Deputy Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, Patiala vs Gopal Krishan Chadha and anr.

Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu, J.

Union of India has filed this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of the order of the trial Court as well as of the revisional Court vide which the accused respondents were discharged at the precharge stage. The brief facts of the case are that a complaint was lodged by Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports Shri R. Jayaram Naidu against Gopal Krishan Chandh and another for the offence under Section 120B IPC read with Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. It was alleged in the complaint that the firms M/s General Engineering Industries, 30, Mohali Tehsil Kharar, District Ropar was proprietorship concern of accused Gopal Krishan Chadha and he in that capacity obtained a mumber of import, licences under actual user category in the year 197071 the office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports New Delhi., The licences were issued to the firm for the import of stainless steel pipes and tubes of a value of Rs. 15,89,537/ and the said firm was registered with D.I.O., Ferozepore as a small scale industry unit. The firm shifted its unit from Moga to Mohali and obtained a number of import licences through other concerns for the goods of a value of Rs. 15 lacs. All the applications and other documents submitted to the Licensing Authority and the Directorate of Industries, Punjab were signed by Gopal Krishan accused. The firm submitted physical verification reports regarding the material, which were attested by Gursharan Singh accused, and in those verification reports the transportation of the material was shown through the firms which were not in existence. When the technical officers of the Small Industries Services Institute, Ludhiana visited the factory of the accused to check up utilisation it was found that the factory was not equipped with the machinery which had been imported. The account books of the firm showed sale of Hypodermic needles for which the material was imported and most of the material imported was found to be of specification which could not be utilised for the manufacturing of the goods for which licences were granted. Thus the complaint.

In the trial Court the complainant examined 37 witnesses. The Special Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Patiala, after perusing the evidence and hearing the counsel for the parties found that it was a fit case where both the accused should be discharged as the evidence on record, even if that remained unrebutted, shall not warrant the conviction of the accused. Aggrieved by this order dated 15101989 a revision petition was filed by the State which was dismissed by learned Additional Sessions JudgecumSpecial Judge, C.B.I., Punjab, Patiala vide his judgment dated 2141999. The petitioner has assailed these two judgments by way of this petition under section 4812 Cr.P.C.

The accused respondents were discharged by the trial Court on various grounds. The complaint was filed by Shri R. Jayaram Naidu who appeared as a witness and admitted that the complaint was sent to him by Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi and he simply put his signatures thereon. In the complaint it was mentioned at he was authorised to file the complaint on the basis of an order No. 10/66 dated 1.12.1965 but that order was not produced so it was not possible to find out whether the complaint was filed by a competent person. The case of the prosecution also suffered from a long delay which remained unexplained. The occurrence took place in the year 1970 71 but the complaint was filed in 1980. There were also findings to the effect that there was no evidence connecting the accused G. K. Chadha with the proprietorship of M/s General Engineering Industries, Mohali. In fact one V.P. Anand was the person who was conducting the affairs of M/s General Engineering Industries, Mohali. Although a number of witnesses were examined at precharge stage but their evidence was not sufficient even to make out a prima facie case. Most of them did not know G.K. Chadha accused. No handwriting expert was examined to prove, the signatures of the accused on the various documents alleged to have been signed by him.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the reasoning by the Courts below for holding that no case for charge was made out against the accused was not correct and the accused could not be discharged on the basis of delay in filing the complaint. In fact there was no delay in filing the complaint as the complainant learnt about the offences committed by the accused only in the year 1978.

It was argued on behalf of the accused respondent that the present petition was not maintainable as the petitioner had already filed a revision against the order of the trial Court which had been dismissed. The second revision is barred by the provisions of subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as under :

"If an application under this Section has been made by any person either to the High Court or the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."

The learned counsel also relied upon the case of Rajan Kumar Machananda v. The State of Karnataka, 1988(2) Recent Criminal Report 662 (SC) : 1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 132 . In this case it was observed :

"Where a revision petition is dismissed by the Sessions Court, a second revision would not lie to the High Court. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of the High Court for exercise of its inherent power was being invoked, the statutory bar could not have been overcome. If that was to be permitted every revision application facing the bar of Section 397 (3) of the Code could be labelled as one under section 482."

I find that this authority is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. After the trial Court discharged the respondents the complainant party filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, assailing that order and when the revision petition was dismissed that matter could not be gone into again by this Court nor the petitioner could be permitted to circumvent the bar imposed under Section 397 (3) Cr.P. C. The petitioner cannot overcome the hindrance imposed by the statute by alleging that he was seeking intervention of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In view of the above mentioned authority this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition.

The petitioner is further not entitled to any relief on ground of delay. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place in the year 197071. The complaint was filed in the year 1980. The trial Court discharged the respondents on 15101989 and the judgment in the revision petition was recorded in April, 1990. Now more than 20 years have elapsed and the case under no circumstances can be ordered to be reopened. The right to speedy public trial of criminal prosecution is applicable equally to all offences. It extends to offences generically irrespective of their nature and it is not confined or constricted to either serious of capital offences only. In the case of Madheswardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) Recent Criminal Reports 302 (DB) : AIR 1986 Patna 124 , it was observed :

"The right under Art. 21 of our Constitution to a speedy public trial is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution in terms says, in all criminal prosecutions. the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Even on principle it is obvious that on the plain language of the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution the fundamental right of a speedy trial is not confined to any particular category of offences. The language employed is unfettered and without any such restriction. Coming now to the American precedent, which is the fountainhead of the concept of speedy public trial, has now consistently extended it without limitation to all offences and all criminal prosecutions." S. Guin and others v Grindlays Bank Ltd., 1986(1) Recent Criminal Reports 343 (SC) : AIR 1986 Supreme Court 289 is another authority on this point. In this case the accused was acquitted of charge of obstructing Bank officers from entering bank premises and normal business. Appeal against the order of acquittal remained pending before the High Court for six years. High Court disagreed with the acquittal and order retrial. It was held :

"That in view of inordinate delay and nature of offence involved retrial should not have been ordered even though acquittal was improper."

In the instant case for many years the case remained under investigation and then, a complaint was filed in Court which remained pending for 9 years. The respondents are undergoing harassment, mental agony and expense for the last more than 20 years. The petition is liable to dismissal on the ground of delay alone. Even on merits the impugned ordersate quite legal and proper and admit no interference. I, therefore, find no merits in the petition and dismiss the same.