants relied upon Aflatoon v. Lt. regulateor of Delhi and submitted that acquisition proceedings should be completed within a reasonable period and delay on the part of the acquiring authority should not operate against the interest of the landowner. These authorities hold that acquisition proceedings should not remain pending for an indefinite period. At the same time, it requires to be noticed that the controversy before this Court is not directly about the legality or validity of the acquisition proceedings. The present issue is confined only to deciding the proper valuation date under the scheme. Therefore, though these judgments support the importance of timely completion of acquisition proceedings, the present controversy has to be answered by giving effect to Section 126(4).

The claimants submitted that the Award dated 30 June 2012 has proceeded on the assumption that market value had to be determined with reference to declaration dated 3 April 1998. According to them, once that assumption is found to be incorrect, the basis on which valuation has been worked out in the Award disappears. This submission deserves needs to be accepted. The Award proceeds on the footing that the first declaration is the relevant valuation date. Once this Court has held while answering Issue No. (i) that declaration dated 19 September 2011 operates independently under Section 126(4), the basis adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer for determining market value cannot continue to regulate these reference proceedings. However, one clarification becomes necessary.Acceptance of the claimants' submission regarding the relevant valuation date does not establish the market value claimed by them. Determination of the relevant valuation date and determination of the market value are two different exercises. The first exercise relates to deciding the date on which valuation has to be frozen. The second exercise relates to examining comparable sale instances, Ready Reckoner rates and other material for arriving at the true market value. Therefore, though the claimants succeed in showing that the relevant valuation date is 19 September 2011, they are required to establish by acceptable evidence what the market value prevailing on that date was. The submission advanced by MMRDA that valuation should nevertheless remain frozen by taking declaration dated 3 April 1998 therefore cannot be accepted because such interpretation directly conflicts with the mandate contained in Section 126(4).

The reliance placed by MMRDA upon the description of the document as "Corrigendum" does not carry the matter further. As held while deciding Issue No. (i), the nomenclature of the document is not decisive. Its effect is the determining factor. This Court cannot overlook the observations made by the Division Bench in Akkalkot Municipal Council. In paragraph 40, after considering Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd., the Division Bench held:

Though that judgment was rendered on its own facts, the principle emerging from paragraph 40 is that where the notification or corrigendum is found to possess an independent effect, the relevant valuation date shifts to the notification. The present case, in my opinion, stands on the same footing because this Court has concluded while deciding Issue No. (i) that declaration dated 19 September 2011 is an independent declaration under Section 126(4). Therefore, the submission advanced on behalf of the claimants that the market value has to be determined with reference to declaration dated 19 September 2011 needs to be accepted.

Accordingly, I hold that the market value of the acquired land is required to be determined with reference to declaration dated 19 September 2011 published in the Official Gazette and not with reference to declaration dated 3 April 1998. Consequently, the valuation adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer in the Award dated 30 June 2012 cannot be treated as final for deciding the present reference. The market value shall now be determined by this Court on the basis of evidence relating to the relevant valuation date, namely declaration dated 19 September 2011. Accordingly, Issue No. (ii) is answered in the above terms.

The question is whether compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is sufficient or whether the claimants have proved that they are entitled for enhancement. For deciding this issue it is necessary to examine the principles regulating determination of compensation, the nature and scope of proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the protection available to a land owner and appreciate the evidence placed before the Court by both sides.

The learned Advocate appearing for the claimants submitted that the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is only an offer made by the acquiring authority. According to him, once a valid reference under Section 18 is made, the question regarding market value again becomes open before the Reference Court and this Court has to determine correct compensation on the basis of evidence produced before it. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for MMRDA submitted that the Award has been passed after following the procedure and the compensation determined therein is proper and legal. According to him, unless the claimants establish by reliable evidence that the market value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer is incorrect, there is no reason for granting enhancement.

In my opinion, the first submission advanced on behalf of the claimants regarding the nature of proceedings under Section 18 needs to be accepted. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act gives a right to every interested person, who has not accepted the Award, to require the Collector to refer the dispute to the Court. The section permits objection not only regarding the amount of compensation but regarding measurement of land, entitlement of persons and apportionment of compensation. Once such reference reaches the Court, the jurisdiction exercised by the Reference Court is not appellate in nature. This position has been explained by the Supreme Court in Chimanlal Hargovinddas. The Supreme Court held that the Award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer is only an offer and that the Reference Court has to determine market value on the basis of evidence produced before it. The material relied upon by the Collector cannot become evidence before the Court unless the same is proved. Therefore, the submission advanced by MMRDA cannot be accepted. No doubt, the Award forms part of the acquisition proceedings and possesses its own evidentiary value. Still, once a reference under Section 18 is made, the Award neither binds the Court nor creates any presumption regarding correctness of market value. The Court has to appreciate the evidence available before it and arrive at its own conclusion.

The claimants next submitted that compulsory acquisition of private property receives constitutional protection under Article 300A. Reference was made to Article 31A. According to the claimants, though the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, no citizen can be deprived of his property except by authority of law and therefore compensation awarded must be fair and adequate. This submission needs to be accepted. Article 300A protects every citizen against deprivation of property except by authority of law. Compulsory acquisition amounts to exercise of sovereign power. At the same time, acquisition law has recognised that deprivation of private property should be accompanied by payment of lawful compensation determined according to settled principles. The expression "market value" occurring in Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act reflects this legislative intention. Section 23 requires the Court to consider: "first, the market-value of the land…" The section requires consideration of damages relating to standing crops, severance of land, injurious affection, shifting of residence or business and diminution of profits. Sub Section (1A) provides for award of additional amount at the rate of twelve per cent per annum and Section 23(2) grants solatium because acquisition is compulsory in nature. Therefore, the scheme shows that compensation cannot remain confined only to the bare value of the land. The Court has to award every benefit which law permits.

If the market value had continued to remain frozen as on 3 April 1998, then mere lapse of time between the valuation date and passing of the Award by could not justify substitution of another valuation date because the statute fixes the relevant valuation date. However, while deciding Issues Nos. (i) and (ii), this Court has held that under Section 126(4) the relevant valuation date shifts to declaration dated 19 September 2011. Therefore, the question regarding adequacy of compensation can no longer be examined by taking declaration dated 3 April 1998 as the basis. The question now becomes whether compensation awarded by adopting the earlier declaration represents lawful compensation after the valuation date has changed.

Once the basis adopted by the Collector for determining market value is found inconsistent with Section 126(4), the compensation calculated upon that basis cannot be treated as proper merely because calculations made on that basis may be correct. Correct calculation cannot cure an incorrect basis. The claimants relied upon observations made by the Supreme Court in K. Krishna Reddy. Paragraph 12 contains following observations:

These observations were made while explaining why delay in payment prejudices the landowner. Though that judgment arose in another factual background, the principle explained therein remains relevant while appreciating the consequences of delayed acquisition proceedings.

Similarly, reliance was placed upon Ram Chand. The Supreme Court held that where acquisition proceedings remain pending for unreasonable periods, the Court may balance equities by granting appropriate relief. The claimants therefore submitted that the prolonged delay demonstrates inadequacy of compensation.

Delay by does not establish inadequacy of compensation. The Court cannot enhance compensation merely because acquisition proceedings remained pending for a long period. Enhancement must rest upon provisions and evidence regarding market value. However, where the statute shifts the valuation date because of a subsequent declaration, such prolonged delay assumes significance.

The next submission advanced by the claimants relates to Ready Reckoner values and sale instances. According to them, Ready Reckoner values for the years 2011 and 2012 together with comparable sale transactions have been produced on record. According to the claimants, these documents establish market value higher than the value adopted in the Award.

Once the relevant valuation date shifts to 19 September 2011, the exercise of determining market value requires examination on the basis of evidence relevant to that date. Therefore, the claimants have succeeded in showing that the compensation awarded under the Award dated 30 June 2012 cannot be treated as final. Accordingly, Issue No. (iii) is answered by holding that the compensation awarded under the Award dated 30 June 2012 is not proper and adequate and that the claimants are entitled for enhancement.

While deciding this issue, this Court has treated the claim affidavit filed by the claimants, along with all annexures, as the evidence available on record. The acquiring body has also not brought any rebuttal evidence for disputing the material relied upon by the claimants. Because of this position, this Court has to examine only the claim affidavit together with the documents annexed to it and record its findings on that basis.

The claimants have stated in paragraph 24 of their claim affidavit that market value of lands situated in Mumbai was going upward because of inflation, development activities, increasing demand and several other surrounding reasons. According to them, the increase in prices every year was around twenty to forty per cent over the value of the previous year. They have stated that the Ready Reckoner rates prepared by the Government were also increasing every year by more than twenty per cent. On the basis of these statements, the claimants submitted that by the year 2011 the market value had become much higher than the value adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer while passing the Award.

If paragraph 24 is read as a whole, it appears that according to the claimants, prices of lands in Mumbai had increased by the year 2011 and therefore compensation worked out by taking an earlier valuation date could not represent the real value of the acquired land. However, except making these statements in the affidavit, no evidence has been produced for establishing that there was a increase of twenty to forty per cent every year during the whole period. No expert opinion has been brought on record. No valuation report, market survey or statistical material has been produced in support of such yearly rise. Therefore, these statements cannot become proof that market value was increasing every year in the manner suggested by the claimants. Still, they also cannot be ignored. They can safely be accepted only to the limited extent that land values in Mumbai had generally increased over the years. The yearly percentage of increase has not been proved by acceptable evidence placed before this Court.

The claimants have placed considerable reliance upon the Ready Reckoner extracts produced at Exhibits E-1, E-2 and F for showing the prevailing market value of the acquired land. According to paragraph 25(a) of the claim affidavit, the acquired land bearing CTS No.156 falls within Sub Zone No.97/439 and the Ready Reckoner for the year 2011 shows the value at Rs.11,700/- per square metre. It is stated that if Government Resolution dated 31 October 1994 is applied, the rate would become Rs.13,700/- per square metre. On that basis, the claimants contend that even Government records indicate that the value of the acquired land was much higher than the compensation awarded under the impugned Award. Paragraph 25(b) states that the Ready Reckoner rate applicable to lands situated on Ramkrishna Chemburkar Marg was Rs.13,450/- per square metre, whereas lands beginning from Ramkrishna Chemburkar Road carried a Ready Reckoner rate of Rs.16,000/-per square metre. Thus, according to the claimants' own documents, different rates appear to have been applicable depending upon the location and position of the land. Paragraph 25(f) refers to the principles which were incorporated under Section 26 of the Right to Fair Compensation Act, 2013. Paragraph 25(g) states that the Ready Reckoner for Sub Zone No.97/439 shows the rate at Rs.17,000/- per square metre whereas the adjoining Sub Zone No.97/438 carries the rate of Rs.26,500/- per square metre. These documents have been relied upon by the claimants for showing that the locality surrounding the acquired land had higher market value during the relevant period.

Therefore, even if only the documents produced by the claimants are looked into, different Ready Reckoner figures appear from the record. One document mentions Rs.11,700/-per square metre. Another figure of Rs.13,700/- per square metre is suggested after applying the Government Resolution. Paragraph 25(b) refers to Rs.13,450/- and Rs.16,000/- per square metre. Paragraph 25(g) again mentions Rs.17,000/- per square metre for one sub zone and Rs.26,500/- per square metre for the adjoining sub zone. Thus, the documentary material does not disclose one single Ready Reckoner value which can be accepted as the market value of the acquired land. Different figures are appearing because different locations, different sub zones and different surrounding situations are referred to in the documents themselves.

It is now well settled that Ready Reckoner rates constitute one relevant circumstance while appreciating market value. They provide useful guidance and they cannot be ignored. At the same time, they do not become final proof of the actual market value of the acquired land. Normally, compensation cannot be determined only on the basis of Ready Reckoner rates. Therefore, even though the claim affidavit together with its annexures constitutes the only evidence before this Court, it would not be proper to select one particular Ready Reckoner figure appearing in those documents and declare the same as the final market value without examining the surrounding circumstances and the remaining documentary material available on record.

The claimants have also relied upon the Index II documents produced as Exhibits H and I. They have relied upon the sale instances produced as Exhibit J. According to the claimants, these documents also support their contention that the market value prevailing in the locality during the relevant period was higher than the value adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer while passing the Award. However, the affidavit merely refers to these documents and produces them on record. No evidence has been brought explaining whether the properties covered by those documents are comparable with the acquired land. There is no material regarding the distance between those properties and the acquired property, similarity in nature of land, permissible user, available FSI, size of plots, surrounding development or other relevant circumstances which are required while comparing sale transactions. Therefore, though these documents indicate that transactions had taken place in the locality around the relevant period, they cannot safely establish the market value of the acquired land without supporting evidence.

The claimants have also placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in Land Acquisition Reference No.1 of 2002 decided on 31 January 2014 relating to adjoining lands where compensation was determined at Rs.3,950/- per square metre for the notification dated 18 October 1997. This judgment constitutes an important piece of evidence because it relates to neighbouring lands acquired for the same Eastern Freeway Project. A judgment relating to adjoining lands deserves due consideration while deciding another reference concerning nearby property. However, the notification involved in that judgment was issued in the year 1997 whereas this Court has held while deciding Issues Nos. (i) and (ii) that the relevant valuation date in the present matter is 21 September 2011. Therefore, the earlier judgment cannot by become the market value for the present acquisition. Some increase over that earlier rate becomes necessary because of the difference between the two relevant valuation dates.

The claimants have suggested that the earlier rate of Rs.3,950/- per square metre should be increased by twenty per cent every year till the year 2011. However, this method cannot be accepted merely because such calculation has been suggested in the affidavit. Annual escalation depends upon the evidence available in every case and also upon the surrounding circumstances prevailing during the relevant period. No independent material has been produced for proving that there was a continuous and uniform increase of twenty per cent every year throughout the whole period. Therefore, the suggested formula cannot be accepted as a fixed rule for determining market value. Nevertheless, the earlier judgment fixing market value at Rs.3,950/- per square metre for the notification dated 18 October 1997 cannot be ignored. It provides one reasonably reliable benchmark indicating the level of market value prevailing in the adjoining locality during that period. Since this Court has held while deciding Issues Nos. (i) and (ii) that the relevant valuation date in the present reference is 21 September 2011, some suitable increase over the earlier determined rate becomes necessary. The extent of such increase has to be worked out after considering the entire documentary material together.

The claimants have relied upon the village maps produced as Exhibit G. These maps help this Court in understanding the location of the acquired land and its surrounding area. However, those maps only identify the geographical position of the acquired property. They do not establish the prevailing market value of the land. Therefore, they can only be treated as supporting material while appreciating the remaining valuation evidence available on record.

The claimants have succeeded in showing that the market value prevailing on 21 September 2011 was higher than the value adopted by the Land Acquisition Officer. The documentary material produced by them indicates that land prices had increased during the intervening period. However, the same material does not justify immediate adoption of the highest Ready Reckoner value appearing in the documents. Likewise, it also does not establish that there was a continuous annual increase of twenty to forty per cent throughout the relevant years. Therefore, though the claimants have succeeded in showing that the compensation awarded under the Award is inadequate, the market value still requires careful assessment after weighing the entire documentary evidence together.

Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the safer way appears to be that market value should be worked out after giving proper weight to every material available on record and not by treating any one document as finally deciding the whole issue by . In the present matter, the claimants have relied upon the earlier judgment fixing market value at Rs.3,950/- per square metre for adjoining lands, the Ready Reckoner extracts showing different figures between Rs.11,700/- and Rs.17,000/-per square metre, the Index II documents, the sale instances annexed with the claim affidavit and also the location of the acquired land situated on Ramkrishna Chemburkar Marg. Every one of these materials has some evidentiary value. The earlier judgment is relevant because it relates to acquisition of neighbouring lands. Even so, that judgment concerns one earlier notification and, therefore, by itself cannot show what was the market value prevailing in September 2011. In the same manner, the Ready Reckoner reflects the value assessed by the Government mainly for the purpose of stamp duty. Because of that, it becomes one relevant circumstance while appreciating market value. Still, it is equally well settled that Ready Reckoner rates cannot become the market value for land acquisition proceedings. Likewise, the Index II documents and the sale instances indicate that transactions had taken place in the surrounding locality around the relevant period. However, no evidence has been produced explaining similarity of those lands with the acquired property, their location, area, surrounding development or other relevant features affecting comparability. Because of this position, no one document can become the only basis for fixing compensation. In the opinion of this Court, the proper course is to consider all these materials together and reach conclusion which may reflect the true market value.

It also becomes necessary to notice that even the Ready Reckoner does not show one common figure. Different values are mentioned for different sub zones and different localities. The claimants have relied upon Ready Reckoner figures of Rs.11,700/-, Rs.13,700/-, Rs.13,450/-, Rs.16,000/- and Rs.17,000/- per square metre. This shows that even within the same surrounding locality the valuation was not the same everywhere. Therefore, this Court cannot take the highest figure appearing in one document and ignore the remaining material available on record. Such an exercise cannot amount to proper appreciation of evidence. In the same way, the statement made in the claim affidavit that market prices should increase every year by twenty to forty per cent also cannot be accepted only because the claimants have made such statement. No expert evidence, valuation report, statistical study or any other independent material has been produced showing that such yearly increase had continued throughout the relevant period. Therefore, though this Court accepts that land prices had increased over the years, the percentage suggested by the claimants cannot by itself become the basis for determining the market value.

The material available on record shows that the acquired land is situated on Ramkrishna Chemburkar Marg at Chembur, Mumbai. It has also come on record that the acquisition was for the Eastern Freeway Project. This indicates the importance of the locality and also the public purpose for which acquisition was undertaken. The surrounding development, the urban nature of the locality and the general increase in land prices in Mumbai during the relevant period are all circumstances which deserve consideration while appreciating the documentary evidence. Even then, these surrounding circumstances cannot become proof of the market value. They only assist the Court while examining the evidence available on record. Therefore, though these surrounding circumstances support the conclusion that the value prevailing in September 2011 was much higher than the value prevailing in the year 1998, they do not justify acceptance of the highest valuation suggested by the claimants without considering the remaining evidence available on record.

After considering the entire evidence together, this Court is satisfied that the market value of Rs.12,500/- per square metre as on 21 September 2011 represents one fair and reasonable valuation of the acquired land. This figure has been reached only after balancing every relevant circumstance appearing from the material placed before the Court. Due weight has been given to the earlier judgment fixing market value at Rs.3,950/- per square metre in respect of the adjoining acquisition. Consideration has also been given to the substantial rise in land prices reflected from the Ready Reckoner extracts, the Index II documents and the sale instances relied upon by the claimants. The location of the acquired land has also been kept in mind. At the same time, this figure avoids mechanical acceptance of the highest Ready Reckoner value as well as the suggested yearly increase of twenty to forty per cent because neither of those stands proved by evidence. Thus, the figure of Rs.12,500/- per square metre appears to be one balanced assessment emerging from the documentary material.

In many matters, particularly where different documents indicate different figures, the Court is required to make one reasonable estimate after weighing the entire evidence together. Absolute certainty is difficult in matters concerning valuation of land. The duty of the Court is to ensure that neither the acquiring body nor the land owner suffers because of adoption of one unrealistic valuation. In the present matter, the figure of Rs.12,500/- per square metre appears to balance the competing materials available on record. It reflects the increase in land value up to the relevant valuation date of 21 September 2011 and at the same time continues to remain supported by the documentary evidence produced in the present reference. Therefore, this Court is satisfied that the rate of Rs.12,500/- per square metre represents the market value of the acquired land as on the relevant date.

In view of the foregoing discussion, and upon overall assessment of the material record, the following order is passed:

The claim for any independent damages over and above the statutory compensation and statutory benefits is rejected;